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This thesis considers the current requirements for data security in European healthcare systems and 
establishments. Information technology is being increasingly used in all areas of healthcare 
operation, from administration to direct care delivery, with a resulting dependence upon it by 
healthcare staff. Systems routinely store and communicate a wide variety of potentially sensitive 
data, much of which may also be critical to patient safety. There is consequently a significant 
requirement for protection in many cases. 
The thesis presents an assessment of healthcare security requirements at the European level, with a 
critical examination of how the issue has been addressed to date in operational systems. It is 
recognised that many systems were originally implemented without security needs being properly 
addressed, with a consequence that protection is often weak and inconsistent between establishments. 
The overall aim of the research has been to determine appropriate means by which security may be 
added or enhanced in these cases. 
The realisation of this objective has included the development of a common baseline standard for 
security in healthcare systems and environments. The underlying guidelines in this approach cover 
all of the principal protection issues, from physical and environmental measures to logical system 
access controls. Further to this, the work has encompassed the development of a new protection 
methodology by which establishments may determine their additional security requirements (by 
classifying aspects of their systems, environments and data). Both the guidelines and the 
methodology represent work submitted to the Commission of European Communities SEISMED 
(Secure Environment for Information Systems in MEDicine) project, with which the research 
programme was closely linked. 
The thesis also establishes that healthcare systems can present significant targets for both internal 
and external abuse, highlighting a requirement for improved logical controls. However, it is also 
shown that the issues of easy integration and convenience are of paramount importance if security is 
to be accepted and viable in practice. Unfortunately, many traditional methods do not offer these 
advantages, necessitating the need for a different approach. 
To this end, the conceptual design for a new intrusion monitoring system was developed, combining 
the key aspects of authentication and auditing into an advanced framework for real-time user 
supervision. A principal feature of the approach is the use of behaviour profiles, against which user 
activities may be continuously compared to determine potential system intrusions and anomalous 
events. 
The effectiveness of real-time monitoring was evaluated in an experimental study of keystroke 
analysis -a behavioural biometric technique that allows an assessment of user identity from their 
typing style. This technique was found to have significant potential for discriminating between 
impostors and legitimate users and was subsequently incorporated into a fully functional security 
system, which demonstrated further aspects of the conceptual design and showed how transparent 
supervision could be realised in practice. 
The thesis also examines how the intrusion monitoring concept may be integrated into a wider 
security architecture, allowing more comprehensive protection within both the local healthcare 





List of Figures xi 
List of Tables xiv 
Acknowledgements xvi 
Declaration xviii 
Glossary of Abbreviations xix 
Glossary of Terms xxi 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 1 
1.1 Introduction 2 
1.2 Aims and objectives of the research 4 
1.3 Thesis Structure 7 
Chapter 2: The need for Security in Healthcare 13 
2.1 An overview of Information Security 14 
2.2 Current trends in European healthcare and informatics 17 
2.2.1 Healthcare in the European Union 17 
2.2.2 Use of Information Technology 19 
2.3 Security requirements in healthcare 21 
2.4 Special factors of the healthcare environment 24 
2.4.1 Confidentiality 25 
2.4.2 Integrity 27 
2.4.3 Availability 29 
11 
2.4.4 General issues 30 
2.5 Addressing healthcare security in Europe 32 
2.5.1 An overview of previous European initiatives 33 
2.5.2 The AIM SEISMED project 37 
2.6 Conclusions 40 
Chapter 3: A Survey of European Healthcare Establishments 42 
3.1 Overview and objectives 43 
3.2 Survey findings 44 
3.2.1 System Configurations 45 
3.2.2 Main Applications 46 
3.2.3 Existing Security 48 
3.2.4 Security Problems 51 
3.3 Conclusions 52 
Chapter 4: A European Standard for Healthcare Data Security 53 
4.1 Approaches to securing existing systems 54 
4.2 Baseline security for healthcare systems 55 
4.3 An Overview of Existing Systems Guidelines 57 
4.4 HCE Target Audiences 63 
4.5 Implementation of the recommendations 66 
4.6 Potential Problems 68 
4.7 Conclusions 69 
Chapter 5: A Generic Methodology for Healthcare Data Security 71 
5.1 Addressing healthcare security requirements above baseline 72 
111 
5.1.1 Traditional risk analysis 72 
5.1.2 Requirements for a profiling methodology 74 
5.2 Elements of the methodology 77 
5.2.1 Computer Configurations 77 
5.2.2 Operational Environments 78 
5.2.3 Data Sensitivity 80 
5.2.3.1 Overview of healthcare data requirements 81 
5.2.3.2 A Healthcare Generic Data Model 84 
5.2.3.3 Data Use 97 
5.2.3.4 Approach to sensitivity rating 98 
5.3 Countermeasure selection 102 
5.4 Formal stages of the methodology 104 
5.4.1 Determining Data Sensitivity 106 
5.5 An example of methodology implementation 107 
5.6 Extension of the methodology 112 
5.6.1 Enhanced system classification 112 
5.6.2 Expert system 115 
5.7 Conclusions 118 
Chapter 6: Improving system security in healthcare 120 
6.1 Introduction 121 
6.2 Intrusions in healthcare systems 125 
6.3 An overview of Intrusions and Intruders 128 
6.4 Traditional approaches to Intrusion Detection 135 
6.5 Advanced approaches to Intrusion Detection 138 
6.5.1 System auditing 139 
iv 
6.5.2 Initial user identification and authentication 142 
6.5.3 User behaviour profiling 145 
6.5.3.1 User class profiling 146 
6.5.3.2 User-specific profiling 148 
6.5.4 Generic intrusion indicators and rules 155 
6.6 Generic behaviour profiles for healthcare users 160 
6.6.1 Introduction 160 
6.6.2 Categorisation of HCE staff 161 
6.6.3 Questionnaire content 163 
6.6.4 Questionnaire distribution 166 
6.6.5 Results and general observations 167 
6.6.6 Limitations 171 
6.6.7 Conclusions 173 
6.7 A survey of existing Intrusion Detection Systems 173 
6.8 Conclusions 182 
Chapter 7: Conceptual design of an Intrusion Monitoring System 183 
7.1 Introduction 184 
7.2 Operating Cycle 184 
7.3 Response to suspected intrusions 186 
7.4 IMS Architecture 190 
7.4.1 Anomaly Detector 192 
7.4.1.1 Maintenance of an intrusion alert status 192 
7.4.1.2 Restriction of user activities 194 
7.4.1.3 Suspension of supervision 195 
7.4.2 Profile Refiner 197 
V 
7.4.3 Recorder 199 
7.4.4 Archiver 200 
7.4.5 Collector 201 
7.4.6 Responder 202 
7.4.7 Communicator 203 
7.4.8 Controller 203 
7.4.9 Profiles 204 
7.5 IMS Implementation 206 
7.5.1 PC implementation 206 
7.5.2 Minicomputer implementation 207 
7.6 Advantages and disadvantages of the IMS approach 209 
7.6.1 Advantages 209 
7.6.2 Disadvantages 211 
7.7 Intrusion monitoring in a wider security architecture 213 
7.7.1 The Comprehensive Integrated Security System 213 
7.7.2 Intrusion monitoring in the CIS S framework 216 
7.7.3 Distribution of IMS functionality within the CISS 217 
7.8 Conclusions 223 
Chapter 8: Real-time supervision using Keystroke Analysis 225 
8.1 Introduction 226 
8.2 Keystroke Analysis Concepts 228 
8.2.1 Typing characteristics 229 
8.2.2 Categories of typist 230 
8.2.3 Authentication strategies 231 
8.2.3.1 Static Identifier 231 
v 
8.2.3.2 Dynamic Identifier 232 
8.2.4 Evaluation of effectiveness 233 
8.3 Implementation considerations for a Keystroke Analysis System 236 
8.3.1 Typing characteristics evaluated 239 
8.3.2 Keystrokes selected for analysis 240 
8.3.3 Creation of Keystroke Profiles 242 
8.3.3.1 Selection of a Reference Text 242 
8.3.3.2 Filtering of profile sample timings 246 
8.3.4 Authentication assessment 249 
8.4 The experimental Keystroke Analysis System 253 
8.4.1 Implementation environment 253 
8.4.2 System Modules 255 
8.4.2.1 Profiler 255 
8.4.2.2 Sampler 257 
8.4.2.3 Monitor 258 
8.5 Full Keystroke Analysis study 259 
8.5.1 Test subjects 259 
8.5.2 Experimental procedure 262 
8.5.3 Results and analysis 263 
8.6 Potential Enhancements 270 
8.6.1 Impostor identity suggestion 271 
8.6.2 Increased profile specificity 271 
8.6.3 Detection of subject impairment 272 
8.6.4 Neural Network implementation 273 
8.7 Potential Problems 274 
8.7.1 Consistency of users 275 
vii 
8.7.2 Mimicry 276 
8.7.3 User acceptance 277 
8.7.4 Accuracy of keystroke timings 278 
8.7.5 General applicability 280 
8.8 Conclusions 280 
Chapter 9: An IMS Demonstrator System 283 
9.1 Enhancement of the Keystroke Analyser 284 
9.2 IMS Client Implementation 287 
9.2.1 System Configuration Auditing 287 
9.2.2 Virus Scanning 288 
9.2.3 User Identification and initial Authentication 291 
9.2.4 Implementation and operation of background supervision 292 
9.2.5 Challenges and Session Supervision 295 
9.2.6 User logout / Session termination 296 
9.3 IMS Host implementation 298 
9.3.1 Menu Options & General Functionality 298 
9.3.1.1 Monitoring Options 298 
9.3.1.2 Profiling Options 299 
9.3.1.3 System Management 300 
9.3.2 Intrusion Monitoring and Detection 301 
9.3.3 Event Auditing 304 
9.3.4 Internal Communications 305 
9.3.5 Host - Client Communication 306 
9.3.6 Profiling Sub-system 307 
9.4 Implementation constraints and potential enhancements 309 
vi" 
9.4.1 Limited intrusion detection 309 
9.4.2 Insecure Client start-up 310 
9.4.3 Single workstation monitoring 311 
9.4.4 MS-DOS implementation 314 
9.4.5 Code design and development 315 
9.5 Conclusions 315 
Chapter 10 :A Wider Framework for Healthcare Security 317 
10.1 Inter-domain communications in healthcare 318 
10.2 Enabling secure inter-domain operations 322 
10.2.1 Use of cryptography for communication security services 322 
10.2.2 An overview of Trusted Third Parties 328 
10.2.3 Implementing a Trusted Third Party infrastructure 332 
10.3 Inter-HCE communication in an example scenario 334 
10.4 Conclusions 337 
Chapter 11 : Conclusions 339 
11.1 Achievements of the research programme 340 
11.2 Limitations of the research 342 
11.3 Suggestions and scope for future work 343 
11.4 The future for healthcare information systems 344 
References 346 
Appendix A: Surveys associated with the research programme 370 
Appendix B: Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems 383 
ix 
Appendix C: Data Mappings of Operational Healthcare Systems 390 
Appendix D: Text Samples from the Keystroke Analysis Study 398 
Appendix E: IMS Demonstrator module descriptions and source listings 404 
Appendix F: List of Publications 408 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Fig. 2.1 : Perspectives on information system protection 16 
Fig. 2.2 : SEISM ED Reference Centres, partners and collaborators 39 
Fig. 3.1 : Main applications 47 
Fig. 3.2 : General availability expectations 48 
Fig. 3.3 : Relative adoption of security techniques 49 
Fig. 3.4 : Methods of authentication 50 
Fig. 3.5 : Security Incidents in European HCEs 51 
Fig. 4.1 : Approaches to existing systems security 54 
Fig. 4.2: HCE target audiences 64 
Fig. 5.1 : Elements of an information system 75 
Fig. 5.2 : Existing Systems Protection Methodology Overview 76 
Fig. 5.3 : Computer Configuration groups 77 
Fig. 5.4 : Factors of data sensitivity 80 
Fig. 5.5 : General care activity flow 81 
Fig. 5.6 : Classifications of medical data 82 
Fig. 5.7: Healthcare Generic Data Model 85 
Fig. 5.8 : Patient Administration System mapping 96 
Fig. 5.9: Countermeasure selection summary 104 
Fig. 5.10: Data Sensitivity Assessment 107 
Fig. 5.11: Expert System Structure and Interaction 117 
xi 
Fig. 6.1 : Follow-up of system audit trails & log files 137 
Fig. 6.2 : IMS user session supervision strategy 139 
Fig. 6.3 : Information on IMS users 145 
Fig. 6.4 : Relative "strengths" of profile characteristics 153 
Fig. 6.5 : Generic Categorisation of HCE Staff 162 
Fig. 6.6 : Final categorisation of general HCE staff 163 
Fig. 7.1 : IMS Operating Cycle 186 
Fig. 7.2 : Potential IMS operation 188 
Fig. 7.3 : IMS Architecture 191 
Fig. 7.4 : Structure of Alert Status table entry 192 
Fig. 7.5 : IMS Archive record structure 200 
Fig. 7.6 : IMS in networked PC environment 207 
Fig. 7.7 : IMS in minicomputer environment 208 
Fig. 7.8 : Extension of System User Entity data 220 
Fig. 8.1 : Relationship between FAR and FRR errors 234 
Fig. 8.2 : Keystroke analysis experiment overview 238 
Fig. 8.3 : Digraph times where Standard Deviation exceeds Mean 248 
Fig. 8.4 : Typical performance of impostors compared to legitimate subjects 252 
Fig. 8.5 : The Profiler system 256 
Fig. 8.6 : Test sample collection using Sampler 257 
Fig. 8.7 : Comparison of test sample and profile using Monitor 258 
Fig. 8.8 : Average Inter-Keystroke Time Ranges of Test Subjects 260 
Fig. 8.9 : Test Subject Typing Skills 261 
Fig. 8.10: Impostor detection performance 264 
xii 
Fig. 8.11: False acceptance and successful impersonation of each subject 268 
Fig. 8.12: Keystrokes before impostor detection 269 
Fig. 9.1 : Configuration of IMS demonstrator system 285 
Fig. 9.2 : Response to challenge signal 296 
Fig. 9.3 : Demonstrator menu structure 298 
Fig. 9.4 : IMS Demonstrator, Keystroke Monitoring Interface 303 
Fig. 9.5 : IMS Host file usage 305 
Fig. 9.6: IMS Host - Client Communication 306 
Fig. 9.7: IMS Profiling Sub-System 307 
Fig. 9.8 : Polling of active IMS Clients in network monitoring system 312 
Fig. 10.1: Symmetric Encryption 323 
Fig. 10.2: Asymmetric Encryption 324 
Fig. 10.3: The Naming Authority hierarchy 329 
Fig. 10.4: Logical certification hierarchy 330 
Fig. 10.5: TTP infrastructure at the international and national levels 332 
Fig. 10.6: TTP infrastructure at the national and local levels 332 
Fig. 10.7: Potential inter-domain HCE communications 334 
Fig. 10.8: Secure inter-domain communication 337 
Xlii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 4.1 : Principles of Existing Systems Security 58 
Table 5.1 : Computer Configuration countermeasure groups 78 
Table 5.2 : Operational Environment categorisation 79 
Table 5.3 : Operational Environment countermeasure groups 79 
Table 5.4 : General categories of medical data usage 98 
Table 5.5 : Sensitivity ratings for data disclosure 101 
Table 5.6 : Sensitivity ratings for data denial, modification & destruction 101 
Table 5.7 : Derivation of sensitivity ratings 101 
Table 5.8 : Formal stages of the protection methodology 105 
Table 5.9 : Stages of data sensitivity assessment 106 
Table 6.1 : Categories of system abuser 130 
Table 6.2 : Auditable characteristics of PC configuration 141 
Table 6.3 : Potential IMS profile characteristics 149 
Table 6.4 : Scope of intrusion detection methods 154 
Table 6.5 : Examples of generic intrusion indicators 156 
Table 6.6 : Rationale of Survey Questions 165 
Table 6.7 : Responses to profiling questionnaire 168 
Table 6.8 : Healthcare "class" profiles 169 
Table 6.9 : Overview of existing intrusion detection systems 175 
Table 7.1 : Alert status threshold table 195 
xiv 
Table 7.2 : Relationship of IMS modules to CISS agents 218 
Table 7.3 : IMS data storage in the SMIB 219 
Table 8.1 : Typist Skill Categorisation 231 
Table 8.2 : Effect of profile sample size 244 
Table 8.3 : Pseudo-code for replacement interrupt routines 254 
Table 8.4 : Keystroke analyser files 259 
Table 8.5 : Profiled Performance of Test Subjects 261 
Table 8.6 : Overview of impostor detection for test sample 1 265 
Table 8.7 : Overview of impostor detection for test sample 2 266 
Table 8.8 : Figures for subject false acceptance and successful impersonation 267 
xv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The work presented in this thesis represents the results of a three year investigation into 
various aspects of information systems security in the healthcare field. All work was 
undertaken within the Network Research Group in the School of Electronic, 
Communication and Electrical Engineering, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, England. 
I would principally like to acknowledge the contributions of the following people : 
" Peter Sanders, my Director of Studies, whose help, knowledge and support 
throughout the project provided direction for the work and ensured that the best 
opportunities were always available; 
" Dr Colin Stockel, my Supervisor, who provided valuable advice and guidance 
throughout the project and was an unfaltering source of ideas on virtually all 
matters (from subjects as diverse as the research programme itself to the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy ! ); 
" Dr Nick Gaunt, of Plymouth Health Authority and the Department of Healthcare 
Informatics at Derriford Hospital, who provided further valuable input to the 
research programme and significant assistance in respect to the SEISMED work. 
I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of various members of the SEISMED 
consortium who contributed ideas and opinions relating to the security guidelines, the 
generic protection methodology and the initial findings from the keystroke analysis study. 
X 
Thanks are also due to the various friends and colleagues who spared their time to 
participate as test subjects in the keystroke analysis experiments, along with special thanks 
to Dr Simon Shepherd of the University of Bradford for his valuable assistance during the 
initial development of the keystroke analyser. 
Finally, thanks must go to my friends and family for their support and encouragement over 
the course of the last three years. 
xvii 
DECLARATION 
At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author 
been registered for any other University award. 
This study was financed with funding from the Commission of European Communities 
SEISMED project and was carried out in collaboration with Plymouth Health Authority. 
Relevant conferences and SEISMED project meetings were regularly attended (at which 
work was frequently presented) and a number of external establishments were visited for 
consultation purposes. In addition, several papers were prepared for publication, details of 
which are listed in the appendices. 






GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AIM Advanced Informatics in Medicine 
CA Certification Authority 
CCTA Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency 
CEC Commission of the European Communities 
CISS Comprehensive Integrated Security System 
CRAMM CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Methodology 
DES Data Encryption Standard 
DOS Disk Operating System (abbreviation of MS-DOS) 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
EHCR Electronic Healthcare Record 
EU European Union 
FAR False Acceptance Rate 
FRR False Rejection Rate 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
HCE Healthcare Establishment 
HCP Healthcare Professional 
IMS Intrusion Monitoring System 
ISO International Standards Organisation 
IT Information Technology 
LAN Local Area Network 
MA Monitoring Agent (part of the CIS S architecture) 
MAC Message Authentication Code 
MS-DOS Microsoft Disk Operating System 
xix 
NA Naming Authority 
NHS National Health Service 
OS Operating System 
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
PAM Professions Allied to Medicine 
PAS Patient Administration System 
PC Personal Computer (IBM compatible) 
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (method of asymmetric encryption) 
SEISMED Secure Environment for Information Systems in Medicine 
SMC Security Management Centre 
SMIB Security Management Information Base (part of the CISS architecture) 
THIS Trusted Health Information Systems (INFOSEC project) 
TSR Terminate, Stay Resident (a class of PC program) 
TTP Trusted Third Party 
WAN Wide Area Network 
xx 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
The following pages present a series of definitions for the key terminology used within the 
thesis. 
Access Control 
The prevention of unauthorised use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a 
resource in an unauthorised manner. 
Alert Status 
A rating of the level of anomaly in a user session / process that is maintained by the 
Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS). 
Anomaly 
A suspicious or unauthorised system activity. 
Audit Trail 
The historic data and information which are available for examination in order to prove the 
correctness and integrity with which the agreed security procedures related to a key or 
transaction(s) have been followed and which allows breaches in security to be detectable. 
Authentication 
The verification of a claimed identity. 
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Availability 
The property of data and systems being accessible and usable upon demand by an 
authorised entity. 
Baseline 
The minimum acceptable level of security necessary to protect a system. 
Certificate 
The document that binds an entity's unique name and its public key, along with some other 
information, rendered unforgable by the digital signature of the certification authority that 
issued it. 
Certification Authority 
An authority trusted by one or more users to create and sign certificates. 
Checksum 
A value calculated from items of data that may be used to verify that the data has not been 
altered. 
Clandestine user 
A class of system intruder, referring to a user who evades access controls and auditing. 
Computer Misuse 
Unauthorised or improper use of information systems or IT facilities, including the abuse of 
privileges by authorised users. 
x, Ui 
Confidentiality 
The property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, 
entities or processes. 
Countermeasure 
A mechanism or procedure placed in a system environment to reduce one or more elements 
of risk (i. e. threats, impact or vulnerability). 
Digital Signature 
Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows the recipient 
to prove the source and integrity of the data and protecting against forgery. 
Encryption 
A process of disguising information so that it cannot be understood by an unauthorised 
person. 
Existing System 
A system that is already operational within a Healthcare Establishment. 
External Penetrator 
A class of system intruder, referring to an outsider who attempts or gains unauthorised 
access to the system. 
False Acceptance Rate (FAR) 
The proportion of cases in which impostors are falsely authenticated by the system (also 
referred to as Impostor Pass Rate). 
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False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
The proportion of cases in which legitimate users are rejected by the system (also referred 
to as False Alarm Rate). 
Healthcare Establishment (HCE) 
An establishment where medical services are rendered or health education, healthcare 
research or medical training or prevention activities are conducted. 
Health Information System 
A system that processes health data. 
Impact 
The effect of a failure to preserve confidentiality, integrity and/or availability. Impact may 
be one of four types : Disclosure, Modification, Destruction or Denial. 
Information System 
A collection of people, procedures and equipment maintained to gather, record, process, 
store, retrieve and display information. 
Integrity 
The property that systems or data have not been altered or 




A class of system intruder, referring to authorised users of the system who access data, 
resources or programs to which they are not entitled. Sub-categorised into masqueraders 
and clandestine users. 
Intruder 
An entity (e. g. a user or process) performing anomalous activities. Intruders may be 
subclassified into external penetrators, internal penetrators, misfeasors and malicious 
processes. 
Intrusion 
The situation when a series of anomalies are judged to represent a genuine attempt to 
compromise the system. 
Logical Security 
System-based protection mechanisms that allow system managers to control access to and 
use of HCE applications and data (and thereby help preserve their confidentiality, integrity 
and availability). 
Malicious Process 
A class of computer program, such as a virus, worm or Trojan Horse, that can intentionally 
damage or disrupt the operation of an computer system. 
Masquerader 




The arithmetic average of a set of values. 
Misfeasor 
A class of system intruder, referring to a user who is authorised to use the system and 
resources accessed, but misuses these privileges. 
Non-repudiation 
A security service providing a message recipient with a proof that the claimed origin of the 
message is genuine. 
Operating System 
The computer program that performs basic housekeeping functions of the system (e. g. 
maintaining lists of files, running programs). Common operating systems include MS-DOS, 
MS Windows, VMS and Unix. 
Password 
Confidential authentication information, usually composed of a string of characters. 
Personnel Security 
The procedures established to ensure that all personnel who have access to any sensitive 
information have the required authorities as well as all appropriate clearances. 
Physical Security 
The measures used to provide physical protection of resources against deliberate and 
accidental threats. 
Primary Care 
The initial source of healthcare at the community level, conducted by a general practitioner 
and his / her team. 
Privacy 
The right of individuals to control or influence what information related to them may be 
collected and stored and by whom that information may be disclosed. 
Private Key 
In a public key cryptosystem, the key that is known only to the legitimate user and used for 
decryption or signature generation. 
Profile 
A description of user behaviour (in terms of the way that they typically use computer 
systems) that can be used for monitoring and supervision purposes. Profiles may be 
specified at a generic (class) level or on an individual basis and may contain information on 
one or more characteristics of system usage. 
Public Key 
In a public key cryptosystem, the key that is made publicly available and used for encryption 
or signature verification. 
xxvi 
Reference Text 
The text passage used as the basis for the creation of user typing profiles in the keystroke 
analyser system. 
Risk 
This is a method of determining the threats and vulnerability of a particular asset. 
Risk Analysis 
Involves the identification and assessment of risk against assets. 
Scancode 
An identification number associated with each key on a PC keyboard. Each key has two 
associated codes; one to denote key depression (the "make" code) and another to denote 
release (the "break" code). 
Sensitive Data 
This refers to data for which unauthorised disclosure, modification or unavailability could 
adversely affect patients or the healthcare establishment. 
Security 
The combination of confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Smart Card 
A machine-readable card, normally containing a microprocessor, which is capable of holding 
data and performing computations. 
xxviii 
Standard Deviation 
A statistic used as a measure of dispersion in a distribution. 
arithmetic average of the squares of the deviations from the mean. 
System Security Policy 
The square root of the 
The set of laws, rules and practices that regulate how sensitive information and other 
resources are managed, protected and distributed within a specific system. 
Terminate Stay Resident (TSR) 
A special class of PC program in which some of the code remains resident in memory after 
program termination and can subsequently be activated by appropriate triggers. This 
feature may be used to provide a rudimentary background processing facility and is the basis 
for the transparent operation of the IMS Demonstrator. 
Threat 
A potential violation of security. 
Trojan Horse 
An executable program that claims and / or appears to perform some useful or harmless 
function, but also conceals a malicious purpose. 
Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
A person or organisation entrusted by a domain of users to provide a security service and 
who is independent of the communicating parties. 
xxix 
Virus 
A class of malicious software program that has the ability to self-replicate and "infect" parts 
of the operating system or application programs, with the potential to cause loss of or 
damage to data. 
Vulnerability 
The likeliness of a threat to become reality. 
Worm 
A self-replicating program designed to "breed" within computer systems, but lacking the 
potentially destructive "payload" element of a virus. 
xxx 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Overview 
Chapter I: Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last three decades Information Technology (IT) has become progressively more 
widespread in all areas of society. As a consequence, there are now very few people who 
do not encounter this technology, in some form, as part of their everyday lives. Future 
improvements in computer processing power and communication networks should ensure 
that this trend can continue. 
The advancement of IT has been accompanied by a progressive improvement in the 
reliability of systems. Whereas non-operational systems were an accepted and rather routine 
occurrence in earlier generations, such problems are now much less frequent. The net effect 
of this is that confidence and trust in IT has grown, leading to a generally uncritical reliance 
upon computers in most sections of society. As a result, computer systems have been 
entrusted to handle increasingly more important functions and information (often without 
any further checks so long as operations and data appear reasonable). This trend again 
appears set to continue as the further advances open up yet more opportunities. 
The combination of these points serves to make the protection of systems a vital concern, 
and necessitates that security is now considered an essential aspect of the information 
technology field. The introduction of security seeks to eliminate or, more realistically, 
reduce the vulnerability to any risks that may be present. At a general level, protection must 
encompass the computer system and everything associated with it (e. g. from the computer 
unit itself to the building in which it is housed). Most important, however, is normally the 
protection of the data stored by the systems. 
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Information systems are now commonplace in the healthcare field, with computers being 
routinely used in all levels of healthcare establishment (HCE), from primary care up to 
general hospitals. An increasing amount of information is handled primarily (and 
sometimes exclusively) by computerised systems. The nature of this information is very 
diverse, with much being considered sensitive and, in some cases, critical to human life. In 
addition, the more commercial environment of healthcare (particularly in the UK) means 
that the protection of financial data is also becoming very important. As such, the effects of 
loss, damage or disclosure of information are not finite and could have various wide ranging 
consequences for both the HCE and its patients. There is consequently an increasing 
concern within the healthcare communities of Europe for the security of information that is 
stored and transmitted within their computer systems. 
Security will be required to some extent in all types of HCE (note that for the purpose of 
this study a HCE is considered to be any establishment where medical services are offered 
or where training, research or prevention activities are conducted (Katsikas and Gritzalis 
1994)). However, healthcare systems and environments are generally very large and 
complex, with many possible points of access and different operating procedures. These 
factors pose problems when trying to ensure that data is properly protected. 
Many systems do exist in which some attempt has been made to address security, but these 
have met with varying degrees of success and a general observation is that the most 
effective cases are those where security needs were recognised from the outset. However, 
many HCEs have a significant investment in operational systems where security has not 
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been properly addressed, even though in other respects the features and performance of the 
systems may totally satisfy user requirements. It is obviously important that security 
requirements in such systems are not overlooked and a key issue is, therefore, how 
protection can be added or enhanced in these cases. 
A broad overview of information security and a more detailed examination of the specific 
requirements in the healthcare sector is presented in chapter 2. 
1.2 Aims and objectives of the research 
This study is concerned with the issue of data security in modern healthcare establishments 
and information systems. It recognises the importance of security in providing a foundation 
for the future integration and harmonisation of the healthcare community at a European 
level. 
The field of healthcare security encompasses a huge range of issues and it is consequently 
possible to identify a significant number of areas worthy of investigation. It was, therefore, 
necessary to determine an appropriate boundary for the research and, given the observations 
in the previous section, this study specifically addressed the investigation and development 
of suitable security methods for operational healthcare systems. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the overall research programme can be divided into two 
key phases. The first of these was concerned with the production of viable 
recommendations for the standardisation and improvement of HCE security at a general 
level, based upon existing techniques and technologies. The second phase was related to a 
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more specific practical investigation, with the aim of evaluating potential methods for 
enhancing protection technologies within existing systems. 
A principal objective of the first phase was to develop a suitable generic model for data 
storage and flows within the European Health Communities that would allow the necessary 
security requirements to be indicated for their existing systems. This was then extended to 
include the development of a full protection methodology, incorporating not only a data 
model but also a means of classifying other system components. 
With regard to the requirement to address practical implementation, the key issues were 
seen as being convenience and easy integration (requiring a security system that could be 
implemented as an overlay service to existing systems whilst still providing a high degree of 
transparency to the end-user). In this way, the provision of security should not necessitate 
major changes to existing applications or the way in which they are used. As such, the 
chosen approach was an investigation of real-time supervision using a technique considered 
to be suitable for use in HCEs. However, this stage of the work was viewed as being less 
specifically tied to the healthcare environment, as it was considered that the practical 
techniques under investigation would almost certainly be applicable in many other sectors as 
well. As such, the discussion at this level does not limit itself to the healthcare domain. 
The full objectives of the research programme can be more formally listed as follows : 
1. to assess the general need for information systems security within healthcare 
establishments; 
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2. to assess the current use of security in European healthcare systems and identify 
weaknesses and requirements; 
3. to determine practical and viable methods of enhancing security in existing 
healthcare systems; 
4. to develop a mechanism by which HCEs may determine their own security 
requirements, considering the sensitivity of existing systems in terms of both 
system and data elements; 
5. to suggest means of enhancing the protection technologies used in healthcare 
systems and evaluate the effectiveness of the selected approach(es); 
6. to show how the chosen technique(s) could be implemented in practice using a 
demonstrator system; 
7. to examine how the suggested techniques could be incorporated into a wider and 
more comprehensive security system, which would also account for future trends 
in healthcare information system usage, such as increasing inter-establishment 
data exchange. 
These objectives correspond to the general sequence of the material presented in the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis, as will be discussed 
in the next section. 
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The research has involved significant liaison with healthcare professionals (particularly 
during the early stages of the work). The majority of this consultation occurred within the 
context of the AIM SEISMED project (as will be described in chapter 2), which was 
concerned with the improvement of healthcare security at a European level. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis describes the research leading to the formulation of a suitable security strategy 
for addressing some of the requirements of existing healthcare systems within Europe. The 
investigation began at a general level, with an approach that encompassed all of the main 
security considerations applicable in healthcare, before proceeding to identify a particular 
class of technical approach and describing the conduct of a practical evaluation. 
Chapter 2 begins by presenting a general overview of the key issues associated with 
information security. The chapter also highlights the increasing use and potential 
dependence upon information systems within the healthcare community, and the consequent 
demands for security which this brings. This is then followed by an examination of the 
specific requirements that exist in the healthcare field and a discussion of why healthcare is 
somewhat different from many other environments where security is required. This chapter 
also introduces the AIM SEISMED project and explains the close links to the initial phases 
of the research. 
Chapter 3 then considers the results of a European survey that examined the current 
security practice and attitudes within the medical community. This serves to underline some 
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of the points made in the previous chapter regarding the need for security in existing 
systems. An analysis is presented which highlights the weaknesses and inconsistencies in 
the current scenario, pointing to the requirement for a consistent European approach. 
Chapter 4 begins to address the issue of how such a consistent approach may be realised by 
introducing the concept of a baseline level for healthcare security. This highlights the need 
for a standardised approach in the protection of existing systems. A number of general 
recommendations are presented, based upon a new set of information security guidelines 
that have been developed specifically for the medical community. The development of these 
guidelines was an integral part of the first phase of the research and this chapter describes 
their general purpose, the target audiences and the main points from a series of protection 
principles. 
Chapter 5 then proceeds to present the main product of the first phase of the research, 
namely a generic protection methodology specifically tailored to the needs of the healthcare 
environment. It explains the need for a simplified system of security profiling which can be 
applied by existing staff as an alternative to extensive risk analysis investigations. This leads 
into a detailed description of the methodology that has been developed, with a general 
overview of the key elements and descriptions of the formal stages. The methodology is 
based upon the classification of existing information systems (i. e. identifying aspects of the 
computers, environments and data involved) and subsequent selection of appropriate 
security countermeasures. A worked example is used to illustrate how the approach would 
be applied in a typical healthcare information system scenario. A significant section of the 
chapter is devoted to the description of a healthcare data model that was developed as part 
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of the methodology. This attempts to encompass all of the principal data requirements in 
European HCEs and thereby allows a relatively simple means of assessing the data 
sensitivity of healthcare information systems. 
With the guidelines and methodology having been based on existing protection techniques, 
chapter 6 provides the link to the more practical elements of the research by identifying a 
requirement to enhance the protection technology itself. To this end, an overview of real- 
time supervision and intrusion monitoring is presented, along with an explanation of how it 
improves upon conventional user authentication and audit trails in healthcare systems. The 
different types of potential system intrusion are categorised, with brief descriptions in each 
case. Supporting evidence is also given to show cases where such incidents have occurred 
in the healthcare field, providing further justification for such a system. Various approaches 
to intrusion detection are then considered, including the development of user behaviour 
profiles, monitoring for generic intrusion indicators and auditing of system-related factors 
(e. g. changes to the hardware and software configuration). A detailed examination of 
potential techniques is given in each case. This includes a specific link to the healthcare field 
in the form of a series of generic behaviour profiles for different classes of healthcare user. 
These were developed from the results of a survey of healthcare personnel conducted within 
a local HCE. Finally, a brief summary of previous work in the intrusion detection field 
(based upon systems operating in non-healthcare domains) is also presented. 
Having established the main concepts and fundamental elements of system activity that can 
be monitored, chapter 7 then proceeds to present the comprehensive conceptual design 
for 
an intrusion monitoring system (IMS), with appropriate links to show how 
it may be applied 
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in the healthcare environment. The main discussion concentrates upon how intrusion 
detection could realistically be achieved, with a detailed description of a proposed system 
architecture (based upon the idea of a central monitoring host, with a series of local clients 
collecting system activity data and responding to detected anomalies), explaining how the 
different components would be linked and function together. The chapter also explains how 
intrusion monitoring could form part of a more general security architecture for local 
domains. This makes reference to the concept of a Comprehensive Integrated Security 
System (CISS), which has been defined in a previous research programme (Shepherd 1992) 
and shows how the intrusion monitoring system would represent a key element of a local 
Security Management Centre (SMC). 
Chapter 8 contains a comprehensive investigation of one of the potential intrusion 
monitoring techniques identified in chapter 6, namely user identity verification using 
keystroke analysis. It begins with a detailed examination of the concept and the various 
factors that need to be considered for successful implementation (e. g. distinctive 
characteristics of user typing, creation of representative profiles and strategies for 
implementation). The chapter subsequently proceeds to present the results from an 
experimental study that has been conducted, allowing an assessment of the suitability of the 
technique for healthcare implementation. 
Chapter 9 describes a further stage of practical development that was undertaken, whereby 
the keystroke analysis technique was incorporated into the more comprehensive supervision 
framework described in chapter 7. This led to the creation of an IMS demonstrator system 
which succeeded in fulfilling a subset of the key elements from the full IMS design (e. g. 
10 
Chapter I: Introduction and Overview 
local monitoring on a Client system with authentication / supervision performed by a remote 
Host). The keystroke analysis system was considerably enhanced to operate as a 
transparent background task on a monitored PC station, with impostor detection being 
performed by an independent machine. The description in this chapter essentially details 
the main features of the system, highlighting the aspects of the IMS design that have been 
realised (which also include system configuration auditing and anti-virus protection). The 
demonstrator provides a good basis for showing how an intrusion monitoring security 
system would operate in practice. 
Returning to a theoretical level, chapter 10 discusses how a full intrusion monitoring system 
implementation could be integrated into a wider framework for healthcare security, with 
systems involving inter-HCE communications. The suitability of cryptographic protection 
techniques is examined, along with a discussion of how Trusted Third Party (TTP) systems 
could be used to provide an independent assurance mechanism. The applicability of these 
technologies to the healthcare community is illustrated using a further example scenario to 
support the main points raised. This aspect of the discussion represents the integration of 
the research into an overall protection framework and is provided as a pointer to possible 
future work. 
Finally, chapter 11 presents the main conclusions arising from the entire research 
programme, highlighting the principal achievements and limitations of the work, along with 
suggestions for potential further development. 
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The thesis also includes a number of appendices which contain a variety of additional 
information in support of the main discussion (including a number of published papers from 
the research programme). 
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2.1 An overview of Information Security 
A generally accepted view of information security is that it is centred around the 
preservation of the key factors described below (Commission of European Communities 
1991). 
" Confidentiality 
This refers to the prevention of unauthorised information disclosure. All access 
to data must be restricted to authorised users who have a legitimate "need to 
know". The seriousness of disclosure may often be dictated by whether it 
occurs to an unauthorised member of the same organisation or a total outsider 
(with the consequences from the latter being potentially more severe). 
" Integrity 
This refers to the prevention of unauthorised modification of information. There 
is an implicit requirement for users to be able to trust the system and be 
confident that the same information can be retrieved as was originally entered. 
Integrity may potentially be compromised as a result of accidental error or 
malicious activity. 
" Availability 
This identifies a requirement for data and systems to be accessible and usable (by 
authorised users) when and where ever they are required. This necessitates both 
the prevention of unauthorised withholding of information or resources, as well 
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as adequate safeguards against system failure. The seriousness of any denial of 
service will, in most cases, increase depending upon the period of unavailability. 
The requirements above may be compromised by a variety of threats to the system which, if 
realised, could result in security breaches. At a high level, these may be grouped into three 
main categories, resulting from a variety of accidental or deliberate acts against which 
systems must be protected : 
" physical threats (e. g. fire, flood, building or power failure); 
" equipment threats (e. g. CPU, network or storage failure); 
" human threats (e. g. design or operator errors, misuse of resources, various types 
of malicious damage). 
It is recognised that, without adequate security provision, the above threats may lead to a 
number of undesirable consequences, or impacts (Davey 1991) : 
" disruption of activities; 
" embarrassment or loss of business goodwill; 
" breach of personal privacy or commercial confidentiality; 
" failure to meet legal obligations; 
" financial loss; 
0 threat to personal safety. 
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At one time these issues could have been adequately addressed by mainly physical means 
of protection (such as locating equipment in locked rooms and restricting physical access). 
With system access only possible from within this environment, many security problems 
were essentially resolved. However, such centralised computer centres are now being 
replaced by networked mini and personal computers and the use of information systems has 
moved well beyond the stage where physical security mechanisms alone will suffice. The 
advent of widespread data communication networks, increased end-user access and 
multimedia systems has meant that the focus must alter significantly. Physical security is 
still an issue, of course, but it is now just one of several perspectives from which protection 
must be considered (which now include logical security, with issues such as user 
authentication and encryption, and procedural /personnel security, covering more staff or 
policy related measures) - all of which limit vulnerability to threats and thereby reduce the 









Fig. 2.1 : Perspectives on information system protection 
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All of the factors mentioned may potentially pertain to the healthcare scenario and, as such, 
the specific requirements of the healthcare environment will now be considered in more 
detail. 
2.2 Current trends in European healthcare and informatics 
This section attempts to provide an overview of the current situation in the European 
healthcare community, looking firstly at the demands placed upon health services in general 
and then the ways in which information technology increasingly has a role to play. 
2.2.1 Healthcare in the European Union 
The most recent overall assessment of health services at a European level (De Moor et al. 
1994), based upon 1990 statistics, indicates that around 6.6 million people are employed in 
the healthcare field, distributed as shown below : 
" 800,000 doctors; 
" 156,000 dentists; 
" 200,000 pharmacists; 
" 1.6 million nurses; 
9 3.86 million "other" personnel in supporting roles such as administration and 
information technology. 
There are around 15,000 hospitals across Europe, providing a total of some 2.6 million beds 
(a figure which obviously does not take into consideration the number of smaller healthcare 
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practices) and of the 344 million European inhabitants, each person visits a doctor an 
average of five times per year. 
It is possible to cite a number of trends in respect of healthcare demand and provision 
(Barber 1991a) : 
9 an increasing demand for health services, particularly from the increasing 
proportion of elderly patients for whom care is more costly; 
" an increasing ability on the part of HCEs to provide life-saving and life-enhancing 
treatments; 
" an increasing expectancy that services will be provided, coupled with increased 
public awareness of the services that can be successfully delivered. 
The healthcare system must obviously attempt to meet these demands. However, various 
factors may serve as handicaps in this respect, including funding constraints, a reduced 
number of individuals entering health services (partially due to a general reduction in the 
young population) and an increasingly unequal distribution of medical expertise within the 
community (Barber 1991a). 
One means of coping with the increased requirements has been through the use of 
technology to improve the speed and efficiency of healthcare operations. As such, 
information systems are now routinely used throughout the community. 
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2.2.2 Use of Information Technology 
When computers were first introduced into healthcare they were initially used "at a 
distance" from the patient (e. g. for HCE administration purposes). However, the situation 
has since altered dramatically, and modern establishments now utilise a wide variety of 
equipment, ranging from standalone PCs to minicomputers and mainframe systems, with 
increasing volumes of data transmitted between different locations. As such, IT now affects 
most areas of HCE operation, from a continuing role in administration through to patient 
care, with computers now used to directly control medical equipment linked to patients and 
provide information or advice to clinicians. 
In the UK alone, the annual IT expenditure of the National Health Service is several 
hundred million pounds (The Guardian 1994) and similar levels of funding are likely to be 
observed across Europe. As a consequence, the range of current and emerging uses of 
information systems is enormous and some illustrative examples are listed below (all of 
which also pose concerns in terms of security) : 
" interconnection of computer systems and institutions; 
" increasing storage of highly sensitive data (e. g. genetics, contagious and 
incurable 
diseases). 
" widespread use of personal computers (with the 
focus on the end-user); 
" use of clinical expert systems (Riddington et al. 1994; 
Khoor at al. 1994); 
" computerisation of primary care practices; 
" the development of telemedicine; 
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" mobile computing; 
" introduction and use of smart cards for patient data storage (Pangalos 1992). 
In view of these points it should not be too surprising that the increasing pervasion of 
technology has had a significant effect upon standard healthcare practices, leading to a 
number of further trends (Barber 1991b) : 
" more medical systems, networks and users - accompanied by a proportional 
increase in the chance of errors; 
" an increased number of applications directly relating to clinical care, with a 
significant proportion in safety critical areas; 
9 increased information sharing and access from other HCEs; 
" widespread reliance upon the availability of systems and the correctness of 
output. Healthcare staff at all levels will now be less experienced in working 
without access to and support from information systems. As such, there is 
significantly less likelihood of staff still being able to handle work manually 
within the necessary timescales if systems fail. 
General evidence of these trends and the dependence upon IT is provided by a reasonably 
recent survey involving 120 medical staff 
(Al-Hajjaj and Bamgboye 1992). This revealed 
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that some 75% of those questioned considered computers to be either important or essential 
in modern healthcare practice. 
As a result of these considerations, information technology may now be regarded as a 
central, and vital, asset in many aspects of HCE operation (Abbott 1992), representing a 
significant investment in terms of both finance and information. As such, one would 
reasonably expect that sufficient measures would be employed to safeguard healthcare 
systems. However, in practice this has not really been the case. For example, whilst the 
UK National Health Service has had a formal IT strategy since 1986 (NHS 1986) it is only 
in recent years that security and data protection issues have been properly addressed in a 
similar manner. 
2.3 Security requirements in healthcare 
The widespread use and reliance upon information technology can be cited as the first major 
factor dictating a requirement for security in healthcare establishments. Whilst the increased 
use of IT in healthcare should be beneficial at all levels, a more pessimistic view is that this 
means there is simply more potential for something to go wrong. For example, a computer- 
based healthcare records system is advantageous in that it allows more information to be 
collected and stored than its paper-based counterpart. However, this in turn serves to make 
the computer system a more attractive target and it is likely that a security breach would 
result in the disclosure of information about a large number of patients. 
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A second consideration is that protection requirements have been recognised on both 
national and European levels, leading to increasing requirements to comply with various 
legislation (as will be briefly discussed in section 2.5.1). 
A final influence is the actual evidence of security incidents that have occurred within 
healthcare. A number of specific examples have been identified in recent years (Barber et 
al. 1993 a), including : 
" destruction of computing facilities by hurricane winds; 
" loss of emergency calls by ambulance software; 
" errors in the calculation of radiation treatment plans; 
" errors in financial systems. 
In addition, the most recent Audit Commission survey on computer abuse in the United 
Kingdom (Audit Commission 1994) indicated that 24% of the reported incidents from 
respondent organisations occurred in healthcare establishments (a point which is examined 
in more detail in chapter 6). All such issues are bound to have some impact on public trust 
in the HCEs involved and, in a worst case, a really serious security breach could completely 
undermine the reputation of an establishment. 
The combination of these points effectively highlights why the issue of information security 
may now be considered to be of increased importance in health systems. 
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Luckily, whilst the use of technology might increase the threats associated with health data, 
it can also offer the means to compensate through the provision of better protection. 
However, Bakker (1991) believes that the new threats are not properly counter-balanced by 
new security measures. Whilst this will certainly be true in some respects, it is also often 
the case that available protection technologies are not utilised. This point is evidenced by 
the fact that a large number of operational health systems were developed without security 
considerations in mind. There are a number of potential reasons why such omissions / 
oversights may have occurred : 
" the view that because healthcare "means well" (and therefore should not 
represent a threat to anyone), information should not require significant 
protection; 
" the nature of the information stored is secondary to its use in the provision of 
care; 
" security represents an overhead (in terms of both finance and effort) that does 
not directly contribute to the primary objectives of the HCE. As with most other 
organisations, HCEs have to contend with finite levels of resources and 
increasing costs. As a result, expenditure is prioritised such that clinical services 
(i. e. those in direct contact with patients and advantageous to a large 
population) will generally obtain funding more easily than support services. The 
frequent reports of shortages in healthcare (e. g. in terms of waiting lists for beds 
and treatment) indicate the level to which these resources are often restricted. 
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Hence investments to improve security may be considered somewhat secondary 
and will normally only be approved if it can be demonstrated that the benefits to 
the HCE will be of greater importance than if the money was directed at the 
addition or enhancement of clinical services (AIM SEISMED 1993a). 
Whatever the reason, there is now a requirement for security to be "bolted on" in many 
cases. However, it is important to carefully consider how this can best be achieved, 
especially given that healthcare is fundamentally different from other sectors in terms of 
acceptable security. 
2.4 Special factors of the healthcare environment 
The fact that security needs can be identified in many other information technology domains 
raises the question of why healthcare should demand special consideration. Curiously, an 
AIM Working Conference on Data Protection and Confidentiality (Commission of 
European Communities 1991b) suggested that it was "probably not possible to draw a 
distinction between medical requirements and needs and those from other sectors or the 
general domain". Whilst this may be true from the perspective that many protection 
methods appropriate to other domains will also be applicable in HCEs, it tends to overlook 
the fact that HCEs may have some unique requirements and constraints in respect of 
security. Some of these may be explained in relation to the issues of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability that were highlighted in section 2.1, along with more general 
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In the majority of other sectors where obvious requirements for information security may be 
perceived (e. g. in police, military or government systems), it is normally confidentiality that 
is regarded as the over-riding concern. In healthcare, however, the issues of integrity and 
availability are potentially more serious as problems in these respects could, in a worst case 
scenario, result in the most severe consequence of all, namely loss of life. Each of the issues 
will now be considered in more detail in the healthcare context. 
2.4.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality may be viewed as more critical in HCEs than in many other sectors as there 
are several aspects to the problem that must be considered. These result from the handling 
of potentially sensitive data relating to both patients and the institution. 
Firstly, the principle of confidentiality is fundamental to medical practice in that it provides 
an assurance to the patient that discussions with the doctor will not be divulged to others. 
This attitude stems directly from the Hippocratic oath; the oath of ethical professional 
behaviour that is regarded as the basic duty of Healthcare Professionals (HCPs) in almost all 
European countries : 
"Whatever, in connection with my professional practice, or not in 
connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be 
spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be 
kept secret. " - Hippocratic Oath. 
This is central to maintaining a necessary relationship of trust between patient and 
practitioner and the moral responsibilities of HCPs should obviously remain the same 
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regardless of whether records are paper or computer based. National and European data 
protection legislation will also be relevant in this context, as described later in section 2.5.1. 
The unauthorised disclosure of patient healthcare information has the potential to lead to a 
number of undesirable consequences for the affected individual. At the most basic level it 
will represent the infringement of the patients general rights to privacy. However, more 
serious or damaging effects may be : 
" potential to cause embarrassment; 
" potential to cause discrimination, prejudice or even social ostracision; 
" potential to invite blackmail or bribery. 
Particularly relevant in this context will be especially sensitive classes of data, examples of 
which would include any of the following : 
" sexually transmitted diseases (STD); 
9 mental health; 
" drug addiction or alcoholism; 
" child abuse; 
" adolescent healthcare (i. e. that sought without parental knowledge). 
Maintenance of patient confidentiality is also in the interest of the HCE in order to avoid the 
risks of litigation and adverse publicity. 
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There are also various types of information that the HCE itself may wish to remain 
confidential. For example, there may be commercial or organisational implications if 
business data relating to any of the following were to become generally known (especially in 
the context of the more performance-related HCE environments now emerging) : 
" financial constraints; 
" resource shortages; 
" undesirable performance indicators (e. g. relating to staff or the organisation). 
However, despite the considerations identified above, confidentiality may be regarded as a 
somewhat less serious issue in many health systems (particularly those with direct links to 
care delivery) when compared to the demands for data integrity and availability. 
2.4.2 Integrity 
The loss of data integrity is potentially the worst scenario in healthcare as it could most 
easily cause actual harm to the patients (i. e. as a result of decisions and treatment being 
based upon incorrect information). 
Errors can occur in healthcare records for a number of reasons, but in general the 
requirement for data integrity in healthcare must address two aspects : the preservation of 
accuracy and the prevention of unauthorised modification. The first point recognises, for 
example, that under current practice the same data is often duplicated in independent 
systems, leading to a risk of inconsistency. Mechanisms are, therefore, required to ensure 
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that modifications to data in one system are reflected in all others. The implication of the 
second point is that unsuspected, unauthorised modifications could lead to misinformed 
decisions which, in a clinical context, could result in serious harm to patients. 
Examples of integrity failings in the UK health service include several widely publicised 
cases where computer-controlled radiotherapy equipment administered incorrect radiation 
doses to cancer patients. Whilst the root cause is normally human error, the involvement of 
IT is highlighted in all cases. The North Staffordshire Royal Infirmary and the Royal Devon 
and Exeter Hospital were amongst the establishments involved (The Guardian 1992; 
Sunday Times 1993). 
Roger France (1994) identifies an additional consideration influencing the requirement for 
integrity, citing that the handling of health data often has to be done practically "on-line" 
with little or no time for further checking. This practice allows data to be made available 
for care purposes as soon as possible (e. g. there will frequently be no delay between the 
receipt and utilisation of laboratory results data). It is obviously important that the data 
obtained is correct in such circumstances. 
Additional considerations here might be the risk of legal action being taken against clinicians 
or the HCE as a result of its failure to protect the information (e. g. representing a breach of 
data protection legislation). 
N 
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2.4.3 Availability 
The availability of healthcare systems and data may be important at various levels. In 
general, the unavailability of even the most mundane healthcare systems (e. g. patient 
appointments) could result in inconvenience, delays and the like. It is fair to say that most 
HCPs expect systems to be available on demand, and a significant proportion (particularly 
those directly relating to care delivery) will be required to be operational 24 hours a day 
(see chapter 3). 
In terms of care delivery and decision making, healthcare professionals are not only reliant 
upon their own skills, but also upon the information that is at their disposal. Whilst there is 
an expectation that competent and experienced HCPs would be able to cope in many 
situations even if patient records were unavailable, most would still prefer access if record 
were known to exist (in case additional beneficial information was available). The 
unavailability of data (e. g. patient medical histories or diagnoses) could realistically reduce 
the quality and effectiveness of treatment, given that decisions would be made on a less 
informed basis (Barber et al. 1992). Whilst, in most cases, unavailability would be unlikely 
to be "life threatening", such scenarios are not inconceivable (e. g. a system controlling the 
automatic administration of drugs could be seriously affected if data was unavailable for 
even a short period). 
A number of general observations can be made regarding the availability of 
healthcare data. 
Firstly, the impact of unavailability will usually be most critical in the case of recently 
recorded data (e. g. that relating to current patient cases), and will become 
less significant 
for historical data. 
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A second point is that the destruction of information, although significant, should normally 
be less serious than a loss of integrity. The reasoning here is that it is more likely to be 
recognised, allowing short-term alternative arrangements to be adopted. 
Finally, an important consideration should be that security measures themselves do not 
unnecessarily impede or prevent HCPs from getting access to required information 
(especially in vital emergency or exception cases). This point leads into a more general 
discussion of the need for convenience, which is presented in the next section. 
2.4.4 General issues 
A number of further factors can be cited as being relatively special in HCEs. Principal 
amongst these are the open environment, the need for convenience, the staff culture and 
financial constraints. 
The generally open environment in HCEs means that many physical controls are not 
workable and the high degree of public access means that unfamiliar faces will be 
commonplace in most areas. As such, anyone who looks appropriate is unlikely to be 
challenged, whatever their activity (as evidenced by the recent incidents of babies being 
kidnapped from maternity wards (The Times 1994a; The Times 1994b)). At the same time 
there is a necessity for information systems to be inter-mingled in many public areas (e. g. on 
wards or in reception / waiting areas), leaving them potentially vulnerable to abuse. 
However, it is obvious that the openness of the environment must largely be maintained 
and, therefore, the security side must be either compromised or addressed differently. 
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The issue of convenience will influence the types of security that are appropriate to, and will 
be tolerated within, a HCE. Young (1991) cites that there are often problems enough 
entailed in trying to get HCPs to use information systems in the first place (as a result of 
system designers ignoring the clinical environment and the ways in which HCPs are 
motivated) and, as such, the addition of cumbersome or restrictive protection measures 
would only be likely to worsen the situation. For example, effects on staff might include 
demotivation and reduced efficiency, whilst at an organisational level operational costs 
could increase as a result of tasks taking longer to perform. 
In some contexts this significantly limits the types of security that are appropriate. In terms 
of system security it is particularly difficult at present to utilise strong methods of security 
whilst still maintaining a convenient and user-friendly environment. The transparency of 
security mechanisms is one of the key issues promoted later in this investigation. 
The issue of staff culture (i. e. the typical attitudes and behaviour of members or groups 
within an organisation) highlights the fact that there are discrepancies in the need for 
security as perceived by technologists and as seen by HCPs. This comes back to the earlier 
mentioned point that healthcare is seen as being good-intentioned and, therefore, a need to 
have security is essentially contradictory to this view. In addition, healthcare users are 
generally no different to those in other sectors in terms of a tendency to regard security as 
"someone else's problem" and, hence, often have little appreciation of the main issues. 
However, all healthcare staff involved in the development, operation, maintenance and use 
of information systems should be responsible to some degree. It has been observed that 
security is a human issue (Warren and Gaunt 1993) and there is consequently a definite need 
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to move towards a more security conscious culture in HCEs (where security ideally 
becomes an ever-present background consideration for all system users). The first step here 
must be the establishment and adoption of a suitable high-level security policy (Katsikas and 
Gritzalis 1994) that can provide a common staff reference point, specifying the means by 
which the HCE should operate in order to preserve security. However, the other factors 
mentioned in this section will obviously limit the extent to which this can be achieved. 
Finally, as previously identified in section 2.3, the issue of finance will influence the viability 
of security in healthcare. As an illustration of the financial constraints that may be faced, 
European Commission (De Moor et al. 1994) statistics indicate that expenditure on 
informatics represents only 0.4% of the yearly running costs of a hospital (with the majority 
taken up by supplies (26%) and personnel (68%) costs). 
2.5 Addressing healthcare security in Europe 
Whilst possibly not regarded as a top priority in the past, the need for security has 
nevertheless been recognised in many HCEs and steps taken to address the issue. However, 
this fragmented approach often leads to subjective views of what protection is appropriate 
and hence inconsistency between similar establishments and systems. 
As a result, the need for improved methods is widely recognised in the European healthcare 
community and various steps have been taken to address the problems. Several key aspects 
are described in the sections that follow, one of which was closely related to the research 
programme. 
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2.5.1 An overview of previous European initiatives 
One of the key European initiatives in respect to the use of information technology in 
healthcare has been the AIM (Advanced Informatics in Medicine) programme. The 
objective of AIM was to increase harmony and cohesion in the European healthcare 
community, whilst at the same time improving the quality and cost-effectiveness of medical 
care. The need for safe and secure healthcare services was one of the obvious areas that the 
programme addressed. 
A notable step in this respect was the development of what are known as the "Six safety 
first principles of health information systems" (Barber 1991 a). These were specified by the 
AIM Requirements Board as a basis for future development, testing, operation and 
maintenance of healthcare information systems, and are intended to encourage the use of 
such systems within Europe (with conformance to the principles being seen as a way to 
increase the confidence of both HCPs and the public). The six principles are listed below, 
along with a brief statement of the purpose in each case. 
1. Safe environment for patients and users 
To ensure that no-one is harmed by the operation or non-operation of systems. 
This includes the issues of quality control and assessment. 
2. Secure environment for patients, users and others 
To ensure that information is not lost, corrupted or made available to others. 
These points, of course, relate closely to the previously mentioned issues of 
availability, integrity and confidentiality. 
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3. Convenient environment for users 
To ensure that systems can be used easily and effectively within HCEs. 
4. Legally satisfactory environment across Europe for users and suppliers 
To ensure that legal, ethical and professional responsibilities are harmonised 
within the healthcare community. 
5. Legal protection of software products 
To ensure that software products are protected against unlicensed use and 
thereby foster / promote the European market for health informatics systems. 
6. Multi-lingual systems 
To facilitate the spread of systems throughout Europe and avoid errors resulting 
from inadequate understanding of local languages. 
Whilst the second principle can be most clearly related to addressing healthcare security 
requirements, all of the points are important (to some extent) in ensuring the overall secure 
and error-free operation of healthcare environments and systems. 
In addition to these principles, there is also a variety of national and international legislation 
within Europe that either directly or indirectly relates to healthcare and thus 
influences the 
requirements for protection. 
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The most notable legislation in the UK currently includes : 
" Data Protection Act (1984); 
" Computer Misuse Act (1990). 
Whilst both of these acts are targeted at the IT community in general, they also apply in the 
healthcare scenario (although, of course, the Computer Misuse Act serves more as a form 
of deterrent, providing a legal recourse for HCEs in cases of abuse, rather than stipulating a 
requirement to protect systems). Similar types of national legislation are reflected in most 
other European countries (Lobato de Faria 1992). 
At the European level, the most significant legislation is a draft directive on data protection 
(Walden 1990). This lays down very comprehensive rules for the handling of data and 
seeks to cover every situation in which the processing of personal data may involve a risk to 
the data subject (relating to data in manual or automated systems, in both the private and 
public sector). 
The Council of Europe has also been active in the areas of data protection and medical 
information systems, and has made several significant contributions during the past decade 
or so. These principally include the following : 
" Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (1981); 
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" Recommendation No R (81) on regulations for automated medical data banks 
(1983); 
" Recommendation No R (87) 23 on Hospital Information Systems (1987); 
" Draft Recommendation on the communication of health information in hospitals: 
ethical and legal issues (1992); 
" Draft Recommendation on the protection of medical data (1993). 
Useful summaries covering the main issues raised in these regulations and their applicability 
to the healthcare community have been produced by Lobato de Faria (1992) and Duerinckx 
(1993). However, it can be observed that most limit their concern to the areas of data 
protection and confidentiality rather than addressing the wider security field. 
However, despite all of the aspects discussed, there are still practical problems in the actual 
realisation of healthcare security. Firstly, much of the European material is not formally 
binding and, as such, organisations are not legally obliged to follow the recommendations 
(which can again lead to inconsistency in terms of protection or, at worst, the guidance 
being ignored). More significantly, much of the material is of a very high level nature, 
providing general statements of "good practice" rather than more solid recommendations 
that can be followed. For example, the eighth principle of the UK Data Protection Act 
states that : 
"Appropriate security measures shall be taken against all unauthorised 
access to, or alteration, disclosure or destruction of, personal data and 
against accidental loss or destruction of personal data. ". 
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However, there is only a very minimal amount of accompanying material to state what 
issues should be considered and nothing relating to actual security measures. As such, it is 
observed by Barber (1991b) that most HCEs would be unlikely to pass even a basic data 
protection audit. 
Similarly, the six safety first principles, whilst intentionally presented in only general terms 
(to allow them to be set apart from specific computer systems and problems), consequently 
only state what should be done rather than how one should go about it. 
Asa result, more practical recommendations are required by which HCEs can actually 
identify and address their security needs. A significant European attempt to realise this 
objective is the AIM SEISMED project, which is introduced in the next section. 
2.5.2 The AIM SEISMED project 
The initial stages of this research were closely linked to work being conducted under the 
banner of the Commission of European Communities SEISMED (Secure Environment for 
Information Systems in Medicine) project, part of the aforementioned AIM programme. 
The objective of SEISMED was to provide practical security advice and guidance to all 
members of the healthcare community who are involved in the management, development, 
operation or maintenance of information systems. The eventual aim of the project was to 
establish a consistent framework for the protection of medical data across the European 
Union (AIM SEISMED 1991). 
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The project was structured in three main phases as described below. 
1. The identification of information security requirements within the European 
medical community (including investigation of the protection practices currently 
in use). 
2. The development of guidelines by which secure systems may be designed and the 
security of existing systems may be enhanced. 
3. The implementation and evaluation of the above guidelines in four European 
healthcare establishments selected as project "Reference Centres" to ensure their 
practicality and applicability. 
Work on the project commenced at the beginning of 1992 with an original duration of three 
years, but this was subsequently been extended for a further 6 months (until mid-1995). 
A total of 14 workpackages were established within the project, each addressing a separate 
aspect of healthcare security. The contributing partners were comprised from 
establishments across the community. Principal amongst these, as regarded getting 
representative European medical input and opinions, were the aforementioned Reference 
Centres. These establishments were located as follows : 
. Plymouth Health Authority (United Kingdom); 
The Royal London Hospital NHS Trust (United Kingdom); 
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" Leiden University Hospital (The Netherlands); 
9 GEN Hospital Cantonal Universitaire de Geneve (Switzerland); 
" Institute for Clinical and Experimental Medicine (Czech Republic). 
The reference centres are indicated on the map in figure 2.2, which also highlights those 
countries directly involved in SEISMED and additional countries that participated in a 
healthcare security survey conducted by the project (the results of which are described in 
the next chapter). 
QL 
" SEISMED Reference Centres 
Q Countries directly involved in SEISMED 
Other countries that participated in SEISMED survey 
Fig. 2.2 : SEISMED Reference Centres, partners and collaborators 
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This research programme was primarily linked to the SEISMED project through 
workpackage SP07, which dealt with Security in Existing Systems. The scope of the 
workpackage was to produce a comprehensive set of recommendations for the addition (or 
enhancement) of security in operational healthcare systems and environments. More 
formally, the three main objectives of the workpackage, as stated in the original Technical 
Annex of the project, were as listed below. 
1. To produce guidelines on the level of protection that should be attached to 
existing operational healthcare systems. 
2. To produce guidelines as to how the appropriate level of security in existing 
systems may be achieved. 
3. To revise the approach based on Reference Centre feedback. 
A significant proportion of the work described in this report was conducted to assist in the 
fulfilment of these objectives. 
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that whilst a significant requirement for information system security 
exists in healthcare, the nature of the environment itself imposes some constraints upon 
what is acceptable. 
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Having identified the basic concerns, it is necessary to show that many existing European 
systems are actually deficient in terms of the protection provided. This issue is addressed in 
the next chapter, with the discussion of a survey of existing security practice. 
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3.1 Overview and objectives 
A broad picture of healthcare security within the European Community was obtained as a 
result of a questionnaire study conducted within the SEISMED project during 1992 (AIM 
SEISMED 1995a). The objective of this was to identify and assess current HCE practices 
and attitudes regarding information systems security, which could then be used as a 
foundation for further work within the project. 
Whilst the questionnaire used in the study was devised prior to the commencement of this 
research programme, the results of the survey were available for the purpose of assessing 
existing security weaknesses (or inconsistencies) and deciding the appropriate means of 
resolving the problems. As such, the procedure and relevant findings of the survey are 
summarised in the sections that follow (whilst a copy of the relevant sections of the 
questionnaire itself can be found in appendix A). 
In order to obtain a true European perspective, questionnaires were distributed to 
healthcare establishments in the following countries : 
" Belgium " Greece 
" Denmark " Ireland 
" France " Netherlands 
" Germany " Portugal 
" Sweden 
" Switzerland 
" United Kingdom 
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The survey aimed to elicit responses on a broad range of security related issues including 
types of operational system and data, awareness of the need for security, awareness of 
relevant protection legislation and current technological environments. This was 
accomplished using a total of 56 questions, 18 of which were relevant to the assessment of 
existing systems. It was sent to larger institutions, such as general hospitals, as opposed to 
the primary care establishments of general practitioners. 
Usable responses were received from 75 establishments, with respondents representing all 
major categories of healthcare professional and possessing varying levels of both 
professional and security-related experience. This response base was relatively small and 
could not be considered to provide a representative sample across the community (e. g. only 
one response was obtained from each of France, Portugal and Sweden, whilst 43 came from 
the United Kingdom). However, the results do serve to give a high-level view of the 
current situation and it was possible to extract a substantial amount of information relevant 
to existing systems, allowing an overview of current security practice to be gained. 
3.2 Survey findings 
The following sections of the survey enabled information to be obtained regarding the types 
and level of security currently found in existing systems : 
" Physical Security Details of your System; 
" Design Security Details of your System. 
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Responses were analysed to allow information to be extracted pertaining to four key areas 
of interest : 
1. system configurations; 
2. main application areas; 
3. existing security measures; 
4. security problems encountered; 
The survey considered these issues in significant detail and a full reproduction of the results 
would be outside the scope of this report. The analysis that follows is based on a summary 
of the most relevant statistics, and should be sufficient to allow an appreciation of the main 
problems and requirements. 
3.2.1 System Configurations 
As one would expect, a wide variety of different system architectures are employed across 
Europe. As a basic distinction, the survey gave separate consideration to minicomputers / 
mainframes and personal computers. 
The majority of sites claimed at least one mini or mainframe based system, with over 16 
different hardware and operating system platforms being listed. Most HCEs have 
equipment from more than one supplier and, therefore, whilst a dominant architecture could 
be identified (DEC VAX being used by just over 70% of sites), it was normally used in 
conjunction with a number of other systems. 
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In the personal computer field things are slightly more clear cut, with IBM compatible 
machines and MS-DOS accounting for around 75% of responses. However, the remainder 
of the small systems were based upon a wide range of other hardware and operating 
systems. 
In both of these cases, the fact that no system is universally accepted precludes the option 
of specifying system-specific standards for protection. 
Communications feature significantly in most environments, with 78% of systems being part 
of a network. Of these, 92% of systems are part of a local area configuration and 55% are 
connected to wide area networks. The latter case illustrates a substantial requirement to 
transmit and receive information from outside a single establishment. 
3.2.2 Main Applications 
Respondents were asked to indicate which of six named applications were present in their 
environments, along with any other significant systems. The results of this are summarised 
in figure 3.1 and it is clear that the named applications can be found in the majority of 
environments. It would, therefore, appear advantageous to devise appropriate protection 
profiles for these types of system that could then be applied in any scenario. However, this 
approach in itself would be insufficient as it overlooks two key factors. Firstly, there are 
still a significant number of "other" application types (25 identified in all, as listed in 
Appendix A) for which security may also be required and, secondly, these profiles would 
not take into consideration the underlying hardware / software systems that support the 
application. 
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Fig. 3.1 : Main applications 
In terms of the security requirements associated with these systems, it can be assumed that 
confidentiality will be required in many cases (this will depend largely upon the data 
involved, making it hard to generalise), and that integrity will be expected regardless. As a 
result, the survey did not attempt to collect any opinions on these issues. It does, however, 
relate information pertaining to the issue of availability, and the charts in Figure 3.2 give 
an overview of the performance expectations associated with healthcare systems in general. 
The first chart indicates the typical period of time during a day that systems are expected to 
remain operational. This reveals that a clear majority of systems are required to be available 
most of the time. The second chart indicates the length of time that is considered 
acceptable for a system to satisfy an information request (in average cases - the times could 
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be expected to be less in emergencies). These figures underline the importance that is 
attached to availability (substantiating the observations made in chapter 2), and indicate that 
any denial of service could have serious consequences. 
Planned hours of operation 
23.75 to 24 
43% 




8 to 12 
21% 




Fig. 3.2 : General availability expectations 




Bearing in mind the expectation that security in existing systems would be somewhat weak 
and inconsistent across the community, the survey asked respondents to indicate which 
types of security were present in their systems. Figure 3.3 illustrates the relative adoption 
of six key categories of protection (it should be noted that the percentages in the chart serve 
to compare the acceptance of the different measures rather than indicate the proportion of 
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Fig. 3.3 : Relative adoption of security techniques 
In a reasonably secure system, one would expect that all of these areas (with the exception 
of encryption and possibly audit trails) would be given roughly equal consideration. 
However, even at this high level it is apparent that some areas (e. g. disaster recovery) are 
given substantially less attention than others. Whilst it could be argued that some systems 
genuinely demand less in terms of disaster recovery than they do authentication, it should be 
noted that these proportions are maintained across all the main systems considered. Using 
the same example, logic would seem to indicate that if a system or data is worth protecting 
against unauthorised use then it should almost certainly be sensitive / valuable enough to 
safeguard against damage or possible destruction as well. 
Inconsistencies become even more apparent when the individual areas are examined in more 
detail, and the survey highlights significant discrepancies in the types of countermeasure 
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employed to achieve each aim. This may be illustrated by considering the variety of 















Fig. 3,4 : Methods of authentication 
It can be seen from figure 3.4 that there appears to be little standardisation in the 
approaches taken. A further observation is that very few cases appear to use anything other 
than variations on the simple password, the potential weaknesses of which are well 
documented (Jobusch and Oldehoeft 1989). Similar criticisms can be levelled at 
breakdowns of the other groups from figure 3.4. 
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3.2.4 Security Problems 
The final area of interest in the results was data relating to experience of security problems. 
Twelve types of incident were considered and respondents were asked to indicate the 


















Fig. 3.5 : Security Incidents in European HCEs 
This range of incidents provides further justification for the need to enhance the existing 
protection in many systems. It is important to note that the frequency of occurrence should 
not be regarded as the sole determinant of protection; even a one-off breach may have 
serious consequences. Unfortunately, the survey gives no indication of the precise impacts 
that may have resulted from these incidents. Nevertheless, the figures still represent a 
significant number of incidents that would at the very least have caused inconvenience to 
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the HCEs involved. In addition, the results do not allow a correlation to be made between 
the problems encountered and the level of existing security measures (which may have given 
an indication of which types of security were most effective). 
3.3 Conclusions 
Whilst the small number of responses received meant that the results could not be 
considered properly representative, they were nevertheless felt to be indicative of the 
current European healthcare situation. 
The first overall conclusion that can be drawn from the survey findings is that they confirm 
the increased use and importance of IT in healthcare. They also reveal significant variety in 
the types of medical system currently in use and discrepancies in the existing protection 
being afforded (including likely inconsistency in the levels provided even to systems of a 
similar nature). This provides reasonable grounds for patients to assume that treatment 
would generally be safer in those countries / establishments where security and protection 
issues are properly addressed. 
These points underline the requirement to address the security implications more seriously 
and provide the justification for much of the further work described in this thesis. As a first 
step, there is a requirement for a formalised approach to security enhancement that may be 
applied on a general level. This will be the main topic of the next chapter. 
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4.1 Approaches to securing existing systems 
The results of the SEISMED survey in the previous chapter underlined the fact that 
information systems security in European HCEs is currently anything but standardised. It is 
considered that, in many cases, the disparity of security measures has resulted from an 
overall lack of appropriate standards and guidance. More generally, healthcare practitioners 
are often so preoccupied with their professional activities that they are not aware of 
computer security concepts or have only a token appreciation of them. As a result, HCEs 
are unclear over both general protection issues and the level that they should aim for. It 
was the objective of the SEISMED project and, in particular, the SP07 workpackage to 
remedy this situation by establishing the methods by which existing systems security 
measures could be added (or enhanced) and the systems themselves thereby brought up to 
an appropriate standard. 
Discussion within the SEISMED consortium identified two approaches by which security of 






Fig. 4.1 : Approaches to existing systems security 
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As a first stage of improvement, the most appropriate strategy was considered to be the 
definition of baseline recommendations for security, to provide a common foundation for 
all HCEs. As such, it was proposed that the baseline guidelines should be considered by 
HCEs as the basis of protecting all systems. The second approach, (i. e. that of the 
protection profiles) would then be utilised in especially sensitive scenarios. 
This chapter will focus upon the new guideline sets that have been established, whilst the 
idea of protection profiles (and an accompanying methodology that has been developed) 
will be discussed in chapter 5. 
4.2 Baseline security for healthcare systems 
The concept of establishing a healthcare security "baseline" immediately raises the question 
of what level of security should be specified. Whilst various guidelines and standards for IT 
security have previously been developed, none have specifically targeted the needs of the 
medical community at a European level. As highlighted in chapter 2, the nature of the 
healthcare environment, with the inherent requirements to maintain patient safety and 
confidentiality, demands that protection should generally be higher than in many other 
domains. As a result, the security requirements extend beyond the levels proposed by many 
existing standards. At the same time, it has previously been cited (Louwerse 1993) that the 
stronger levels of security attainable under many existing security classification schemes 
(e. g. the US "Orange Book" (Department of Defence 1985) and European ITSEC 
(Commission of European Communities 1991a)) are not directly applicable to healthcare 
due to : 
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" complex systems (e. g. a wide variety of data, with differing levels of sensitivity, 
may be found within a single healthcare system); 
" low security awareness (e. g. low funding and generally low acceptance of 
"strong" security measures means that recommending them is only likely to 
increase the gap between theory and practice). 
As a result, the new baseline recommendations were developed to satisfy the following 
aims, whilst still attempting to remain practical for healthcare implementation : 
" to represent a minimum acceptable standard for the security of operational 
healthcare systems and their associated environments; 
" to be usable by all HCEs and staff within Europe; 
" to allow a straightforward means of validating existing systems security to ensure 
compliance. 
The development of the resulting guidelines was based upon an interactive approach, in 
close co-operation with the SEISMED Reference Centres and in consultation with other 
independent healthcare professionals. The purpose of this was to ensure that the resulting 
recommendations would be genuinely applicable to the healthcare environment. 
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From the outset it was established that the recommendations should address more than just 
the host system in isolation. Indeed, to provide comprehensive protection, several aspects 
of security must be considered (as previously identified in chapter 2) : 
" logical / system-based controls; 
" physical and environmental protection; 
" personnel procedures; 
" policy and administration issues. 
On the basis of these high level requirements, existing IT security guidelines and standards 
(NHS Management Executive 1992; CCTA 1993; DTI 1993) were used in conjunction with 
suggestions from within the project to formulate initial recommendations. These were 
progressively refined and enhanced over time on the basis of Reference Centre feedback and 
comments from the independent healthcare personnel. This procedure provided the 
principal criteria for retention, addition or removal of guideline recommendations. 
4.3 An Overview of Existing Systems Guidelines 
The final Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems (AIM SEISMED 1994a) are 
grouped under ten key principles of protection, representing the main elements governing 
the security of existing healthcare information systems (having been agreed in detail with the 
Reference Centres). The principles are denoted by ESP followed by a unique reference 
code, as listed in table 4.1 below. 
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Principle 
Code 
Title Number of 
Guidelines 
ESPO100 Security Policy and Administration 5 
ESP0200 Physical & Environmental Security 22 
ESP0300 Disaster Planning & Recovery 7 
ESP0400 Personnel Security 8 
ESP0500 Training and Awareness 6 
ESP0600 Information Technology Facilities Management 31 
ESP0700 Authentication & Access Control 28 
ESP0800 Database Security 21 
ESP0900 System Maintenance 5 
ESP 1000 Legislation Compliance 5 
138 
Table 4.1 : Principles of Existing Systems Security 
Each of the principles has a number of associated guidelines. These represent the specific 
security concepts or countermeasures that should be considered by the HCE to meet the 
requirements of a given principle. As established earlier, the consideration of existing 
systems encompasses a very broad range of issues and the overall coverage consequently 
extends from general concepts to specific technical measures. 
The ten protection principles are detailed further below, with description quoted directly 
from the SEISMED guidelines. In each case the general purpose of the principle is stated, 
along with a list of the main issues that are covered by the underlying guidelines. A total of 
13 8 guidelines were established and a complete listing of the individual titles (and their 
applicability to different categories of HCE staff) is given in appendix B. 
1. Security Policy & Administration 
General Principle 
A formal policy will provide clear direction and support for security within the HCE. 
Policy is formulated from the senior managerial level, with subsequent guidance 
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provided to all levels of staff. Correct administration of and adherence to the policy 
should ensure the effectiveness of HCE security controls. 
Main issues : 
" the need for a security policy; 
" policy awareness issues; 
" co-ordination and administration of security; 
" use of specialist security personnel. 
2. Physical & Environmental Security 
General Principle 
The generally open nature of HCEs and their high degree of public access dictates that 
physical security measures are a vital first stage of protection to prevent unauthorised 
access to computing equipment and facilities. Systems must also be safeguarded 
against a variety of environmental hazards that may adversely affect operation. 
Main issues : 
" physical access control; 
" security of HCE equipment; 
" protection against natural disasters; 
9 environmental controls; 
" various procedural measures. 
3. Disaster Planning & Recovery 
General Principle 
The continuous availability of Information Systems is essential to the operation of a 
modern HCE. It is essential that adequate plans are made to ensure the level of 
availability needed by the HCE can be maintained in the event of any catastrophe. 
Recovery of IT systems should be a component of an overall HCE disaster / recovery 
plan. 
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Main issues : 
" continuity planning (including the development, testing and update of plans); 
" fallback arrangements; 
" post-disaster procedures and controls. 
4. Personnel Security 
General Principle 
The major security weakness of many systems is not the technology but the people 
involved. Many organisations are extremely vulnerable to threats from their own staff 
and, as a result, even the most comprehensive technical controls will not guarantee 
absolute security. There are, however, a number of personnel-related measures that 
can be introduced to help reduce the risks. 
Main issues : 
9 staff recruitment; 
" contractual agreements promoting security; 
" security during normal working practices; 
" staff appraisal and monitoring; 
" termination of employment. 
5. Training & Awareness 
General Principle 
Information systems security can only be maintained if all personnel involved in their 
use know, understand and accept the necessary precautions. Many breaches are the 
result of incorrect behaviour by general staff who are unaware of security basics. The 
provision of security training and awareness will make it possible for staff to consider 
the security implications of their actions and avoid creating unnecessary risks. 
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Main issues : 
" the need for general security awareness; 
" specific areas that must be addressed (job training, use of information systems); 
" recommendations for internal / DICE training and awareness initiatives; 
" use of specialist training courses; 
" assignment of responsibilities for training. 
6. Information Technology Facilities Management 
General Principle 
A variety of activities can be identified that are related to the normal day-to-day use 
and administration of information systems. All categories of HCE personnel 
(management, technical and general users) have responsibilities that must be addressed 
in order to maintain security in this area. 
Main issues : 
" system planning and control; 
" the importance of maintaining back-ups; 
" media controls (e. g. handling, transport and disposal); 
" auditing and system monitoring; 
" virus controls (e. g. prevention, detection and recovery); 
" documentation issues (e. g. availability and control). 
7. Authentication & Access Control 
General Principle 
It is essential that IT systems are protected by comprehensive logical access controls. 
Access should be guaranteed for legitimate users and denied to all others. All classes 
of user must be identified and authenticated before any access is granted and further 
mechanisms must control subsequent reading, writing, modification and deletion of 
applications and data. There should be no method for bypassing any authentication or 
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access controls. HCE users are unlikely to be satisfied with controls that intrude upon 
working practices and chosen schemes should be transparent and convenient in order to 
gain acceptance. 
Main issues 
" requirements for user identification and authentication; 
" password issues (e. g. secrecy, selection and changing); 
" system and object access restrictions; 
" methods of control; 
" access in special cases (e. g. system management, third parties, temporary staff). 
8. Database Security 
General Principle 
Database security is concerned with the enforcement of the security policy concerning 
the disclosure, modification or destruction of a database system's data. Databases are 
fast becoming very important for HCEs. Over 90% of today's IT systems contain some 
kind of database and the value of information stored is now widely recognised as a 
major asset, far more important than any other software. However, databases also 
introduce additional security concerns (e. g. granularity, inference, aggregation, 
filtering, journaling etc. ) and therefore warrant specific consideration. 
Main issues : 
9 control of medical database software; 
" organisation and administration of HCE database systems; 
" database operation issues. 
9. System Maintenance 
General Principle 
System maintenance activities merit special consideration given the opportunities that 
exist to affect the operation of the system. Unauthorised or uncontrolled changes to 
any aspect of an operational system could potentially compromise security and, in some 
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cases, endanger life. Maintenance must therefore be carried out in accordance with 
well-defined procedures. 
Main issues : 
" controls to prevent unauthorised changes to and upgrades of HCE software, vendor 
software and operating systems; 
" requirements for testing and acceptance. 
10. Legislation Compliance 
General Principle 
Specific levels of protection may be demanded in order to comply with national and 
European legislative requirements, as well to satisfy internal HCE policy. Whilst the 
guidelines highlight the most basic requirements, this principle represents an ongoing 
process which must take account of any new legislation that may be relevant, as well as 
ensuring compliance with existing standards. 
Main issues : 
" data protection; 
9 abuse of information systems; 
" prohibition of "pirated" software; 
" compliance with internal security standards; 
" retention and protection of business records. 
4.4 HCE Target Audiences 
The new guidelines are intended to provide a common source of reference for European 
healthcare establishments and are broadly relevant to (and will affect) all categories of 
personnel. However, it should be evident that many of the specific issues covered will not 
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be relevant to all HCE staff. As such, the Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare 
Systems are targeted at three main staff groups (as shown in figure 4.2), with separate 











Fig. 4.2 : HCE target audiences 
IT & Security 
Personnel 
(122 Guidelines) 
Whilst all three sets draw upon the same core principles, they nevertheless differ 
dramatically in terms of the type and quantity of information presented. The significance of 
each audience, along with the anticipated readership and general content of each guideline 
set, is summarised below. 
9 The General guideline set is aimed at the majority of HCE staff, including 
clinicians, administrators and general system users. Although the need for 
security is most likely to be considered in the context of HCPs, it should be 
remembered that security issues actually apply to all health workers. Many non- 
care staff (e. g. secretaries and clerks) will also handle sensitive data and make 
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extensive use of IT systems. Guidelines are presented for user reference during 
day-to-day use of HCE information systems, highlighting what they can do to 
safeguard security. 
" The Management set primarily targets the senior decision makers within the 
DICE, who will be responsible for defining security policy (although a significant 
number of points will also be relevant at department / line management level). 
Management will be central in setting the style and standards of operation 
within the HCE, but may be unaware of the dangers posed by inattention to the 
key security issues. This set is intended to highlight areas in which management 
should be directly involved and also improve management security awareness by 
explaining / justifying the importance of other more technical guidelines (for 
which management approval will be required). 
" The IT & Security Personnel set is aimed at IT staff, system administrators, 
security officers and other support staff who will be most likely to have the 
lower level responsibilities for implementing security. Information technology 
personnel will occasionally need access to, or come into contact with, health 
data as part of systems development, operation and maintenance activities. This 
is the most detailed of the subsets and should be a key source of reference for 
the implementation and validation of security. 
The Management and IT & Security audiences would also be required to read and observe 
the General guideline set. 
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A complete description of the individual guidelines and how they apply to each staff group 
is obviously outside the scope of this thesis. However, as an illustration of how the 
emphasis is altered for each target audience, the following example guidelines (all taken 
from the Security Policy & Administration principle and relating to the need to formulate 
and observe a Security Policy Document) may be considered : 
"All users should acquaint themselves with the HCE security policy and 
observe any general regulations as well as any that may specifically 
apply to their role or department. " 
"Written documentation detailing HCE security policy (or a synopsis of 
the main points) must be available to all personnel. It should contain a 
clear definition of information security, as well as a clear and 
unambiguous explanation of the objectives and scope in relation to the 
HCE. The specific principles and guidelines implemented by the HCE 
should also be detailed. " 
"Technical staff should provide relevant expertise to assist management 
in the formulation of the HCE security policy. They should 
subsequently acquaint themselves with the policy in full and observe any 
general regulations as well as any that may specifically apply to their role 
or department. " 
4.5 Implementation of the recommendations 
It was envisaged that the Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems would be 
broadly applicable in any European Healthcare Establishment with existing operational 
information systems. They will be relevant even where systems are thought to include 
security provision, so that the level of protection can be validated against the 
recommendations. 
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However, given the diverse nature of European healthcare environments and systems, it was 
impossible to specify precise guidelines for implementation that would be correct for all 
scenarios. Healthcare establishments will differ in terms of both the information systems 
used, as well as financial, operational and other constraints that may apply. These issues 
will all have bearing on the applicability of the recommendations and the guidelines 
therefore concentrated more on describing what aspects of security should be considered 
rather than how they may be best implemented (with broad recommendations that should be 
compatible, to at least some degree, with the majority of systems and environments). 
Despite these attempts to ensure applicability, it was still conceivable that some guidelines 
may not be suitable for all systems. In general, the baseline is flexible enough to accept that 
some guidelines are not implemented and, as such, implementors can use their discretion in 
cases where guidelines are genuinely inappropriate to the environment. However, 
recommendations should be followed as closely as possible and in some cases the 
implementation of a guideline will rely upon others already being in place (which is made 
clear from the guideline context and / or cross-references to other points). 
As for the implementation strategy itself, it would obviously be impractical to attempt to 
address all of the suggestions at once due to constraints of cost and likely disruption to 
services. A phased approach is, therefore, advised in which each principle is considered in 
turn to identify the areas in which the HCE / department is currently deficient. The 
individual guidelines can then be assessed to determine implementation priorities based upon 
local requirements. 
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Further work within the SEISMED project resulted in the development of the methodology 
SIM-ETHICS (Security Implementation Methodology - Effective Technical and Human 
Implementation of Computer based Systems) which may be used to assist with the 
implementation of these and other SEISMED guidelines (Warren and Gaunt 1993). The 
methodology is based upon the concept of participational management, using groups of 
users and managers to carry out a hypothetical implementation of chosen security 
countermeasures. This provides a means of highlighting any problems which may occur, 
allowing them to be overcome in advance of the actual implementation. An expert system 
to support this methodology is currently under development (Warren 1995). 
Finally, the Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems should not be considered 
in isolation and a number of the other SEISMED guideline deliverables are also relevant in 
the context of existing systems. These include specific guidelines relating to high-level 
security policy (AIM SEISMED 1993b), network security (AIM SEISMED 1994b), data 
encryption (ATM SEISMED 1994c) and system development (AIM SEISMED 1995b). 
4.6 Potential Problems 
Whilst the new recommendations were intended to provide a simple and straightforward 
means of addressing healthcare security issues, it was recognised that problems may exist. 
Firstly, many establishments may currently be operating with security significantly below the 
recommended standard and progression to the required level could consequently be a non- 
trivial task. As mentioned in the discussion of implementation, HCEs may face a number of 
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constraints that affect their ability to address security requirements. For example, cost (in 
terms of finance, performance and practicality) will be a significant factor in determining 
acceptability. Financial cost will be particularly relevant, given the previous observation 
that expenditure for direct care activities is likely to receive higher priority than security. In 
addition, organisational constraints will play a role in so far as recommendations will need 
to integrate with existing practice (or, at least, not conflict too greatly) in order to gain 
acceptance. If such constraints are present, establishments are advised to consider that 
every guideline implemented will improve the security of their systems. 
Conversely, some environments and / or applications may demand a level of security 
significantly higher than the proposed baseline. This point was recognised within the 
research project and led to the definition of the protection methodology that will be 
described in chapter 5. 
4.7 Conclusions 
In conclusion, it is believed that the guidelines have fulfilled their objective of providing a 
solid basis for the improvement of security within existing HCE systems. Whilst baseline 
protection alone will not be sufficient in many scenarios, uniform adoption would provide 
the common foundation that the survey indicated was lacking. 
With regard to further development of the baseline, it is envisaged that whilst the principles 
will remain relatively static, the underlying guidelines will require periodic updates to 
account for changes within the healthcare field or in the types of information system 
technology available (e. g. the increasing use of multimedia systems may introduce new 
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considerations). Changes within the local HCE (e. g. organisational structure, medical 
applications and practices) may also necessitate re-evaluation of some recommendations. 
The involvement of the SEISMED reference centres has already ensured the general 
healthcare acceptability and applicability of the guidelines at a theoretical level. Further 
work is in progress at the time of writing in which selected guidelines are actually being 
implemented to provide a practical validation. These experiences will also be documented 
and available for future reference by European HCEs (AIM SEISMED 1995c). 
Details of the guidelines are to be published in the proceedings of the SEISMED workshop 
"Security and Legal Aspects of Advanced Telematics Systems" (Brussels, 11 July 1994) and 
a separate paper has also been submitted to the international journal Medical Informatics. 
Both of these papers are included in Appendix F. 
The next chapter will now proceed to consider how protection may be taken beyond the 
baseline level in the more sensitive healthcare scenarios. 
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5.1 Addressing healthcare security requirements above baseline 
It is recognised that, whilst comprehensive, the baseline level recommendations will not be 
sufficient for all healthcare information systems and stronger protection will be required in 
some scenarios. The next question is, therefore, how these requirements may be best 
addressed. 
Whilst the application of the baseline is relatively easy (insofar as all guidelines are generally 
meant to be considered in all systems), progressing beyond it will be more complicated in 
that requirements will be much more system or environment-specific. HCEs will need to 
determine where further protection is required and what level is appropriate. It is, 
therefore, necessary to have some method by which these factors can be determined. 
5.1.1 Traditional risk analysis 
It can be seen from chapter 3 that the large scale introduction of security in healthcare 
across Europe is hampered by the variety of different applications and system 
configurations that may be identified. The issue is further complicated by the variety of 
information that may be held and the fact that several different levels of data sensitivity 
may exist. These factors make it impossible to assert a single level of security that will 
be appropriate for all applications, without being excessive in some cases (which is why 
the guidelines discussed in chapter 4 could only recommend the minimum, baseline level 
of protection). 
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As a result, healthcare establishments require guidance on the selection of appropriate 
measures, as well as on where and how they should be incorporated into their systems. 
The commonly accepted means of achieving this is to conduct a risk analysis 
investigation, where a specialist IT analyst looks in detail at the value of systems and 
data and determines the specific threats and vulnerabilities that apply to the establishment 
involved. This then results in a tailored security package for the system. However, it is 
possible to identify two significant disadvantages : 
1. a full risk analysis investigation can be a complicated and, therefore, time 
consuming process involving the co-operation of many HCE staff, which may 
result in significant disruption of normal working activity; 
2. the required specialists are unlikely to exist in most HCEs, which will 
necessitate the use of potentially costly outside consultancy. 
These points are underlined by the observations of Gaunt (1992) in relation to the 
practical use of the CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Methodology) 
methodology in HCEs. Whilst CRAMM is the method currently advocated by the UK 
National Health Service (Barber et al. 1993b), the process of conducting a review was 
considered too involved and too difficult for healthcare middle management to 
undertake. The need for a "trimmed-down" approach was identified. 
73 
x^ 
Chapter 5: A Generic Methodology, f or Healthcare Data Security 
As a consequence of these points, it can be seen that such an analysis may be prohibitive 
in many HCEs. However, given that many of the threats and vulnerabilities in 
healthcare are not unique to individual establishments, a full analysis in each case may be 
largely unnecessary. It is, in fact, possible to provide a protection methodology in which 
the basic risk analysis has already been performed, allowing existing systems to be easily 
classified in order to determine their security requirements. 
5.1.2 Requirements for a profiling methodology 
By studying the care activities carried out by the hospitals, general practitioners and 
community health centres (as well as the various support services that are necessary to 
facilitate these activities) the framework of a generic protection methodology for the 
healthcare environment has been developed. This is intended to provide a simplified 
means by which HCEs may determine their own security requirements. 
It was previously established in the discussion of the existing systems guidelines that 
security must be examined from the perspective of the whole system, considering all 
elements that may influence protection requirements. However, in providing a 
methodology there were two rather conflicting requirements : 
" given that recommendations will need to be selected to suit the host system 
rather than being applied across the board, it is desirable to use a simpler 
structure than that provided by the existing systems security principles (so that 
the approach can still be easily understood and applied by non-specialists); 
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" at the same time, the approach must not be so simplistic that it does not allow 
recommendations to be tailored (to some degree) to the host systems under 
consideration. 
A compromise was, therefore, reached in which HCE systems may be categorised at a 
generic level, as shown in figure 5.1. 
Information 
System 
Computer Operational Data 
Configuration Environment Sensitivity 
Fig. 5.1 : Elements of an information system 
These elements have been incorporated into the framework of a methodology as shown 
in figure 5.2, illustrating the high-level steps involved in determining the security 
requirements of existing systems and selecting appropriate countermeasures. The 
rationale behind the methodology is that similar organisations and systems will have 
similar security requirements. From this came the concept of developing generic system 
protection profiles that could then be used in any establishment. 
However, the number of possible system variations makes it impractical to derive a 
profile for each of them on an individual basis. The most workable approach was 
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considered to be the development of a series of smaller profiles targeting each key 
element of a system. It would then be possible, using appropriate combinations of the 
profiled elements, to generate high-level system profiles to account for the majority of 
healthcare IT scenarios. What the methodology therefore proposes is a "mix and match" 














Fig. 5.2: Existing Systems Protection Methodology Overview 
Although the purpose of the methodology is to remove the need for a specialist IT risk 
analyst, it would still need to be applied by someone with a high level of IT expertise 
in 
order that the significance of its recommendations can be properly appreciated. 
It is 
envisaged that HCE information systems administrators or security officers would suffice 
in this capacity. 
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As shown in figure 5.2, the methodology proceeds up to the point of final 
countermeasure selection. The subsequent implementation would then proceed in the 
same manner as suggested for the baseline recommendations in chapter 4. 
5.2 Elements of the methodology 
The main elements of the methodology will now be considered in more detail. 
5.2.1 Computer Configurations 
The computer configuration refers to any IT assets that are related to the information 
system under consideration. 
At a high level it is possible to identify a relatively small number of elements that may 
be included in any given computer configuration, as illustrated by the breakdown in 
figure 5.3 below. 
Computer 
Configuration 
System Type Network Type 
Portable Desktop PC Minicomputer LAN WAN 
Laptop / Mainframe 
Standalone Networked Standalone Networked 
Fig. 5.3 : Computer Configuration groups 
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It should be noted that whilst networks are included here they were primarily the 
responsibility of a separate SEISMED workpackage, which developed a specific 
protection methodology for them (Patel and Kantzavelou 1994). As such, attention to 
this aspect was minimised. 
Protection countermeasures may be associated with each of these configuration types, 




Physical Physical access; theft protection. 
Disaster planning Maintenance contracts; alternative processing arrangements; 
backup procedures. 
S stem Authentication; logical access controls. 
Procedural Backup / recovery policy; policy for software usage; hardcopy 
control. 
Personnel O erational trainin ; Information Technology awareness. 
Table 5.1 : Computer Configuration countermeasure groups 
Individual systems would be analysed to determine which of these elements are present, 
and which countermeasures are therefore applicable. 
5.2.2 Operational Environments 
This considers the nature of the environment in which the IT assets of the establishment are 
actually located and used. 
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Table 5.2 indicates the main features of an environment that are considered to influence the 
level and type of security required. Appropriate combinations of these factors can be used 
to describe the majority of healthcare establishments from general practice (i. e. primary 
care) up to large hospitals. 
Factor Options Comments 
Location Fixed / Mobile A variable environment (e. g. as would be 
associated with a portable computer system) 
limits the environmental measures possible. 
Rural / Urban / City The geographical area in which the environment 
is located will provide a general indicator of the 
local population density, crime potential and 
likelihood of natural disasters. 
Buildings Single / Multiple The number of buildings will determine access 
control and site security requirements. 
Old / Modern The age of a building may indicate the likely 
level of risk from fire, natural damage etc. 
People Number The number and mixture of people within an 
(low, medium, high) establishment influences the requirements for 
access controls and personnel related measures. 
Staff / Contract / Public 
Table 5.2 : Operational Environment categorisation 
Again, the basic countermeasures appropriate to each type of environment can be identified 




Site Securi Building / site access controls; theft prevention measures. 
Disaster Plannin Protection against fire, flood and natural disasters. 
Procedural Control of visitors; controls on smoking, eating and drinking. L7- 
Personnel Job recruitment / termination; security awareness. 
Table 5.3 : Operational Environment countermeasure groups 
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5.2.3 Data Sensitivity 
It should be evident from previous comments that data is the key aspect of healthcare 
information systems. As such, significant attention has been devoted to the issue of 
establishing a suitable means to assess data sensitivity within the methodology. 
In many cases it will ultimately be the beliefs and circumstances of the data subject that 
determines the sensitivity of personal data. At the same time, HCPs might generally argue 
that all healthcare data should be considered equally sensitive. However, neither of these 
observations are of any real use in a practical sense for specifying protection and some 
means of general assessment is necessary. As a first step it is useful to identify that the 







Fig. 5.4 : Factors of data sensitivity 
These aspects, along with a means of assigning sensitivity ratings, are discussed in the sub- 
sections that follow. 
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5.2.3.1 Overview of healthcare data requirements 
A high level analysis reveals that the basic activities performed during care delivery fall into 
the sequence of operations shown in figure 5.5. It can be seen as an iterative process 
centred around the patient, incorporating various clinical and administrative services that 
may be called upon. 
Referral 
I Identification of patient i 
Consult history of patient 
Determine present state of 
health 
i Diagnose problem and decide Care Plan 
Carry out Care Plan 
Analysis of results of Care 
Plan 
Final state of health I 
End of Episode 
Clinical and administration 
services 
Potential Involvement 
at all stages 
Fig. 5.5 : General care activity flow 
All stages of care delivery may produce or require various types of data - the type, 
sensitivity and quantity of which will depend upon the problems and requirements of the 
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patient involved. In addition, the various associated support services will also generate 
much information. It is likely that most (if not all) of this data will require protection to 
preserve its confidentiality, integrity and / or availability. 




General Special Sensitive 
Fig. 5.6 : Classifications of medical data 
Operational data is related to day to day clinical care, involving information that is used 
to directly govern care decisions. This will generally have the greater requirements in 
terms of data integrity and availability. Further general subdivisions can be identified, 
this time based on the confidentiality demands of the information, as shown below : 
" General 
Data relating to the vast majority of patients requiring healthcare services within 
an establishment. 
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" Special 
Data that relates to patients who are also HCE staff members, or represent 
special categories within the community (e. g. VIPs, politicians etc. ). Information 
disclosure is likely to have greater impact for these individuals and, as a 
consequence, there may be an increased likelihood of the data being the target of 
a breach (e. g. for blackmail or journalistic purposes). 
" Sensitive 
Data relating to patients with particularly sensitive health problems, such as 
AIDS or psychological disorders. The level of protection required in these cases 
will frequently be influenced by statutory control (e. g. UK Mental Health Act). 
Non-operational data refers to information that does not directly influence patient care 
decisions. Such information may be related more towards planning and resourcing purposes 
(for example, analysis of trends and workloads), management and administration of non- 
clinical departments (e. g. finance, estates) or the control of supporting systems (e. g. air 
conditioning, telephone switchboards). Whilst not directly associated with care activity, this 
data is still essential to the optimal functioning of the HCE. 
Whilst these categories are useful as a general guideline, it is necessary to have a more 
detailed breakdown of medical data before it becomes possible to assign suitable protection 
with any accuracy. The approach taken to accomplish this was to develop a generic model 
of all major data types used in healthcare. 
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5.2.3.2 A Healthcare Generic Data Model 
The decision was taken to develop a generic data model to provide a simple means of 
specifying what data is available within a system and thereby help with this stage of 
allocating protection. 
A number of existing healthcare data models were considered (including the Korner Data 
Model (NHS 1985) and the NETS Common Basic Specification (NHS 1990)) but none 
appeared to be viable for use in security specification. The main problems were that the 
models were either too detailed to be practically useful or had not been devised with 
security considerations in mind. A simplified model of the information stored within the 
HCEs was therefore required. 
At a very broad level, the range of sensitivity for healthcare-related data can be defined as 
follows (Commission of European Communities 1991b) : 
name -- > Administrative -- > Personal -- > Highly sensitive personal data 
data data & diagnostic data 
However, this breakdown is rather too simplistic for security specification purposes, in that 
each of the last three categories can be seen to encompass a very wide range of information. 
As a result, varying levels of sensitivity will exist within them. 
In order to establish a more comprehensive high-level view of data requirements, a number 
of basic system arrangements were examined from various establishments within Europe 
(including the SEISMED Reference Centres and further hospitals located in Hannover, 
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Thessaloniki and Dublin). The key groups of data utilised by these systems were then 
identified, and structured into an initial model which was considered to be an appropriate 
foundation for specifying protection guidelines. Subsequent refinements were then made 
based on opinions gathered from various healthcare personnel. 
The new model is comprised of twelve data groups as shown in figure 5.7, providing a 
framework that should encompass all data required by a HCE. 
Patient 
Identification Administration 
Demo fq* c k-JCnrocffl n 
Solo Data 
Walting List Info 
Theatre mgmt 
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- Forma 
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Fig. 5.7 : Healthcare Generic Data Model 
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The diagrammatic form shown in the figure is intended to provide a consistent and 
conceptually simple means of indicating and representing the data utilised by different 
healthcare applications. It should be noted that the groups specified can also adequately 
include all of the healthcare data types that have previously been cited as being important 
from the security viewpoint (Gritzalis et al. 1991). 
The data groups identified by the model are of a high-level nature, but they can be sub- 
divided into further levels of detail as required. The following pages include a breakdown 
of each data group, including a brief description of the type of information held and example 
data items. 
1. Patient Identification 
This group describes the general information that is held regarding each 
patient referred to the healthcare service. It is often used in a number of 
systems within the organisation. The data is split into demographic and 
social subcategories. Demographic data is largely for identification 
purposes, whereas social data may also be required in order to determine 
additional risks, genetic predisposition and the need for modifications to 
normal care. The disclosure of social data generally has the greater 
potential for embarrassment. 
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Next of Kin, 





2. Patient Administration 
Data that describes patients contact with the HCE. This group contains 
information used in the day to day scheduling of the various non-clinical 
care activities carried out on patients (e. g. the delivery of resources that in 
turn facilitate clinical care). It allows for the planning and efficient 
running of a large number and complex sequence of system operations. 
Example data : 
Waiting List 
Time and date of Appointments 
Name of clinic 
In patient or Out patient 
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Scheduling of operations 
Consultants 
Anaesthetists 
Routine or emergency 
Inventory 
Ward and Bed Management 
Patient Groups 
Specialities 
Day care details 
Service Capacity 
Transport 
Emergency and routine allocation 
Routes 
Times and dates 
Referral Details 
Method, Source 
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Date, Method 
Destination 
3. Patient Care 
This group contains the medical history, diagnosis, care decisions and the 
treatment information relating to individual patients. It is essentially the 
electronic representation of the patient healthcare record. 
Example data : 
Episode Information 
Dates of admissions / discharges 
Staff Involved 





Outcome of treatment 
Consultants and anaesthetists reports 
4. Clinical Services 
This data group is obtained from the analysis facilities within the HCE. It 
is concerned with the operational functioning of service departments and 
the data generated is for internal use within the departments (i. e. not 
patient related). 
89 
Chapter 5: A Generic Methodology for Healthcare Data Security 















Stock control details 
5. Finance 
This group of data covers all aspects of finance involved in the operation 
of healthcare organisations. Data here is used for payroll, acquisition and 
economic modelling purposes. Such information could conceivably be of 
use to competing HCEs and could disrupt operations (including the 
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potential to indirectly affect patient care activity) if damaged or 
unavailable for long periods. 






6. Hotel Services 
This group covers the information stored on all of the basic 
"housekeeping" functions within healthcare establishments. Principal 
examples include catering, portering, transport and cleaning services. 
Example data : 
Hospital supplies 
Catering 
Domestic / cleaning 
Works data 
7. Staff 
This group includes personnel information on all grades of staff working 
within the HCE. 
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Example data : 
Personnel details 
Rostering information 
8. Resource Management and Planning 
This group involves the data used in management, monitoring and 
planning of healthcare organisations. 
Example data : 






Planning and estimating 
General management data 
9. Library and Information Services 
This data group encompasses the existing medical knowledge that is 
referenced by clinical staff and national / local protocols for clinical 
management. Such data is not normally linked to individual patient 
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records (although it may be referenced in order to justify a clinical 
decision). 
Example data : 
Medical Knowledge 
Drug Information 
Definitions - Codings 
- Classifications 
Care guidelines, procedures and protocols 
10. Expert Systems 
This group represents information utilised by decision support tools and / 
or neural networks within the HCE. These may directly assist in the 
planning of healthcare to determine the most appropriate care for 
individual patients, or in the overall running of the HCE. Data integrity is 
obviously highly important for the correct / effective operation of such 
tools. This data is represented as a separate group as it also refers to the 
data that is used to control the expert system as opposed to just the 
information that is presented to users. In addition, systems offer the power 
of deduction and, as such, the accessible information will not necessarily be 
predefined, making sensitivity more difficult to quantify. 
Example data : 
Expert knowledge 
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Decision support data 
Probability matrices 
Decision trees 
11. Communications Services 
This group serves to identify the process of internal communication within 
the HCE and takes into consideration the different formats by which data 
is transmitted. 
The majority of communicated information would ultimately reside in 
another data group of the model. The nature of shared healthcare 
information systems essentially means that the storage of data by one 
individual will ultimately lead to its communication to other staff. 
Conversely, communication is often the starting point for a large amount 
of patient data (for example, information on all services required and 
conducted on behalf of the patient) and may, therefore, be potentially 
sensitive. Additionally, it may be possible either to determine directly or 
infer information on service levels or HCE productivity (e. g. from 
communications such as staff work planning, supply orders, requisition of 
tests and return of results), all of which requires protection. 
The group could contain a wide range of additional data that is generated 
during the communication of information around the organisation (i. e. e- 
mail, transaction information, requests for activity, general notices). 
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12. External Systems 
This group recognises the potential for substantial data relationships / flows 
to exist between different applications. The incorporation of this group 
into a mapping may therefore be used to represent the `interface" to another 
system. 
A specific application may store or communicate data from all of these groups, or a 
particular subset of them. It is consequently possible to map real world systems onto the 
model, indicating the data groups that are involved. This is effectively the first step in 
establishing the data sensitivity of the system. Figure 5.8 shows how the mapping of a 
Patient Administration System (as found in the Plymouth Reference Centre) could 
appear. 
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Fig. 5.8 : Patient Administration System mapping 
Further example mappings, based upon operational systems found within Plymouth and 
Thessaloniki hospitals can be found in appendix C. These were specified by the 
establishments concerned, who were amongst those given access to the model and data 
group descriptions for evaluation purposes. The resulting mappings should, therefore, give 
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model can be applied in practical scenarios. The applications covered include radiology and 
mental health systems (Plymouth) and staffing, accounting, pharmacy and patient 
administration systems (Thessaloniki). This last example can be usefully contrasted with the 
system represented in figure 5.8, in that whilst they represent the same basic application, 
different data groups are encompassed. This in turn indicates that an alternative approach 
to protection profiling that was considered (based upon specifying standard profiles for 
generic types of healthcare application, such as `Patient Administration System') would 
have been impractical. 
The generic data model was the subject of a paper presented at the MIE 93 Medical 
Informatics Congress in Jerusalem during April 1993 (Sanders and Furnell 1993), a copy of 
which can be found in Appendix F. 
5.2.3.3 Data Use 
Whilst the model allows easier identification of the types of data present in a system, it has 
already been stated that data sensitivity is also affected by the context in which the 
information is used. As such, it is also necessary for the methodology to incorporate a 
similarly high level set of data uses. 
Related work within the SEISMED project (AIM SEISMED 1993a) identified a generic set 
of nine healthcare data uses that were suitable for the model. However, this work only 
provided a simple description of the different uses and did not attempt to relate them to any 
corresponding requirements for security. The nine categories are 
described in table 5.4, 
with further information relating to sensitivity rating 
being added in the next section. 
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Data Use Description 
Operational Clinical Used in the planning, delivery and monitoring of patient 
healthcare. 
Emergency Care Provision of care in a clinical emergency, where optimal 
conditions and / or information cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, 
only a minimum set of essential data is required, with HCPs 
relying on their own train . experience. 
Critical Clinical Control of instrumentation / systems in direct feedback loops (e. g. 
control of radiation dose administration to cancer patients). Data 
availability and integrity essential in such contexts. 
Expert Systems Use in decision support tools or neural networks, which aid 
clinical diagnosis and interpretation or general management of 
HCE. 
Operational non- Use of information that supports the HCE infrastructure, but does 
clinical not directly influence the care of individuals. 
Financial Use of data in financial systems for contract management, 
Purchasing and patient billing. 
Planning & resource Systems used for aggregation of patient data for planning and 
management clinical review purposes. 
Quality Management Systems using data for clinical audit, assessment of care efficiency 
and outcome. 
Clinical Research Identifiable or anonymised data used for research purposes. 
Normally utilises aggregated data. 
Table 5.4 : General categories of medical data usage 
5.2.3.4 Approach to sensitivity rating 
Data sensitivity has been considered in terms of the following key impacts that may result 
from lack of protection, covering the issues of confidentiality, integrity and availability : 
" information disclosure; 
" denial of access to data; 
" modification of data; 
" destruction of data. 
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These impacts are rated at different levels, with different sets of countermeasures being 
associated with each level of each impact type. For simplicity, ratings are low, medium or 
high (where low represents basic protection and high is the maximum level of 
countermeasure available). The impact level has been assigned by considering a number of 
potential consequences (as previously identified in chapter 2) : 
" loss of confidentiality; 
" disruption of activities; 
" embarrassment; 
" failure to meet legal obligations; 
" financial loss; 
" threat to personal safety. 
The potential impacts relate to the types of data involved and the way(s) in which it is used. 
The impact from disclosure is most closely related to the data type involved. Data will 
generally portray the same information in all contexts and the protection afforded should 
therefore remain consistent regardless of the application that uses it. Conversely, any impact 
resulting from denial, modification or destruction of data is heavily influenced by the 
purpose for which it is being used 
As an example we may consider patient information indicating that an individual is a 
registered drug addict. When used in the context of direct care the denial, modification or 
destruction of such information could adversely affect care delivery and hence the 
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requirement for protection would be quite high. However, if the same information was used 
in a less critical context (e. g. generation of a statistical summary of addict cases), then the 
resulting impacts could be somewhat less. In either case, the raw data would be the same, 
and hence the impact from disclosure would remain the same. 
A set of general impact ratings are presented in tables 5.5 and 5.6. These valuations were 
determined using the following strategy. In the case of individual data types and uses, the 
rating levels were influenced by considering the six factors above. As an example of this, 
table 5.7 lists the main factors that influenced the ratings for the data type Patient Care and 
the Operational Clinical data use. At a higher level, more general criteria were considered, 
such as the need to maintain the integrity of patient care data. From this, it can be seen that 
the data modification impact is rated high in all contexts that may relate to care delivery. 
Finally, opinions were gathered from various European medical practitioners, using a small 
survey that contained the set of initial valuations and asked for feedback on their validity 
(AIM SEISMED 1993c). This served to provide some level of validation and the final 
values are based upon an amalgamation of the responses received (and should, therefore, 
represent a reasonable view of the issue). 
Having first identified the data types and uses in a system, it is then possible to use these 
ratings to determine the appropriate levels of protection countermeasure. Where a number 
of types and uses are identified, the extraction of the highest impact values will allow 
protection to be delivered that caters for the worst case scenarios. 
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Data Group Disclosure 
Impact 
Patient Identification Low 
Patient Administration Medium 
Patient Care High 
Clinical Services Low 
Finance Medium 
Hotel Services Low 
Staff Low 
Resource Management & Planning Medium 
_Library 
& Information Services High 
Expert Systems Medium 
Communications Services High 
External Systems High 
Table 5.5 : Sensitivity ratings for data disclosure 






Operational Clinical Medium High Medium 
Emergency Care Medium High Medium 
Critical Clinical High High High 
Expert Systems Low High Low 
Operational non-clinical Low Low Low 
Financial Medium Medium Medium 
Planning & Resource Mgmt Low Low Low 
Quality Management Low Low Low 
Clinical Research Low Low Low 
Table 5.6 : Sensitivity ratings for data denial, modification & destruction 
Data Type or Use Impact Type Rating Reason / Derived from 
Patient Care Disclosure High confidentiality, embarrassment. legal 
Operational Clinical Denial Medium disruption, safety 
Modification High safety, legal 
Destruction Medium disruption, safe 
Table 5.7 : Derivation of sensitivity ratings 
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Whilst these valuations serve to give an illustration of the concept, it would be possible to 
specify them in greater detail by using a more extensive breakdown of impact types and 
levels. However, this was not considered necessary during the development of the 
methodology (see section 5.6.1 for further discussion of this aspect). 
5.3 Countermeasure selection 
Security countermeasures can be identified and refined at various stages within the 
methodology. The overview diagram from Figure 5.2 categorised them under three 
headings, which are distinguished as follows : 
1. Basic system countermeasures 
These represent the minimal security considerations for a given type of computer 
configuration operating in a particular environment, and should be considered 
irrespective of the data held or the purpose(s) for which the system is used. 
2. Appropriate countermeasures 
These represent the overall set of countermeasures that may be appropriate for a given 
system, having also considered what data is used and how. This does not take into 
account any practical constraints that may apply in respect to implementation. 
3. Selected countermeasures 
Whilst the "appropriate countermeasures" may represent an ideal solution, a number of 
real world factors are also likely to influence the final selection process (identified as 
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`other factors" in figure 5.2). These are principally considered to include the following 
elements : 
" Cost constraints 
The cost of adopting particular countermeasures may be considered from 
several perspectives (e. g. financial, performance, practicality etc. ). 
Acceptable levels will obviously be highly dependent upon individual 
environments and their priorities. As previously identified, financial cost is 
perceived to be a particularly important factor in security-related decision 
making for the majority of healthcare establishments. 
" Operational constraints 
The nature of the organisation itself will also influence countermeasure 
selection. Proposals should not conflict too greatly with the established 
practice of the particular healthcare environment, or they risk being rejected. 
This relates to the idea of "staff culture" that was previously identified in 
section 2.4.4. 
" Existing countermeasures 
Any security countermeasures that are already in place will obviously 
influence whether some of the suggested countermeasures need to be 
considered / adopted. 
These are obviously subjective elements in the application of the methodology and, as 
such, it is not possible to formalise them further. 
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The `elected countermeasures" represent the final output of the methodology (having 
considered any limitations of the individual HCE), which may be added to the existing 
system to address its security requirements. 
Given that the objective of the work was to establish a methodology framework, the 
definition of a full range of accompanying countermeasures was outside the scope of the 
research programme. However, the issue is being addressed as part of a further research 
project which is currently building upon the foundation that has been provided here (Warren 
1995). For completeness, illustrative examples of the types of countermeasures that might 
be recommended are included in the example scenario in section 5.5. 
5.4 Formal stages of the methodology 
This section describes the formal steps by which the methodology may be implemented. 




















Countermeasures are derived as shown in figure 5.9. Appropriate countermeasures would be 
selected at each stage from corresponding categories (note that some 
duplication would be 
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likely to occur in terms of the suggestions arising). The stages of the methodology may be 
more formally described as shown in table 5.8. 
Stage Description 
1 Determine basic system profile 
Inputs None 
Output Basic system countermeasures 
Description Categorisation of the computer configuration and operational 
environment of the existing system according to pre-determined 
profile categories. 
For computer configuration choose appropriate elements from : 
" Laptop / Portable 
" Desktop PC 
" Mini / Mainframe 
" Network 




2 Determine data sensitivi 
Inputs None 
Output Data-related countermeasures 
Description Establishment of data types and uses. Selection of countermeasures 
based upon sensitivities encompassed. 
Choose countermeasures from each of the following groups based 
upon sensitivity levels identified : 
" Disclosure countermeasures 
" Denial / Destruction countermeasures 
" Modification countermeasures 
This stage is described further in section 5.4.1. 
3 Determine appr opriate system countermeasures 
Inputs Basic system countermeasures; Data-related countermeasures 
Output Appropriate system countermeasures 
Description Combination of the countermeasures obtained from stages 1&2 to 
form an initial countermeasure set that would satisfy the requirements 
of the existing system. 
4 Select final countermeasures 
Inputs Appropriate countermeasures 
Output Selected (final) system countermeasures. 
Description Refinement of the countermeasure set by considering any HCE 
specific factors / constraints that may apply. 
Table 5.8 : Formal stages of the protection methodology 
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5.4.1 Determining Data Sensitivity 
Determining the countermeasures dictated by data sensitivity is the most complex stage of 
the methodology, as they will be based upon a variety of impact values derived from the data 
involved. It is necessary to establish : 
" impact valuations for disclosure (based on data type only); 
" impact valuations for denial, modification, destruction (based on data uses). 
The specific procedure involved is described in table 5.9 and illustrated in figure 5.10. 
Stage Description 
2.1 Identify the data groups involved (using the generic data model). 
2.2 Determine disclosure impacts from the model group valuations. 
2.3 Identify general data usage category(s) that apply to the system. 
2.4 Determine denial, modification and destruction impacts from usage 
valuations. 
2.5 Derive overall sensitivity values for the application by selecting "worst 
case" values from component groups (i. e. 4 values in total). From this the 
appropriate data sensitivity countermeasures may be selected. 
Table 5.9 : Stages of data sensitivity assessment 
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Identify 
Data Groups 
(from generic mode! ) 






































Fig. 5.10: Data Sensitivity Assessment 
5.5 An example of methodology implementation 
The following section presents a basic example to illustrate the application of the 
methodology. It is based upon a typical information system scenario that may be 
found 
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within the UK health service (namely the Patient Administration System example introduced 
earlier in this chapter). It has not been possible to apply the methodology in practice at this 
stage in time and the example is, therefore, a theoretical outline of how the procedure 
would work. 
As previously mentioned, the countermeasures shown would be selected from pre- 
determined lists. However, the example provides only a small, representative selection of 
what might be recommended. 
It should also be noted that the example only proceeds to the third stage of the 
methodology. The reason for this is that stage 4 relates to the consideration of subjective 
factors in specific real world environments. It was felt that the imposition of artificial 
constraints would add little to the example. 
Scenario Outline 
A patient records system is maintained by a small primary care practice. The system is 
primarily based upon a standalone PC, although selected data may be transferred to and 
from this using a portable computer that the healthcare practitioner takes on general visits 
and emergency call-outs. The practice is based in a single, modern building located in an 
inner city. 
Stage 1: Determine basic system profile 
The following factors can be determined from the scenario description : 
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Computer Configuration : Laptop / Portable - Standalone; 
Desktop PC - Standalone; 
Operational Environment : Location - Fixed & Mobile, City; 
Building - Single, Modern; 
People - Staff, Public, Low. 
Stage 2: Determine Data Sensitivity 
2.1 Identify data groups 
Three data groups are encompassed (and can be identified using the data model as 
previously shown in figure 5.8 ), these being : 
" Patient Identification; 
" Patient Administration; 
" Patient Care. 
2.2 Determine disclosure impacts 
The following ratings can be extracted from the disclosure impact valuations previously 
given in table 5.5 : 
Data Group Impact Level 
Patient Identification Low 
Patient Administration Medium 
Patient Care High 
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2.3 Identify data uses 
Potential uses of the data in a Patient Administration System are determined as being : 
9 Operational Clinical; 
9 Emergency Care. 
2.4 Determine Denial, Modification & Destruction Impacts 
The following impact valuations can be extracted from table 5.6 relating to data denial, 
modification and destruction. 






Operational Clinical Medium High Medium 
Emergency Care Medium High Medium 
2.5 Derive o vera/i sensitivity ratings 
The "worst case" values from the previous tables are used to determine the overall 
sensitivity of the system. 
Disclosure : High 
Denial : Medium 
Modification : High 
Destruction : Medium 
These are now used to determine the level of data sensitivity countermeasures. 
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Stage 3: Determine appropriate system countermeasures 
The overall countermeasure sets that would be considered in this scenario are as follows. 
Computer Configuration Countermeasures 
Laptop j Portable 
(Standalone) 
Countermeasure 
Category Example countermeasures 
Casing locks 
Physical Property markings (visible and UV) 
Protective carry case 
Service warranty 
Disaster planning Maintain / store data backups 
Carry spare batteries etc 
Use of any standard security features 
System Password protection virus checking 
Hard disk encryption 
Store sensitive data on seperate 
media 
Procedural Care of floppy disks 
Lock away when not in use 
Regular backup to desktop machine 
Stress individual accountability for 




Category Example countermeasures 
Locks and / or alarms Physical Property markings (visible and UV) 
Site to deny casual access 
On-site service contract 
Disaster planning Maintain / store data backups Documented / tested recovery 
stratejjy 
Use of any standard security features 
Password protection 
System Virus checking 
Menu-only access (no DOS) 
Integrity checksums 
Ban unauthorised software 
Procedural Control software updates Regular (potentially automatic) backups 
Care of floppy disks 
Provide software training Personnel Disciplinary procedures for misuse 
Operational Environment Countermeasures 
Single-building / Modern / City Mobile 
Countermeasure 
Category Example countermeasures 
Use of staff ID badges 
Receptionist / guard at main entrance 
Site Room access control (locks) 
Alarm systems 
Disaster planning 
Smoke and moisture detectors 
Fire alarm (linked to fire station) 
Visitors escorted (non-public areas) 
Procedural Strangers challenged (non-public 
areas) 
Prohibit smoking 
Controlled access hours 
Personnel Defined responsibilities 
Monitor maintenance work 
The nature of this environment is, by 
definition, variable, making it difficult to cite 
environment-specific countermeasures. 
Additional attention should, therefore, be 
devoted to the physical countermeasures 
relating to the computer configuration, with 
the level of protection being appropriate to 
account for the "worst case" scenario. 
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Data Sensitivity Countermeasures 
Disclosure 
Countermeasure 
Level Example countermeasures 





Removable storage media 




level Example countermeasures 





Denial / Destruction 
Countermeasure 
Level Example countermeasures 
Regular recovery checks 
Medium Alternative processing arrangements Disk shadowing 
Resource control 
5.6 Extension of the methodology 
Whilst the methodology is considered to provide a reasonably comprehensive means of 
classifying the additional protection requirements of existing systems, there are several ways 
in which it could be extended or improved. Two principal ideas are presented in this 
section. 
5.6.1 Enhanced system classification 
There is definite potential to extend the level of classification for each of the key 
information system elements used in the methodology. This has the obvious advantage that 
allowing greater levels of specificity in profiling will result in the countermeasures being 
increasingly tailored to the needs of the host systems. 
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With regard to the computer configuration, further subdivision of the main groups could be 
performed according to factors such as : 
" number of users; 
" number of terminals / potential access points; 
" modes of access available (e. g. local or remote); 
" number of applications supported; 
" operating system security provision. 
Classification of operational environments could be assisted by providing more specific 
predefined profiles. For example, typical countermeasure sets could be determined to suit : 
" primary care establishments; 
" community hospitals; 
" general hospitals; 
" specific medical departments. 
Whilst the data model and data uses are considered to provide a solid high-level breakdown, 
it is conceivable that in some cases a more specific division of the existing groups could be 
advantageous. For example, the existing Patient Care data group could be subdivided into 
further the groups Psychiatric, Diagnostic and Treatment as suggested in related work by 
Davey (1994). 
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The way in which data sensitivity is assessed has considerable scope to allow more specific 
ratings. For example, it would be possible to utilise more detailed impact scales instead of 
the current low-medium-high ranking. This could include the possibility of rating the 
separate contributors to the overall impact (i. e. impact in terms of patient safety, 
embarrassment, financial loss etc. ). This was, in fact, the approach used during initial 
development of the data model aspect, with each of the impact factors being assessed using 
a 1-10 ratings scale (as used in CRAMM). However, this was felt to be far too complex for 
what was intended as a simplified methodology and it was also considered difficult to 
separate countermeasure recommendations to this degree. 
The rating of data uses could also be extended if required, for example by rating each data 
type in each usage context (although again this could serve to make matters significantly 
more complicated). 
All such changes would serve to complicate the process of applying the methodology and 
would, therefore, place further restrictions upon who would be capable of doing so. In 
addition, of course, the more detail that is added, the closer the methodology will come to 
representing a full scale risk analysis in terms of the time and effort required to apply it 
(remembering that these points were the deficiencies that the approach was originally 
intended to overcome). 
It is envisaged that further complexity could only be introduced effectively 
if the 
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5.6.2 Expert system implementation 
During the course of the methodology development the potential was identified for 
implementing the idea within an expert system framework. Although the full development 
of such a system was considered outside the scope of the research, a conceptual design was 
undertaken for discussion purposes and is described in this section. 
The main purpose of the system would be to provide an intelligent decision support tool to 
assist in applying the methodology, based on standard expert system techniques (Giarratano 
and Riley 1989). It is considered that the most appropriate approach would be for the 
system to be based around a "consultation" style of interaction, guiding the user through 
each stage of the security analysis process. 
The expert system knowledge base would contain a full range of countermeasures and 
selection rules associated with the methodology, along with additional expertise gathered 
from security consultants to enable further inferences (the latter would be related more to 
selection rules than actual countermeasures, being based upon the experts own experiences). 
The principal stages of the expert system analysis would correspond closely to the normal 
steps in applying the methodology, with the system eliciting a fundamental system 
description from the user (identifying the computer configuration, operational 
environment(s) and data groups / uses involved). The majority of the user 
interaction 
would occur at this stage, with the system querying the user to establish which elements are 
present. The level of expertise employed could be made 
dependent upon the security and 
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IT experience of the user. Therefore, in the case of the analysis being driven by a relatively 
novice user, the system would rely upon a detailed style of consultation in order to elicit the 
required knowledge. Conversely, experienced staff would be more likely to utilise the 
system as an automated methodology tool. 
An initial system profile would be derived from the consultation using a series of basic 
selection rules associated with each methodology category. At this stage countermeasures 
could be extracted directly from the knowledge base without any need for further inference. 
The basic profile would not take into account any of the practical constraints that might 
apply with regard to countermeasure implementation (i. e. the financial limitations, 
operational constraints and / or existing countermeasures). Further consultation to establish 
such constraints could be used as the basis for filtering of the countermeasure suggestions 
(helping to automate the transition from appropriate to selected countermeasures). This 
would, however, demand that the data in the knowledge contained information about both 
"implementation difficulty" and costs (the latter of which would need to be updated 
regularly in order to be practical). 
Having established the basic profile and any constraints, more advanced selection rules 
could be utilised to allow inferences based upon information from across several categories 
(which would be based upon the additional knowledge gathered from the experts). This 
would potentially allow the identification of additional requirements that may have 
been 
missed during the initial consultation. 
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It is anticipated that the overall structure of the system, and the process of user interaction 












Sensitivity J4 CMs Full desc. & 








(Countermeasures & Knowledge 
selection rules) aquisition 








º Information flow 
-------------º Process flow 








It is envisaged that the use of expert system technology would provide a number of 
advantages. At the most basic level it would serve to ensure the correct and consistent 
application of the methodology concepts. However, the encapsulation within this 
framework would also offer opportunities beyond the simple automation of the 
methodology. Having established the basic system profile by following through the key 
methodology stages, the specification could then be enhanced using inferences based upon 
the advanced rules in the knowledge base. The countermeasure recommendations would 
then be narrowed, making them more specific to the system under consideration. Finally, an 
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expert system would improve the user friendliness and general accessibility of the method. 
It would improve the opportunity for the techniques to be employed by healthcare staff who 
were not necessarily fully security-trained (e. g. the hospital IT manager). If such a system 
were to be developed for the PC environment then this would guarantee the maximum 
potential for adoption, given that this platform is available in nearly all ICE environments. 
Although the expert system approach was not pursued beyond the conceptual stage within 
this project, an actual implementation is being undertaken within the related research 
programme that was previously mentioned in section 5.3. 
This conceptual design was presented at NNESMED 94, an international conference on the 
use of neural networks and expert systems in healthcare and medicine, which was held in 
Plymouth in August 1994. A copy of the paper appears in appendix F. 
5.7 Conclusions 
The methodology serves to illustrate how high level categorisations of healthcare systems 
may be used to considerably simplify the process of security selection. It is envisaged that 
the approach would be valuable in cases where a full security review has previously been 
denied on the grounds of budget or inconvenience. 
A fully developed methodology of this type should be usable with the majority of scenarios, 
catering for a range of general existing system categorisations. Despite this, however, it is 
still conceivable that some systems would be encountered that do not fit comfortably within 
the profiles suggested. In these cases it would still be necessary to perform a more detailed 
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risk analysis to determine the specific requirements of the system / environment. In any 
case, the recommendations from the methodology would always need careful, common- 
sense consideration, especially if they appear either too low or too high for the system 
involved. Again, specialist advice would be advocated in cases of significant doubt or where 
extremely high levels of risk are identified. 
The methodology as described has been published in Medical Informatics (Furnell et al. 
1994) and a copy of the paper appears in appendix F. In addition, although it was not 
originally one of the specified deliverables, the approach was also the subject of a 
supplementary report submitted to the CEC as part of the work from the SEISMED project. 
119 
CHAPTER 6 
Improving system security in healthcare 
120 
Chapter 6: Improving system security in healthcare 
6.1 Introduction 
It should be evident that the security strategies advocated in chapters four and five were 
intended to address healthcare requirements as a whole, encompassing all of the key areas in 
which protection may be required. As a result, the approach presented so far has remained 
necessarily broad and largely theoretical. 
However, the scope of the research programme also allowed for the investigation of more 
practical, technically-based means of improving existing systems security. As such, the 
focus of the report now changes significantly to examine a specific category of technical 
measures that are considered appropriate for use in healthcare. 
With regard to the work presented so far, it can be seen that whilst the overall approach to 
security classification and enhancement is new, the underlying recommendations made by 
the guidelines and the protection methodology are largely confined to those which can be 
readily accomplished using existing technologies. This reliance was necessary, given that 
the techniques needed to be usable now by European HCEs. However, there are a number 
of areas in which considerably more advanced security techniques could be applied to 
existing healthcare systems and an examination of these will be the principal focus of the 
remainder of the thesis. 
It was previously established in section 3.2.4 that existing security measures are often weak 
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" user abuse of systems; 
" internal hacking; 
" external hacking; 
9 viruses. 
Although the earlier results indicated that such malicious activities are normally more 
infrequent than other types of security incident, they are potentially the most costly to the 
organisation (with possible impacts ranging from the simple disruption of HCE activity to 
threatening patient safety). The key to combating and preventing them ties in improved 
logical security measures on the system side. 
The conventional approach to logical security (as highlighted in the Authentication and 
Access Control principle of the new guidelines) is to use suitable techniques to create a 
"shield" around the system, with a consequent reliance that it cannot be penetrated. 
However, there are a number of limitations to this, particularly in the context of healthcare 
and existing systems, as identified below. 
" The approach may constrain the user in many circumstances, introducing 
additional barriers that may be inconvenient to legitimate. users. 
This is 
obviously undesirable in the healthcare environment. 
" In some cases addition / enhancement of controls may not 
be straightforward and 
adoption may necessitate significant changes to, or even abandonment of, existing 
systems. Even if the approach was desired, such change could only 
be phased in 
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over a relatively long period. In healthcare it would be likely to be infeasible on 
grounds of cost. 
" The approach tends to rely on the creation of an absolutely secure system. This 
may be unrealistic for several reasons, including flaws in both system design and 
subsequent administration. 
" Finally, the resulting system may still be vulnerable to abuse by authorised users 
who misuse their rights. Numerous sources (American Bar Association 1984; 
Evans 1991) have indicated that as many as 80% of security incidents are the 
result of an organisation's own stafff. 
These limitations lead to the requirement for a different approach to system security which 
is not totally reliant upon preventing intruders from gaining initial access. 
Authentication in existing systems is often solely based upon the use of passwords. The 
probable reasons for this are the convenience to the user and the expense that is often 
incurred by more elaborate techniques. In healthcare the issues of authentication and access 
control are complicated by the fact that many areas of an establishment will be open to the 
public. Terminals will often be widely distributed, with a necessity for many in public areas 
(e. g. on the wards). As a result it is not always possible to implement sufficient physical 
security or to rely upon continuous manual supervision. 
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However, in a domain such as healthcare, it would be foolish to insist upon a level of 
security that would greatly impede users in their legitimate work (i. e. security at the expense 
of care delivery). This points to a requirement for a security system that can operate 
transparently unless abuse of some kind is suspected. 
A further consideration is financial cost, as it has already been established that expenditure 
on security will often be rejected in favour of improving aspects more directly related to 
patient care. This effectively means that hardware protection devices would not be adopted 
on a large scale, and dictates that a software-based security system may be the most 
favourable route. 
It must also be recognised that even with satisfactory authentication, the issue of insider 
abuse is not resolved. Normal solutions to this problem are to incorporate measures such as 
access control and auditing. However, both of these need careful consideration if they are 
to be implemented effectively. The potential of auditing in particular may be wasted if 
handled incorrectly (as will be discussed in section 6.4). 
What is therefore advocated is the use of real-time intrusion monitoring and user 
supervision techniques, that would combine the key elements of authentication and auditing, 
to provide transparent supervision of all user and system activities. This is viewed as a very 
good example of a security system that may be added as an overlay to operational 
healthcare systems, as it may be installed alongside existing security measures whilst at the 
same time compensating for some of their deficiencies. 
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However, before discussing the concept in any detail it is first necessary to show that 
systems abuse does actually occur in healthcare and that there is consequently a legitimate 
role for these techniques. 
6.2 Intrusions in healthcare systems 
In order to justify the need for, and advantages of having, some form of intrusion 
monitoring system in healthcare, this section highlights some cases of known abuse, along 
with general statistics relating to the frequency with which they occur. 
Some brief examples of specific abuse incidents that have occurred in healthcare 
establishments in recent years are given below, illustrating a variety of undesirable 
consequences that can result. 
" Three machines at European Organisation for the Research and Treatment of 
Cancer (EORTC) in Brussels were penetrated by a hacker and then subsequently 
accessed on 25 separate occasions. The system held a database of patient details 
including names, addresses, test results and life expectancy (The Guardian. 1993). 
"A masquerade attack (involving an unnamed establishment) was reported 
in 
which a nurse hacked into a system using a memorised password 
belonging to a 
doctor. The individual involved prescribed potentially lethal drugs for one patient 
and altered treatment records for others. Luckily, the changes were spotted 
by 
another nurse before the drugs were administered (Audit 
Commission. 1994). 
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" Another unnamed establishment was affected when a series of computer games 
were installed in the system area of a PC boot disk. The presence of the games 
served to corrupt the disk, which ultimately led to the corruption of a months' 
worth of data, which then had to be reconstructed (Audit Commission. 1990). 
9A local health services authority in London was affected when a routine letter 
inviting women to have smear tests for cervical cancer was altered by a hacker to 
include an obscene message. The letter was subsequently distributed to some 
5,000 women in the area before the modification came to light (Computer 
Weekly. 1994). 
" In 1989,26,000 floppy disks purporting to contain information on AIDS were 
distributed to individuals and establishments on a world-wide basis. In actual 
fact, each disk contained a malicious Trojan Horse program and victims were 
subsequently informed that their hard disks would be damaged unless $378 was 
sent to a Post Office box in Panama (when initially installed the program modified 
the PC's ATJTOEXEC file, and every time this was subsequently run a count was 
updated in a hidden file. After a random number of iterations the names of the 
files on the hard disk were encrypted and the files hidden. The only non-hidden 
file contained the request for payment). The perpetrator was eventually 
jailed for 
two-and-a-half years (Computing. 1993). 
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In most other organisations / sectors the principal impacts of such incidents will normally be 
felt in terms of financial loss and disruption. However, in healthcare various other factors 
will be equally, if not more, important (e. g. impacts on patient confidentiality, safety and 
trust). 
At a more general level, the summary findings from the most recent of the two UK Audit 
Commission surveys cited make very interesting reading in terms of their implications for 
healthcare and the principal points are summarised below. 
Amongst the main sectors surveyed other than healthcare were local government, 
education, finance, manufacturing, retail, IT and communications. The number of abuse 
incidents reported in the healthcare field (i. e. 127 cases) was more than for any of the other 
sectors, with the exception of local government (which had 193 incidents), and represented 
24% of the total abuse cases reported. This can be contrasted with only 18 incidents 
(equating to 10% of the total number) being reported in healthcare in the previous Audit 
Commission survey in 1990. 
A total of 334 HCEs responded to the survey, with 35% reporting some kind of abuse 
incidents. These are broken down as follows : 
(a) 5 reported incidents of hacking (more than any other sector surveyed); 
(b) 69 incidents of virus (more than any other sector except Local government); 
(c) 11 incidents of fraud; 
(d) 23 incidents of illicit software; 
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(e) 7 incidents of private work; 
(fl 7 incidents of theft of data or software (again more than any other sector). 
These statistics, and the magnitude of incidents in comparison to other sectors, seem to 
indicate that healthcare appears to be one of the more attractive areas to both internal and 
external abusers. They can, therefore, be added to the observations from section 3.2 to 
further underline the need for appropriate countermeasures. 
A further, and final, illustration of the seriousness with which abuse issues are taken in 
healthcare is that the UK NHS has introduced a seminar specifically dedicated to the risks 
from viruses and hacking as a principal topic within its Information Systems Security 
Awareness programme (Barber et al. 1993c). 
It is believed that the combination of these points provides sufficient evidence that intrusion 
monitoring would be appropriate in healthcare systems. 
6.3 An overview of Intrusions and Intruders 
The aim of this section is to provide a foundation for further discussion by describing, in 
general terms, what might constitute an intrusion and who might commit one. 
At the highest level, intrusions or malicious activity will be the result of actions by users or 
processes, which will operate on one or more targets (which may include data (files), 
system devices and other users or processes). 
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The purpose of introducing supervision will be two-fold : 
1. to ensure that systems are only accessed by authorised users; 
2. to ensure that systems are only used for authorised purposes. 
At the highest level user actions can be categorised as being either legal or illegal. 
However, it is useful if a more detailed breakdown than this can be derived for the different 
potential classes of illegal activity. For example, all of the following scenarios represent 
types of illegal activity that should be monitored : 
" an illegal action that is still within the normal authorisation of a legitimate user (i. e. 
abuse of privileges); 
" an action by a legitimate user which is outside the normal limits of authorisation; 
" any action by an unauthorised user. 
In addition, it is necessary to recognise differences in the types of potential system abuser. 
These have already been comprehensively categorised by Anderson (1980), and are 
described in table 6.1. 
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Abuser Type Description 
External Penetrators Outsiders attempting or gaining unauthorised access to the 
system. 
Internal Penetrators Authorised users of the system who access data, resources or 
programs to which they are not entitled. Sub-categorised into : 
" Masqueraders Users who operate under the identity of 
another user. 
" Clandestine users Users who evade access controls and 
auditing. 
Misfeasors Users who are authorised to use the system and resources 
accessed, but misuse their privileges. 
Table 6.1 : Categories of system abuser 
These groupings are considered appropriate for describing the different types of user-related 
abuse within an intrusion monitoring framework and will, therefore, be adopted for the 
remainder of the discussion. Whilst it is also possible to develop a deeper profile of 
potential intruders, by considering factors such as the common motivations behind abuse 
(e. g. money, ideology, egotism etc. ), these are not explored here as knowledge of them 
would not contribute to the process of detection. 
It should be noted that Anderson's categorisations fail to take into account any of the 
categories of abuse that may result from process activity (e. g. viruses, Trojan Horses etc. 
). 
This is understandable given that his analysis was made in 1980 before such incidents 
had 
become commonplace. However, there has been a significant increase 
in such attacks in 
recent years with a number of high profile incidents, including the Internet worm, 
the AIDS 
Trojan Horse and the Michealangelo virus) and evidence suggests that viruses are now the 
major cause of security breaches in both networked and standalone 
PC systems (National 
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Computing Centre 1994). It is now extremely unlikely that the problem will ever totally 
disappear and, therefore, countering such activity should also be within the scope of a 
comprehensive monitor. As a consequence, a further category of intrusion, which will be 
called malicious process, will be added to Anderson's list. These may introduce various 
undesirable consequences, particularly in the healthcare environment, including the 
alteration or destruction of data, creation of false data, degradation of system performance, 
crashing of systems or other effects that might render data or systems inaccessible. 
The characteristics of the different intrusion groups will now be briefly examined, 
identifying the aspects that set them apart in terms of detection. 
An external penetrator will best equate to the traditional perception of a "hacker", 
representing someone without a legitimate purpose who should consequently play no role in 
the system. These should theoretically be the easiest intruders to identify, for example, by 
looking for signs of "exploration" or unfamiliarity with the system, as well as departures 
from normal user behaviour. Although reported evidence suggests that the number of 
"hacking" incidents are relatively small, the majority of reported cases have resulted in 
serious losses for the organisation involved (National Computing Centre 1994) 
Masquerader intrusions use the compromised accounts of other users and may again be 
identifiable based upon a departure from the established behaviour of the masquerade 
victim. However, some measures (such as typical activity) may be 
less effective as the 
impostor will often be masquerading with the intention of accessing the same 
facilities as the 
legitimate user. 
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Clandestine user intrusions will primarily rely upon low-level techniques to effect a 
compromise (e. g. direct memory manipulation) and therefore a first step should be to 
restrict unnecessary access to utilities and tools that allow these techniques to be employed 
(e. g. assemblers, compilers etc. ). Where access is required, the usage should be closely 
monitored (i. e. by the intrusion monitor). In general, supervision will need to operate at a 
lower level if such intrusions are to be identified, with particular attention to any events that 
may be indicative of attempts to disable or evade security controls. 
Misfeasors will again be more difficult to identify, as they have legitimate access to the 
system. However, as with a masquerade, unauthorised activities should stand out in some 
way when compared to typical patterns of use (obviously assuming that the majority of use 
is for authorised purposes). Misfeasors often behave outside the rules of the system in 
general and examples of their activity may include : 
" illegal storage of information; 
" illegal use of applications; 
" illegal dissemination of information to unauthorised parties; 
" games playing. 
Finally, with regard to Malicious processes, various different categories can 
be identified 
(Brunnstein et al. 1990), as briefly described in the pages that follow. 
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" Viruses 
These are self-replicating programs that carry a (potentially destructive) 
"payload". Viruses may "infect" disks and / or individual files, spreading via 
network communications and exchange of diskettes (Hruska 1992). 
" Worms 
Also known as "rabbit" programs, these are self-replicating programs designed to 
"breed" within the system, spreading in the same manner as a virus but lacking 
the "payload" element. Whilst not necessarily designed to be malicious these may 
still pose a threat to security by consuming system resources and degrading 
performance (Denning 1990). 
" Trojan Horses 
Taking their name from the famous Greek horse, these are executable programs 
that claim and / or appear to perform some useful or harmless function, but also 
conceal a malicious purpose (e. g. stealing passwords, corruption of files). 
Trojans may be introduced onto a system in the form of new programs or in 
modified versions of existing applications / utilities (Parker 1990). 
" Logic and time bombs 
Logic bombs and time bombs both refer to malicious code embedded within a 
program that is only activated (or triggered) when some specific condition 
is 
fulfilled. Logic bombs are triggered by the occurrence of a specific event (or 
133 
Chapter 6: Improving system security in healthcare 
event series) within the system. A classic example is the modification of a payroll 
system by an employee to monitor for the removal of his / her name, with 
encryption of all company data programmed to occur if this ever happens. By 
contrast, time bombs are programmed to trigger either after a certain period of 
time has elapsed or when a specific time / date is reached (Hruska 1992). 
All of the above may be disguised in various ways and the nature of the malicious activity 
will vary (e. g. some may simply display a message, whilst others crash the system, delete 
files, encrypt data etc. ). For example, the complete identification / analysis of a virus 
involves knowing the following (Gold 1989) : 
9 the mechanism by which it creates its effects; 
" the mechanism by which it conceals its existence; 
" the mechanism by which it replicates; 
" any clues it gives to its existence; 
" what its effects actually are (i. e. the payload). 
Therefore, without knowing exactly what signs to look for it is only possible to monitor for 
the broadest indicators - which may not be effective in all cases. 
In general it may be easier 
to detect the introduction of the malicious process (i. e. the "infection") rather than the 
resulting payload action. A further difficulty arises from the fact that each new generation 
of malicious process may be explicitly designed so as to avoid existing means of 
detection 
(e. g. the emergence of self-mutating viruses). 
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Referring back to the list of Audit Commission figures from section 6.2, it can be seen that 
cases (a) and (b) would be respectively classified as penetrator and malicious process 
related intrusions, whereas in cases (c) to (f) it is likely that a large number would almost 
certainly be classifiable as misfeasor activity. 
6.4 Traditional approaches to Intrusion Detection 
In most IT environments, including healthcare, details of intrusions are traditionally 
captured by the system audit trail. However, in many organisations auditing does not fulfil 
its full potential and is viewed with low regard by systems administrators. The key reasons 
for this include : 
" the large volume of data collected (even in small or medium sized systems) and 
the associated burdens terms of analysis and storage space consumed. This can 
be illustrated by considering the findings of Piccioto (1987) based on the 
implementation of auditing at Mitre Corporation in the USA. On average, 
auditing of workstation activity was found to generate around 7MB of data per 
day (24 hours), rising to 136MB under peak / worst case conditions; 
" the further overhead, in terms of staff time and effort, required to inspect data 
and follow-up anomalies; 
" the actual interpretation of the data and identification of an intrusion may be 
difficult (especially if the intruder has attempted to cover-up any activity); 
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"a lot of the data collected will not be security relevant, but must still be analysed 
to identify that which is; 
9 the fact that audit trail analysis only occurs after events have occurred (by which 
time damage may already have been done). 
An example of the typical attitudes towards auditing is presented in a discussion of the 
"Green System" security architecture used in the Danish health sector (Birkegaard 1990). 
Here the author states that the following up of audit trails generated by the system is a 
matter of the security administrators "personal taste" and that, whilst records will not 
always be examined, "if he needs them, he can use them". This, of course, fails to 
acknowledge that an administrator might only think he needs the records if a security breach 
is already suspected. 
The lax attitude towards auditing is further illustrated in figure 6.1, based upon the results 
obtained in another general survey of computer abuse (Gliss 1990). This information relates 
to auditing in mini / mainframe systems (using audit trails, log files and monitoring print- 
outs) and reveals that only 10% of organisations always follow-up their reports. The 
situation in the PC environment was even worse, with only 12% of systems even having any 
auditing / control software installed. Given these statistics, it is unsurprising that of the total 
abuse incidents covered in the latest Audit Commission survey, over half were only actually 
detected by accidental means. 
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Fig. 6.1 : Follow-up of system audit trails & log files 
Considering the feedback received from healthcare personnel and the SEISMED survey it 
would appear unlikely that the healthcare environment is any different in this respect or 
that the situation has changed significantly. 
It is envisaged that an intrusion monitoring system operating in real-time would overcome 
the problems identified, analysing the significance of data as it is obtained and thereby 
having the potential to identify intrusions before any major security compromise occurs. 
The sections that follow present a set of outline ideas and preliminary designs for a real- 
time Intrusion Monitoring System (which will herein be referred to as IMS) to meet these 
objectives. 
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6.5 Advanced approaches to Intrusion Detection 
It is envisaged that intrusion detection could be improved considerably beyond the level of 
simple audit trailing by building it into a more comprehensive framework that encompasses 
full user authentication and supervision. This section will introduce the various approaches 
that would be desirable within IMS. It should be noted that many of these techniques could 
be equally applicable outside the healthcare sector and, for this reason, the majority of the 
discussion is pitched at a general level. 
It is suggested that IMS intrusion detection could be based on a combination of several 
independent strategies : 
9 auditing of the local system configuration; 
" initial user identification and authentication; 
" on-going comparison of user activities against historical "behaviour profiles"; 
" use of generic rules to identify potentially anomalous system events. 
The integration of these elements into a basic user supervision strategy is shown in figure 
6.2 overleaf. It is believed that this structure has the potential to provide a very 
comprehensive protection framework and each of the component factors will now 
be 
described in more detail. 
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Continuous Behaviour Generic 
Monitoring Profiles Rules 
Fig. 6.2 : IMS user session supervision strategy 
6.5.1 System auditing 
The first task of IMS should be to ensure the integrity of the system upon which supervision 
is to be conducted. The local system should therefore be checked at user login or system 
start-up time to ensure that no changes have been made that may compromise security. 
A number of stages may be incorporated into start-up tests, including : 
" auditing of the basic system set-up and hardware configuration (e. g. processor 
type, operating system version, default access paths etc. ); 
" checking the integrity of important system files (e. g. login scripts, application set- 
up files); 
" virus scanning. 
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Beginning with the first of these points, it is envisaged that certain configuration changes 
may have serious implications from a security standpoint (where the configuration in this 
context encompasses factors relating to the system hardware, the operating system and any 
significant user defined settings). For example they might : 
1. be indicative of physical tampering with (or theft of) equipment. 
2. affect the compatibility and / or performance of existing applications (including 
the IMS supervisor itself), which could result in accidental security compromise; 
3. be indicative of a deliberate attempt to compromise security. 
As a countermeasure, relevant configuration data should be collected and stored by IMS, 
which may then be used for comparison against the system configuration on subsequent 
occasions to ensure that everything is still as expected. For example, in the case of a PC 
system, various elements of the configuration may be audited and a selection are presented 
in table 6.2, indicating the classes of compromise that the monitoring of each would help to 
highlight. 
Although data could also be collected relating to a number of other aspects of the PC 
environment (e. g. video mode, number of printers, number of serial ports etc. ), it would 
serve little purpose as any changes would not have significant implications for the secure 
operation of the system. 
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Total conventional RAM size 
Free conventional RAM 
BIOS release date 
DOS version number 
Number of DOS files 
Default working directory 
Number of floppy drives 
Number of hard drives 
Hard drives capacities 
Maths co type coprocessor P 
Control-break setting 
Command processor specification 
Path specifications 
Table 6,2 : Auditable characteristics of PC configuration 
Whilst it is acknowledged that various public domain utilities and some commercial 
products already exist to collect configuration data (e. g. "CheckIt Analyst" (S&S 
International 1994)), the purpose of most of them is simply to report the configuration or 
highlight changes that may affect application compatibility. Beyond this, the fuller 
implications from a security standpoint are not considered. 
With regard to file integrity, the modification of certain files could adversely affect the 
performance of the system or compromise security (e. g. again using the PC environment as 
an example, maintaining the integrity of the AUTOEXEC. BAT and CONFIG. SYS 
files may 
be particularly important). Integrity can be ensured by calculating checksums 
based on the 
file content (Simmons 1992). The IMS system would validate each 
file during start-up by 
141 
Chapter 6: Improving system security in healthcare 
recalculating the checksum and comparing it with the value already held. A different result 
would be indicative of file modification and could be used as a trigger for further action. 
It is envisaged that the final aspect of the audit, that of virus scanning, could be achieved by 
incorporating a link from the IMS into one of the many existing anti-virus utilities that are 
available. 
Whilst this element of IMS would not provide intrusion detection in real-time, it is 
nevertheless important to provide such a measurement of system integrity every time it is 
first accessed. 
6.5.2 Initial user identification and authentication 
Identification of the current user is necessary at the start of a session to enable to system to 
determine which profile should be used for supervision. In theory, the subsequent 
monitoring of behaviour could then act as the mechanism for authenticating the claimed 
identity. However, the inclusion of an initial authentication phase would provide some 
basis for believing that the correct identity was given from the outset, which would allow 
the system to proceed with an initial high confidence of user legitimacy (lessening the 
chances of an external penetrator or masquerader class intrusion). Some consideration of 
appropriate authentication mechanisms is, therefore, necessary. 
At the most basic level, the simple passwords could be used for this purpose 
(as in most 
existing healthcare systems). In this sense, the procedure would then remain much the same 
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as a conventional system login. However, two factors suggest that traditional password- 
based methods may no longer afford sufficient protection : 
" the level of data sensitivity in many healthcare systems adds weight to the 
argument that passwords (which often provide a weak / unreliable basis for 
authentication anyway (Jobusch and Oldehoeft 1989)) should be supplemented by 
other mechanisms; 
" in real terms, passwords do not provide a particularly user-friendly authentication 
mechanism, in that the burden of proof is placed upon the user. Users often have 
difficulty remembering passwords, leading them to write them down or use ones 
that could be easily guessed - negating the security benefits. Things get especially 
complex where users must remember several passwords (for example, where 
secondary levels of passwords are used to access specific applications or data, or 
where users have accounts on several systems). Even in cases where users have 
no trouble remembering passwords, it is likely that many would rather not have to 
do so. 
So, whilst various means exist to enhance the security of traditional passwords (see, for 
example, Gritzalis et al. 1992), the second of these points still highlights a potential 
disadvantage. 
With regard to alternatives, the use of smart card systems may have a place 
in overcoming 
these problems (Zoreda and Oton 1994), but may not be practical as a compulsory measure 
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as this would introduce an immediate financial burden across the whole system (e. g. for the 
installation of card readers and issuing of cards), which most HCEs would not be able to 
tolerate at the present time. However, the option of advanced authentication is not entirely 
precluded. 
In some cases, it may be possible to take advantage of one of the previously identified 
trends in modern healthcare - namely the use multimedia systems. These may allow several 
new options to be introduced for improving authentication. For example, appropriate 
hardware for implementing several biometric identification methods may already be present 
"as standard" in a multimedia configuration (e. g. cameras which may be present for video 
conferencing purposes could also be used for image / "faceprint" recognition; microphones 
and audio processing facilities could be used as the basis for voice recognition). These 
techniques have been successfully implemented elsewhere, delivering adequate 
authentication performance and gaining a high degree of user acceptance (Sherman 1992). 
As such they should integrate well with multimedia healthcare systems, providing a more 
user-friendly method than most in current use. However, the presence of such hardware 
enhancements should not be a prerequisite of the authentication strategy for the same 
reasons as smart cards. Nevertheless, some mechanism of intelligent supervision would be 
desirable that can allow such extra facilities to be utilised if they are present. 
It is acknowledged that there are a number of other biometric authentication measures that 
may also be technically feasible, including fingerprint, hand geometry or signature 
recognition. However, none of these really offer any better basis for authentication and, in 
actual fact, hold less potential for transparent or continuous integration into the supervision 
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system given that they require more specific actions on the part of the user (U. S. Congress 
1987). In addition, the required hardware in each of these cases would not be a likely 
"standard" feature of any healthcare system (multimedia or otherwise) and would, therefore, 
represent an additional expense. 
All user authentication information (be it passwords or the more advanced vocal / facial 
biometric information) could be incorporated as the first aspect of a user personality 
profile. The other aspect, as indicated in figure 6.3 below, relates to details of user 
behavioural activity that will be discussed further in the next section. 
Personality 
Profile 
Authentication Behaviour f 
Data Activity Profile 
Fig. 6.3 : Information on IMS users 
6.5.3 User behaviour profiling 
It should be possible to detect intrusions related to user activity by comparing the current 
system use against established patterns of user behaviour (i. e. profiles) and then 
looking for 
anomalies. In this way, any activity that is not compatible with the normal 
behaviour of the 
user in question can be highlighted as a potential cause for concern. Such an approach was 
originally proposed by Denning (1987) and was the basis for the IDES system, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
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Over time users become familiar with the way that their system normally operates and will 
notice any significant departures from the norm. Similarly, experienced system 
administrators are often able to detect anomalies from the way the system appears to be 
running or by monitoring user activity. This is illustrated by the following quote, taken 
from the book "Cyberpunk" (Hafner and Markoff 1991), describing system administrator 
Steph Marr's initial discovery of a hacker : 
"harr was one of the people who worked to keep Santa Cruz Operation's network of 
computers up and running. He had been there for a year, long enough to know that certain 
users not only had certain privileges on the system but also had individual habits. 
Engineers logged on from their homes late at night; secretaries logged on only from work 
and only during working hours ... one of the secretaries who used the computer was 
acting out of character. She was logging in after hours, cruising the system and trying to 
peek into other people directories ... " 
The purpose of behaviour monitoring is to allow this anomaly detection ability to be 
encapsulated within the IMS. The maintenance of behaviour profiles for each legitimate 
user would enable their activities to be compared against what is historically normal. 
It is envisaged that behaviour profiling could be usefully implemented at two levels : user 
class (high level) and user specific (low level). These approaches are described 
in the 
sections that follow. 
6.5.3.1 User class profiling 
At this level profiles are maintained describing the expected behaviour 
for each class of 
user. This is based on the premise that it is possible to separate users 
into different 
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behavioural classes according to their role within the organisation and then develop 
general-level profiles of acceptable activity within each group. 
Validation of current activity against this profile will give an indication of whether users are 
operating within their legitimate bounds (i. e. providing a good means of detecting 
misfeasors, as well as any penetrators / masqueraders who stray from the accepted 
behaviour of the user being impersonated). However, this approach is not sufficient in 
terms of authentication as users of the same class would be able to successfully masquerade. 
The approach is heavily dependent upon the personnel, applications and responsibilities 
within each specific environment. Each organisation would need to determine its own user 
classes and then define appropriate rules for behaviour within them (a task which would be 
performed by the System Security Manager, or similar). Even where the same user classes 
existed in different establishments it is unlikely that the behaviour profiles would be the 
same. For example, a "secretary" in one establishment may be permitted to use significantly 
different systems and applications from someone else performing the same role elsewhere. 
As such the behaviour profile for the user class "secretary" would be equally different. 
Once developed, however, it is anticipated that the behaviour rules for each class would 
remain relatively static. 
It may be noted that high level profiling of this type represents a similar activity 
to the 
development of an Access Control Matrix. Indeed, some operating systems would allow 
the "behaviour rules" derived for each class to be used to explicitly define access controls 
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rather than requiring a supervision system to detect deviations. As such the usefulness of 
maintaining class behaviour profiles is reduced in these contexts. An example of a user 
class profiling exercise that has been conducted within a local HCE is given in section 6.6. 
6.5.3.2 User-specific profiling 
At a lower level, profiling may be based upon historical patterns of behaviour for each 
individual user. This requires the maintenance of more detailed information but, as it is 
user specific, will also allow a capability for continuous user authentication to be 
incorporated into the supervisor. 
Many activities can be identified that may provide a suitable basis for user-specific profiling 
and previous research (Lunt at al. 1989) has differentiated between methods on the basis of 
whether they provide discrete or continuous indicators, as defined below : 
" Discrete indicators 
Provide single measurements that are obtained once during a session (normally 
at the beginning) and may be analysed immediately by the intrusion monitor; 
" Continuous indicators 
Provide information throughout a session, which changes according to the types 
of activity in progress (and must, therefore, be periodically reassessed). 
For consistency, the same terminology will be used here. 
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Individual behaviour profiles would need to be developed using data collected over a 
reasonably long time period, in order to establish what constitutes "normal" behaviour for 
each legitimate user. However, unlike class profiles, this information could be collected and 
analysed by IMS without the need for human involvement. In addition, the system could 
take account of legitimate changes in the subject's behaviour, with some form of profile 
refinement being incorporated. 
Table 6.3 lists a series of characteristics that could potentially be used as a basis for user 
identity and activity assessment. A brief outline description is given in each case, along 
with the perceived advantages and disadvantages of each approach. The second part of the 
"description" column is intended to indicate whether the detection method would provide a 
discrete (D) or continuous (C) measurement. For completeness, table entries are also 
included for System Auditing and Generic Rules detection methods, although neither are 
directly related to user behaviour. 
Method Description Advantages Disadvantages 
Keystroke The authentication of users C " Authentication. " Only suited to 
Analysis based upon distinctive " Based on external penetrators or 
characteristics of their typing behavioural masqueraders. (Dynamic) 
style / rhythms. characteristic " Still allows a 
(difficult to imitate "window" for abuse 
May be based upon statistics or transfer to others). (i. e. some keystrokes 
such as inter-keystroke time, " Can use any text as may be entered before 
keypress duration, frequency basis for analysis. detection). 
of typing errors etc. " Only useful in text 
intensive contexts. 
In this case, analysis uses " Requires large test 
any arbitrary text input. sample. 
" Requires intelligent 
The approach is described in terminal / device to 
detail in chapter 8. collect timings. 
Table 6.3 : Potential IMS profile characteristics 
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Method Description Advantages Disadvantages 
Keystroke As above, but based on D " Authentication. " Heavily context 
Analysis analysis of specific text C " Based on dependant (can only 
(Static) strings 
that subject will enter 
l l d 
behavioural test for specific text). 
regu ar y (e. g. passwor s, characteristic " Requires intelligent 
OS commands). Normally (difficult to imitate terminal / device to 
used to provide a discrete or transfer to others). collect timings. 
judgement. " Less intensive 
sampling. 
More details are given in " Samples concentrate 
chapter 8. on specific text 
(which is more 
familiar to subject . 
Access Time Time(s) between which D " Effective for users " Valid access times 
subjects typically access IT C with strict working may vary significantly 
systems. In some cases there hours. with some classes of 
may be a detectable " Various activities user. 
correlation between access may only be seen as " The percentage of 
time and application usage, "normal behaviour" cases where a 
allowing a continuous if they occur within correlation can also be 
measure. certain periods, and made to application 
would classed as usage may be very 
anomalous at all small, as few users are 
other times. likely to exhibit such 
regimented behaviour. 
Access May be approached from two D " Many users only " Some users may 
Location perspectives : monitoring the access from specific legitimately require 
location(s) from which terminals / locations, access from many 
subjects typically access IT highlighting use of locations. 
systems OR monitoring other locations as 
which subjects normally anomalous. 
access from any given 
terminal / port. 
OS Command Type and frequency of C " Will differentiate " Not applicable in 
Usage operating system commands between subjects of 
Graphical User 
used. different expertise. Interface (GUI) 
environments. 
Application Type and frequency of C " Most users will " Masqueraders would 
Use application systems used. spend most time probably target the 
using only a small same applications as 
number of the user they are 
applications. impersonating. 
" Significant use of an 
infrequently used 
application may be L 
suspicious. 
-- 
Table 6.3 : Potential IMS profile characteristics (continued) 
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Method Description Advantages Disadvantages 
User Monitoring of the method(s) C " Likely to give an " Not a particularly 
Interaction by which a subject indication of users strong discriminating 
commonly interacts with the experience and / or measure in its own 
system / applications (e. g. familiarity with a right. 
keyboard or mouse, system (e. g. whilst " Many users may be 
commands or menus). novice users could inconsistent in the 
be expected to rely methods they use. 
on a mouse & pull- 
down menus, users 
with more 
experience might 
make use of short- 
cut key sequences 
etc. ). 
File Access Data files most frequently / C " Anticipated that " Natural that some 
recently used by each subject most access occurs files will be accessed 
and for what purpose (i. e. within a small infrequently or 
read, write). "working set" of irregularly. 
commonly used " Masqueraders may 
files. target the same files 
as the le itimate user. 
Resource Statistics of typical usage of C " Significant changes " Provides a rather 
Usage system resources (e. g. CPU, in user activity 
loose measurement. 
memory, disk) associated should result in 
with each subject. different statistics. 
in Failure Lo Tracking of unsuccessful D " Valid users should " Detects no anomaly 
if 
g 
attempts to gain system only require a small intruder knows the 
access. number of attempts password etc. 
(e. g. a maximum of 
three). 
Access Tracking of the number of C " Provides a good " Clandestine users may 
Violations access violations (e. g. to 
indicator of bypass access 
files, data, applications, unauthorised controls. 
devices) made by a user / behaviour. 
process during a session. 
Session The duration of a user D " May be useful in "A discrete measure 
Length session. 
May be monitored C conjunction with would only be 
i bl il in terms of either a discrete Access Time to on e after sess a ava 
measure of the overall detect unusual termination (of little 
session length or as a periods of activity. use to prevent 
continuous measure past a damage). 
certain threshold. 
Network Characteristics of the users C " May contribute to " May require a 
network usage, based on the the identification of hardware 
device to 
Traffic 
monitoring of data on the all classes of user monitor network 
Analysis network lines (e. g. packet intrusion. activity and collect 
size, frequency, source and data. 
destination). " Complex analysis. 
Table 6.3 : Potential IMS profile characteristics (continued) 
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Method Description Advantages Disadvantages 
System Auditing of the system set- D " Useful to highlight " Most suitable for PC 
Auditing up, file integrity and 
hardware configuration (e. g. 
changes that may 
affect program 
systems. 
processor type, operating compatibility or 
system version, default performance. 
access paths etc. ). " May also highlight 
physical tampering 
or theft. 
Generic Rules Monitoring for specific C " Requires no " Only able to detect 
events that may be indicative knowledge of intrusions based upon 
of an intrusion attempt. previous behaviour known scenarios. 
patterns. 
" Can be used to spot 
malicious process 
activity, 
Table 6.3 : Potential IMS profile characteristics (continued) 
In addition to these, there may also be potential in assessing a number of more minor 
behavioural measures or statistics associated with user sessions. These might include : 
" number of files created or deleted; 
" number of print jobs submitted or pages printed. 
However, the usefulness of these measures is envisaged as being much more context- 
dependant than those listed in the table and, therefore, their monitoring may not be 
worthwhile in terms of the additional processing and storage requirements that would 
be 
incurred. 
It should be evident that some of the methods listed in the table will provide much stronger 
indicators than others. It is in fact possible to break the potential elements of the 
personality / behaviour profile down into different levels of effectiveness as shown 
in figure 
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6.4. For simplicity, only a subset of the measures identified are shown and they are split 
into just three levels (although there could conceivably be more in practice). 
Strong 
Faceprint Authentication Level I Voice Verification 
Keystroke Analysis 







Fig. 6.4 : Relative "strengths" of profile characteristics 
A .s indicted in the figure, the strength of the measures in terms of their potential for accurate 
user authentication decreases as one moves down through the levels. However, at the same 
time, other positive factors can be cited, including : 
" ease of practical implementation / integration into existing systems; 
" transparency of the measure; 
" potential to detect abusers other than penetrators; 
" financial viability. 
However, it is expected that in most cases no single factor would provide an adequate 
detection measure and the combination and analysis of several would be most appropriate. 
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For this reason the system will require some ability to identify aggregations of activity that 
could lead to a security violation. 
In fact, the methods vary in terms of their ability to detect the different types of intrusion. 
Many of them, for example "keystroke analysis", represent "authentication only" measures 
and would only be suitable to distinguish between a legitimate subject and an impostor, 
whereas "file access" could also be used to identify misuse by a valid system user and, 
therefore, allow more comprehensive supervision. Table 6.4 shows which methods are 



























_ Generic Rules 
Table 6.4 : Scope of intrusion detection methods 
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The applicability of each measure will also vary between different users (e. g. monitoring of 
operating system commands will not be applicable to a user who is not granted command 
line access). The IMS would, therefore, need to allow the administrator to determine which 
measures will be active on which accounts. 
6.5.4 Generic intrusion indicators and rules 
In some cases intrusions may be identified without requiring any historical knowledge of 
specific users behaviour. Rules may be incorporated into the system to allow it to spot 
specific events (or event series) that may be indicative of a security compromise. Relevant 
activity data may be compared against these to see if it might form part of an intrusion 
scenario. This will assist in the monitoring of the system state as well as user-related 
activity. 
The "intrusion rules" could be based upon a number of factors, as listed below : 
" known intrusion scenarios / patterns of abuse (also known as "attack signatures") 
- see table 6.5; 
" known weaknesses of the host system (e. g. operating system vulnerabilities); 
" HCE security policy (e. g. rules for data / file access by different staff groups); 
" advice from security experts; 
" audit trail analysis (Leipins and Vaccaro 1989). 
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The examination of literature relating to known intrusion scenarios and documented hacking 
case studies (Landreth 1985; Stoll 1988; Hafner and Markoff 1991; Sterling 1992; Quittner 
and Statalla 1995) reveals several classes of event that should at least be regarded as 
"suspicious". A series of examples, drawn from both these sources and other knowledge, 
are given in table 6.5 below, including the type of event, a brief description and the type(s) 
of intrusion that may be indicated (along with a general confidence rating - low, medium or 
high). Note that some of the characteristics that are monitored in behaviour profiles (e. g. 
access time) may also be incorporated at this level as more general rules. 
Event Description Potential 
Indication 
Consecutive login failures Consecutive or frequent failed attempts to access External penetrator H 
the system (or a specific account) may indicate Masquerader 
someone trying to guess their way in. 
Consecutive access violations A significant number of failures during a session Penetrator, H 
indicates that the user may be trying to access Misfeasor 
objects / resources for which he / she is 
unauthorised. 
Guest / anonymous access Guest accounts and other forms of anonymous External penetrator L 
access can provide a "foothold" for hackers and 
any significant use of such accounts should be 
monitored. 
Account overuse Unusually high levels of activity on user accounts Penetrator M 
may be suspicious. Simultaneous sessions 
utilising the same account may indicate that a 
penetrator is using the system. 
Excessive session length An unusually long session may indicate that the Penetrator, L 
system is being misused. Misfeasor 
Out of hours access Out of hours access (especially at night) may Penetrator, L 
indicate unauthorised activity. Misfeasor 
Access of infrequently used file Access to a file that is seldom used may be 
Penetrator L 
indicative of an unauthorised user browsing 
through the system. 
Modification of login or system Login and configuration files can control 
Penetrator M 
configuration files important aspects of system 
behaviour and will 
not normally be changed on a frequent basis. 
Modification may assist a penetrator in 
compromising the account or system. 
Copying of password file Whilst many systems permit read access to the 
External penetrator H 
password file, attempts to do so should be 
regarded as suspicious. Penetrators in possession 
of the file would be able to run password cracking 
software against the contents. 
Table 6.5 : Examples of generic intrusion indicators 
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Event Description Potential 
Indication 
Copying of system files Duplication of operating system files should not Penetrator M 
normally be necessary. These are standard targets 
for malicious users wishing study / modify the 
system and exploit weaknesses. 
Use of inactive accounts Sudden or unexpected activity on accounts that External penetrator M 
have been dormant for long periods. Masquerader 
Repeated / frequent use of Repeated checking to see who else is logged into External penetrator M 
"WHO" (or other system status a system may be an indication of a penetrator 
related enquiries). "watching his / her back". Hackers will normally look out for the system administrator being logged 
in. 
Extensive use of "help" External penetrators may be unfamiliar with the External penetrator M 
systems system and its facilities and may refer to help 
systems frequently. 
Repeated / frequent user errors External penetrators may highlight their External penetrator M 
unfamiliarity with systems through errors such as 
issuing commands that do not exist, and / or 
attempting to access non-existent files or 
directories. Errors above a certain threshold will 
be suspicious. 
Accessing of dummy ("bait") This involves setting deliberate "traps" for Penetrator H 
files. unauthorised system browsers in the form of 
specially monitored dummy files which should 
appear to be interesting. Users with legitimate 
access to the system / area should be instructed to 
ignore these and, therefore, any access attempts 
indicate a potential intrusion. 
Excessive memory / file space Consumption of unusually large amounts of Penetrator, M 
consumption memory or storage by a user or process may Malicious process 
indicate undesirable activity (e. g. a hacker (Worm) 
accumulating files, a worm duplicating in the 
system). 
Remote use of system accounts Anticipated that authorised system management / External Penetrator M 
/ privileges "superuser" account holders would most 
commonly operate from local terminals. Any 
access of such accounts from remote locations 
should be noted. 
Use of local system as a A remote login to the system, followed by an External penetrator, M 
gateway to other hosts attempt to connect to another remote system may 
Malicious process 
indicate a penetrator or process passing through (worm, virus) 
("network weaving"). 
Modification of "system" Alteration of certain memory locations may Clandestine user, M 
provide a means to bypass security controls and Malicious process memory areas 
may interfere with system operation. 
Disk boot sector modification Many viruses infect systems by installing 
Malicious process H 
themselves in the disk boot sector that is read (virus) 
during start-up. As such, attempts to modify boot 
sectors should be monitored. 
Increase in number of Many OS allow for "hidden" files that 
do not Malicious Process L 
"hidden" files. show up in normal directory listings. Addition of (virus, 
Trojan horse) 
a hidden files may represent a simplistic attempt 
to disguise the introduction of malicious 
programs. 
Table 6.5 : Examples of generic intrusion indicators (continued) 
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Event Description Potential 
Indication 
Modification of executable file Executable programs should remain static under Penetrator, M 
most circumstances and alteration may indicate Malicious process 
the introduction of malicious code. (virus, Trojan horse) 
Addition / replacement of Addition or replacement of executable files Penetrator, M 
executable file outside a users own area (and especially in Malicious process 
"system" areas) is unusual and may represent an (virus, Trojan horse) 
attempt to introduce malicious code. 
Table 6.5 : Examples of generic intrusion indicators (continued) 
The events in the table are all related to established patterns of abusive behaviour that may 
relate to almost any system. As previously indicated, further rules could be devised at a 
later stage when the implementation platform has been selected, based upon any known 
weaknesses in the environment. In addition, examples of healthcare-specific anomaly 
indicators that might be derived from HCE policy include : 
" repeated access (browsing) of different patient records; 
extensive printouts of patient data. 
It may be noted that many of the indicators represent security risks that can be overcome by 
explicit action from system administration (e. g. disablement of "guest" accounts, limitation 
of access times for each account). However, many organisations may not observe these 
precautions and the use of such rules therefore provides a means to compensate 
in cases 
where administration is not comprehensive. 
Whilst no single event may be conclusive of an intrusion, occurrences may 
be used to 
increase an IMS alert status (with events that are considered most significant causing 
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greater increases). In this way, certain combinations of events may be identified that are 
much more significant than any event on its own (for example, the occurrence of three low- 
confidence events such as excessive night-time use of a "guest" account would be a very 
strong indication of an intrusion). 
It should be noted that the larger the rule-base, the longer it will take for the system to 
search on each monitoring iteration (and, hence, the greater the processing overhead on the 
system). As such, in cases where efficiency is of paramount concern, it may be desirable to 
prioritise the rules along the lines of the confidence ratings shown in table 6.5. In this way, 
the monitoring system could minimise its effort by initially testing only the "high 
confidence" rules, and then only proceeding to the next level of rules if one or more of these 
were satisfied. 
A further limitation on this aspect is that many intrusions may exhibit characteristics that, 
whilst easy for a user or administrator to spot as unusual, would be difficult for the 
supervision system to identify. For example, both of the following are quite often caused by 
the presence of a virus : 
" unexpected slowness of system response / application operation; 
" system crash. 
However, in either case it would be difficult for an intrusion monitor to separate these 
events from other system activity and determine whether the event was a symptom of a 
deliberately malicious process or some other anomaly in the system. 
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6.6 Generic behaviour profiles for healthcare users 
This section builds upon the idea of user class profiling that was previously outlined in 
section 6.5.3.1 and describes how the concept could be used to formulate high-level profiles 
suitable for the staff within a healthcare establishment. 
6.6.1 Introduction 
It can be observed that many of the behaviour characteristics described in section 6.5.3.2 
(e. g. keystroke analysis, time and location of access, use of operating system commands) 
represent techniques that are equally applicable in almost any environment (i. e. not just 
healthcare). However, it is envisaged that supervision may be more effective using a two- 
tier profiling approach, with general profiles at the first level and more detailed profiles 
underneath. As such, an appropriate approach is the development of user class profiles, 
which describe the general behaviour characteristics of different types of HCE personnel. 
In order to be monitored by the supervision system, only behaviour that relates to the use of 
information systems can be profiled (i. e. a limited "window" on the overall behaviour of 
different staff). The profiles, therefore, aim to categorise how each type of HCE user 
typically uses information systems, as well as modelling any additional information that may 
usefully set one class of user apart from another. In short, this will include : 
" what systems are used; 
" when they are used; 
" how they are used. 
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Such information can be used to formulate general rules for reasonable behaviour within 
each of the different job categories; rules which could subsequently be incorporated into the 
full IMS. This approach is very similar to the idea of "role profiling" that was proposed by 
Calitz et al (1995) in work published after the completion of this aspect of the investigation. 
It was considered that suitable profiles could be developed using the responses to a 
relatively small series of basic questions, obtained from a broad cross-section of HCE staff. 
These questions would all be relatively easy for staff to answer and, as such, a questionnaire 
approach was considered a sufficient data collection method (and probably more 
appropriate than conducting detailed interviews of individual staff). 
For convenience, the study was based in the Plymouth reference centre (i. e. Derriford 
Hospital), with support and assistance from the Trust Information Doctor (Dr P. N. Gaunt). 
It should be remembered at this point that the resulting profiles were, therefore, only 
intended to be representative within the Derriford domain and could not be guaranteed to 
apply elsewhere. 
6.6.2 Categorisation of HCE staff 
It was originally envisaged that class profiling work would begin with more specific sub- 
divisions of the existing General, Management and IT & Security Personnel staff groupings 
taken from the SEISMIED work. This led to the definition of a number of generic roles as 
shown in figure 6.5. 
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Researcher Nurse Doctor Consultant Secretary Administrator 
IT & Security 
Personnel 
Data IT Technical 
Protection Professional Support 
staff 
Fig. 6.5 : Generic Categorisation of HCE Staff 
However, it was quickly established that attempting to address all of these groups would be 
impractical within the context of Derriford Hospital due to other research projects also in 
progress. At the time at which this study was proposed, the staff who would have 
constituted the IT & Security audience had only just finished participating in a different 
questionnaire study, whilst the attention of HCE Management staff was required for 
interview studies. In view of this, it was considered unfair to burden these groups further 
and the hospital requested that the study be confined to the general / end-user population. 
This limitation was considered acceptable given that the general user category encompassed 
the largest number of generic roles and was also the most easily accessible of the groups 
within the hospital. As a result, it was considered that specifically targeting this audience 
offered the most scope for obtaining survey responses anyway. 
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The specific focus on general staff was used as opportunity to expand the choice of generic 
roles with two further categories, Clerk and PAM (for Professions Allied to Medicine) 
having been suggested by the hospital, so that a more accurate classification could be 
achieved. Thus, the final staff categories used were as illustrated in figure 6.6, with the 
range of roles encompassed ensuring that staff would be able to select a category into which 
their actual role would fit reasonably naturally. 
Clinical 
Consultant Nurse Junior PAM Researcher Secretary Clerk Administrator 
Doctor 
Fig. 6.6 : Final categorisation of general HCE staff 
6.6.3 Questionnaire content 
As previously stated, it was considered feasible to formulate the class profiles 
from 
responses to basic questions relating to the what, when and how of 
information system 





Chapter 6: Improving system security in healthcare 
The questionnaires that were distributed included eight questions designed to elicit the 
required information relating to HCE staff and their use of information systems. The 
following section presents a breakdown of the questionnaire material and explains the 
rationale behind each question (or group of related questions). 
The questions are listed below, presented in the same manner as they appeared in the 
questionnaire (however, it should be noted that the questions are sequentially numbered 
here for reference purposes only and did not appear in this strict sequence in the final 
questionnaire). 









2. What are your typical hours of work (if fixed) ? From to 
3. On average, how long do you spend using the hospital computer systems each 
day ? hours ? 
4. Please indicate the types of computer system that you regularly use? 
Q Standalone PC Q Terminal to Hospital Computer 
Q PC on a Network Q Remote (non-Derriford) System 
Q Other (please specify) 
5. Please indicate which of the following types of applications you use and how 
frequently (1 whole of day, 2 part of day, 3 less frequently, leave blank if never 
used) 
Q PAS Q Clinical Workstation 
Q Radiology Q Financial Systems 
Q Other (please specify) 
Q Clinical Laboratory 
Q Theatres 
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6. Which of the following types of data do you create (C), access (A), update (U)? 
Please tick all boxes that apply : 
C A U 
Q Q Q Patient Care/Diagnosis 
Q Q Q Patient Administration 
Q Q Q Personnel 
Q Q Q Resource Management 
Q Q Q General Hospital Administration 
Q Q Q Financial 
Q Q Q Laboratory, Radiology or other service dept. 
7. Do you normally access information systems from more than one workstation / 
terminal ?Q Yes Q No 
If yes, are these workstation I terminals in different areas of the 
Hospital ?Q Yes Q No 
8. Do you legitimately share a group password ?Q Yes Q No 
The rationale behind each of these questions is given in table 6.6. This indicates the 
information that should be obtained from each question (or related group) and how it 
contributes to the development of class profiles. 
Question(s) Reason for inclusion 
1 Information intended to allow the responses to be grouped 
into appropriate classes. 
2,3 Information that may be used to determine the typical / 
ossible system access times for different classes of user. 
4,5,6 Responses to these questions gave information on what 
systems are used and how. The data types listed are based 
upon a principal subset of the groups from the healthcare 
generic data model, whilst the named applications relate to the 
main systems available within Derriford Hospital. 
7 Gave information on whether the location of access is relevant 
in monitoring a particular user class. 
8 Responses here indicated whether or not the respondents 
would be good candidates for lower level supervision. Shared 
accounts remove individual accountability (and the ability to 
monitor individual behaviour characteristics) and as such the 
only profiling possible would be at the user class level. 
Table 6.6 : Rationale of Survey Questions 
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In addition, the following questions were originally included, but were then subsequently 
removed during interim revisions of the material (their purpose was to indicate whether a 
class of user had any potential for effecting a security breach requiring technical knowledge, 
but they were removed once it was established that the IT & Security Personnel audience 
was not to be surveyed) : 
" How would you rate your level of operating system knowledge ? 
" Please indicate your familiarity with the concepts of malicious software and 
system flaws. 
" Are you involved in any software development work ? 
These were not considered relevant to general users given the level of system access that 
they are normally granted within Derriford (e. g. they are not involved in software 
development work and may not even be familiar with the concept of an Operating System). 
6.6.4 Questionnaire Distribution 
For the convenience of the staff at the Hospital, the survey was tied into another study that 
was being conducted at the same time as part of an undergraduate final year project (Holben 
1995). This work was concerned with conducting a more detailed survey of attitudes 
towards security within the hospital and it was decided that the questions relating to class 
profiling would also provide useful background information in this context. 
The required 
questions were, therefore, incorporated into this study, with co-operation 
being seen as 
beneficial to all sides (in that the security attitudes survey also formed part of an 
internal 
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study being conducted within Derriford). The full questionnaire contained 37 questions and 
a copy is provided in appendix A. 
A total of 200 questionnaire forms were provided and distributed to staff by managers 
within the hospital, acting on behalf of the Trust Information Doctor. From the profiling 
viewpoint, it was hoped that at least ten samples would be obtained in each staff category, 
but this could not be guaranteed as the HCE controlled the distribution and staff co- 
operation could not be relied upon in all cases. 
6.6.5 Results and general observations 
In actual fact, the overall return was 74 responses (i. e. 37%), with all staff categories except 
"researcher" being represented. Whilst this was considered to be a very good response rate 
considering the size of the full questionnaire, the fact that the total number then had to be 
broken down into the sub-categories for each user class meant that in some cases the 
response base was still very small. 
As a first stage of analysis, it was necessary to disregard the responses from any 
respondents who indicated that they did not use hospital information systems at all. The 
effect of this upon available responses within each staff category is shown in table 6.7. 
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Staff Category Total Responses Responses where IT 
system used 
Consultant 11 7 
Junior Doctor 4 3 
Nurse 23 18 
Administrator 12 11 
Secretary 5 5 
PAM 7 5 
Clerk 12 12 
Total 74 61 
Table 6.7 : Responses to profiling questionnaire 
A full breakdown of the relevant responses is provided in table 6.8, with the columns 
consequently corresponding to basic class profiles that may be derived (the number of 
usable responses to each question are represented in the table by the values in brackets). 
In most cases, the profile values are single figures representing tallies of the valid responses. 
However, there are a number of exceptions where entries are broken down into a number of 
sub-columns : 
" typical hours of work (2 entries - earliest start and latest finish across responses);. 
" IT hours per day (3 entries - minimum, mean and maximum hours across 
responses); 
" applications (3 entries - number of respondents who use them whole 
day, part day 
or less frequently); 
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Chapter 6: Improving system security in healthcare 
Some principal observations that can be made from the profiles are given below 
(remembering again that they are specifically linked to the Plymouth environment and 
cannot necessarily be extrapolated to represent the same classes of user in another domain). 
" Typical hours of work would allow some sort of valid boundaries to be 
determined for all classes except Nurse, for whom irregular shift patterns appear 
to be the norm. 
" All classes except for Administrator, Secretary and Clerk appear to be relatively 
consistent in terms of the number of hours per day spent using IT systems. 
" Junior Doctors and Clerks appear likely to access systems from more than one 
terminal, with the opposite being the case for the class Secretary. Results were 
rather less conclusive for the other classes. 
+ The majority of classes access a wide variety of applications and data. However, 
some clear trends may be observed (e. g. Nurse and Clerk classes are more 
likely 
to use the Patient Administration System (PAS) than any other application. 
Nurses are most likely to utilise patient care or administration data). 
" It is possible to classify the use of systems, applications and 
data as being 
frequent, occasional or never for each class of user - giving a broad profile of 
their relative IT usage. 
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9 It appears that users in classes Consultant, Nurse, Administrator and Clerk are 
only likely to access IT systems from one area of the HCE. 
" Group passwords seem rare in most cases (with the possible exceptions of 
Consultants and P. A. Ms, for whom insufficient samples were available to allow 
more definite conclusions to be drawn). As such, user-specific behaviour profiles 
would be feasible in most cases. 
6.6.6 Limitations 
It is possible to identify some notable weaknesses with the results and the underlying 
profiling strategy that was employed. 
Firstly, careful examination of table 6.8 reveals some significant contradictions in the 
results. For example : 
" whilst the responses indicated that Nurses might typically use IT systems 
for less 
than an hour a day (with a maximum claim of two hours), eight respondents 
later 
claimed that they accessed the PAS application for the "whole day"; 
" whilst all secretaries indicated that they used IT systems, only two of 
them 
indicated that they actually used any applications (which in both cases was the 
PAS - an application that does not 
handle much of the data subsequently 
indicated in response to the follow-up question). 
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Whether such discrepancies resulted from simple misunderstandings or carelessness on the 
part of the respondents is unclear. However, whatever the cause, they serve to highlight a 
weakness of questionnaires for approaching this form of profiling. 
Secondly, the rather small response rate in the majority of the staff categories means that 
the results cannot be regarded as a conclusive basis for profiles. They do, however, allow 
an indication of how the concept could be applied (although in practice, a more formal and 
thorough investigation would need to be conducted by the HCE involved). 
Finally, the questions included only enabled rather basic information to be collected - again 
making it difficult to draw definite conclusions across the responses. More detailed 
investigation could potentially have yielded more descriptive and accurate profiles, 
determining for example : 
" which systems are used for which applications ? 
" which applications are used for which data ? 
However, this level of analysis was considered too difficult to present in a questionnaire 
format (a view that appears justified by the apparent misunderstandings of even the 
basic 
material that was distributed). 
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6.6.7 Conclusions 
This work has served to provide an illustration of how the class profiling concept could be 
applied in healthcare and shown that it is possible to draw some clear distinctions between 
user groups based upon their general use of IT systems. 
However, the limitations cited above mean that the resulting profiles are probably not of 
sufficient accuracy to be of use in practice, due to the poor representation of some users 
and the rather basic questions utilised. As a result, it is concluded that the best approach for 
profile development may be to automate aspects of the data collection and analysis (e. g. 
using neural networks to observe and learn system usage patterns across user groups over 
an extended period). 
As such, it is still envisaged that class level profiles could be used as the first stage of 
supervision in a practical scenario (alongside more comprehensive user-specific profiles). 
6.7 A survey of existing Intrusion Detection Systems 
The previous section has established various means by which IMS intrusion monitoring and 
supervision could be achieved. However, before proceeding to consider the actual system 
design, it is necessary to acknowledge a number of previous examples of systems in this 
area. This section presents an overview of earlier work and, in doing so, attempts to 
highlight which aspects of the previously identified functionality were encompassed and 
what, if any, weaknesses were apparent. 
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A recent survey of existing intrusion detection systems (Mukherjee et al. 1994) identified 
several examples of known approaches to the problem. These are listed below, along with 
other principal examples that were identified during the course of the research : 
" ComputerWatch (Dowell and Ramstedt 1990); 
" DIDS (Distributed Intrusion Detection System) (Snapp et al. 1991); 
" Discovery (Tener 1986); 
" Haystack (Smaha 1988); 
" IDES (Intrusion Detection Expert System) (Lunt 1990); 
9 ISOA (Information Security Officer's Assistant) (Winkler 1990); 
" MIDAS (Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System) (Sebring et al. 1988); 
9 NADIR (Network Anomaly Detection and Intrusion Reporter) (Hochberg et al. 
1993); 
" NIDX (Network Intrusion Detection eXpert system) (Bauer and Koblentz. 
1988); 
9 NSM (Network Security Monitor) (Heberlein et al. 1990); 
" SecureNet II (Androutsopoulos et al. 1994); 
" Wisdom and Sense (Leipins and Vaccaro 1989). 
The significant number listed may immediately raise the question of why a new IMS would 
be needed. However, it should be noted that many of these systems have been developed to 
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Whilst all of the systems share the common basic aim of "intrusion detection", the 
approaches and capabilities vary significantly between the cases. Table 6.9 presents a high 
level summary of the capabilities, based upon details either explicitly stated in, or inferred 
from, the documented descriptions of each system. With regard to the table, a rather loose 
definition of "real-time" has been adopted and systems are judged to meet the criteria as 
long as data is analysed during the active session as soon as it becomes available (as 
opposed to being batched and then assessed en masse at some later time, e. g. the end of 
each day or week). Entries in the "attacks potentially detectable" column refer to the types 
of intrusion that each system is designed to combat (although there may be circumstances 
where a variety that is not indicated might still be trapped). 
System Detection 
methods 












DIDS J ýl J ,l J J ,l 
Discovery 
Haystack J ýf ý1 J 
IDES 
ISOA 
MIDAS 4 ýi 'SI 4 4 
NADIR 
NIDX 
NSM 4 ý1 4 
SecureNet II ýf ýf ýf ýf -1 4 4 
Wisdom & Sense I L_ 
Table 6.9 : Overview of existing intrusion detection systems 
Of course, this table only provides summary indications of the 
capabilities of each system 
and there will obviously be differences between the systems even where they 
have a tick in 
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the same column. As such, a full assessment / evaluation would require that various further 
questions need to be asked (e. g. How are behaviour profiles comprised in each case ? On 
what aspects are rules based ? How is monitoring implemented ? What are the detection 
strategies for each represented category of intruder ? Are the systems application / 
platform specific ? ). In general, the reader is referred to the original references for answers 
to such questions, but a brief summary of the notable advantages and / or limitations in each 
system is presented below. 
" ComputerWatch is principally an audit trail data reduction tool, which applies 
limited expert system rules to detect anomalous behaviour and simple security 
breaches. It is intended as a tool to assist the system administrator, minimising 
the amount of data that needs to be viewed. The system runs on the V/MLS 
operating system and aims to provide three levels of intrusion detection - system, 
group and user (although analysis of group events was described as a planned 
future enhancement in the referenced material). 
" DIDS is actually an outgrowth of the NSM project (described below), and is 
designed to overcome some of the deficiencies in the earlier system. Intrusion 
detection capability is extended from the LAN environment to arbitrarily wider 
networks. The architecture involves the use of host and LAN monitors which 
report any "interesting" events to a centrally-located DIDS 
director where they 
are analysed using an expert system (hence, distributed monitoring and 
data 
reduction is combined with centralised analysis) 
intrusion detection algorithm as Haystack. 
The system uses the same 
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" Discovery was specifically developed to detect unauthorised accessing of the US 
credit agency TRW's credit database and, as such, only aims to detect abuses of 
this application (rather than the operating system as a whole). Genuine 
subscribers are assumed to have more consistent inquiry patterns than hackers 
and the system uses a self-learning capability to determine frequently occurring 
patterns in this data. These patterns are used to construct rather basic user 
behaviour profiles, which are then compared to daily activity data in order to 
detect variances. The system outputs a file of exception data (with reasons) for 
later analysis by investigators. 
" Haystack is another audit trail data reduction tool and particularly targets the 
detection of abuse by authorised users. The system was designed for detection of 
misuse on US Air Force mainframe computers. The anomaly detection rules used 
are based on constraints imposed by official security policy and behaviour models 
for users and groups. Data is transferred from the mainframe to a PC for 
analysis (with a typical days activity being processed within a few hours). 
Intrusion detection is performed in three ways : monitoring notable events (single 
events that alter the security state of the system - e. g. access violations), special 
monitoring (involving the specific supervision of nominated users or objects) and 
statistical analysis (based upon the monitoring of a number of minor behaviour 
characteristics, such as the number of files created or pages printed, and looking 
for anomalies). 
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" IDES has been developed by Stanford Research Institute (SRI) and aims to 
provide a system-independent approach to the detection of security violations. 
The system is based upon a combination of statistical anomaly detection and 
expert system rules. A notable feature is that it is able to adaptively learn a 
subjects behaviour patterns, as profiles are updated from audit records on a daily 
basis. IDES was enhanced to develop a new prototype entitled NIDES (for 
Next-generation IDES), which utilises new statistical algorithms. It is better 
integrated and has an improved security officer interface over the original version. 
" ISOA also incorporates statistical and expert system analysis methods. The 
system is designed for Unix-based workstations and monitors hosts as well as 
users. Two methods of anomaly detection are supported, termed preliminary 
(which occurs in real-time with the collection of audit data) and secondary 
(which is invoked at the end of a user session). A key point in this case is that the 
detail of supervision increases in response to the identification of initial anomaly 
indicators (these stages of monitoring are termed "concern levels"). ISOA 
behaviour profiles also include a historical record of previous supervision (e. g. 
how often a particular threshold has been violated in the past). 
" MIDAS, as its full name suggests, is specifically designed for systems running the 
Multics operating system and is used on the US National Computer Security 
Center's Dockmaster mainframe. User and system level profiles are maintained 
and three types of rule are used to review audit data : immediate attack 
(based 
on the same principle as generic intrusion indicators), user anomaly and system 
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state (based upon departures from user and system profiles respectively). As 
with IDES, the system has the ability to update behaviour profiles, but in this case 
at the end of each user session. The system incorporates four tiers of rules and, 
as with ISOA, the firing of some rules will cause monitoring to advance to the 
next level. 
" NADIR is a system designed for Los Alamos National Laboratories' Integrated 
Computing Network (ICN) and runs on a SUN SPARCstation II, collecting data 
from three service nodes on the network. The system supplements manual audit 
record review by comparing weekly network activity against expert rules and 
reporting suspicious behaviour to the system security officer (SSO). Tools are 
then provided to allow the SSO to perform follow-up investigations. The expert 
system rules are developed through audit analysis and consultation with security 
experts, with user's suspicion level being the sum of all rules that are triggered. 
" NIDX was a prototype system developed by Bellcore specifically aimed at the 
monitoring of Unix systems. The rules in the knowledge-base model information 
about file system and user objects (classifying them as being either public or 
restricted for read, write and execute activities) and contains a set of policies and 
heuristics for detecting and assessing activities in relation to these. Although 
monitoring may have the potential to identify various classes of intrusion, the 
approach seems rather limited in terms of the factors considered. The user 
profiles are only based on a small number of historical usage statistics (e. g. login 
times, file and directory access, typical working directories and frequency of 
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command errors) and, as such, they do not attempt to fully characterise user 
behaviour. Similarly, only a limited number of indicators are monitored to detect 
Trojan Horse type activity (e. g. modification of file or directory permissions). 
" NSM, developed by the University of California, differs from most of the previous 
cases in that it analyses LAN traffic rather than audit trail records. Behaviour 
profiles in. this case are related to expected network traffic, which are compared 
to current traffic by a simple expert system. The NSM approach has several 
advantages. Firstly, it is capable of monitoring heterogeneous hosts by 
interpreting standard network protocols (e. g. TCP/IP). Secondly, LAN 
monitoring allows almost instant access to data (as opposed to waiting for it to be 
retrieved and transmitted from audit records). Lastly, the fact that NSM 
passively listens to the network logically protects it from subversion (e. g. by 
clandestine users). A limitation is that the system is restricted to LAN monitoring 
and may, therefore, be weak on detection of external penetrators who access via 
dial-up lines. 
" SecureNet II is intended to deliver threat identification and recognition in 
Integrated Broadband Communication (IBC) networks. The system utilises both 
neural networks and rule-based expert systems approaches to interpret monitored 
behaviour information, and attempts to detect and predict user intentions from it. 
In the event of anomaly detection the system selects appropriate countermeasures 
and presents them as recommendations to the security officer. 
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" Wisdom & Sense is a statistically based anomaly detection system operating on a 
Unix system, but analysing data from VAX/VMS-based hosts. The most notable 
feature of the system in comparison to the others here is that it has the ability to 
derive its own rulebase of normal behaviour from historical audit data. These 
form a rule forest of human-readable rules, allowing them to be inspected, 
modified and supplemented by human experts. The rulebase may contain 
between 104 and 106 rules (of 6 to 8 bytes each), which can be searched in around 
50ms. 
From this review it can be seen that only a minority of the existing applications provide 
complete coverage of the full range of monitoring requirements and that none of the 
surveyed systems are specifically targeted at the healthcare environment. Those systems 
that simply present anomalies to the system administrator (e. g. ComputerWatch, Discovery) 
only provide a one stage improvement over conventional audit trails and, as such, may be 
considered inappropriate to the requirements originally identified. It is desirable that the 
detection of an anomaly should not require administrator intervention in all cases and the 
system should have some degree of autonomy (an administrator will still be a mandatory 
requirement of course). It should be noted that none of these systems appear to have 
considered the issues of system auditing and advanced initial user authentication or, indeed, 
the advantages of combining them within the intrusion monitoring framework. 
With these points in mind, it is possible to identify the need for a new monitoring system 
that can more adequately address the comprehensive supervision requirements that exist in 
healthcare systems. 
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6.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has served to illustrate the various categories of computer abuse to which 
healthcare systems may be exposed and has highlighted the applicability of real-time 
supervision techniques as a means of addressing the problem. To this end, a number of 
suitable monitoring techniques and behavioural characteristics have also been identified that 
would assist in the detection of all classes of intrusion, in both healthcare and other 
domains. 
It is now necessary to move on from this to consider how these can be incorporated into a 
security system. This issue is covered in the next chapter, which presents a comprehensive 
conceptual design for an intrusion monitoring system. 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes in more detail how the elements identified in the previous sections 
would be integrated into the framework of a comprehensive monitoring system. Limited 
aspects of implementation will then be addressed in the chapters that follow. 
A full IMS would be implemented using an expert system approach and would operate by 
comparing current system activity against information held in a knowledge base. The 
knowledge base would effectively maintain two "models" of activity for reference by IMS : 
9 normal activity (i. e. the user behavioural profiles); 
" intrusive activity (i. e. the generic rules). 
These models will determine what types of activities and events the system will look for 
and, as such, an event will be judged to be indicative of a suspected intrusion if : 
9 it is compatible with intrusive activity; 
OR 
" it is incompatible with normal activity. 
7.2 Operating Cycle 
In common with other similar systems (Androutsopoulos et al. 
1994) the standard operating 
cycle of IMS (following the initial user identification and authentication) would 
involve the 
key phases listed below. 
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9 Monitor 
The principal function of the system, involving the collection of data relating to 
current user behaviour and system activity and the subsequent comparison against 
existing profiles and rules. 
" Detect 
The identification of unusual behaviour or activity (indicated by departures from 
the profiles etc. ). 
" Classify 
The investigation of the detected anomaly. Does it represent an intrusion ? If 
so, what type (e. g. is it caused by a user or a process; a penetrator or a misfeasor 
etc. ) ? 
" Respond 
The automatic action (countermeasure) performed in response to the intrusion. 
It should be noted that whilst they are logically separated here, the stages of monitoring, 
detection and classification may not be so distinct in terms of actual processing. For 
example, monitoring has the specific aim of detecting any anomalies, and the fact of 
detection assumes a knowledge of what to look for (and, hence, some degree of implicit 
classification). The operating cycle is illustrated in figure 7.1. 
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DETECT º CLASSIFY ---º RESPOND 
Fig. 7.1 : IMS Operating Cycle 
As the figure implies, the monitoring activity is envisaged as a continuous process that will 
be performed at all times whilst the host system is in operation. In a fully networked 
implementation (see section 7.7) this cycle would describe the Hosts relationship to each 
IMS Client process. 
7.3 Response to suspected intrusions 
The existence and operation of IMS should remain transparent to the user unless an 
anomaly is suspected. As stated above, a suspected intrusion will cause IMS to 
automatically perform some further action (the nature of which will vary depending upon 
the type of intrusion involved). Options here include : 
" issuing of an explicit request (or challenge) for further authentication; 
" recording of details in an intrusion log for later inspection / investigation; 
" immediate notification of the system manager (i. e. an intrusion alarm); 
" phased reduction of permitted behaviour (whereby less activities 
become possible 
as alert status increases); 
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9 locking of the intruder's terminal; 
" termination (or suspension) of the anomalous session / process. 
The degree of automatic response is an important consideration and, as indicated above, 
must be matched to the severity of the suspected intrusion. For example, if there is high 
confidence that an activity represents an intrusion or if a particularly serious breach is 
suspected, then the maximum countermeasure response should result. However, in lesser 
scenarios more limited responses will be appropriate (e. g. to the extent of just writing 
details to the intrusion log). 
There is an obvious danger that any option which allows the user to continue working 
whilst the anomaly is investigated would also allow more time for an intruder to cause 
damage. At the other extreme it would be undesirable for the system to terminate a session 
or process without a very high degree of certainty that an intrusion was in progress (e. g. 
there are many scenarios in healthcare where such action could disrupt care delivery or 
threaten patient safety, and it is unlikely that HCPs would tolerate such an occurrence more 
than once). Therefore, the first two options above are considered to be the most 
appropriate as initial forms of response. 
In practice, there are several possibilities for the type of challenge that the system could 
issue in the event of a suspected intrusion. The original system password would obviously 
be inadequate, given that it may have already been compromised in order for an intruder to 
have gained access in the first place. It is desirable that the challenge be such that 
it allows 
any legitimate user to resume work quickly with minimal interruption 
(i. e. it should be easy 
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for them to overcome, whilst still trapping impostors). A suggestion is that a (short) series 
of question and answer type challenges be posed to the user (Raga and Zviran 1991), who 
would then need to answer them correctly in order to proceed further. These could be 
based upon cognitive and / or associative information, with valid responses having been 
obtained and stored in conjunction with the original user profiling. If several (e. g. 5 to 10) 
such questions were to be obtained from users during profiling then the challenge could be 
based upon a random selection from the set (further reducing the chance of impostors being 


















Normal information flow 
............... o, - Potential flows if intrusion suspected 
Fig. 7.2 : Potential IMS operation 
There are, however, a number of scenarios in which this approach would be ineffective. 
Firstly, it must be remembered that any form of "authentication-based" challenge would 
be 
an inadequate countermeasure against misfeasors They would obviously be able to 
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respond correctly to such challenges (having originally supplied the information themselves) 
and then continue with unauthorised activity. There is a solution here in the realisation that 
continuing anomalies would lead to a succession of intrusion alerts; an event which would 
be suspicious in itself. At this point, the IMS response could then change to a method 
which would effectively combat misfeasors as well (e. g. a session lock or a trigger for 
system manager investigation). Nevertheless, this would still enable misfeasors to continue 
for longer than other classes of intruder (albeit with intermediate challenge(s)) before the 
system locks them out. 
A second problem / exception relates to suspected malicious processes - these cannot be 
issued with a challenge to which they may respond and verify their legitimacy. This in turn 
places more importance on the correctness of the resulting IMS response (e. g. the dangers 
of suspending / deleting a legitimate, and possibly essential, process or failing to take 
positive action against a genuinely destructive one). 
Finally, some classes of anomaly (for example, login failures based on unrecognised user 
identities) cannot be tied to a specific user and, as such, the issue of a challenge based on 
profile information is again inappropriate. However, it is conceivable that some form of 
generic challenge could be issued (the answer to which would be known by legitimate 
system users), with invalid responses causing the IMS to proceed to its next level of 
countermeasure (e. g. system manager notification, terminal lockout). 
In conclusion, therefore, any anomalies deemed most likely to represent one of these 
scenarios should be addressed using some response other than the automatic challenge. 
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7.4 IMS Architecture 
At a high level, the IMS architecture is based upon the concept of a centralised Host 
handling the monitoring and supervision of one or more Clients running on local 
workstations. The purpose of the Clients is to collect the required data relating to user and 
process activity and respond to any suspected intrusions detected by the Host. 
All behaviour profiles, generic rules and such like are maintained securely at the Host, 
which also handles all of the analysis and the main bulk of other processing associated with 
the supervision. By contrast, the Client involves no local data storage and acts almost 
exclusively as an agent of the Host. 
At a lower level, the Host and Client systems will be comprised of a number of modules, 
each handling a different aspect of the overall intrusion monitoring task, as illustrated in 
figure 7.3. The modules shown are intended to represent the conceptual elements of the 
system, but could also equate to the coded functional elements in a full implementation. 
The key aspects of this design are defined in the sections that follow. 
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7.4.1 Anomaly Detector 
The purpose of the Anomaly Detector will be to analyse user and process activity for signs 
of suspected intrusion, comparing it against the behaviour profiles (class and user-specific) 
that apply to the current users (claimed) identity as well as against the generic intrusion 
rules. It is envisaged that this will be comprised of a number of further sub-modules, each 
handling a specific aspect of anomaly detection (e. g. keystroke analysis). 
Various aspects of Anomaly Detector functionality will now be discussed. 
7.4.1.1 Maintenance of an intrusion alert status 
The detector will maintain an alert status table, with entries existing throughout the life of 
each user-initiated session or process to indicate the level of detected anomalies and thereby 
the confidence of a potential intrusion. Each entry will be in the basic form shown in figure 
7.4 and will be examined and updated each time activity data relating to the relevant user / 
process is analysed. 
User / Alert Idle # previous Session 




Fig. 7.4 : Structure of Alert Status table entry 
It is envisaged that, at its most basic, the "alert status level" could be a simple aggregate 
value based on the number of behavioural anomalies detected and intrusion rules satisfied 
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(with the monitored characteristics and rules having been weighted to indicate their 
significance). The entry relating to "idle time" will be used to allow the phased reduction 
of the alert status level after certain periods of inactivity. Recording a tally of "previous 
challenges" would then be used as a safeguard to determine whether the level of IMS 
response should be escalated in response to an anomaly even if the alert status is currently 
low (i. e. as a result of the phased reduction). As the figure illustrates, the table might also 
be used to store other information, such as the time of session / process initiation or the 
number of access violations incurred. These would be used to for the purposes of on-going 
comparison against behaviour profiles (for example, session start time could be used to 
derive the current session length) and would also be required to be maintained throughout 
the live of the session. It should be noted that some of the table entries are most applicable 
in the context of monitoring user sessions and will be redundant in the case of process 
supervision. 
The alert status level would increase in response to a number of conditions : 
" departures from user-specific behaviour profile; 
" departures from user class profile; 
" satisfaction of generic intrusion indicators. 
However, given that the class profile only represents behaviour in the most general terms, it 
is conjectured that even total departure should only be able to take the alert status to a 
certain level (e. g. enough to flag the user for attention, but not to cause a challenge). 
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Under normal circumstances the detector would commence supervision of a session with an 
alert status of zero (i. e. no suspicion of an intrusion). However, factors such as failed login 
attempts, system configuration anomalies and the like could cause it to begin with a non- 
zero status so that it is essentially more sensitive to further anomalies in the initial instance. 
The alert status would be reduced after successful challenges or after a sufficient period of 
normal activity to allow the system to discount the previous anomaly. 
7.4.1.2 Restriction of user activities 
It is considered feasible for the alert status level to be interlinked with the types of activity 
that a subject is allowed to perform, such that a phased reduction of permitted behaviour 
would occur as the level increases (as suggested in section 7.3). In this way, highly 
sensitive activities and / or information could be denied if there is any doubt over the current 
users legitimacy, whilst still allowing more mundane activities to continue. The approach 
would demand that a maximum alert status threshold be associated with each of the 
activities or objects which IMS is to control. If the current status level was then to exceed 
this, the activity or object would become unavailable. 
For example, consider the thresholds in table 7.1 associated with two objects 
(wordprocessor and patient database) and the activities create and delete file. If the 
current alert status level was 5 then the user would not be permitted to access the patient 
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database or to perform any file deletion. However, the creation of a file using the 
wordprocessor application would still be possible. 
Activity / Object Alert Status 
Threshold 
word processor 8 
patient database 2 
create file 8 
delete file 3 
Table 7.1 : Alert status threshold table 
Such a threshold table would be maintained within IMS, but the values would initially need 
to be assigned (and, if necessary, subsequently updated) by the system administrator. 
It must be said that the potential for error would make this approach inappropriate in many 
healthcare scenarios (for example, the denial of data access in a direct care application could 
be most unwelcome). In any case, it would be advisable for the system administrator to be 
notified whenever behaviour restrictions were being imposed so that the situation could 
be 
investigated (in case legitimate users were being unintentionally impeded). 
7.4.1.3 Suspension of supervision 
In some cases it is envisaged that continuous behaviour monitoring at all times 
throughout a 
user session may not be strictly necessary or even advantageous. 
This is especially true in 
the case of the mechanisms aimed solely at the detection of penetrators 
(e. g. keystroke 
analysis). The rationale here is that, after a reasonable amount of uninterrupted 
behaviour 
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analysis (i. e. with no challenges and no significant periods of user inactivity), the monitoring 
system should have been able to accurately determine the legitimacy of the current user. If 
an impostor is not suspected at this point then it is extremely unlikely that further 
monitoring will detect one (indeed, monitoring for longer than is necessary would simply 
allow more opportunity for false rejections to occur and place an additional load on the 
system). 
In view of this, it is considered that monitoring activity during the following periods is likely 
to be most crucial in terms of impostor detection (with supervision being temporarily 
suspended at other times) : 
" during the time immediately after the start of the session (when the authenticity of 
the user has yet to be conclusively proven); 
" during the time after any significant periods of inactivity (during which an 
impostor could potentially have replaced the legitimate user). 
Important considerations here would obviously be the period of monitoring necessary 
before suspension of supervision and also what length of time would constitute the 
"significant period of inactivity" necessary for it to be resumed. Suggested periods would 
be up to 5 minutes of activity before suspension (in order to allow a sufficient appraisal of 
the user to be made), followed by 2-3 minutes of inactivity as a trigger for monitoring to 
resume (as this length of time could have allowed sufficient opportunity 
for impostor 
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intervention). However, in a practical implementation both of these aspects could be 
configurable so that the optimum levels could be established. 
It should be noted that this approach would not be adequate for detection of misfeasor 
activity, as this could very well proceed after authentication has been established. 
Therefore, if suspension of monitoring was still to be incorporated, it would be sensible to 
periodically reintroduce supervision at random intervals as an additional safeguard (this 
would also help to guard against a situation where an impostor / penetrator might be able to 
replace the authorised user without there being a significant period of inactivity - e. g. 
coercion of the legitimate subject). 
This idea is primarily suggested as a means of minimising the likelihood of false rejections in 
the practical context. However, a further advantage in the context of practical 
implementation would be that it would reduce the significant processing overhead that 
would be associated with continuous monitoring in an environment with several Client 
machines 
7.4.2 Profile Refiner 
In a full implementation it would be desirable for IMS to utilise user activity data in two 
ways - to analyse for anomaly detection and as the 
basis for updating behaviour profiles. 
This second point recognises the possibility that user behaviour may legitimately alter over 
time (e. g. as a result of access to new applications, improvements in typing ability etc. 
). 
The purpose of the Profile Refiner would, therefore, be to provide an automatic means 
for 
user-specific profiles to be updated to account for such changes. 
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It would be most appropriate for the Profile Refiner to be based upon a Neural Network 
approach (Fausett 1994), given that the inherent ability to analyse and recognise patterns 
could allow behavioural characteristics to be identified that might not be apparent to a 
human observer. In this way, the effectiveness of the system would have the potential to 
improve over time, in that it could gradually learn more patterns of legitimate activity for 
each user (building upon the foundation provided by the generic rules and the initial 
profiles). It might also be possible to determine which of the profiled characteristics 
provide the best discriminators for each user and thereby establish (for example) primary, 
secondary and tertiary level behaviour indicators (with the primary level representing the 
most reliable identity verifiers). This hierarchy could also be extended to allow for the fact 
that some characteristics may represent negative indicators (i. e. those that, despite 
refinement, are found to cause a high level of false alarms). 
It would be undesirable for the Profile Refiner to utilise data that is later found to be 
anomalous. Refinement should, therefore, only take place after the termination of user 
sessions / processes (provided, of course, that no intrusions were proven during this time). 
However, it is also considered sensible to allow refinement to proceed if any challenges that 
were generated were correctly answered by the user (the reason being that the generation of 
the alert may be indicative that legitimate behaviour has departed 
from the profile and that 
refinement is, therefore, necessary). However, in order to 
help guard against the 
recognised problem that misfeasors will answer challenges correctly, refinement should 
be 
performed on the proviso that the number of alerts raised was small relative 
to the length of 
the session (i. e. 2 alerts in a3 hour session would 
be acceptable, whereas the same number 
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in a 10 minute session would be very suspicious). Additionally, any activity occurring 
during periods where supervision of the relevant aspect was suspended could not reliably be 
used for profile refinement. 
User-specific profile records would also incorporate a series of flags to indicate whether the 
individual behaviour characteristics are ready to be used in supervision or still being 
developed. This will allow a gradual training period to be defined for new user profiles 
without the IMS continually generating intrusion alerts (the flags would also allow a specific 
"refinement only" period to be established for existing profiles that have proved to be 
inadequate for the legitimate user). The purpose of associating flags with each profile 
characteristic is so that some degree of monitoring could still continue whilst other aspects 
are being (re)trained. The flags could also be used to allow the total disablement of some 
aspects of monitoring if, for example, some characteristics are found to be inappropriate to 
certain users. 
Data relating to process activity would not be used for refinement as the generic rulebase 
would remain static (unless specific information on new intrusion methods is introduced by 
the system administrator). 
7.4.3 Recorder 
The Recorder handles the short-term storage of system activity data during the period of a 
user session. Upon termination the information will be picked up and used 
by the Profile 
Refiner, provided that the session was not considered anomalous. 
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7.4.4 Archiver 
The Archiver will collect data relating to all system activity and store it in a long-term 
archive (in the same manner as a traditional audit trail), providing a more permanent record 
of activities and suspected anomalies. 
The storage will occur regardless of whether sessions / processes are regarded as 
anomalous and details of all security relevant events will be archived. Such events will 
include login failures, intrusion alerts, authentication challenges, suspended sessions and the 
like. 
The basic format of the archive records would be as shown in figure 7.5. 
Date Time Used Logged Privileges-; Resources 
Process ID Event j utilised J 
Fig. 7.5 : IMS Archive record structure 
However, in order to conserve storage space, it may be desirable in some scenarios to only 
record details of certain types of event. The Archiver should therefore be configurable to 
suit the preferences of the establishment involved (note that the same would not necessarily 
be true for the Recorder as this would always need to collect information on any activities 
for which profile refinement may later occur). 
The long-term retention period of archived details would be determined by the security 
policy of the HCE involved. 
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7.4.5 Collector 
The Collector represents the interface between the IMS and the existing information system 
/ applications, with the responsibility for obtaining information on all relevant user and 
system activity. 
The module would be required to operate in such a way as to encompass, but be 
independent of, all system applications. It is envisaged that this could be best achieved by 
implementation at the operating system (OS) level, such that key events also lead to IMS 
notification. For example, a significant proportion of data collection could be based around 
the interception and redirection of selected OS interrupts and service requests (such as file 
input / output, application execution, keyboard input). These would be monitored with two 
objectives : 
" to collect data on those events which pertain to monitored behaviour 
characteristics; 
" to identify those events which may affect the security of the system (for 
comparison against generic intrusion indicators). 
In some cases the required data could be obtained directly from audit trail records on the 
underlying system (as with some of the other systems discussed earlier, such as 
ISOA and 
Wisdom & Sense). However, with certain aspects (e. g. keystroke analysis) the required 
information will not be maintained in audit trails and implementation may, therefore, require 
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a significant number of operating system links. Whilst this would serve to make this aspect 
of IMS very system specific, it would be considerably more efficient than attempting to 
modify each individual application to specifically provide relevant information to IMS via an 
API (Application Program Interface) or similar method. The system specific coding of the 
Collector would only need to be done once, whereas modifications would be required to all 
current and future applications (which would be likely to be a non-trivial undertaking and 
potentially impossible in the case of commercial packages where source code may be 
unobtainable). 
The resolution of data collection would be determined at the Host by the System 
Administrator. 
7.4.6 Responder 
This module resides in the Client and handles the task of responding to anomalies detected 
by the Host. The operation of the Responder would centre around the continuous 
monitoring of the alert status transmitted by the Host, with increases in the level triggering 
appropriate actions. The nature of response might include issue of a user authentication 
challenge, suspension of a session or cancellation of a process (as previously identified in 
section 7.3). 
In some implementation scenarios, the Responder might also be responsible for handling the 
initial user identification and authentication process that is required to gain access to the 
system in the first instance. 
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7.4.7 Communicator 
The Communicator provides the network communications interface between the Host and 
the Client(s) operating on the local systems. As such, the functionality of this module is 
duplicated on both sides of the link. 
The principal functions would include transmitting user and process information to the Host 
and then subsequently keeping the Client(s) informed of the current alert status. 
If implemented in a heterogeneous environment, the Client side of the module would be 
responsible for resolving any operating system differences that exist within the monitoring 
domain so that information could be presented to the Host in a consistent, standardised 
format. 
7.4.8 Controller 
This module is provided for use by the System Administrator to allow the operation of the 
IMS system to be configured. 
On the Host side, configuration would apply to the following modules : 
" Anomaly Detector, e. g. behaviour characteristics to consider / prioritise, generic 
rules in operation; 
" Profile Refiner, e. g. frequency of refinement, acceptable thresholds for challenges 
within a session; 
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" Archiver, e. g. level of detail required, specific events to record or exclude from 
logging. 
On the Client side, the operation of the following modules could be controlled : 
" Collector, e. g. the level of data collection (linked to the characteristics being 
monitored by the Anomaly Detector). 
" Responder, e. g. the level of response required at each alert status level. 
These settings would obviously be controlled and recorded through the Host system. The 
configuration of the local Client(s) would then be established at the time of session 
initiation. 
In addition, several other features would also be provided under the auspices of the 
Controller module. These would include facilities such as user profile management, update 
of the generic rulebase and the like. 
7.4.9 Profiles 
As previously identified in sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.3, IMS profiles could conceivably hold a 
range of identification, authentication and behavioural information relating to legitimate 
users. 
The profiles would use a number of methods to represent measures of user behaviour : 
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" frequency tables (e. g. for file access); 
" means and standard deviations (e. g. for keystroke / typing profiles); 
" ranges (e. g. valid access times); 
9 lists (e. g. for valid access locations). 
"a combination of methods (e. g. a list of valid access locations which also indicate 
the relative frequency of use). 
The profile data obviously requires secure storage to prevent unauthorised browsing or 
tampering by potential impostors. If users were able to modify profile information it would 
be possible for them to adjust the records of other users to match their own (and therefore 
allow them to access the account in place of the legitimate owner). Whilst disclosure of the 
profile statistics may not initially appear to pose such a threat, it could still be a problem in 
the case of a determined impostor. For example, if the characteristics of the "target" user 
were known, the impostor would have a concrete statement of what he / she would be 
required to mimic. An alternative option would, of course, be to subsequently enlist the 
help of an accomplice with a comparable profile. 
At the very least, this dictates a requirement for encrypted storage, as used with the 
password files in the majority of commercial operating systems (Gait 1978; Morris and 
Thompson 1978). However, the proposed method for storing profiles, and other security 
management information, goes beyond this and will be discussed in section 7.7.3. 
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7.5 IMS Implementation 
The IMS concept is considered most appropriate to implementation in a networked 
environment, for the following reasons : 
" standalone systems will most often be dedicated to a single user. As such, more 
traditional authentication and access controls (e. g. passwords) will probably be 
sufficient to ensure security if they are correctly implemented. 
" implementation of a full IMS would be likely to degrade the performance of a 
standalone system. 
" networked systems provide more potential for collecting monitoring information. 
Many statistics (e. g. access location, resource usage) would not be appropriate to 
a standalone environment. 
The sections that follow will consider the options for IMS implementation in different types 
of networked environment, with a view to establishing which approach would be best to 
pursue for the purpose of a demonstrator system. 
7.5.1 PC implementation 
In this scenario the Host would be centralised (on a dedicated machine) with multiple uMS 
"Clients" being used to monitor activity on the individual workstations. The purpose of the 
Clients would be to collect any activity data that is generated locally (e. g. keystroke 
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timings) and to enforce IMS restrictions in suspected intrusion scenarios (e. g. issue a 
challenge, lock access to the system etc. ). 
In such a scenario it would be necessary to maintain the security of the IMS Clients on the 
individual machines to ensure that their operation cannot be compromised (e. g. by a 
malicious user trying to avoid detection). 
O 
° Ims 





(running IMS Clients) 
Fig. 7.6 : IMS in networked PC environment 
7.5.2 Minicomputer implementation 
There are two alternative strategies for implementing IMS in a minicomputer environment : 
" complete implementation as process(es) running on the main machine; 
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" host implementation on a physically separate processor / system, taking 
information from a client on the central host. 
The first scenario has the disadvantage that IMS would be consuming processing resources 
of the system and possibly degrading other applications as a result. In addition, the IMS 
process(es) may be vulnerable to interference from clandestine users or other (malicious) 
processes. 
The second method partially overcomes these issues as IMS processing would be limited to 
the Client process(es), but has the disadvantage that separate hardware would be dedicated 
to IMS operation (as in the PC network solution). However, this is considered the better 
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Additional problems may arise in either scenario from the fact that minicomputer systems 
will often rely upon "dumb" terminal devices. In these cases a limitation is placed upon the 
information that IMS can collect locally. For example, it would not be possible to obtain 
the measurements required to perform keystroke analysis (although the addition of some 
kind of hardware "black box" may overcome this - at a price). 
As indicated by the earlier discussion in chapter 3, both types of system configuration are 
significantly represented in HCEs, so in that sense either approach to IMS would serve a 
useful purpose. However, as the previously identified intrusion detection prototypes were 
all based in minicomputer environments, it was considered more important from the 
research perspective to pursue an implementation in the rather unsupported PC 
environment. The discussion of this aspect will begin in chapter 8. 
7.6 Advantages and disadvantages of the IMS approach 
This section presents an overview of the principal advantages and potential disadvantages 
that are perceived with the IMS approach, with particular reference to the use of the 
concept in healthcare systems. 
7.6.1 Advantages 
The advantages of the IMS approach were largely established as part of the original 
justification for investigating the concept. However, for completeness, the main points are 
also listed here. 
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" Improved security 
This is advantageous in any information system, and is achieved here due to the 
continuous nature of supervision. User authentication is no longer restricted to 
the discrete judgement(s) possible with passwords and misuse will be identifiable 
a lot earlier than with traditional auditing. In addition, the fact that much of the 
supervision is based upon behavioural characteristics makes it more difficult for 
users themselves to undermine security (e. g. by allowing colleagues unauthorised 
access to their accounts) as they cannot easily transfer these abilities to other 
users. 
" Cost 
Advantages here result from the fact that it is possible to implement the concept 
entirely in software at the user end, whereas many frequently suggested 
authentication enhancement schemes (e. g. Smart cards, other biometric methods) 
would be reliant upon specialised equipment at each user workstation. This 
makes the technique particularly suited to financially constrained environments 
such as healthcare. 
" Convenience 
This comes from the fact that the supervision can be performed transparently, in a 
non-intrusive manner. In addition, the fact that the IMS would demand nothing 
special from the users (e. g. they are not required to remember additional 
password-type information or possess any physical token) means that its 
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operation should not contradict or undermine the existing staff culture in any 
way. 
It should be noted that these advantages specifically address some of the special constraints 
that normally apply in the healthcare environment. 
7.6.2 Disadvantages 
There are a number of inherent disadvantages / weaknesses in the concept of IMS (and any 
other type of comprehensive monitoring and supervision system). The principal concerns 
are highlighted below. 
" The operation of IMS Clients and / or data collection will consume system 
resources and may degrade overall performance. The collection of detailed audit 
trail data typically degrades machine performance by between 5 and 20 percent 
(Wolfe 1992; Mukherjee et al. 1994). An IMS performing full behavioural 
monitoring and testing of generic intrusion rules would be envisaged to introduce 
a similar burden. 
" Transmission of data from Clients to the Host will result in a loss of network 
bandwidth and a loss of timeliness of data. However, this factor is also shared 
with most of the other intrusion detection systems previously identified in chapter 
6 and, in any case, data would still be available and analysed far faster than with 
traditional auditing. 
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" Maintenance of the IMS itself would entail a more significant management / 
administration burden in the affected host systems. For example, correcting 
problems with behaviour profiles would be a more complex operation than 
cancelling a forgotten password. At the same time, however, other duties (such 
as inspection of audit trails) would be reduced, so the new demands would at 
least be somewhat offset. 
" The overall concept of continuous supervision raises a question of user 
acceptance. It is conceivable that there may be mistrust and resentment of the 
system on the grounds of it being seen as a means of monitoring legitimate work 
and staff performance as opposed to just guarding against intruders. It would, 
therefore, be important to ensure that the system is perceived as a "Caring 
Mother" rather than a "Big Brother". This issue is discussed in somewhat more 
detail in chapter 8. 
In general terms the likely advantages when compared to other means of protection are 
considered sufficient to outweigh these points in the healthcare context. However, the most 
significant of the concerns here would be the potential effects on speed / performance of 
existing applications (given the high availability requirements in many cases). It is not really 
possible to give a definite statement on the extent of the problem as this would depend upon 
the practical implementation of the IMS, as well as the general processing power and 
operational overheads (e. g. number of concurrent users) of specific host systems. 
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7.7 Intrusion monitoring in a wider security architecture 
The concept of the IMS as discussed to this point has been presented as an independent 
system in its own right. However, healthcare security needs go beyond this and it is 
therefore sensible to expect that an intrusion monitoring facility would be required as part of 
a wider, more comprehensive, security system framework. 
This section describes how this objective may be achieved by examining IMS in the context 
of a Comprehensive Integrated Security System (CISS), which has been defined in a 
previous research programme (Shepherd et al. 1990; Patel and Sanders 1991; Muftic et al. 
1993). As the concept is fully documented in these reference sources, this section only 
provides a brief overview of CISS itself and concentrates upon how IMS could be 
incorporated within the framework. 
7.7.1 The Comprehensive Integrated Security System 
The basic intention of CISS is to provide a single, flexible system that can be integrated into 
any application as required (i. e. as an overlaid service with the entire system sitting between 
end-users and host applications in much the same way as is intended with IMS), allowing all 
activities to be transparently mediated by the security system. Service provision is based 
upon a limited number of well-defined procedures / techniques. In this way each can be 
analysed and tested so that certain standards of security can be "guaranteed" to the user. 
The architecture supports the full range of Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) security 
recommendations (ISO 1989), which include the following principal 
functions (it can be 
seen that the majority of these are outside of its intended scope of IMS) : 
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" invocation; 
" identification and authentication; 
" key generation and key distribution; 
" encryption and decryption; 
" digital signature; 
9 verification. 
The CISS architecture is based upon the interaction of ten autonomous agents. These 
represent the logical components of the system, with each implementing one, or a group of, 
strictly defined functions. Separate agents exist to handle the management and co- 
ordination of security services, the establishment of secure associations within and between 
domains, and user authentication and monitoring, as well as providing facilities for system 
administration and fault recovery. The specific functionality and logical relationships 
between the ten agents is described in detail in the referenced material, but for summary 
purposes their names are listed below : 
1. User Agent (UA); 
2. Security Administrator Agent (SAA); 
3. Security Services Agent (SSA); 
4. Security Mechanisms Agent (SMA); 
5. SMIB Agent (SMIBA); 
6. Agent for Operational Environment Interactions (OPENA); 
7. Association Agent (AA); 
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8. Inter-Domain Communications Agent (IDCA); 
9. Monitoring Agent (MA); 
10. Recovery Agent (RA). 
A further important aspect of the architecture is the Security Management Information Base 
(SM B) which acts as the repository for all data relevant to the security system (i. e. users, 
security functions and system objects). 
The implementation of CISS is based upon the concept of security domains, which refer to 
sets of users, applications networks and systems that are tied together by a common security 
policy. Examples of domain composition could, therefore, be different departmental LANs 
within the same HCE or even different HCEs within the same local authority (the 
compatibility of security policies being made possible through the adherence to a common 
standard; for example, an enhanced set of the baseline security guidelines presented in 
chapter 4, which also consider encryption issues). 
Each domain would include one or more Security Management Centres (SMCs) to handle 
and control all local security activities - analogous to an extended version of the IMS Host. 
These will perform the majority of management functions and will securely hold information 
relating to user authentication, access rights and other supervisory characteristics. SMCs 
could be operated by the host HCEs to avoid problems of trust, with inter-domain activities 
then being mediated by the SMCs in the domains involved. 
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7.7.2 Intrusion monitoring in the CISS framework 
The integration of the IMS concepts into the CISS framework is initially simplified by the 
fact that the ideas of intrusion detection and user supervision have both been considered as 
potential aspects of the CISS architecture. However, neither have been defined in any detail 
and, as such, the integration of the IMS concept provides a means to rectify this. 
At the most basic level, the concepts previously presented in the discussion of IMS can be 
seen to integrate into the CISS architecture by providing the functionality required by the 
Monitoring Agent (MA). The role of this agent is to monitor system usage for audit trailing 
and fault reporting purposes - which approximates to the general idea behind IMS. 
However, it is worth examining the existing definition of the MA in more detail to establish 
a more specific relationship. The main functions that can be ascertained are as follows : 
" continuous monitoring of all security relevant events; 
" access and management of an (encrypted) security log; 
" event handling (i. e. responding to anomalies). 
Further definition, taken directly from the previously cited work by Shepherd et a1, states 
that the agent : 
... could 
be an Al-based module that will detect problems and even 46 
likely problems before they occur, and take the necessary actions for 
preventative or remedial measures. " 
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Both of these elements of the specification continue to relate closely to the IMS concept. 
The existing documentation also suggests that some connections be may drawn between 
IMS and the Recovery Agent, in so far as the latter is defined as having responsibility for : 
" all security violation detection; 
9 CISS error recovery. 
However, the majority of the further discussion of the R. A. in the existing material tends to 
concentrate on the second aspect, leading to the conclusion that this agent is more 
concerned with handling CISS internal errors than those resulting from anomalous user / 
process behaviour. As such, it is possibly better to regard IMS-type "security violation 
detection" as being within the terms of the MA through the "continuous monitoring" and 
"event handling" aspects. 
Given that only this broad specification exists, it is definitely feasible for the intrusion 
monitoring and recovery aspects of CISS to be implemented in the manner suggested by 
I MS without introducing major conflicts with either of the existing designs. It is, therefore, 
possible to consider in more detail how the integration would be achieved. 
7.7.3 Distribution of IMS functionality within the CISS 
It has already been established that the role of the SMC is analogous to that of an extended 
IMS Host and, therefore, the latter would be encompassed at this level. By examining the 
separate functional elements that comprise the IMS design, it can be seen that it is actually 
the Anomaly Detector that would equate most closely to the basic concept of the MA. 
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However, the MA would actually handle more than just this aspect and a more 
comprehensive breakdown of the relationships of IMS modules to CISS agents is given in 
table 7.2. 
IMS Module CISS Agent(s) 
Anomaly Detector Monitoring A gent 
Archiver Monitoring A gent (via SMIB Agent) 
Collector Operational Environment Interactions Agent 
User Agent 
Communicator User Agent 
Controller System Administrator Agent 
Profile Refiner Monitoring A gent (via SMIB Agent) 
Recorder Monitoring A gent 
Responder User Agent 
Monitoring A gent 
Table 7.2 : Relationship of IMS modules to CISS agents 
All aspects of IMS stored data would be absorbed into the CISS framework as part of the 
SM[B. The storage of data in the SMIB is logically separated into six conceptual segments, 
as follows : 
1. an identification segment for entities and other network resources; 
2. an extended security segment holding security profiles of users, programs and 
other network resources; 
3. a secure associations segment which maintains details of active network users 
and their associations (e. g. membership of closed groups, secure teleconferences 
etc. ); 
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4. an extended access control segment holding the specification of access control 
parameters for network users and resources; 
5. a security log - for recording of security relevant information and use in 
recovering after system failures; 
6. a confidential segment for active entities. 
It is envisaged that the integration of the IMS data groups would affect the majority of 
these segments in some way and the likely relationships are shown in table 7.3 below. 
IMS data group SMIB Segment 
User-specific behaviour profiles Extended Security 
Class level behaviour profiles Extended Security 
Generic rulebase Extended Security 
Alert Status table Secure Associations 
Alert Status thresholds for object access Extended Access Control 
Archive Security Lo 
Table 7.3 : IMS data storage in the SMIB 
Whilst this is fine at the conceptual level, it is necessary to consider this issue in slightly 
more detail to see how data would actually be stored. Looking first at where the behaviour 
profiles would be incorporated, it is clear that they could be integrated as an expansion of 
the existing data on user entities. This is confirmed by the description from Shepherd et al 
(1990), which recognises the use of behavioural data and briefly mentions the opportunities 
that would be offered by a future, "semi-intelligent" version of the system that was able to 
take account of "users' habits". However, the current SMIB data structure for system users 
is somewhat vague, containing only the following "fields" : 
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Name 1 Password 1 Extra data Capabilities 
Name N Password N Extra data Capabilities 
Incorporation of user behavioural data would require a data structure significantly more 
complex than this, with the further information basically representing an expansion of the 
"extra data" field. At the very least, this would involve the inclusion of the field structures 
shown in figure 7.8. 
Behaviour Behaviour Profile Challenge Data Class Identifier(sl 
Characteristic 1 Status Challenge Question I Valid response 
Characteristic 2 Status Challenge Question 2 Valid response 
Characteristic 3 Status I Challenge Question 3 Valid response 
tChäracteristic 
N Stätus Challenge Question N Valid response 
Fig. 7.8 : Extension of System User Entity data 
The representation of behavioural characteristics would involve the use of a variety of 
underlying data structures, as appropriate for each specific measure involved (for example, 
keystroke characteristics could be stored using a series of digraph matrices). Note that the 
status flag associated with each behaviour characteristic would be used to indicate whether 
it is enabled, disabled or being (re)trained in relation to the particular user entity. 
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As a result of the further "secret" data within the structure, it would be desirable to increase 
the use of encryption beyond just the user password to also include the challenge data and 
some elements of the behaviour data (i. e. those aspects that could potentially be mimicked if 
details were made known to impostors). 
The maintenance of the generic rulebase does not fit neatly into the existing SMIB structure 
and would require an additional structure type. For each intrusion rule it would be 
necessary to store the series of events against which the MA would be required to monitor 
in order to identify anomalies, as well as (an indication of) the necessary remedial action 
that should be taken in the event of detection (e. g. alert status increase, immediate issue of a 
user challenge etc. ). For example : 
Rule 1 Event Conditions 
Rule N Event Conditions 
Required Actions 
Required Actions 
User and system supervision facilities will then become available as part of the range of 
common security services offered to applications by CISS. Examples of specific services 
(of both discrete and continuous nature) would be as follows 
" Discrete services : 
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" Continuous services : 
real-time user supervision (at class and individual levels); 
process monitoring and control; 
anti-virus protection; 
However, it can be deduced from this list that IMS is more oriented towards providing 
services to system / application entities than to end-users. Therefore, the Security 
Administrator would be likely to be the only "user entity" with the ability to selectively 
enable / disable the services that are provided. 
The IMS Profile Refiner would utilise an existing inter-relationship between the Monitoring 
and SMIB Agents as a means for the automatic update of behaviour profiles in the Sly. 
Other CISS agents will handle further aspects of IMS functionality which would otherwise 
need to have been provided in an IMS-specific fashion. For example, the IMS sub-system 
would utilise the generic facilities of the System Administrator Agent to allow management 
and administration of user profiles, available supervision features, generic rules and such 
like. 
As indicated at the beginning of this section, the formulation of the CISS framework was 
the basis of a previous research project. A further, independent research programme is 
currently in progress that should lead to the realisation of certain elements of the 
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architecture in a practical context (Rhodes 1995). It is envisaged that an IMS-type 
architecture could consequently be incorporated at some later time. 
7.8 Conclusions 
The IMS concept is not intended as a total replacement for conventional authentication and 
access control methods (although in some cases it will offer an opportunity for more dated 
approaches to be replaced). In the majority of systems, supervision could be incorporated 
alongside other methods to complement the security already provided. 
In addition, it will have little or no effect upon the need for physical security and personnel- 
related measures within an organisation. There are also some important aspects of "logical" 
security that are not addressed (e. g. protection of data communications) which highlight the 
potential need for a wider framework such as that of CISS. 
Finally, the advocated monitoring approach would incur too great a processing overhead if 
attempts were made to implement it on a scale above that of a LAN. As such, further 
protection is required to safeguard WAN activities and inter-HCE interactions. This issue is 
explored in more depth in the penultimate chapter of the thesis. 
Before this, however, the next two chapters present a yet lower level examination of 
(certain aspects of) the IMS concept. This is based around the practical investigation and 
evaluation of a specific real-time supervision technique that is considered appropriate for 
(although again not limited to) use in healthcare systems. Following an experimental study, 
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it is then shown how the technique may be incorporated into a framework similar to that 
which has been presented in this chapter. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Having established the basic design options and required functionality for the IMS, it was 
also necessary to evaluate aspects of supervision in a more practical context. However, 
rather than present a general overview of several methods it was decided that a detailed 
treatment of a specific technique would be more appropriate. 
The earlier discussion has identified that passwords provide an unreliable basis for user 
authentication and that stronger methods are necessary, using techniques that are more 
difficult, if not impossible, to forge. One of the necessary requirements of IMS will be the 
ability to perform continuous authentication to ensure that a valid user is present at all times 
during a session. 
Previous work has identified three main categories of information that may be used to 
validate a user (Wood 1977) : 
" something the user knows (e. g. a password); 
" something the user has (e. g. a token such as a card or key); 
" something the user is (e. g. a biometric such as fingerprint or voice pattern). 
In general, the last option appears to be the strongest, as possession may not be easily 
transferred to other people in the same way as secret knowledge or a token. This point was 
recognised by the 1990 AIM Working Conference on Data Protection and 
Confidentiality 
(Commission of European Communities 1991b), which cited a need in healthcare 
for 
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"identification possibilities which are directly connected with the individual staff member" 
Biometric measures were specifically mentioned as being worthy of further investigation. 
However, as previously mentioned, the cost of the technology required to successfully 
implement most biometric methods would largely preclude its uptake in healthcare. What 
is, therefore, required is a biometric measurement that can be obtained without requiring 
any form of additional hardware. Fortunately, such a characteristic can potentially be 
identified in the form of users typing style (or keyboard rhythm) and this has been selected 
as the basis for more detailed investigation. 
The basic premise of the approach is that typing characteristics will be reasonably unique to 
each user, revealing an individual "signature" (analogous to those that can be identified with 
normal handwriting (Fairhurst et al. 1994)). This theory is lent weight by previous studies 
relating to the actual process of typing (Cooper 1983; Shaffer 1970). The concept of using 
keystrokes to assess identity was originally proposed by Spillane (1975) and can be claimed 
to provide a "behavioural" biometric measurement, in that the act of typing represents how 
a user does something as opposed to being a physiological characteristic. 
Evaluation of the technique for inclusion in the IMS was considered to be appropriate as 
none of the intrusion detection systems surveyed in section 6.6 had incorporated keystroke 
analysis in their supervision strategies (although previous studies have been conducted 
independently, as will be discussed later). 
In addition, it was considered that it would be easier to develop a user profile for keystroke 
characteristics than with most other behavioural aspects A usable typing profile can be 
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constructed relatively quickly by having users partake in a specifically arranged profiling 
session. This would not be possible with any of the other characteristics discussed (e. g. 
analysis of operating system command usage, typical access times) as the only way to obtain 
an accurate measure of normal user behaviour in these cases would be by monitoring 
genuine, operational use of systems over a long period of time. Keystroke analysis was, 
therefore, considered more convenient as it would place relatively little demand on test 
subject availability (making it possible to use people who would not otherwise have been 
accessible for profiling). Conversely, the investigation of other methods would have 
required sustained access to test subjects which, if possible at all, would have considerably 
reduced the size of the test group in comparison to that which was eventually used in this 
study. 
It was envisaged from the outset of the work that it would be possible to implement the 
technique transparently on the monitored systems and using entirely software-based 
methods. These factors would help to satisfy the convenience and financial constraints 
previously identified in the healthcare environment. However, it was also realised that this 
form of monitoring would only be appropriate for identifying the penetrator classes of 
intruder (as the keystroke signature alone could not be used to determine whether legitimate 
users are acting abnormally or abusing their privilege). 
8.2 Keystroke Analysis Concepts 
In order to provide a foundation for further discussion it is necessary to establish some of 
the theoretical concepts behind keystroke analysis. This includes consideration of 
how the 
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activity of typing may be used to identify and discriminate between users, as well as 
alternative implementation strategies. These issues are discussed in the sections that follow. 
8.2.1 Typing characteristics 
Before considering a monitoring strategy, it is necessary to identify suitable typing 
characteristics that may be used as a basis for analysis (and hence authentication). 
The list below presents a series of factors that may be considered as a means of determining 
the keystroke "signature" of an individual user (note that some characteristics have more 
obvious potential than others). 
" Inter-keystroke times 
The elapsed time between user keystrokes. These can be analysed in two ways, to 
generate general and digraph-specific measures. The general measure relates to the 
mean inter-keystroke time across all keystrokes, giving an indication of the users 
overall typing speed. The digraph-specific measure is more detailed and refers to 
the intervals between specific character pairs (e. g. the time between releasing "T" 
and pressing "H"). This measurement may potentially reveal details of the users 
characteristic typing rhythm and should be the more useful / accurate of the two 
inter-keystroke measurements. 
" Keystroke duration times 
The length of time for which keys are held down. 
and key-specific measures. 
This can again provide general 
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" Typing error frequency 
A basic measure of the user's typing accuracy. Typing errors can be classified in a 
number of ways (Cooper 1983), but in simple terms such a measure could be 
determined by monitoring the usage of the delete key(s). 
" Force of keystrokes 
Whilst this would be likely to be quite distinctive in some cases (e. g. in 
differentiating between users who traditionally use manual typewriters and those that 
type entirely on computers), it is unfortunately impossible to obtain such 
measurements from the standard electrical keyboards found on most PCs and 
terminals. 
" Keystrokes/ Words per minute 
The standard measures of typing ability. These would be likely to portray similar 
information to a general keystroke interval measure. 
8.2.2 Categories of typist 
Users are likely to differ dramatically in terms of typing styles and abilities, depending upon 
factors such as their familiarity with the keyboard, experience and any formal tuition. 
Previous research (Card et al. 1980) has broken the classifications down into six categories 
based upon the average inter-keystroke time of the subject. These categories are shown in 
table 8.1. 
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Average (Skilled) 0.20 
Average (Non-Skilled) 0.28 
Poor 0.48 
Unfamiliar with keyboard 1.20 
Table 8.1 : Typist Skill Categorisation 
In theory it should be relatively easy to differentiate between users from different categories. 
Separation within a category may, however, be more problematic (for example, professional 
typists who underwent the same training may all exhibit a similar style). 
8.2.3 Authentication strategies 
As previously identified in table 6.3, there are two general approaches by which the concept 
of keystroke analysis may be incorporated into an authentication / supervision system. For 
the discussion purposes these will be referred to as the Static Identifier and Dynamic 
Identifier approaches. 
8.2.3.1 Static Identifier 
In this scenario authentication is based upon the entry of a static text string. 
This could be 
used in conjunction with normal login where a username and password are entered as usual, 
but rather than just authenticating the user from this 
information alone the system also 
analyses the way in which it was typed, providing a further 
level of authentication. 
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There are two fundamental factors that may strengthen this approach : 
0 the system analyses a constant text pattern for authentication rather than any 
arbitrary input. The samples used to generate user "typing profiles" can, therefore, 
concentrate on the specific text used for the identifier; 
" the users typing is likely to be more consistent (automatic) for a well-known, 
regularly typed string than with other arbitrary input. 
This combination theoretically means that quite a high degree of accuracy should be 
possible in the authentication. 
The majority of reported studies and experiments to date appear to have concentrated in 
this area (Bleha et al. 1990; Joyce and Gupta 1990; Obaidat and Macchiarolo 1992; de Ru 
and Eloff 1995), with errors as low as 2% in the rejection of valid users. 
8.2.3.2 Dynamic Identifier 
Using this approach authentication is based upon any arbitrary text input, allowing greater 
scope for supervision in real-time during user sessions. Monitoring could occur either 
continuously or at selected (random) periods during the user session 
(the choice is likely to 
depend upon the processing overhead incurred by the monitoring system). 
This would 
provide the desired transparent (i. e. non-intrusive) means of authentication 
that is not 
currently possible with most other methods (even those 
based on biometric features). 
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In this scenario security is no longer reliant on a single authentication period but becomes 
continuous throughout the session. One advantage here is that it should serve to prevent 
"logical piggybacking", whereby an intruder attempts to utilise an unattended terminal that 
is already logged into another account. Whilst other methods exist to prevent use in this 
manner (e. g. physical keyboard locks), they tend to require positive action on the part of 
users if they are to be effective. 
It is desirable that the decision period required to accept or reject a subject is as small as 
possible. The results of a previous experiment in this area (Leggett et al. 1991) cited that 
many impostors were detected in less than 100 keystrokes. Whilst this is impressive, it 
should be appreciated that this would still be a sufficient "window" in which to wreak havoc 
in some cases. 
8.2.4 Evaluation of effectiveness 
In order to determine whether keystroke analysis would be a worthwhile element of the 
IMS, it is necessary to obtain some measure of its effectiveness. As with other 
authentication systems based on biometric measurements (Cope 1990), this may be judged 
on the basis of two factors : False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR). 
The false acceptance rate, which may also be referred to as the Impostor Pass Rate (IPR), 
relates to errors where impostors are falsely believed to be legitimate users. Conversely, the 
false rejection rate, which may also be termed the False Alarm Rate (FAR), refers to errors 
where the system falsely identifies the legitimate user as an impostor. These rates share a 
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mutually exclusive relationship, such that configuring the tolerance settings of a system to 
give good results for one will generally cause a degradation of the other (and, as such, it is 
not possible to attain optimum levels for both measures). This is illustrated in figure 8.1 
below. 






Slack Tolerance / Threshold Tight 
Setting 
Increasing end-user rejection 
Fig. 8.1 : Relationship between FAR and FRR errors 
The "equal error" scenario is not really an appropriate compromise and a decision must, 
therefore, be made as to which rate should receive priority. In actual fact, the priorities will 
vary depending upon whether a static or dynamic authentication system is used. 
" False Acceptance Rate 
This is obviously required to be as low as possible, otherwise impostors could 
remain undetected and the way is left open for breaches of security to occur. 
As 
highlighted by Joyce and Gupta (1990), in the case of a static verifier a FAR of 
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even 5% would be unacceptable as it would suggest that one in twenty 
unauthorised access attempts would be likely to succeed. If continuous 
authentication was used however, such a figure may be more tolerable as there 
would be increased likelihood of the system challenging the impostor at some stage 
during the session. 
" False Rejection Rate 
From a security standpoint this statistic is of less concern, as false rejections do not 
facilitate security breaches. However, for the legitimate user the issue is obviously 
more significant. Again considering an error rate of 5% as the basis for comment, 
in the case of a static verifier the figure would probably be deemed acceptable as it 
would simply represent occasional inconvenience to legitimate users (one in twenty 
logins would fail wrongly - probably a lesser proportion than would normally fail 
simply as a result of typing mistakes anyway). However, for continuous 
authentication this frequency would be much more noticeable and, as indicated on 
the graph, could consequently be irritating to the user if the supervision system was 
to persistently disrupt the session to demand further authentication. Frequent 
instances of false rejection for specific individuals should trigger resampling their 
typing characteristics to create a more accurate profile. 
In summary, therefore, minimising the FAR is the prime concern with static authentication, 
whereas a minimal FRR is of greater significance in the dynamic scenario. 
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A further important consideration (in the dynamic scenario) is the speed with which the 
identity assessment can be provided by the system (i. e. how many keystrokes could an 
intruder enter before being noticed ? ). 
8.3 Implementation considerations for a Keystroke Analysis System 
The effectiveness of the keystroke analysis concept was tested in practice using an 
experimental system developed as part of the research programme. The following sections 
present details of how this system was implemented, as well as the main findings observed 
during a large scale study. 
Whilst a significant number of previous research efforts have been concentrated in this area, 
the majority have only considered the use of keystroke analysis in static authentication 
systems. As a consequence, this investigation concerned itself with the dynamic identifier 
approach, which was in any case considered most appropriate to the continuous supervision 
requirements of IMS. 
In terms of the objectives of the investigation it was considered that, given the previous 
discussion of false acceptance and false rejection in section 8.2.4, the minimisation of the 
FRR should be a priority. The rationale here was that if the system was to be recommended 
as a viable supervision technique in -ICE systems, then it should have the properties of 
transparency and convenience for legitimate users (which would not be the case with 
frequent false rejections). 
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It was further conjectured that if a FRR of 0% could be achieved, then what would 
effectively be observed in the results would be a "worst case" level for false acceptances 
(giving a good indication of the security that would be provided and the contribution that 
the technique would make to an overall IMS user profile). As such, this was considered to 
be the most suitable approach and was, therefore, the method pursued in the investigation 
(the means by which the minimal FRR was ensured is discussed in section 8.3.4). 
A similar approach was previously used in a static verification study (Brown and Rogers 
1993), where techniques were used to purposefully bias the system in favour of 0% false 
acceptances (bearing in mind that these are the key consideration in the static context). 
Whilst establishing a "worst case" FRR would have served no advantage in our 
investigation, the fact that such a study has been performed does provide further 
justification for an experiment that pursues the converse goal in the dynamic scenario. 
The chosen strategy is also significantly different from that presented in the only previously 
available study of dynamic keystroke analysis (Leggett et al. 1991). Here the authors 
attempted to establish reasonable minimums for both FAR and FRR errors - an approach 
which was previously discounted as an inappropriate compromise in section 8.2.4. (note : 
the results yielded in this case were a FRR of 11% and a FAR of 13%). 
It was considered that an experimental evaluation could be conducted using a system as 
shown in figure 8.2, with the typing characteristics of a series of test subjects 
being profiled 
and each then subsequently submitting further text samples for testing. 
The profiles and 
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samples would then be compared off-line by a monitoring system to determine impostor 
detection effectiveness (note: each test sample would be used as an impostor attempt by 








Analyser ---º (Monitor) " 
Authentication 
Judgement 
Fig. 8.2 : Keystroke analysis experiment overview 
However, prior to staging a full investigation, a series of preliminary tests and a pilot study 
were conducted to answer some general questions about how the system should operate. 
The principal considerations here included : 
" which typing characteristics would be most suitable for inclusion; 
" which keystrokes should be included in the analysis; 
" how to obtain an adequate typing profile; 
" how to perform authentication. 
The following sections detail how these issues were addressed. 
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8.3.1 Typing characteristics evaluated 
From the various typing characteristics described in section 8.2.1, the following were 
considered to be the most likely discriminators and were selected for evaluation in an initial 
pilot study using 13 test subjects : 
" Inter-keystroke time; 
" Typing error frequency; 
" Keystroke duration. 
Even prior to the pilot study it was anticipated that the analysis of inter-keystroke times for 
specific digraphs would be the best discriminator, with the other measures serving to 
provide supplementary information to strengthen the process. The tests confirmed this 
view, with significant differences being observed between valid subjects and impostors in 
terms of the proportion of valid interval timings that each generated. However, the general 
keystroke interval test was found to be less robust, with a FAR of 66%. 
Typing error frequency was found to be quite variable for certain subjects whilst others 
appeared to be relatively consistent. This indicated that the measure would not be an 
adequate discriminator in its own right, but it was nevertheless used in the tests as an 
additional consideration to the inter-keystroke timings. However, it was actually found to 
be even worse than the general inter-keystroke test, yielding a FAR of 72%. 
The strength of the keystroke duration measurements was considered even more 
doubtful 
and was dropped following some preliminary tests conducted before the pilot study. 
The 
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reason for this was that all test subjects, regardless of their typing skills, appeared to 
generate very similar results. The general conclusion drawn from this was that the sampling 
"window" for key depressions is too narrow to obtain any information from which to 
distinguish between the majority of users. Only users with a very "deliberate" keystroke 
style may be an exception to this. Although attempts were made to strengthen the test, no 
noticeable improvements resulted and the keystroke duration measurements were, therefore, 
dropped entirely. 
8.3.2 Keystrokes selected for analysis 
It was decided that the system should not attempt to gather information for all user 
keystrokes, as only a subset would be likely to exhibit the distinctive rhythm necessary for 
authentication. 
Monitored keystrokes were, therefore, restricted to alphabetic characters and spaces. 
Numeric characters were not included, although it is acknowledged that in some contexts 
(e. g. financial systems) the monitoring of numeric input could be potentially characteristic 
(and, indeed, that alphabetic input may not feature so strongly). Punctuation and other 
"special" characters were excluded as their use is generally less frequent. 
No differentiation is made between the use of upper and lower case characters. Whilst 
some previous experiments (Leggett and Williams 1988; Umphress and Williams 1985) 
have chosen to exclude upper case input from analysis (presumably on the grounds that they 
occur with less frequency within normal prose) this disregards the fact that in some contexts 
(e. g. certain command line environments) upper case input may occur with more 
frequency. 
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The only scenario in which the character case is likely to affect timing is when a character is 
generated in conjunction with the shift key. However, the frequency of shifted input is not 
considered sufficient to significantly distort results and with this system the decision was 
therefore taken not to differentiate. 
Previous research (Leggett and Williams 1988) has also attempted to differentiate between 
digraphs according to which half of the keyboard they appear on and, hence, the hand(s) 
used to type them (i. e. left or right hand only, left to right or right to left) to determine 
whether any further discriminating power could be gained. However, this additional 
filtering resulted in FARs and FRRs that were noticeably higher than when all digraphs were 
treated equally and, therefore, no such tests were performed in this investigation (a further, 
independent observation is that the distinction between left and right hand digraphs is only 
sensible when talking in terms of reasonably skilled typists. Inexperienced typists may be 
less consistent in terms of which hand they use and may, for example, type a character on 
the left side of the keyboard with their right hand). 
Deleted keystrokes are not used in the creation of inter-keystroke time profiles. It is 
anticipated that if the second character of a digraph was entered as a result of a mis-stroke 
then the inter-keystroke time observed would be unlikely to be representative of a users 
normal typing style. Therefore, the interval times associated with keystrokes that are 
subsequently deleted should be disregarded. 
It is to be expected that users may pause during typing (e. g. due to distraction, stopping to 
think or read ahead etc. ) resulting in inter-keystroke times that are uncharacteristic of their 
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normal typing rhythm. Use of these times could distort both keystroke profiling and 
subsequent monitoring and, therefore, inter-keystroke times exceeding a certain threshold 
should be ignored. For this reason a highpass filtering level of 750ms was incorporated into 
the system (chosen to be compatible with Card's classification of a user who is unfamiliar 
with the keyboard layout and pauses to look for keys). However, there is a danger that, 
upon discovering the existence of the highpass filter in the monitoring system, an impostor 
could attempt to fool the system by typing deliberately slowly. As such, an additional 
safeguard must be provided to detect unnaturally slow typing. 
8.3.3 Creation of Keystroke Profiles 
It is necessary to obtain a reference sample of the typing characteristics of each legitimate 
user for use as the basis for future authentication (i. e. a keystroke profile). It is obvious 
that this profile will be extremely important in determining the accuracy / effectiveness of 
the resulting keystroke analysis. 
The considerations that must be addressed at this stage are the selection of an appropriate 
reference text upon which to base the profiling and issues of how best the profile timings 
may be processed once obtained. 
8.3.3.1 Selection of a Reference Text 
The main considerations in the selection of the reference text are sample size and 
composition. 
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The main issues regarding sample size are that the profile text must be sufficiently long 
enough to ensure that the following requirements can be satisfied. 
" Individual digraphs can be sampled sufficiently to allow typical performance ranges 
to be established. In theory, the more samples that are used to create the mean and 
standard deviation values, then the more effective the profile should be. 
Conversely, profile entries based on a very small number of samples will be 
unreliable indicators of typical performance. Therefore, the experimental system 
only utilises profile entries if five or more digraph samples were used to create 
them. This attempts to ensure that "weaker" profile entries are ignored, whilst still 
retaining a significant number of usable digraphs. 
" The users "natural" typing style emerges. Too small a sample may not accurately 
reflect the users normal typing style. For example the user may try to type as fast 
as possible to complete the task and / or may make more typing mistakes than 
usual (e. g. the user may feel pressured due to the knowledge of being monitored). 
However, a sample of adequate size should ensure that the users normal style is 
forthcoming. 
9 The requirements for test composition can be satisfied (see below). 
The performance of legitimate users was experimentally examined using profiles generated 
using text samples of varying sizes (a 541 character passage of text was used as the 
basis 
for this and was sampled two, four and eight times to generate the different profiles). 
The 
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effectiveness of each profile was then gauged by observing the percentage of incompatible 
inter-keystroke times in a subsequent sample, as shown in table 8.2. 
Total Sample Size 
(chars) 
1082 2164 4328 
% keystrokes not 50 41 35 
matching profile 
Table 8.2 : Effect of profile sample size 
From this it can be seen that sample size makes a significant difference to the results. 
Authentication noticeably improves using the profiles based on larger text samples and 
hence the a large text sample appears to be warranted. 
However, it is unlikely that increasing the sample size further would be beneficial given that 
the second doubling of the sample size did not yield as dramatic a reward as the first. 
Additionally, factors such as user fatigue (and patience) had to be considered during 
profiling and an even larger sample would have been likely to be unwelcome (note: in these 
tests a good typist was able to complete the 4328 character sample in 20 minutes, whereas a 
poor typist required around 45). From the administration perspective, too large a sample 
will mean the process of explicitly profiling each user will become burdensome in a 
large 
system. This point was made in another previous study (Joyce and Gupta 1990), which 
was generally critical of the use of large sample texts (it should, however, be noted that this 
experiment was concerned with the static identifier approach, where such significant 
samples were not required). 
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It was, therefore, considered that an overall sample size of between 4000 and 4500 
characters was most suitable in order to construct a representative profile of typing. 
The issue of sample composition refers to the number of different characters and character 
digraphs within the text. It would be almost impossible to generate a (readable) reference 
text that would incorporate all possible valid character digraphs. It is therefore to be 
expected that during subsequent monitoring some digraphs will be encountered for which 
no profile sample was taken. In such cases the system cannot make any judgement and 
must ignore the test data, which in turn reduces the opportunities for authenticating the 
input and hence the effectiveness of the system. As a result, it is important to minimise the 
frequency with which such cases will arise by selecting a representative text for initial 
profiling. 
A statistical analysis typical English language text reveals significant differences in the 
frequencies with which particular characters (and hence character digraphs) occur (Beker 
and Piper 1982). It was, therefore, considered that user profiles would be likely to be more 
accurate if the reference text was representative of these frequencies. Further investigation 
of this possibility resulted in the discovery of a suitable text (with a length of 2202 
characters) in which the character frequencies corresponded very closely to the expected 
frequencies in normal English (with the 30 most frequent character digraphs all being 
significantly represented). As such, acquiring two samples of this text was considered 
sufficient to satisfy both size and composition requirements. Tests revealed that with two 
samples, between 60% and 70% of the individual digraphs would be sampled the required 
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five times or more (the actual percentage depended on the number of digraphs excluded due 
to typing errors), thus providing a reasonably sound basis for later supervision. 
It should be noted that the selection of the texts used as the basis for the test samples was 
not subject to the same strict conditions that applied to the reference text. The only 
requirement was that they were of an adequate length to provide a basis for monitor 
assessment. Issues of text composition were ignored based on the premise that monitoring 
should aim to be equally effective with any arbitrary text. 
8.3.3.2 Filtering of profile sample timings 
It was previously established that profiling filtered out deleted keystrokes and any inter- 
keystroke timings exceeding 750ms. 
In addition, analysis of the keystroke profiles from the aforementioned pilot study revealed 
that many contained anomalous entries where the profiled digraph means were less than the 
associated standard deviations. Two potential explanations could be offered for this : 
" one or more "rogue" keystroke times occurred during profiling that were artificially 
high or low when compared to the rest of the values) and distorted the overall 
result (most likely in the case of experienced typists); 
" the users performance for the particular digraph was too erratic for any "typical" 
keystroke pattern to be identified (the more likely explanation for poor or novice 
typists). 
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Irrespective of the cause, it was considered that the discrepancy would render the values 
themselves unsuitable for use in subsequent monitoring comparisons. Whilst the frequency 
of occurrence was shown to vary between test subjects, the number of digraphs available 
for use in monitoring was significantly reduced in some cases. 
An experiment was, therefore, conducted to determine the extent to which each of the 
above explanations contributed to the problem and whether it would be worthwhile to 
introduce further filtering into the profiling module. The graphs in figure 8.3 illustrate eight 
digraphs for which the problem occurred within an experimental profile. The individual 
keystroke times that were observed in each case have been plotted in ascending order (note 
that interval times exceeding 750ms are not plotted as they would have been filtered out 
before calculation of the anomalous mean and standard deviation values). 
It can be seen from the graphs that filtering out the highest and lowest sample times would 
overcome the problem in many cases (e. g. digraphs OF, AT, SO, EY and U. 
On this basis further tests were conducted to determine the level of filtering that should be 
applied. It was discovered that mandatory filtering of all digraph samples was 
unsatisfactory as samples that were perfectly valid were ignored, resulting in a weaker 
profile. Therefore, filtering was only applied if the initial calculation of mean and standard 
deviation was found to be anomalous. 
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Fig. 8.3 : Digraph times where Standard Deviation exceeds Mean 
(inter-keystroke times against digraph occurrences) 
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It was considered that filtering should only be applied if ten or more digraph samples had 
been obtained (to ensure that a reasonable number of samples would remain after filtering 
upon which to base the profile entry). 
Initial tests attempted to filter only the highest and lowest 5% of times, but this was found 
to be unsatisfactory where only a relatively small number of digraph samples had been 
collected. With the filter level increased to 10% the process was more effective, resolving 
standard deviation anomalies in approximately two thirds of the cases (with the remaining 
cases being ones where the profile entries were based upon less than ten samples and 
therefore filtering had not been applied anyway). 
It was, therefore, considered that as the inclusion of filtering yielded a noticeable 
improvement in the number of usable digraphs (which should in turn result in more effective 
and reliable profiles for the affected users) it should be incorporated into the Profiler for the 
full study. 
8.3.4 Authentication assessment 
With the exclusion of the keystroke duration, general inter-keystroke time and typing error 
frequency measures, authentication is based entirely around statistics associated with the 
analysis of digraph-specific inter-keystroke times. 
The user profiles store the mean and standard deviation of inter-keystroke times 
for each 
profiled digraph. These values are used to define the range of inter-keystroke times that are 
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considered "valid" for each digraph. It is expected that most keystroke times from 
legitimate users will be within this range whilst impostor keystrokes fall outside. 
Various valid ranges were tested (including 0.5,1,1.5 and 2 standard deviations from the 
mean) and performance was observed in relation to legitimate subjects and impostors. The 
most acceptable range was found to be mean plus or minus 1.5 standard deviations. 
Statistics relating to invalid times (i. e. those falling outside the range) are used as the main 
basis for user authentication. 
Three conditions trigger the issue of a challenge : 
1. if the percentage of invalid timings (in the 100 most recent keystrokes) exceeds a 
subject-specific threshold; 
2. if the number of consecutive invalid keystrokes exceeds a second subject-specific 
threshold; 
3. if the proportion of inter-keystroke times exceeding the highpass filter level is 
greater than 50% (i. e. insufficient valid data for analysis). This is again based 
upon data from the 100 most recent keystrokes. The test was included to 
provide the safeguard against deliberately slow typing that was mentioned in 
8.3.2. 
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All tests were considered to be of equal importance and it was necessary for subjects to pass 
all of them in order to be authenticated (however, the third method was not expected to 
affect the experimental study as the test subjects would not be actively attempting to beat 
the system in this way). 
With dynamic data analysis, authentication judgements are made in real-time with a revised 
judgement after each user keystroke. By considering only the 100 most recent keystrokes 
in its calculations the monitor can ensure that its analysis is always based on up-to-date 
information. As such, it would be responsive to changes such as the legitimate user being 
replaced by an impostor. 
It was realised that, even though the profiles were based upon significant typing samples, 
user performance in practice was unlikely to be totally compatible with them at all times. 
As a result, some degree of "invalid time" judgements must be tolerated for legitimate users. 
For example, a previous study (Leggett and Williams 1988) discovered that up to 40% of 
inter-keystroke times generated by a legitimate user could still be incompatible with their 
typing profiles. 
The pilot study had used this 40% threshold to represent the percentage of invalid 
keystrokes at which an impostor alert would be generated. However, it was discovered that 
whilst all users did indeed generate a percentage of invalid keystrokes, the 40% threshold 
was rather excessive in most cases and simply served to allow leeway for impostors (leading 
to several false acceptances). At the same time, it was observed that in general, the 
percentage of invalid keystrokes generated by impostors was noticeably higher than that 
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which would be generated by the associated legitimate subject. This is illustrated in figure 
8.4 where, for example, subject 12 typically generates only 20% invalid keystrokes against 
her own profile, whereas impostors average 35%. A threshold level of (say) 25% would, 
therefore, seem appropriate for authentication of this subject. However, the same level 
















Valid Subject ----- Impostor Average 
Fig. 8.4 : Typical performance of impostors compared to legitimate subjects 
On this basis, an appropriate solution was considered to be the use of subject-specific 
authentication thresholds, achieved by measuring legitimate subject performance against 
their own profile using subsequent typing samples. From this, the peak values observed for 
the percentage of invalid keystrokes and the number of consecutive invalid keystrokes were 
obtained and used as the basis for that subject's future authentication thresholds. This was 
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the method by which the investigation was able to ensure that no false rejection errors 
occurred. 
8,4 The experimental Keystroke Analysis System 
This section describes details of how the experimental system was implemented, considering 
the computing platform chosen for the experiments and the components of the system itself 
8.4.1 Implementation environment 
The experimental system was written in the C language and implemented in an IBM PC 
environment running under the standard MS-DOS operating system. 
Keystroke timing data was collected by means of two PC hardware interrupts : 08h (timer) 
and 09h (keyboard). These are described in detail by Williams (1990), but an overview is 
given here along with an explanation of how they were utilised in the keystroke analysis 
system. 
The timer interrupt is generated for each "tick" of the PC's internal clock (the 8253 
Programmable Interval Timer). This normally runs at 18.2 ticks per second, but can 
actually handle speeds of up to 3 MHz. As such, the keystroke analysis system increases 
this to 1000 ticks per second allowing a timing resolution of one millisecond accuracy. 
The keyboard interrupt is generated twice for every user keystroke : once on key depression 
and again on key release. In each case a scancode is generated by the keyboard to tell the 
interrupt which key was involved (note that a scancode is normally a one byte value and 
is 
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completely distinct from any ASCII character code that the key may generate). In actual 
fact, each key has two associated scancodes -a make code and a break code - with the 
latter always being the equivalent of the make code plus 128. The replacement keyboard 
interrupt can therefore determine whether a key has been pressed or released simply by 
testing whether the scancode value is less than 128 (and if pressed, an inter-keystroke time 
can be stored). A final notable point regarding scancodes is that some keys (e. g. function 
and cursor keys) generate two byte codes, of which the first byte is always EO hex. The 
replacement routine ignores these and does not store associated inter-keystroke times. 
By using a combination of the timer and keyboard interrupts and testing scancode values it 
is, therefore, possible to time the interval between a key release and the next key press. 
This procedure is illustrated by the pseudo-code in table 8.3. 
Interrupt Pseudo-code 
timer (triggered every millisecond) 
counter = counter + 1; 
CALL old timer interrupt 
keyboard (triggered every time key pressed or released) 
IF first iteration 
counter = 0; 
READ current keyboard scancode; 
IF not extended key sequence 
IF scancode =a "make " code 
inter-keystroke time = counter; 
counter = 0; 
CALL old keyboard interrupt 
Table 8.3 : Pseudo-code for replacement interrupt routines 
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It can be seen that the time counter is incremented every time the timer interrupt is run and 
then reset every time the keyboard interrupt is executed. As such, the counter value 
accumulated between a key "break" iteration and a subsequent "make" iteration will 
represent the inter-keystroke time (in milliseconds). The time is stored, with the non- 
interrupt-driven code then determining the characters involved and calculating mean and 
standard deviation values for alphabetic / space digraphs. 
It should be noted that the use of these interrupts serves to make the system specific to the 
PC architecture. 
8.4.2 System Modules 
In common with the overview diagram previously shown in figure 8.2, the experimental 
system was comprised of three principal modules, as will be described in the sections that 
follow. The implementation was very much geared to providing a platform for evaluation 
of the keystroke analysis technique and did not (at this stage) provide a fully functional 
security system. 
8.4.2.1 Profiler 
This accepts the initial text sample that is used to generate the keystroke profiles for 
legitimate users. The user enters a number of samples of the current "reference text", with 
inter-keystroke times being collected and used to generate the typing profile. The profile is 
then stored, along with the user name, for subsequent use by the Monitor module. 
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The Profiler presents the reference text in a small (three line) window that scrolls through 
the text in response to user input. The text currently being input is shown on the middle line 
and highlighted to distinguish it from the others (and enable subjects to more easily track 
their positions), User input occurs in a similar window below. If typing errors are made, 
the colour of the input text changes (white to red) from the point of the error onwards, so 
that users are able to easily identify where they went wrong. This is illustrated in figure 8.5 
below : 
A report file is created after profiling which includes an assessment of the subjects typing 
skill (according to the Card classifications), the total number of distinct digraphs sampled 
and the proportion of profile entries that are unusable (based upon the number of digraphs 
sampled less than five times and cases where the profiled standard deviation exceeds the 
mean). 
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8.4.2.2 Sampler 
This module accepts further text samples from test subjects and stores all keystrokes and 
their associated timing data to a file for later use. These test samples are then used by 
Monitor to determine the effectiveness of the system. Figure 8.6 shows an example of 
sample collection in operation : 
Fig. 8.6 : Test sample collection using Sampler 
The storage of sample data to a file overcame the problem of test subject availability to a 
large extent as they were only required to be available for testing on one occasion. Once 
test samples were obtained they could be run against any profile at any time (with the 
monitor still treating the stored data as if it was being entered in real-time), thus allowing 
greater flexibility in the testing process. As a result, there were very few missing test cases 
in the study. 
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8.4.2.3 Monitor 
This compares user test samples stored by Sampler against the typing profiles generated by 
Profiler, The system plots an on-screen graph of the test subject performance against the 
profile, showing the percentage of invalid keystrokes and highlighting any points at which 
an authentication challenge would be issued. An example of this is shown in figure 8.7. 
Fig. 8.7 : Comparison of test sample and profile using Monitor 
In terms of reporting, the Monitor details the peak values observed for consecutive invalid 
keystrokes and the percentage of invalid keystrokes, the total number of authentication 
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challenges issued and, if applicable, the number of keystrokes before the first challenge and 
the reason the challenge was triggered. 
The system also generates and utilises a number of files, as listed in table 8.4. 
Files Type Description 
PROFTEXT TEXT The text used by the Profiler module for the creation of user 
typing profiles. 
TEXTANAL REPORT The character / digraph analysis of the current reference 
text. 
PROFILES DATA The user keystroke profiles generated by Profiler and 
referenced by Monitor. 
SUMMARY REPORT The report entries created by the Profiler and Monitor 
modules. 
Table 8.4 : Keystroke analyser files 
8.5 Full Keystroke Analysis study 
Having identified the main issues considered in the design and implementation of the 
keystroke analyser, the discussion now proceeds to detail the experimental evaluation that 
was performed. This includes a description of the test subjects involved, the experimental 
procedure and the final results observed. 
8.5.1 Test subjects 
The analysis aimed to encompass subjects with a broad range of typing abilities. 
A total of 
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It was not possible to get an equal distribution of subjects across the different typing skill 
categories as only a vague assessment of their skill level was possible prior to profiling 
(e. g. it was obvious whether someone was closer to being categorised "good" than "poor", 
but impossible to distinguish between, say, "average (skilled)" and "average (non-skilled)" 
typists by simple observation). The actual skill level was assessed by the Profiler, by 
which time, of course, a profile had already been generated (and it was considered better to 
include all of these in the tests rather than allow any to be wasted). 
A breakdown of the test subjects profiled typing performance and skill classification 
(according to the categories described earlier) is presented by the graphs in figures 8.8 and 
8.9 and by the associated details in table 8.5 (which also lists the subject-specific 
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Fig. 8.8 : Average Inter-Keystroke Time Ranges of Test Subjects 
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1 109 51 Good 26 3 
2 110 50 Good 32 4 
3 121 47 Good 29 4 
4 122 60 Good 30 4 
5 148 67 Good 25 5 
6 185 81 Average (skilled) 28 4 
7 186 77 Average (skilled) 37 4 
8 191 87 Average (skilled) 24 4 
9 196 95 Average (skilled) 29 3 
10 196 80 Average (skilled) 29 3 
11 198 81 Average (skilled) 26 4 
12 214 92 Average (skilled) 25 3 
13 216 80 Average (skilled) 33 5 
14 221 87 Average (skilled) 23 4 
15 224 83 Average (skilled) 32 4 
16 226 93 Average (skilled) 24 5 
17 229 89 Average (skilled) 28 3 
18 231 80 Average (skilled) 24 3 
19 232 79 Average (skilled) 24 3 
20 233 92 Average (skilled) 24 3 
21 247 97 Average (non-skilled) 29 2 
22 250 71 Average (non-skilled) 24 4 
23 256 109 Average (non-skilled) 25 3 
24 287 96 Average (non-skilled) 29 4 
25 298 86 Average (non-skilled) 30 4 
26 307 105 Average (non-skilled) 26 3 
27 330 113 Average (non-skilled) 32 2 
28 338 91 Average (non-skilled) 26 2 
29 345 104 Average (non-skilled) 25 3 
30 398 84 Poor 30 4 
Table 8.5 : Profiled Performance of Test Subjects 
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Whilst the heavy concentration of "average skilled" typists may not be fully representative 
of a true user population, it does provides a good test of the systems ability to distinguish 
between typists of a seemingly similar nature. The lack of a "best" skill categorisation was 
surprising, especially given that trained typists were involved, and possibly indicates that 
Card's criteria is somewhat strict. It was considered legitimate that "poor" subjects were 
under-represented as these would be unlikely to found in the role of regular information 
system users anyway. 
8.5.2 Experimental procedure 
The experimental procedure adopted for the investigation was based upon the following 
stages. 
1. A typing profile was created for each test subject on the basis of two samples of a 
2202 character reference text (text 1). 
2. Each subject entered two test samples, text 2 (574 characters) and text 3 (389 
characters). 
3. The text 2 and text 3 samples were used to determine the individual 
authentication thresholds for each legitimate user by running them against 
the 
profile. This allowed the peak ratings for the percentage of 
invalid keystrokes 
and number of consecutive invalid keystrokes to be obtained 
(see table 8.5). 
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4. Impostor tests were performed using both test samples to determine the FAR. 
Each sample was compared against all profiles other than that of the legitimate 
subject who created it (giving a total of over 1700 impostor attempts). 
Copies of the three texts that were utilised in the study (along with an analysis of their 
character and digraph composition) can be found in appendix D. 
The use of the Sampler module to store text samples that could subsequently be replayed 
back through the Monitor on demand proved to be very useful, in that it allowed the 
experiment to be repeatedly remounted as new test subjects were added. This issue is one 
of several raised in a paper produced during the course of the research which discusses the 
applicability of computer simulation to the testing of security systems (Furnell et al. 1995a). 
A copy of the paper can be found in appendix F. 
8.5.3 Results and analysis 
With the FRR having been eliminated, the aims of the study were to determine the FAR and 
the speed of successful impostor detection. 
In terms of overall impostor detection effectiveness, the experimental system exhibited a 
FAR of 15% across the two text samples, as shown in figure 8.10. However, given that 
each subject provided two test samples, it was also possible to investigate the level of 
impostor consistency. This was established by sub-dividing the test samples into the pairs 
that were generated by the same subjects and then determining the proportion of cases 
where both samples were able to pass as another user against those where only one attempt 
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was successful. This information is also illustrated in figure 8.10. It can be conjectured that, 
given longer test samples, the impostors who were successful in only one attempt would 
eventually be detected at some point (albeit after a more significant number of keystrokes) 
and that the overall FAR in practice might, therefore, be somewhat less. However, it 
appears unlikely that those who were successful in both cases would be detected within a 
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Fig. 8.10: Impostor detection performance 
In any case, the FAR observed represents only a slight degradation on the figure observed 
by Leggett et at (i. e. 13%), but without any associated false rejections. 
The matrices in tables 8.6 and 8.7 present the full results of the study in respect to each of 
the sample texts. Columns represent test subject profiles and rows represent test samples 
(i. e. the impostor attempts). The subjects are again listed in order of typing ability, with the 
bold horizontal and vertical lines being used to denote the boundaries of each skill category. 
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For each conducted test, the grid squares indicate whether the impostor was able to 
successfully pass as the profiled user or, if not, why a challenge was issued (it should be 
noted that the majority of impostors were actually challenged many times during their test 
samples, but this is not reflected in the tables, which only indicate the cause of the first 
alert). 
The key for both tables is as follows : 
C Challenge due to consecutive invalid keystrokes 
% Challenge due to percentage of invalid keystrokes 
- Test not conducted 
Blank False acceptance of an impostor 
Profile 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 % % % % % C. %1 %1 % 
2 C C % % % % % % o% ° % C C C % C C C % C C C C C C 
3 % % % % % C % C. C C C C % °z % C % C 
4 C C °lo % % %, % %1 % % % % % C % °% o C % C C C C C C C 
5 C % % % C % % % C C C C % C % C C C C 
6 % C C C °lo C % % % C % % % C % C C % C 
7 C % C C % % % C C % % 1 %1 % % C % % C % % % % C C C C 
8 C C % C % % °/o % % c % % %a C % C % C C % % % C C C C 
9 % % % % 1% 1% C % C % % %1 %, % C C C % C. C % % C % C C % C 
10 C C % % % % % % % % C % C % C C C % C C C C 
11 % % % C % % % % c % °lo % % % C C C % % % C C C % C 
12 C C C C % C % % % % % % % % % % C C C % C % C C C C 
13 % 1% C C % C % c % % C % % % c % % % % C c C C 
14 % % % C % C % % % C N4 C % C % C % C % % C C C % C 
15 % C C % % % °fo % C % - °% o % %%o % C C % c1 c %1 % % 
C C C C 
16 C C C % % % % °/O C % °/O %O C % C C C % % C C C % C 
17 C C C C % °to % % C °fo % % %1 % % C % % C % C % % C C C % 
18 C C C C % C % °fo % % % C % C % % % % C 
19 C C C C % % C % % % % % C % % °fo % C % % % C C C C C 
20 C. C C C % % C °% o C % % % % % % % C % % C % C % C 
C C C % % 
21 C C C C %1 % % % 1% %1 % C %1 %1 % %1 % C % % C C % % C C C 
22 C C C C C 1 C 
1 C % % % C % o/o o/a C % C C % C C % C C C % 
23 C c % C %1 % C °1o C C C % % 1% % % C ,% C % % C % C C % 
C 
24 C C C C % C % % C C % % % C %1 % 1% % 1% C % % C IL % C 
25 C C C C % C C % C C % % % % C % C C C % C C % C C C C 
26 C C C C % % C % C % C C % % % % % 1% C % 1C C % % C C C % % 
27 C C C C C C C % % C % C % % C C C C C. C % C % % C. C C 
C 
28 C C C C C C %ý % % C C C % % C °/o % % C C C % C C 
% 
29 C C C C C C C °lo % % C C °lo C C % C C C C C % 
C C % 
30 C C C C C C C C C C C C °fo C C C C C C C C C C °lo % % 
C C 
Table 8.6 : Overview of impostor detection for test sample 1 
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Profile 
1 2 3_ 4 5 6 7 8 9 101 111 12 131 141 151 16 17 118 119 20 121 122 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 °/o % C C % % % % % C % % C C % % C C C C C C 
2 c °lo % °lo % % % % C % C C % C C C C C C 
3 % C % % % % C C % C % C C % C C % C C C C 
4 C % % C % % % % % C % 1% % % C % % C C C C C C 
5 C % C % C C C % C % % % 1% C C % % % C C C C C 
6 C C % C % % % % % C C % C °/o % C C C 
7 C C % C % C C °/o % % % % % % C C % % % C C C C 
8 C C C c % % % % % % % % % % % % % C C C C 
9 C % % % % °lo C % % % C °/o C % C % % C C C C C C 
10 C % % C % % C % % % % % % % % % C C C % % C °lo °lo C 
11 C % C C C % C C % % C % C % °to C C % °! o C I% C C 
12 
13 C %1 % % % % C % C % °lo % % °lo C % °lo % °lo C C C C 
14 C C C C % C % C NI "*N % % C C C C % % °lo C C % C 
15 % C % C % % C C C % % C % % C % C C C C C C C C 
16 C C % C °/o C C C C 
1 
% %° C C °lo C % % % C % °lo % °lo C C C C 
17 C C C C %1 % C C % % % % % % % % C % C 
18 C C C C % % C %1 % %. %. c % % °lo N'j c C c1 % °lo % c1 c % C 
19 C C C C % C C C % % % 1 %1 % % % -NI CI % % % % C C % C 
20 C °/o C C C % % % % %1 % % 1 % C % % C C % C C C C 
21 C IC C C 
.% 
% % % C C % C % % C % % % C % % % C C' % C 
22 C C C C % % C % IC % %I C % % % % % °lo C % C C C % 
23 C C C % % % C C C C % C % % % C % C % C C C % C C % % 
24 C C C C % °/o % °lo °lo C % % °lo % % % % % C % C C % C 
25 C % C C % % C % % C %1 % % %1 % % % % C % % °lo C % 
26 C C. 
-C 
C °lo C % C % % % °lo %1 % % C % % % C % C C C C 
27 C C C C C C C C C C % C % % % % % C C % C % C °/o % % C % % 
28 C C C C C % C % % C % C % % C % C C C C % % % C C C C C 
29 C C C C % % C C C C % C % C % % C ON C °/o C % % C C C 
30 C C C C % C C % C C C 7 
1-77. 'C 
% % % 0o % 
.l 
C 1 C % 1 % % 1 1 % C C 
Table 8.7 : Overview of impostor detection for test sample 2 
It is immediately evident from these matrices that the FAR is greater in relation to the 
impostor attempts based on the second text sample. In total, 111 impostor attempts were 
successful using sample one, as opposed to 151 with sample two (i. e. a 36% increase in the 
second case). This can largely be explained by the fact that the text used was shorter than 
that for sample one and, therefore, less opportunity for impostor detection was presented. 
This substantiates the earlier observation that, with longer test sample texts, the FAR might 
be reduced. 
Another observation resulting from the matrices is that the impostor detection performance 
of the two monitoring methods (i. e. percentage invalid and consecutive invalid 
keystrokes) 
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is very similar, with an almost exact 50% split between them in terms of the cases detected 
(actually 722 cases verses 724 I). As such, both methods can be considered to be useful 
authentication measures. As expected, no impostors were challenged as a result of there 
being insufficient data for analysis (however, this does not alter the requirement for such a 
safeguard to be included in practice). 
From the matrices it was possible to extract the number of false acceptances in each row 
and column and thereby determine an overall summary of those scored by and against each 
subject. This is presented in table 8.8 and the accompanying chart in figure 8.11. For each 
individual subject, the percentages for false acceptance are based on 58 test cases (except in 
the case of subject 12, where only one test sample was taken and hence the percentage is 
based on 29 test cases), whilst the percentages for successful impersonation are based on 57 



























1 11 19 3 5 16 7 12 10 18 
2 15 26 1 2 17 12 21 22 39 
3 19 33 1 2 18 14 24 0 0 
4 10 17 1 2 19 8 14 0 0 
5 16 28 1 2 20 6 10 7 12 
6 19 33 8 14 21 5 9 6 11 
7 8 14 22 39 22 8 14 0 0 
8 11 19 27 47 23 3 5 34 60 
9 7 12 21 37 24 8 14 10 18 
10 11 19 6 11 25 7 12 11 19 
11 10 17 2 3 26 4 7 9 16 
12 3 10 15 26 27 0 0 5 9 
13 12 21 23 40 28 5 9 0 0 
14 12 21 4 7 29 3 5 4 7 
15 8 14 12 21 30 3 5 0 0 
Table 8.8 : Figures for subject false acceptance and successful impersonation 
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  Falsely Accepted 0 Successfully Impersonated 
Fig. 8.11 : False acceptance and successful impersonation of each subject 
A initial observation is that, in general, the subjects who performed best as impostors were 
the least easily impersonated and vice versa. Looking at the cases in more detail it can be 
seen that the more skilled typists were the most successful impostors and that the majority 
of false acceptances occurred where the impostor was of the same or better skill 
classification than the target profile. 
It can also be observed that the test subjects who were most frequently and consistently 
impersonated (i. e. subjects 7,8,9,13,17 and 23) were generally those who had either 
larger than average valid keystroke ranges or high authentication threshold settings. Both 
of these factors would allow more leeway for impostors and, in either case, false 
acceptances could potentially be restricted by obtaining a more accurate keystroke profile 
for the affected users. 
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However, given that impostor detection was actually possible in the majority of cases, the 
next most important consideration was the speed with which it could be achieved (i. e. how 
many keystrokes was an impostor able to enter before being detected). The experimental 
findings on this aspect are shown in figure 8.12 below. This shows the percentage of 
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Fig. 8.12: Keystrokes before impostor detection 
These results indicate that the vast majority of impostors would be detected within 160 
keystrokes (the equivalent of two standard lines of text), with detection in under 40 
keystrokes in 26% of cases. Whilst this may not combat the most destructive scenarios 
(e. g. the immediate entry of "delete *. *" would very likely be unchallenged), 
it should be 
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sufficient to identify the more common types of intruder who generally require sustained 
access in order to effect a serious breach. 
It should also be noted that these figures essentially characterise the impostor detection 
performance that would be observed from the point of initial login (i. e. beginning with 0% 
invalid keystrokes). However, in scenarios where an impostor takes the place of a 
legitimate user it is likely that detection would be quicker and more frequent, as a certain 
percentage of invalid keystrokes would already have been registered (by the legitimate user) 
and, therefore, the rejection threshold would be reached more easily. 
The preliminary results from this system (based on a test group of 26 subjects) were 
published by Furnell at al (1995b) and a copy of the paper is included in appendix F. It 
should be noted that these results also yielded an overall FAR of 15%, showing some 
measure of consistency in the systems performance despite the subsequent addition of four 
further test subjects. 
8.6 Potential Enhancements 
A number of suggestions can be made for further development of the keystroke analyser. 
Several such ideas are presented below, but were considered outside the scope of this 
investigation (although significant other enhancement was performed, as will be discussed in 
chapter 9). 
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8.6.1 Impostor identity suggestion 
A further (albeit possibly more ambitious) extension to the system would be to allow it to 
generate suggestions as to the most likely user(s) in the event of an impostor being detected 
/ suspected (with appropriate confidence levels for each suggestion) - effectively altering the 
premise of the system from "are you who you say you are ?" to "who are you ? ". This 
could in theory be achieved by selecting the best match(es) from the reference profiles 
against the current subject. The information could then provide a basis from which 
subsequent security enquiries could begin. There is an obvious danger here that the system 
suggestions may provide misleading information, especially if the actual impostor was an 
outsider who did not have a reference profile stored by the system. However, the concept 
is more realistic when considered in the light of previous studies suggesting that the 
majority of security breaches are, in fact, perpetrated by insiders who are legitimately 
registered on the system. 
8.6.2 Increased profile specificity 
A number of ideas may be suggested for ways in which the keystroke-related aspects of 
IMS behaviour profiles could be made more specific : 
0 maintenance of different user / keystroke profiles to suit different applications or 
contexts (e. g. the profile for word-processing may be substantially different 
from 
that when using a database application); 
" specifically analysing the keystrokes associated with commonly occurring words 
(e. g. "the", "and", "from" etc. ) or key combinations that the user is known to 
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enter most frequently. This may overcome (to an extent) the fact that dynamic 
analysis is based upon arbitrary text input and that typing styles may generally be 
less consistent than with the regularly typed information that would be used in a 
static identifier. The premise is that more frequently occurring words would be 
more consistently typed and the approach would effectively apply a static 
identifier technique in a dynamic scenario; 
" analysis of character "trigraphs" which might also be distinctive in some cases 
(e. g. "ING", "THE", "PRE"). These could be measured from the point of key 
depression for the first character until key release of the last. 
8.6.3 Detection of subject impairment 
Previous investigators (Joyce and Gupta 1990) have also suggested that an alternative 
application of keystroke analysis may be in detecting whether a legitimate subject is 
excessively tired or under the influence of alcohol / drugs (any of which would be likely to 
cause a noticeable departure from the "normal" profile). An obvious application for this 
would exist in safety critical environments such as healthcare, where it is generally 
important that subjects remain alert in order to deal with problems and minimise errors. 
Detection of the above is, therefore, advantageous based on the principle that a 
deterioration in physical performance may also be accompanied by a corresponding 
reduction in mental ability (a factor which could lead to errors of judgement and the like). 
It should, however, be noted that the end result of detecting an abnormality would be the 
same regardless of whether it was caused by an impostor or uncharacteristic behaviour from 
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a legitimate user (it would be extremely unlikely that a fine enough threshold could be 
established to enable differentiation between the two). 
8.6.4 Neural Network implementation 
The existing implementation is based entirely upon statistical methods, with the keystroke 
profiles being generated from a statistical analysis of the timings obtained during the 
profiling session. In subsequent monitoring, all profile entries are considered equal, with 
no distinction being made as to whether particular digraphs may be good or bad identity 
indicators (other than when the standard deviation exceeds the mean or insufficient samples 
were obtained). 
It is believed that the system performance could be further enhanced by incorporating neural 
network techniques to analyse the user typing characteristics more closely. An inherent 
property of neural networks is that they have the ability to learn the differences between 
patterns, making them quite appropriate to the task of analysing the differences between 
typing styles. 
Use of a neural network could enable the system to learn which typed digraphs are the most 
characteristic for each user (and, therefore, allow greater confidence to be associated with 
these when determining authentication judgements). This would also eliminate the need to 
set authentication challenge thresholds as the system would be effectively be determining 
them for itself. 
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The technique could also be used to enable the system to determine the optimal 
configuration for other aspects of monitoring, for example : 
" determining how many recent keystrokes upon which to base the calculations for 
percentage invalid and percentage unusable keystrokes; 
" determining the number of standard deviations from the profiled mean that a 
legitimate user can tolerate, possibly on a digraph-specific basis (so that the 
smallest possible valid inter-keystroke time range can be established for each user 
digraph, thus further limiting impostor potential). 
Several previous studies have successfully incorporated neural network techniques, 
although all have been in relation to a static verification approach (Brown and Rogers 1993; 
Obaidat and Macchiarolo 1992). 
It should be noted that the keystroke analyser developed in this research programme is 
currently being modified as part of another project (Morrissey 1995). This will include the 
addition of neural network techniques and a paper discussing the findings (and contrasting 
them with this system) will be produced in the near future. 
8.7 Potential Problems 
This section considers a number of potential problems that may be encountered with 
keystroke analysis, relating to both conceptual and implementation issues. It should be 
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noted, however, that the significance of many points would be considerably reduced if 
keystroke analysis was just one of several mechanisms in a full IMS. 
8.7.1 Consistency of users 
The categorisation of typists into the six groups identified earlier tends to imply that the 
keystroke characteristics of specific individuals will always be consistent. This is not 
necessarily the case (e. g. under certain circumstances even a professional typist may revert 
to a "one finger" style - which could radically differ from their reference profile). In fact, 
ones ability to type and / or compatibility with the profile may be affected by various factors 
(some of which may be more easily compensated for than others) : 
" physical condition (e. g. injury to fingers) 
One of the most common concerns over keystroke authentication is something akin to "what 
happens if the subject's hand / fingers are injured such that the ability to type is impaired ? ". 
In such circumstances it may be desirable (or even necessary) to be able to bypass the 
continuous authentication system, as a radical departure from normal style could lead to 
constant requests to perform more explicit authentication. The ability to override the system in 
this way would be at the discretion of the security / system manager, 
" illness or general fatigue; 
" familiarity with current task / activity; 
" interruption; 
" concentration lapse; 
" keyboard variations 
The feel (quality) and layout of keyboards are often noticeably different between different 
systems / manufacturers. The results from the healthcare user profiling survey showed that 
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users frequently require access from a number of different locations / terminals. If the nature 
of the keyboards vary from one to another then it is likely that subtle performance differences 
may be detected by the monitor system at least until the user becomes more familiar with them. 
9 profile drift 
In some cases user performance may depart from the profiled level as their typing skills 
improve or evolve over time. This will cause problems if profile refinement is not successfully 
incorporated in some way. 
8.7.2 Mimicry 
As with normal handwriting, it may potentially be possible for an impostor to forge the 
keystroke "signature" of a legitimate user. 
A key issue if this were to be attempted would be the ability of the impostor to mimic the 
legitimate subject's typing characteristics with sufficient accuracy to fool the system. 
Common sense suggests that for mimicry to be feasible it would be necessary for the 
impostor to be possess the same or higher typing skill classification as the target. 
The experimental results showed that poor typists were the easiest targets for compromise, 
generally being less consistent and exhibiting fewer characteristic rhythms in their 
keystrokes. Overall it is hoped that all but the total non-typist should exhibit some 
characteristics that are relatively unique. However, whilst observation shows that even the 
classic "one finger typist" may exhibit certain characteristics that may 
increase the difficulty 
of imitation (e. g. periodic "bursts" of speed over particular sequences of characters 
/ words 
with which they are more familiar), such distinctive rhythms may 
be too infrequent (when 
compared to the rest of the typing) to contribute significantly enough to 
the authentication. 
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Successful mimicry in this manner assumes (at least to an extent) that the would-be 
impostor is in a position to know the typing ability of the target. If this was not the case, 
the impostor would be forced to experiment (increasing his / her likelihood of being 
detected). However, in many scenarios (e. g. amongst colleagues) the possibility of subject 
observation will exist and, therefore, informed mimicry cannot be ruled out. 
8.7.3 User acceptance 
As with other aspects of IMS, the issue of keystroke authentication (particularly in the case 
of continuous monitoring) raises the question of the acceptability to users. Will there be 
resentment of the idea (for example, on the grounds of it being too reminiscent of a "big 
brother" scenario) ? 
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (1993) has raised concerns over the 
legality of keystroke level monitoring in cases where the typed information is viewed (or 
recorded for later use by) system management. In this context it is rightly observed that 
monitoring would be analogous to an unauthorised telephone tap and the conclusion is that 
a system sign-on banner should specifically notify potential users that monitoring may take 
place (and that by using the system they are submitting to this policy). 
It should be noted that the study described here would not raise these concerns as user 
keystrokes are not stored after analysis. In actual fact, the keystroke analysis concept is 
fundamentally different from some other forms of supervision in that it monitors how users 
are typing rather than what they type. Therefore, the sole purpose is clearly the protection 
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of the systems, resources and data, as opposed to a more wide ranging means of user 
surveillance. However, other potential aspects of IMS supervision (e. g. access time, 
application usage) would not necessarily share this distinction and, therefore, the sign-on 
banner is considered to be a sensible idea (if only in as much as it could further deter 
unauthorised use or system abuse). 
A small survey of the test subjects involved in our practical examination revealed that the 
majority of them were comfortable with the idea of keystroke monitoring. The few who 
expressed doubts did so mainly on the basis that whilst the concept does not necessitate 
monitoring of work done and the like, it could potentially provide a basis for this purpose. 
An additional concern was the number of interruptions that it could cause with false 
rejections. A supplementary question in the survey asked how many false rejections each 
subject would be prepared to accept within the space of an hour. Answers to this varied, 
with subjects who only used computers occasionally being prepared to accept around three 
rejections, whereas more frequent users would only accept one. 
8.7.4 Accuracy of keystroke timings 
It is obvious that the accuracy of the timing system is an extremely critical factor in 
determining the success or failure of the concept. 
It has been suggested by Joyce and Gupta (1990) and previous studies that problems may 
be introduced where the system is implemented in a time-sharing environment with access 
through a variety of networks, as this could render it impossible to obtain timings 
from the 
remote system of an adequate resolution. 
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This problem has actually been encountered in practice, during the monitoring of the "Wily 
Hacker" by Clifford Stoll at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories (Stoll 1988; Hafner and 
Markoff 1991). At one point during his investigation Stoll, wishing to determine whether 
he was dealing with a single intruder or a group, decided that an analysis of the incoming 
typing rhythms could provide the answer. Stoll firstly set up an experiment within the 
confines of his lab, using his colleagues as the subjects, and discovered that it was indeed 
possible to differentiate between the different users. Suitably encouraged, Stoll proceeded 
to apply the test to the "keystrokes" coming in over the network. However, it soon became 
apparent that, as a result of the delays in transmission through intermediate computers, any 
information that could identify the typist had been lost (the data was simply received at 
evenly spaced intervals resulting from network transmission, with only occasional 
discrepancies being apparent when, for example, the hacker may have been searching for the 
next key). 
It is, therefore, necessary for the timing data to be captured by the local keyboard and then 
subsequently transmitted for analysis upon request. In order to be viable, this would require 
either the use of intelligent terminals or additional devices to supplement dumb terminals to 
enable them to collect timings (the latter of which would probably negate any cost benefits 
that would be apparent from using the keystroke authentication concept). However, given 
that virtually all future terminals are likely to be provided in the form of PCs or 
workstations, obtaining the timings should not be a significant problem. 
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8.7.5 General applicability 
Keystroke analysis cannot be regarded as a universal solution to the authentication issue. In 
some ways the concept may be deemed counter-intuitive, given the move towards "user- 
friendliness" of applications which in some areas can significantly reduce the role / 
requirement for the keyboard (e. g. use of keys only for simple menu-based selection, use of 
a mouse instead etc. ). Therefore, in some applications, the periods in which the keys are 
used may be so brief as to make any measurements impractical / unreliable. 
However, as mentioned in section 8.6.2, it may be possible to compensate in scenarios 
where the keyboard is still used to some extent by specifically profiling and monitoring users 
in relation to words or key combinations that are still known to be frequently typed. An 
example of this may be if a user has to issue a specific command or series of keys to invoke 
an application that is regularly used. However, it is acknowledged that such limited 
opportunities would significantly reduce the level of supervision possible with the technique. 
8.8 Conclusions 
It is obvious that, given the level of false acceptances observed, keystroke analysis cannot 
be regarded as a total panacea to IMS supervision requirements. Whilst it may help to 
combat abuse by penetrators, there are still clear areas which are not addressed (specifically, 
potential abuse by legitimate users and malicious processes). 
That said, the practical study has served to illustrate the significant potential of the concept 
and indicates that keystroke data would still provide a perfectly viable profile characteristic 
in a large percentage of cases. The results observed are comparable with, if not better than, 
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the previously documented investigations. In addition, the pilot study was able to assess the 
potential discriminating power of typing characteristics other than simply inter-keystroke 
times, which had not been addressed in previous work. 
Another advantage of the investigation was that it allowed the determination of a worst case 
FAR. However, it must, of course, be remembered that the consequent 0% FRR observed 
in the study was obtained artificially and some false rejections would be almost bound to 
occur in practice from time to time. However, with authentication thresholds set correctly, 
it is envisaged that these cases would not be frequent enough to significantly trouble 
legitimate users. 
A FAR of 15% would be of less significance if the preliminary user identification phase was 
still to include some form of initial authentication (as suggested in section 6.5.2) as the 
combination would almost certainly serve to foil the majority of intrusion attempts. In 
addition, it should be remembered that this is only the FAR for one supervision technique - 
in a full IMS, using more comprehensive behaviour monitoring, the overall system FAR 
(based on a combination of approaches) could be significantly less. 
As previously mentioned, it is considered that false acceptances could be reduced 
by 
generating more representative profiles of legitimate users. Whilst this would require 
larger 
text samples (which could be collected via a background process to reduce the user 
burden), it would potentially allow more accurate authentication thresholds to 
be set and 
reduce the number of unrepresented digraphs in the profiles 
(therefore allowing more 
keystrokes to be analysed). 
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In practice monitoring would also need to be implemented as a background process, 
analysing the keystroke data in real-time in conjunction with normal activities and 
remaining transparent unless an intrusion is suspected. The extension of the system to fulfil 
this role is the subject of the next chapter, which also goes some way to showing how 
keystroke analysis can be integrated into a more comprehensive demonstration of the 
overall IMS concept. 
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9.1 Enhancement of the Keystroke Analyser 
Whilst the results and analysis from the experimental study proved the effectiveness of the 
keystroke analysis concept, they did not demonstrate how the approach would be used in a 
practical context. Having established keystroke analysis as a suitable supervision technique, 
further development was undertaken to show how it could be incorporated into an 
operational security system, based upon some of the principles established in the IMS 
conceptual design from chapters 6 and 7. 
The resulting JMS Demonstrator system is based upon the keystroke analysis "engine" from 
the experimental keystroke analyser, with extended functionality which also incorporates 
system configuration auditing utility, virus scanning and comprehensive system management 
options. 
The system has been considerably extended to operate in a new configuration involving the 
use of two PCs communicating over a serial link, as illustrated in figure 9.1. 
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Fig. 9.1 : Configuration of IMS demonstrator system 
PC A acts as the monitored user workstation running the IMS Client. The Client is 
implemented as a transparent, background task collecting inter-keystroke timing data (see 
section 9.2.4). The user is initially identified by this machine and will be authenticated in the 
usual manner before the start of a supervision session. The system configuration of the 
machine is assessed at the start of each session (to ensure that it has not been compromised 
/ tampered with in any way that might signify a breach of security), followed by a virus scan 
to detect the presence of malicious processes. 
PC B is be used to run the IMS Host and holds the keystroke profiles for the registered 
users of the system, along with system configuration data relating to the Client workstation. 
The Host analyses all incoming inter-keystroke times from the local workstation, comparing 
them against the profile of the logged-on user (note that since no changes were made to the 
basic keystroke analysis approach, it was possible to re-utilise the user profiles from the 
experimental system). Discrepancies between the incoming times and the profile increase 
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the alert status for the current user session (which is maintained by the Host). This is sent 
as a continuous signal to the IMS Client. 
Whilst the demonstrator does not set out to provide a full implementation of the IMS 
design, the minimum configuration is nevertheless sufficient to model the following : 
" the Host - Client relationship; 
" basic implementation of all IMS modules bar the Profile Refiner; 
" transparent real-time user supervision (based on keystroke analysis); 
" detection of external penetrator and masquerader-class intruders. 
The system does not incorporate the use of generic intrusion rules or class-level behaviour 
profiles. 
Aspects of the demonstrator will now be discussed in more detail, with descriptions of the 
Client and Host systems that have been implemented. It should be noted that these 
descriptions are not intended to act as either user manuals or technical reference - they 
provide an overview of the demonstrator functionality, highlighting aspects of the IMS 
design that have been addressed and significant additions to the basic keystroke analyser. 
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9.2 IMS Client Implementation 
9.2.1 System Configuration Auditing 
The activation of the Client can optionally trigger a system configuration audit of the local 
workstation, with the first task of the Host then being to verify the details collected (with 
immediate system administrator warnings and possible Client suspension if the configuration 
has been changed). 
If system configuration auditing is enabled, details of the Client workstation's memory, disk 
and DOS set-up are transmitted to the Host for validation against stored details (in actual 
fact, the system audits all of the characteristics previously listed in table 6.2). Any 
discrepancies are then highlighted at the Host with a message describing what has changed 
(in addition, a more detailed description is written to a text report file, which also specifies 
the date and time of discrepancy detection and the original and changed configuration 
settings). The way in which the Client responds depends upon how the Host has been 
configured. If suspension is enabled, the Client session is locked to allow the Host system 
administrator to investigate the situation The administrator must then answer two 
questions : 
1. whether the configuration stored by the Host should be updated; 
2. whether the Client session should be unlocked. 
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The Host then responds accordingly (note that if the Client remains locked, the only option 
is to reset it and, unless the configuration details stored by the Host have been updated, 
suspension will keep occurring until the original system configuration is restored). 
File checksum calculation is limited to the CONFIG. SYS and AUTOEXEC. BAT files if 
they exist on the Client system. These are considered the most important files as far as 
system integrity is concerned and their inclusion serves to demonstrate the principle 
effectively enough. The checksums themselves are based upon a simple function of the size 
and composition of the target files. 
In a multi-workstation implementation IMS would need to store several configuration 
records and each workstation would consequently have its own unique identity that would 
be transmitted to the Host to indicate which record to use. This element has not been 
implemented in the demonstrator given that it is limited to operating with a single client 
workstation anyway. 
9.2.2 Virus Scanning 
Client activation may also optionally invoke a virus scan of the local machine, depending 
upon the Client Control and Virus Scanning options selected at the Host. 
If scanning is enabled, the Client executes an external DOS program to 
handle the 
operation, whilst the Host waits for the completion status of the operation to 
be sent. If 
viruses are detected then, as with configuration audit discrepancies, the 
Host can optionally 
suspend the Client to allow the anomaly to be further investigated. 
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The scanning is based upon the shareware virus checker F-PROT (Skulason 1993), which is 
called by the Client process using parameters passed to it by the Host. These parameters 
correspond to command line options offered by F-PROT. 
F-PROT is an example of one of the most widely used approaches to virus detection and 
works by scanning memory and nominated groups of files for specific byte patterns 
extracted from each known virus (this pattern is referred to as the virus signature). It has 
the ability to recognise 818 families of virus, with each family consisting of anywhere 
between 1 and 150 viruses (giving a claimed total of up to 2933 viruses). A number of 
scanning options are offered, the following of which are supported by the demonstrator 
(options shown in bold are mandatory, whereas the remainder may be selectively enabled by 














Check all files. 
Delete all infected files. 
Disinfect whenever possible. 
Scan all DOS partitions on the hard disk. 
Do not abort scan if ESC is pressed. 
Skip initial memory scan. 
[Do not] scan boot sectors. 
[Do not] scan files. 
[Do not] scan inside packed files. 
[Do not] scan for trojans and joke programs. 
[Do not] scan for user-defined patterns 
Do not complain if the program is outdated. 
Send the output to a file. 
Don't generate any screen output. 
Of the further parameters offered, the following are not supported as they are not applicable 
to the demonstrator context and / or would serve no useful purpose : 
/COMMAND Force command line mode. 
/EXT= Specify default file extensions to scan. 
/HELP Display this list. 
/MONO Use monochrome mode on color displays. 
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/MULTI Scan multiple diskettes. 
/IN'T'ER Force interactive mode. 
/NET Scan any network drives found. 
/NOWRAP Do not wrap text in reports. 
/PAGE Pause after each page (command-line mode) 
Finally, the inclusion of the remaining options was considered undesirable as their use could 
potentially reduce scanning effectiveness or produce unwanted results : 
/640 Only scan 640K of memory. 
/ANALYSE Use heuristic analysis, instead of signatures 
/APPEND Used with /REPORT - append to existing report. 
/AUTO Automatic deletion/disinfection. 
/LIST List all files checked. 
/QUICK Faster search, but not as accurate. 
/RENAME Rename infected files to *. VOM or *. VXE 
/NOSUB Do not scan subdirectories 
It should be noted that as the demonstrator uses F-PROT version 2.09 (circa July 1993), it 
is possible that (a) certain virus strains will not be identified and (b) detection options 
available in later versions of the software are not supported. As such, it may be necessary 
to modify the system if a more recent version is used in order to take advantage of any new 
or changed command line options. 
A further consideration arises from the fact that F-PROT is an external DOS program and, 
hence, returns no status value upon termination. This prevents it from being able to directly 
report the results of the scan back to the Client (which, in turn, constrains the Clients ability 
to report to the Host). As a result, the Client must determine for itself whether F-PROT 
detected any anomalies. This necessitates that a rather untidy solution be used, whereby the 
Client parses a report file created during the scan (note this file is subsequently deleted 
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unless report generation was specified by the Host administrator). It was established that if 
no viruses are detected, an F-PROT message to this effect always appears as the last entry 
of the report file (a fixed number of bytes from the end-of-file). The Client process, 
therefore, reads the file from this position and looks for the start of the message. If it is not 
found then it is assumed that one or more viruses were detected and the Host is notified 
accordingly. 
Whilst this overcomes the basic problem of reporting a virus scan result back to the Host, a 
weakness is that the capability still only extends to stating whether or not any anomalies 
were found. For specific identification of the number and type(s) of viruses involved the 
Host administrator must still examine the F-PROT report file at the Client. 
9.2.3 User Identification and initial Authentication 
Before supervision can commence, the demonstrator must perform a user identification 
phase so that an identity can be sent to the Host. This is required to enable the Host to 
determine which profile should be used and, as such, this stage is mandatory and cannot be 
disabled. 
In addition to requesting an identity, the opportunity has also been taken to perform basic 
authentication (via a simple password) as an additional safeguard. It should be evident that 
the combination of this stage along with the system configuration audit provides a means of 
verifying both the integrity of the local workstation as well as the legitimacy of 
its user prior 
to the start of the session proper. 
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Despite the discussion in section 6.5.2, the process is based upon a standard login 
procedure rather than the more advanced faceprint or voice verification techniques. These 
facilities were not available within the development environment and, in any case, the 
demonstration of this aspect was regarded as secondary to the need to show real-time 
supervision in operation. 
A disadvantage of the software-based PC implementation is that the Client is currently 
executed from the AUTOEXEC. BAT file of the local system. As a consequence it is 
possible for the user to prevent the Client from being installed (and thereby bypass 
supervision) by booting from the floppy drive or interrupting the AUTOEXEC sequence. 
In a full implementation this would have to be prevented and a potential solution is outlined 
in section 9.4.2. 
9.2.4 Implementation and operation of background supervision 
The transparent background operation of the Client is achieved using a special form of MS- 
DOS coding, called a Terminate and Stay Resident (TSR) program (Angermeyer et al. 
1989; Christopher et al. 1990). The difference between these and normal applications is 
that some of the code is retained in memory after program termination (and can then be 
activated later by a variety of stimuli). The programs can, therefore, be divided into two 
portions : the initialisation code and the resident code. 
The purpose of the initialisation code is to perform any initial functions that may 
be required 
and set up the environment for TSR operation. In terms of the IMS 
Client, this involves the 
following key stages : 
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1. check for previous TSR installation; 
2. perform all other foreground processing (i. e. set up serial communications, 
perform system audit, virus scan and user identification operations); 
3. install replacement interrupts (i. e. key action, timer tick and equipment list); 
4. terminate and stay resident (retaining functions required for issue of challenges, 
session suspension etc. as the resident code). 
Stage one in the above is achieved using the largely redundant DOS equipment list interrupt 
(OXl 1), which is patched the first time the Client code is run. Whenever it is run, the first 
thing that the Client does is to call the equipment list service, passing a value 1111 in the 
CX register. If the TSR is already installed, then the aforementioned patch will cause 2222 
to be returned in CX as a response. If this value is not returned, the Client process knows 
that it is okay to proceed with TSR installation (note that any calls to equipment list by 
other applications are unaffected as the patch preserves the normal data which it returns). 
Subsequent activation of the TSR is then triggered by the key action and timer tick 
interrupts, so it effectively operates continuously throughout the remainder of the user 
session. The amount of processing performed by each of the interrupts is negligible, so 
applications still operate as normal and the fact that the TSR is installed will remain 
transparent unless an impostor is suspected. 
During background operation the Client monitors signals received from the Host to 
determine whether it must perform any action to respond to a suspected intrusion. These 
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signals equate to a basic version of the alert status from the full design. The signals 
currently used are : 
" all clear; 
" issue challenge; 
e lock workstation; 
" unlock workstation. 
The latest alert status signal is read by the Client every time a key is pressed, effectively 
allowing an immediate response to any anomalies. 
A continuous signalling method is used such that if no specific Client action is required, the 
Host sends out an "all clear" signal. This is used as a means for the Client to determine the 
integrity of Host operation - i. e. if no signal at all is received then the Client assumes that 
the Host has been compromised in some way and can automatically lock the local 
workstation. The session is then subsequently unlocked if / when the Host becomes 
operational again and the status signal resumes. However, it is noted that in some scenarios 
it may be preferable to accept the risks of an unsupervised session rather than allow the 
workstation to be locked (as the enforced unavailability of a vital system could have as 
equally serious consequences as an impostor breach) and, as such, the system can be 
configured not to do so (however, the Host must always be operational at the start of the 
Client session in order to perform the configuration audit and user authentication). 
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A regular signalling system is also implemented in the other direction, in that, at all times 
when keystroke data is not being transmitted, the Client sends a regular (once per second) 
signal to the Host to indicate that it is still operational (i. e. the Client machine has not 
crashed or been reset). This is used to allow the Host to detect user "logout", as described 
in section 9.2.6. 
9.2.5 Challenges and Session Supervision 
As previously mentioned, the demonstrator maintains a basic alert status which is sent to 
the Client TSR. Two levels of action may potentially result as the alert status increases : 
1. the Host automatically initiates the issue of a challenge to the user at the monitored 
workstation. The challenge is based around a question and answer password 
(using personal information supplied by the user during profiling); 
2. the Host causes the Client TSR to suspend the session at the monitored 
workstation. 
Additionally, the Host administrator is able to manually cause a challenge to be issued or 
suspend the session if he / she is suspicious of the Client user for some reason. 
The issue of a challenge by the Host is registered at the Client after the first subsequent 
keystroke, with the challenge window being displayed on the second (allowing virtually no 
opportunity for impostor action after anomaly detection). This sequence 
is illustrated in 
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figure 9.2 below, showing an example impostor input and the IMS actions that would occur 
after each keystroke was made. 
Impostor Keystroke Sequence 10 
E Qljffjlj AD AA 
Anomaly Challenge 
detected & signal 
challenge received 




Fig. 9.2 : Response to challenge signal 




to user. Keystroke 
not displayed. 
(IMS Client) 
In addition to identifying the user at the start of a session, a further requirement is for the 
Host to be able to detect session termination (for auditing purposes and so that it can be 
reset to allow a new monitoring session to commence). 
The initial plan was to allow users to explicitly logout from the Client (e. g. via a hot-key 
combination), which would then notify the Host and reset the TSR to allow the next user to 
login. However, a flaw here was that the issue of a machine reset (e. g. ctrl-alt-del) on the 
Client PC would result in the removal of the TSR without Host notification and monitoring 
would have to be reset manually. Attempts to overcome this proved unsuccessful as no 
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readily documented means was found to detect (and then subsequently avert) a ctrl-alt-del. 
It was, therefore, necessary to adopt a different approach. 
The solution employed is that the Host keeps a constant watch to ensure that the Client is 
still operational, as opposed to the Client having to fell the Host that it has been reset,. This 
was achieved by having the Client send out regular "dummy" signals (once per second) if no 
keystroke data is being transmitted. These signals are filtered out and subsequently ignored 
by the Host, but serve the purpose of proving that the Client TSR is still running. 
As a result, the Host should, under normal circumstances, always be receiving some kind of 
signal (keystroke data or "dummy") every second and if this is not the case it can be 
assumed that the Client system has been reset. However, in the implemented demonstrator 
the Host actually waits for 10 seconds of inactivity before assuming that a logout has 
occurred. The reason for this is that the launch of some applications (e. g. DOS EDIT) will 
cause the Client clock rate to be reset to the normal 18.2 ticks per second (as opposed to 
the 1000 ticks rate used for inter-keystroke timing). This in turn delays the transmission of 
the "dummy" signals, meaning that the Host will temporarily not be receiving one every 
second. The 10 second period allows enough time for the Client TSR to have rectified the 
situation by reselecting a high tick rate and, therefore, resuming regular signal transmission. 
The use of this approach meant that it was not necessary to provide specific "logout" 
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9.3 IMS Host implementation 
9.3.1 Menu Options & General Functionality 
The Host is predominantly menu-driven and provides a comprehensive range of security 
control options, as shown in figure 9.3 and described in more detail below. 
Fig. 9.3 : Demonstrator menu structure 
9.3.1.1 Monitoring Options 
Monitor Workstation 
" force a remote challenge (e. g. used if security manager is suspicious of the current user); 
" force a remote lock (for the same reasons as above); 
" unlock remote system (i. e. after session suspension); 
" configure real-time graph display; 
" monitoring controls (on, off and reset). 
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Monitor Setup 
" Configuration options affecting monitor sensitivity (i. e. highpass filter level, valid 
standard deviation range, number of recent keystrokes to monitor). 
" Configuration options affecting monitor operation (i. e. whether continuous monitoring is 
enabled and, if not, how many valid keystrokes must be entered before it is suspended 
and what period of user inactivity will cause it to be resumed). 
9.3.1.2 Profiling Options 
User management 
9 list registered users; 
" user registration (i. e. keystroke profiling); 
" test profile (establishes user-specific authentication thresholds through collection and 
analysis of two text samples); 
" profile update; 
" profile deletion. 
Text management 
" text creation (including automatic text analysis); 
" text editing (based on the DOS EDIT utility); 
" text analysis (for independently created or modified files). 
Profiler Setup 
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Configuration options for number of sample iterations and profiler highpass filter level. 
9.3.1.3 System Management 
Keystroke monitoring control; 
Auditing 
" inspect audit log; 
" configure auditing; 
9 clear log entries. 
Client control options (i. e. to determine how the Client behaves). 
" system configuration auditing enabled (yin); 
" suspend Client if configuration modified (yin); 
" suspend Client if Host signal lost (y/n); 
" Client virus scanning enabled (y/n); 
" suspend Client if virus(es) detected (y/n). 
Virus scanning options (i. e. F PPOT parameters enabled). 
Intrusion action control (e. g. to determine how the system responds to suspected 
intrusions). 
" maximum warnings before challenge issue; 
" maximum failed challenges before suspend; 
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" monitoring reset / time-out period. 
View Client Setup 
Displays the Client system configuration details currently stored by the Host. 
9.3.2 Intrusion Monitoring and Detection 
A .s with the experimental system, the Demonstrator identifies suspected intrusions by 
monitoring three factors : 
"% invalid keystrokes; 
" consecutive invalid keystrokes; 
% unusable keystrokes (i. e. inter-keystroke times exceeding highpass filter). 
The Keystroke Monitoring options allow the Host administrator to specify which 
combination of these methods should be in operation during the monitoring session. In 
theory, all options should be enabled at all times for maximum impostor detection potential. 
However, in practice some methods may be found to cause problems for legitimate users 
(and would, therefore, be better disabled until a more adequate typing profile could 
be 
obtained). 
In common with the description of the IMS Anomaly 
Detector in section 7.4.1, the 
demonstrator includes an option for supervision to be automatically suspended and resumed 
during user sessions (rather than operating continuously at all times). 
The number of 
keystrokes required before authentication is granted and the subsequent period of user 
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inactivity after which monitoring will resume are both configurable options. The system 
default in the first case is 300 keystrokes, which is considered to provide an adequate 
window for supervision - especially given that the experimental study showed that 160 
keystrokes was normally sufficient to trap the majority of impostors. The default for the 
resumption of monitoring is after three minutes of inactivity. Options also exist for the Host 
administrator to manually control monitor operation (for use in cases where he / she may be 
suspicious of a user or, alternatively, confident of their legitimacy). 
The incorporation of this idea (which was not part of the experimental system) is seen as 
having two main advantages in the practical context : 
9 it helps to further minimise the likelihood of false rejections; 
" it will (to a limited extent) allow for the fact that users may sometimes entirely 
depart from their profiled typing style (for example, by adopting a one finger 
approach). Provided that authentication is already been determined by the 
initial 
keystrokes, users will be permitted more leeway in how they subsequently 
behave. 
In order to avoid confusion, the Host reports whether continuous monitoring 
is enabled or 
disabled as the first task once supervision begins. 
During monitoring sessions, a real-time graph is displayed showing the percentage 
of invalid 
keystrokes against time. If the percentage of invalid keystrokes are 
being monitored, the 
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current users authentication threshold is shown on the graph as a horizontal red bar at the 
appropriate level. Under normal circumstances, points on the graph are plotted in white. 
However, there are two exception cases, as follows : (a) if consecutive invalid keystrokes 
are being monitored, graph points denoting invalid keystrokes are plotted in green and (b) if 
monitoring is suspended then points are plotted in black (just to indicate when keystrokes 
are received). The issue of a challenge is denoted by a vertical bar, colour-coded to indicate 
the challenge cause as follows : red (% invalid keystrokes), green (consecutive invalid 
keystrokes), blue (% unusable keystrokes) and yellow (issued manually). 
In addition to the graph, a status report window is provided which displays date / time- 
stamped messages relating to security-relevant events. The events reported include 
anomaly detection, issue of challenges, challenge failures and suspension or unlocking of 
Client session. An example of the principal monitoring interface is shown in figure 9.4, 
Fig. 9.4 : IMS Demonstrator, Keystroke Monitoring Interface 
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9.3.3 Event Auditing 
The Host features comprehensive event-configurable auditing to allow a log of all "security- 
relevant" incidents to be maintained. The events that can be recorded include : 
" login failures; 
" start and end of user sessions; 
" anomaly warnings; 
" issue of impostor challenges; 
" challenge passes and failures; 
" suspension and unlocking of client sessions; 
" registration of new users (profiling); 
" update of user profiles; 
" user profile deletion; 
" change of profiler "reference text"; 
" start-up and shutdown of IMS Host; 
" changes to the Client workstation system configuration; 
" results of Client virus scans; 
" suspension and resumption of monitoring during sessions. 
In each case the date and time of the event is recorded, as well as the identity of the user 
involved (if applicable). As indicated above, limited features for managing the collected 
data are also available. 
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9.3.4 Internal Communications 
An overview of the Hosts internal communication flows and file usage (i. e. excluding any 
interactions with the Client) is shown in figure 9.5. 






User Configuration Z Data Data 
IMS 4ý IMS 
Host --º Config. 











Fig. 9.5: IMS Host file usage 
The configuration file shown in the figure is used to store various settings and user 
preferences relating to system operation. These currently include : 
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" monitor sensitivity settings (i. e. highpass filter level, valid standard deviation range, 
number of recent keystrokes used to calculate monitor statistics); 
" monitor operation settings (i. e. continuous monitoring enabled / disabled, 
thresholds for suspension and resumption of monitoring); 
" intrusion detection preferences; 
" auditing preferences; 
" client control preferences; 
" virus scanning preferences; 
" intrusion action thresholds; 
9 real-time graph display preference. 
9.3.5 Host - Client Communication 
An overview of the data exchanges between the IMS Client, running on the local 
workstation, and the IMS Host system is shown in figure 9.6. 
IMS ' I IMS 
System Host Client 
Audit System Configuration Data 
Con fig. 
Virus Scan Status 
User ld + Password Foreground 
Profiles Alert Status 
Task User Id + Passxead 
Data 
Profile Anomaly 
Detector Challenge Data Keystroke Applic. 
User °° Data Keystroke Data Input 
(or dummy status signal) Background Application 
Anomalies 
Task 
Alert Status (TSR) 
IMs 
Archive .. (User & ...... 
Challenge Pass /Fail 
.. ---- 
ý. L.. CAallenge 
System) 
> Normal communications 
....... --. º Communications if intrusion suspected 
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Note that the user passwords are transmitted to the IMS Host for validation rather than 
being checked locally within the Client. This ensures that the valid responses always 
remain in the secure Host (and thus reduces opportunities to compromise security by 
monitoring the communications link). However, the transmission of valid responses from 
the Client could still be vulnerable (unless encryption is employed). 
9.3.6 Profiling Sub-System 
The demonstrator provides facilities for handling user profiling. This includes both user 
















Fig. 9.7 : IMS Profiling Sub-System 
MONITORING 
SUB-SYSTEM 
The profiling sub-system involves a total of three texts : the profiler reference text 
(from 
which the initial user profile is created) and two test sample texts 
(from which the user- 
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specific authentication thresholds are established). A feature is provided to allow new texts 
to be entered from within the system or, alternatively, text may be used from an existing file 
created elsewhere. The system generates a statistical analysis of all new texts, detailing the 
frequency of occurrence of individual characters and the 70 most frequent character 
digraphs. In addition, a series of text suitability ratings are calculated in order to provide a 
measure of a texts usefulness as the basis for profiling. The ratings are based upon the 
degree to which the 30 most common English language character digraphs are represented 
within the text. Four ratings are generated in total, as listed below : 
" Rating 1: represents the percentage of the 10 most common digraphs that 
occur 5 or more times in the text; 
" Rating 2: represents the percentage of the 11th to 20th most common digraphs 
that occur 5 or more times in the text; 
" Rating 3: represents the percentage of the 21st to 30th most common digraphs 
that occur 5 or more times in the text; 
" Rating 4: represents the overall percentage of the 30 most common digraphs 
that occur 5 or more times in the text; 
Note that the digraphs are required to appear at least 5 times in order to ensure that a 
reasonable number of samples would be taken during the formation of any resulting profiles. 
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The separate Text Analyser option is provided to generate statistical analyses and suitability 
ratings for text files that have been created independently of IMS (or for files that have been 
modified - see below). 
Whilst not shown in figure 9.7, a text editing option is also provided to allow modifications 
to existing reference and sample texts. This makes use of the MS-DOS EDIT utility and is 
basically intended as a means for mistakes to be corrected or for other small changes to be 
made (the reason being that, due to a restriction in the demonstrators text handling, no 
linefeeds can be included in any of the texts it uses and EDIT, therefore, displays the whole 
text as one continuous line. Note that if any linefeeds are included they are filtered out by 
IMS before the text is used). 
9.4 Implementation constraints and potential enhancements 
Setting aside the aspects of the IMS design that are not addressed, it is important to 
recognise that the demonstrator system still suffers from a number of limitations that would 
potentially reduce its usefulness in a practical context. 
9.4.1 Limited intrusion detection 
Possibly the most significant constraint of the demonstrator is that real-time intrusion 
detection functionality has been limited to the keystroke analysis technique discussed in 
chapter 8. The reason for this, as identified at the start of that chapter, was the relative ease 
with which keystroke profiles could be developed in comparison with other supervision 
techniques. The fact that the demonstrator was developed by an individual project rather 
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than a team effort meant that there was insufficient scope for practical examination of other 
techniques (although scope obviously exists for future research efforts in these areas). 
9.4.2 Insecure Client start-up 
As previously mentioned, the nature of the PC / DOS environment currently handicaps the 
Client initiation process in that it is possible to bypass the supervision system by either 
booting from the floppy drive or interrupting the hard disk boot-up. 
This weakness could be overcome by the use of secure hardware to force the system to 
boot into the IMS Client before allowing any user interaction. The principal stages of the 
PC start-up procedure can be described as follows : 
1. automatic Power On Self Test (POST); 
2. system disk boot-up (with priority given to floppy drive); 
3. execution of CONFIG. SYS file - uninterruptable; 
4. execution of AUTOEXEC. BAT file - interruptable. 
If the floppy drive was temporarily disabled following the POST and the Client system then 
initiated at the CONFIG. SYS stage rather than in the AUTOEXEC file, it would be 
impossible for the installation of the supervision system to be circumvented. 
It would, in fact, be possible to effect this solution by installing a ROM adapter card 
in the 
Client PC. This ROM could be positioned in memory in such a way that it would 
be 
executed immediately after the firmware for the POST, before any 
floppy drives are 
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recognised (Shepherd 1992). When execution is passed to it, the ROM would disable the 
floppy drive via software methods, forcing the system to boot from the hard drive. The 
Client software would then be installed as a device in the CONFIG. SYS file, and would 
include appropriate code to re-enable the floppy drive once supervision was in operation. 
In this manner, the Client could not be bypassed without the need to physically open and 
modify the computer. 
9.4.3 Single workstation monitoring 
Another fundamental departure from the full IMS design is that the demonstrator is only 
intended to monitor a single workstation / user session at any one time (although there may, 
of course, still be a significant number of registered users). 
It is considered that the concept would be most usefully implemented in the context of a 
Local Area Network (LAN) envirorunent, where the single IMS Host would be responsible 
for monitoring users on a network with many Client workstations. A basic idea of how this 
could be approached is described below. 
Rather than continually transmitting activity data, the local Clients would collect and 
accumulate information (storing it in a temporary file) and then transmit it to the Host (e. g. 
via FTP using a specially created account and automated login) as a block representing X 
minutes of Client activity. The Host will then analyse the data received and 
immediately 
send an alert to any Clients with anomalous activity. This is illustrated 
in figure 9.8 (note 
that a Star topology is shown for ease of illustration only). 
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Fig. 9.8 : Polling of active IMS Clients in network monitoring system 
The obvious drawback here is that the impostor detection will no longer be occurring 
strictly in real-time, but will be delayed until the relevant Client is polled and its data 
analysed by the Host. As a result, the polling frequency will be crucial in preventing too 
great a window of opportunity for impostors. This will, however, be constrained by the 
following factors : 
the network size and the number of active Clients in operation; 
" the typical network traffic loading (frequent polling could overwhelm network 
with IMS-related traffic); 
" the speed at which the Host can analyse and, if necessary, respond to the 
incoming data from each Client. 
312 
Chapter 9: An IMS Demonstrator System 
It would be desirable for all Clients to be closely monitored at the start of a session to 
ensure that an impostor is not active from the outset. However, after this the desirable 
polling frequency depends upon the type of intruder that one wishes to detect. For 
example, polling a Client once every 5 minutes may be enough to effectively detect 
penetrators (given that some delay would be likely between a legitimate user leaving and an 
impostor becoming active), whereas such an interval would be inappropriate for misfeasors 
as anomalous activity could start at any time. 
In a full implementation of IMS, the potential problems here could be limited by 
transferring some of the more straightforward intrusion detection functionality (e. g. 
identification and response to login failures, suspicious command sequences) from the Host 
to the Client systems. This would give the Clients a degree of independence and leave them 
less vulnerable between polling cycles. The functionality transferred would most likely to 
relate to the generic intrusion rules as opposed to the monitoring of user behavioural 
characteristics. In this scenario, data would still be accumulated and analysed by the Host 
as originally described but, in addition, Clients could also specifically request Host attention 
if any anomalies were detected in the interim periods. 
As an example of the quantity of data that would be involved in each Client-Host transfer, 
the Keystroke Analyser currently sends three bytes for every keystroke entered at the local 
workstation (two for the inter-keystroke time + one for the typed character). A fast typist 
may manage around 400 keystrokes per minute (giving a total of approximately 1.2K per 
minute in keystroke information alone). Given that keystroke analysis would probably 
be 
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the most significant element in terms of its data transmission requirement, and that details of 
some other activities (e. g. OS commands, application usage) would be encapsulated in that 
data as well, the largest Client-Host packet size would be probably be 2-3K per minute. 
In this scenario it will also be important to safeguard the integrity of the temporary files 
created by the local Clients to prevent them from being modified (or deleted) prior to 
transmission to the Host. 
9.4.4 MS-DOS implementation 
The MS-DOS platform was retained for the demonstrator due to the existing experimental 
implementation and the easy availability of DOS-based software development tools. 
However, most PCs no longer run DOS-based application software and have moved on to 
the more user-friendly platform offered by Microsoft Windows. Unfortunately, the 
demonstrator in incompatible with this environment, with virtually all aspects of 
implementation requiring modification to rectify the situation : 
" obtaining keystroke timings; 
" co-operation with other applications; 
" serial communications; 
" user interface design. 
However, the DOS implementation does not prevent intrusion detection from being 
demonstrated in a practical context (e. g. using a DOS application such as a wordprocessor) 
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9.4.5 Code design and development 
Although the demonstrator has been coded in a structured manner and incorporates 
functional elements from virtually all of the IMS modules, the development of the system 
did not adhere strictly to the modular structure proposed in the IMS conceptual design. 
The principal reason for this was that the foundation of the demonstrator was provided by 
the code from experimental keystroke analyser and the subsequent extension was geared 
around this framework. As such, enhancement of the system to incorporate further 
supervision techniques would be more difficult, involving modification to aspects of several 
code modules, relating to both Host and Client functionality. 
9.5 Conclusions 
Despite the limitations identified, the demonstrator does achieve its objective of proving the 
workability of real-time monitoring in practice and illustrating how it can be incorporated 
into the context of an operational security system. The system in its current form is also 
believed to represent an advancement on any previously documented investigation of 
dynamic keystroke analysis. 
On a practical level, further development was constrained by the time available within the 
research programme and the need to address other aspects of the work in addition to the 
demonstrator. In addition, suitable Windows development tools and LAN facilities were 
unavailable within the research environment, effectively preventing these aspects 
from being 
pursued. However, even if such facilities had been available, addressing the 
issues of 
Windows and LAN implementation would not have represented research so much as 
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straightforward software development, which would ultimately have been unlikely to affect 
the end results / findings relating to the effectiveness of the system. 
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10.1 Inter-domain communications in healthcare 
Having covered the practical elements of the study, the discussion now proceeds to examine 
healthcare security needs on a wider scale. The IMS concept (in conjunction with the CISS 
architecture discussed in section 7.7.1) is considered to be an appropriate means of 
providing comprehensive security within individual domains, allowing complete mediation 
of user activity. However, whilst it is likely that the majority of secure operations will still 
be restricted to the local domain, it is also necessary to consider the security of inter-domain 
operations, given the increasing requirement for transfer and exchange of data between 
HCEs (on a potentially international scale). In fact, a number of future trends involving 
inter-HCE communications have been predicted (European Commission 1994) : 
" increased inter-HCE networking; 
9 increased exchange of data between HCEs; 
" increased potential for sharing of facilities between HCEs; 
" establishment and adoption of the composite electronic healthcare record 
(EHCR). 
Steps to realise these objectives are already in progress. For example, the üK National 
Health Service has already planned to bring all aspects of voice and data communications 
together into a common framework, with all major HCEs having the facility to 
communicate electronically by 1996 (NHS 1992). In addition, European project 
sponsorship is underway at the time of writing that will encourage and speed this 
progression. In these scenarios the key issue is likely to be that of trust 
between the 
318 
Chapter 10 :A Wider Framework for Healthcare Security 
participating establishments -a factor that cannot always be guaranteed between 
communicating parties, even in healthcare. This places renewed emphasis on the need for 
security, with key issues being integrity (of both services and data), non-repudiation of 
activities and confidentiality. This is necessary not only to prevent unauthorised or 
undesirable activities, but also to provide a level of trust that allows broader and better 
services to be introduced. 
In general terms, the demand for secure inter-domain communications in healthcare can be 
closely linked to three main factors : 
9 the increasing mobility of patients within the European healthcare community, 
with a consequent need to exchange healthcare records; 
" the increased networking, accessing and sharing of systems between HCEs; 
" the increasing desirability and viability of telemedicine services (i. e. medical 
diagnosis and treatment conducted at a distance from the patient). 
The requirement to share healthcare records is largely a result of the increasing integration 
within the European Union and the choice that is consequently offered to patients. 
However, the viability of the idea is dependant upon the records being both portable and 
accessible, which in turn dictates a requirement for security. The portability 
issue is 
overcome by the emergence of the electronic healthcare record (EHCR), 
but the new 
opportunities that this offers also introduce some additional security concerns even 
before 
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the issue of inter-domain exchange is considered. For example, the nature of the 
information held in records is changing to include the integration of images, voice and data 
in a multimedia framework (Arnold and Peter 1993). This introduces a further concern in 
that the amalgamation of different forms of data into the composite record may potentially 
increase the sensitivity of the information beyond that of any of the component parts. 
Transmission of the records over a network only serves to heighten the concern and it is 
recognised that up until now much of the protection of HCRs has been provided by the fact 
that they rarely left the originating establishment and could not be accessed from external 
facilities (Barber and O'Moore 1991). 
Sharing of HCE systems is desirable in that it could enable establishments with limited 
resources to overcome their lack of facilities. However, additional consequences of this will 
be increased complexity and interdependence of healthcare information systems and an 
increased access control burden. Significantly more people will have the potential to access 
(parts of) the system and they will no longer be confined to members of a single 
establishment. 
As inter-HCE communication becomes more technically feasible, it is likely that the 
desirability and the potential applications of the service will increase. Widespread 
networking will enable easier and more effective communication between hospitals, 
laboratories and community care establishments and increase the level of potential contact 
between specialists and generalists. In short, information and expertise that may 
be lacking 
in one establishment should become more easily available from other 
HCEs. The 
combination of this point with the earlier one regarding the sharing of 
facilities illustrates a 
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way in which inter-HCE communications could be used to somewhat offset the potentially 
damaging trend observed by Barber (1991a) in chapter 2, where healthcare knowledge and 
resources become unequally distributed within Europe, leading to consequent inequalities in 
the level and quality of services available in some establishments. 
Finally, such networks would allow an opportunity to broaden the possibilities in medical 
care. Some specific examples could include the following (Pfitzmann and Pfitzmann 1991) : 
" monitoring of patients in their homes; 
" real-time video transmission during operations; 
" accessing of large databases (e. g. cancer registers) for research purposes; 
" provision of medical advice databases for consultation by patients. 
The sensitive nature of healthcare and the systems involved will demand that all such 
activities and exchanges can occur securely, with the properties of confidentiality, integrity 
and non-repudiation all being of potential importance. Again, whilst these concerns are 
recognised, it does not necessarily mean that they have been properly addressed. For 
example, the aforementioned NHS-wide network has already been criticised by the British 
Medical Association for having lax security arrangements (The Times 1995). 
A further observation is that, at the national and international levels, healthcare 
communications will utilise shared networks alongside data from other fields 
(e. g. over the 
Internet). The communications infrastructure as a whole will, therefore, be a rich target 
in 
terms of various types of potentially sensitive information; which serves to 
increase the risks 
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associated with any of the individual types of data being communicated. For example, 
healthcare data may be left vulnerable as a result of attacks targeting other types of 
information on the network (e. g. banking or governmental communications). Healthcare 
establishments must therefore have a means by which the security of their exchanges can be 
maintained in this scenario. However, a suitable protection strategy can be specified as the 
next logical extension of the IMS and CISS architectures that have already been discussed. 
10.2 Enabling secure inter-domain operations 
Suitable methods for achieving the required services on a wide scale are largely based 
around cryptography and involve the use of digital signatures, data encryption and the 
support of Trusted Third Party (TTP) infrastructures. These will be described in the 
sections that follow. However, an exhaustive technical analysis of the techniques is not 
provided as suitable references are subsequently included in the text. The intention is to 
illustrate how the concepts may be used to extend the security framework previously 
described to enable secure inter-domain operations. 
10.2.1 Use of cryptography for communication security services 
The use of cryptographic techniques contributes (to some extent) to the provision of all the 
security services required for inter-domain operations. It is possible to identify two main 
types of cryptographic algorithm, as described below. 
" Symmetric (i. e. secret key) methods, in which knowledge of the encryption 
key 
implies knowledge of the decryption key and vice-versa. In order to preserve 
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confidentiality, the key must only be known by the sender and receiver. In 
addition, a non-repudiation service cannot be provided as it is impossible to prove 
which of the communicating parties had encrypted the data. The most common 
example of a symmetric algorithm is the Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
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Fig. 10.1: Symmetric Encryption 
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" Asymmetric (i. e. public key) in which knowledge of the encryption key does not 
imply knowledge of the associated decryption key and it is computationally 
impossible to derive one from the other. The two keys are referred to as the 
"private" and "public" keys. Whilst the former remains a secret, the public key 
can be made available to all potential senders. Non-repudiation is, therefore, 
possible as only the legitimate owner should be able to encrypt messages with the 
private key (encryption in this manner is referred to as a digital signature). The 
most common asymmetric encryption method is based upon the RSA algorithm 
(Rivest et al. 1978). 
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Fig. 10.2: Asymmetric Encryption 
Whilst the ability to provide an additional security service would seem to indicate that the 
public key approach is the more desirable of the two methods, a problem is that the 
encryption process is computationally intensive and, hence, much slower than the symmetric 
technique. This can be illustrated by comparing the speeds of two typical DES and RSA 
encryption chips (LINTEL 1992a; LINTEL 1992b). Whilst the DES processor is capable 
of encryption speeds in excess of 22 Mbit/sec, the RSA device can only manage a more 
sedate 32 Kbit/sec (using a 512 bit key). This performance constraint serves to make 
asymmetric methods unsuitable for encrypting large messages. The solution lies in the use 
of a hybrid system where the public key encryption is used to provide digital signature and 
integrity services and symmetric encryption is used for confidentiality. This serves to 
combine the "easy key exchange" of public key systems with the speed of symmetric 
algorithms. 
Using a hybrid system, the required security services can be achieved as described below 
(note that in order to explain the concepts more clearly, the discussion will make reference 
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Confidentiality 
In order to use the faster symmetric encryption approach, the two parties wishing 
to communicate confidentiality both require access to the secret key. However, 
for confidentiality to be assured, it is obviously important that this key be known 
only to the communicating parties. Therefore, the party initiating the 
communication (i. e. S) would also initiate the generation of a key to be used for 
the duration of the exchange (i. e. a session key). This would then be sent to R, 
having first been encrypted using R's public key (i. e. so that only R can read it). 
At the receiving end, R would use his secret key to decrypt the message, yielding 
the session key information to be used for the subsequent confidential 
transmission. 
" Integrity 
There are actually two possible techniques for ensuring message integrity. If the 
message is already being sent in encrypted form (i. e. for confidentiality), then this 
also provides an implicit integrity service, in that any modification of the 
encrypted data will result in garbage being generated at the receiving end. 
Alternatively, integrity can be assured using a Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) which is appended to the message by the sender. The 
MAC is a hash 
function of the data itself, such that modification of the message would 
be 
highlighted by a subsequent discrepancy in the accompanying value. 
The 
recipient of the message would perform the same 
hash function on the data 
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received to calculate his own MAC value for comparison (with non-matching 
values indicating that the message has been corrupted). 
The MAC itself must obviously be protected to prevent someone from being able 
to modify the message and then substitute an appropriate new value. This is 
achieved by encrypting it with the public key of the recipient. 
The use of the MAC approach has an advantage in that the process of code 
generation and comparison can be performed automatically (and transparently) at 
the receiving end. With the use of encryption alone, the recipient would still be 
required to manually view the message in order to determine whether it had been 
modified. 
" Non-repudiation 
The sender S encrypts the message with the private key. R can then use the 
public key of S to decrypt the message. If the secrecy of the private key is 
assured, then whatever was signed with it could only have been sent by S and, 
therefore, the origin of the message cannot be repudiated. This digital signature 
can be used as a means of proving the source of session keys and MACs involved 
in the communication. 
The hybrid approach, therefore, provides a basis for all of the necessary security services 
and the overall sequence for ensuring secure communications would 
be as follows (it is 
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assumed that the communicating parties are already in possession of the required public and 
private keys and that all three services are required) : 
1. a session key is generated locally by the sender (S); 
2. the session key is transmitted to the receiver (R) after having been encrypted 
using the public key of R (for confidentiality) and signed using the secret key of S 
(for non-repudiation of origin); 
3. S calculates a MAC for the message to be sent, which is again signed and 
encrypted (for non-repudiation of origin and confidentiality respectively), and 
appended to the message; 
4. the message itself is encrypted using the shared session key (for confidentiality) 
and sent to R; 
5. being in possession of the session key, R can decrypt the message; 
6. using his own secret key and the public key of S, R can decrypt and verify the 
origin of the MAC; 
7. finally, a new MAC value can be generated from the message received and 
compared against the original in order to ensure message integrity. 
However, problems exist in this framework in terms of ensuring that : 
" all potential senders and recipients are uniquely identifiable; 
" public keys are securely associated with the correct user; 
" public keys of users are available to other users when required. 
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These issues can be overcome by using a hierarchy of Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) to 
provide the required services, as found in X509 and ISO 9594-2 (ISO 1988). 
10.2.2 An overview of Trusted Third Parties 
The potential uses of TTPs in healthcare have already been recognised within Europe, 
having been the basis for a dedicated project under the INFOSEC programme (INFOSEC 
THIS 1994). This section identifies the key elements of a TTP service, highlighting the 
aspects of trust involved in each case. Summary descriptions are given below. 
" Naming Authority 
To ensure secure communications a unique and unforgable identification of all 
potential users is necessary which can be bound to all activities or data used in a 
session. 
The Nan-ing Authority (NA) is responsible for assigning each communicating entity 
a distinguished name by which they may be identified within the communications 
framework (where such entities may be users, organisations or computer processes). 
Naming would actually be achieved via a hierarchy of NAs, arranged in an inverted 
tree structure as shown in figure 10.3. The entities at the bottom of the hierarchy 
represent individual users, with the root and intermediate levels all acting as 
NAs. 
Each entity is assigned a unique relative distinguished name by its superior 
NA and, 
thus, the overall distinguished name for any user is the concatenation of all relative 
names found along the closed path from the root. 
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Person Fred John Laser 
Bloggs Smith Printer 
Netherlands 
Fig. 10.3: The Naming Authority hierarchy 
The NA must be trusted that any name issued is unique and cannot be subsequently 
forged, changed or proliferated. A single person may possess more than one 
distinguished name (e. g. several issued by different NAs). In terms of the Directory 
(see below), one of these names will be held as a main entry and the rest as aliases. 
9 Certification Authority 
The purpose of the Certification Authority (CA) is to provide assurance of user 
credentials (which will principally include their distinguished name and public 
encryption key) by producing a certificate which is then placed in the Directory. 
The CA signs the certificate with its own private key, ensuring that any user in 
possession of the associated public key can access it and that no-one can 
subsequently modify it without changes being detected. As such, certificates can 
be 
considered public and unforgable, and do not need to 
be communicated in a secure 
manner. 
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Users will sign data communications using their secret key. Recipients will require 
the associated public key and will, therefore, need to obtain the senders certificate. 
They can then use the public key of the CA to verify the certificate - yielding the 
senders public key which can be used to verify the integrity of the message and 
guarantee the source of the sender. 
It is evident that CAs must be the highly secure, in that their compromise could lead 
to forged certificates. As such, the CAs also need to guarantee the authenticity of 
certificates to each other and a hierarchical arrangement is again used. This is 
illustrated in figure 10.4, along with the format of the certificates (with SK and PK 




Validity (e. g. dates) 
Other Info. 










TTPs / SMCs 
Sub-domain 
SK 3 PK 3 
10 TTPs / SMCs 
CERTIFICATES 
Fig. 10.4: Logical certification hierarchy 
The security of signing keys will also be of paramount importance to prevent the 
forging of user signatures. Storage of the key in a smart card is the commonly 
330 
Chapter 10 :A Wider Framework for Healthcare Security 
recommended means of ensuring this (Rihaczek 1991; INFOSEC THIS 1994), 
which will allow for transparency and ease of use by healthcare staff. The cards 
perform various functions including the creation and verification of signatures, 
encryption / decryption of data and the storage of secret keys or other sensitive data 
(they may also perform other special functions associated with particular 
applications). 
" Directory 
The directory is a distributed database, accessible on a potentially world-wide basis, 
holding information on subscribers (principally distinguished names, aliases and 
public keys) and provides an efficient means for public keys to be distributed to the 
intended communications partners. 
Access to directory entries is possible from any of a series of interconnected and 
geographically dispersed directory service agents (DSAs), but with services 
provided for user authentication. Whilst simple password methods could be used 
for this purpose, stronger approaches (based on cryptographic techniques) are 
considered more appropriate to healthcare (INFOSEC THIS 1994). Methods 
should be of a comparable strength across all of the potential access points. 
In addition, the directory must be trusted to maintain the integrity and, potentially, 
the confidentiality (e. g. for the protection of alias names) of the 
information held. 
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10.2.3 Implementing a Trusted Third Party infrastructure 
In order to provide all the necessary functions on an international scale a network of TTPs 
will be required, as shown in figure 10.5. At this level the infrastructure will be generic for 
all applications, but at the local domain and sub-domain levels (as shown in figure 10.6) 
specific operations can be incorporated to satisfy HCE security policies, with the TTP being 
linked into the more comprehensive SMC functionality described earlier. 
International 
TTPs 


























COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
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Each TTP in the hierarchy is certified by the TTP in the next layer up, which not only 
provides credibility of the complete system by defining the individual certification path 
within a certificate, but allows for the loss of a hierarchical level under fault conditions (with 
the next higher order certificate being used). The arrangement is defined in the X509 / ISO 
9594-2 Directory services architecture and helps to ensure that system failure does not lead 
to service unavailability. 
The actual authorisation and supervision of inter-domain operations would be based upon 
interactions between the Security Management Centres involved. For example, to enable a 
user in domain A to utilise facilities on a system in a remote domain B, the relevant user 
details would be exchanged between the two SMCs. SMC A could (for example) send a 
signed behaviour profile to SMC B which, after ensuring that the user is actually authorised 
to access the system, could be used for subsequent session supervision. 
The SMCs would attempt to harmonise the security services offered at each end. In the 
healthcare scenario, this goes some way towards satisfying a previously identified need for a 
mechanism whereby the level of security determined for data in one establishment can still 
be guaranteed to apply after transmission to another (AIM SEISIVIED 1993a). 
With a secure association established, inter-domain operations can occur as normal, with the 
fact of the SMC communications remaining transparent to the end-user(s) involved. 
This 
would also be true of the other inter-domain services discussed, with all technical operations 
being handled by the security systems in each domain. However, in some cases, such as the 
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use of digital signatures, it would be advantageous for the users to be given some indication 
that a security service is being provided (which could be accomplished by the fact of having 
to use the smart cards). 
10.3 Inter-HCE communication in an example scenario 
The likely types of inter-domain communication in healthcare and the consequent need for 
security can be illustrated using an example scenario. To this end, the information flows 
involved in a potential system are illustrated in figure 10.7 and explained in the description 
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Fig. 10.7: Potential inter-domain HCE communications 
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The neurology department in one establishment (HCE A) performs a series of tests which 
produce a set of "raw" results data. However, HCE A lacks the equipment required to 
process and visualise the data, making it necessary to involve facilities at another site (HCE 
B). Once visualisation has been performed the results are stored in a database, from where 
they are subsequently accessed by a consultant at HCE A. However, further expert opinion 
is required and advice is, therefore, sought from another neurological consultant located at 
HCE C. Hence, the data is transmitted further, with the additional interpretation finally 
coming back to the originating consultant (allowing a more informed care decision to be 
made at HCE A). Both consultants have access to a video conferencing link by means of 
camera-equipped workstations, whilst the other party at HCE A uses a standard 
workstation without such a facility. 
From this basic outline, a general security specification can be given based upon elements of 
the strategy described earlier. The different HCEs would be authenticated to each other by 
the certified public keys obtained from the TTP, with all parties being authenticated locally 
by their respective SMCs. Given that their workstations are equipped with cameras, the 
two consultants could potentially be authenticated by an image recognition system. 
However, the data production user, utilising a standard workstation, would have no facility 
for multimedia-enhanced authentication methods. Authentication of this user would, 
therefore, be reliant upon the SMC facilities for activity supervision (possibly alongside 
traditional methods or the use of smart cards). 
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The example is heavily communications oriented and the SMCs in each domain would 
mediate the various data exchanges and messages. The latter would be protected according 
to the sequence of operations previously listed in section 10.2.1. The principal services 
required between HCEs A and B would be data integrity and confidentiality, whereas the 
HCE A/ HCE C link would also require digital signatures so that the consultants were able 
to verify the origin of the messages received. 
The same scenario, but with the SMCs and logical security information flows indicated, is 
shown in figure 10.8. The SMCs would monitor the activity in each of the three domains, 
with communication via secure protocols to exchange relevant security information (e. g. the 
behaviour profile of the data production user from SMC A to SMC B to allow supervision 
in the remote domain). They would also provide public keys for the verification of digital 
signatures. 
The example serves to illustrate both the types of inter-domain information exchange and 
consultations that will be possible in healthcare, as well as the need for secure data 
communications between the various parties involved. The use of the SMCs would ensure 
that security was consistent across the three sites involved (a factor that considerably 
reduces the potential problems of sharing data and facilities as discussed), whilst the TTP 
certification hierarchy would ensure that SMCs could be authenticated to each other. 
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Fig. 10.8: Secure inter-domain communication 
10.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, it can be seen that the adoption of this strategy would provide the final 
component of a logical security system necessary to allow secure inter-HCE operations. 
The combination of real-time supervision, the CISS framework and TTPs theoretically 
allows full system-wide protection to be realised, with trusted communication paths 
between a number of individually secure healthcare domains. 
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High level aspects of this framework have been published in Furnell et al (1995c) and 
Furnell and Sanders (1995). The former specifically examined the need for security in 
multimedia healthcare systems and suggested that the combination of user supervision 
within local domains and TTP-based communication between HCEs is a suitable strategy. 
The second paper concentrated more upon the TTP issues and the standardisation of 
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11.1 Achievements of the research programme 
The research programme has met all of the objectives originally specified in chapter 1, with 
new conceptual and practical work being encompassed in a number of areas, as listed 
below. 
1. Recommendation of the baseline standard for existing healthcare systems, in the 
form of the guidelines contributed to the AIM SEISMED project. These satisfy 
the basic requirement of providing a viable means for security to be added or 
enhanced in poorly protected systems and environments. 
2. Development of the new protection methodology framework, which allows HCEs 
to assess their own security requirements and thereby determine the level of 
countermeasures that are necessary. 
3. Development of the comprehensive conceptual design for the IMS supervision 
system. The framework specifies a novel combination of auditing, advanced 
authentication and supervision techniques that are considered suitable for use in 
healthcare systems. Several aspects of the design also represent entirely new 
work, including the class profiles for healthcare staff and the IMS module 
architecture. 
4. Implementation and validation of a practical real-time user supervision technique, 
namely keystroke analysis. The experimental study involved a reasonably 
large 
test subject group and was, therefore, considered to provide a good 
indication of 
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the effectiveness of the technique. The results themselves proved that, in the vast 
majority of cases, keystroke characteristics do indeed provide a suitable basis for 
discriminating between many different users (even those with similar typing 
abilities. 
5. Implementation of various other key aspects from the conceptual design within a 
demonstrator system. As well as incorporating further unique aspects of the IMS 
design (e. g. system configuration auditing), this enabled the idea of transparent 
supervision to be shown in practice, thereby also validating that part of the 
concept. 
6. Consideration of the need for security from a wider perspective and with a full 
examination of how the recommended supervision approach could be integrated 
into a more comprehensive framework (i. e. by using the CISS architecture and 
Trusted Third Parties). 
Several papers relating to the research programme have been presented at refereed 
conferences, with favourable comments being received from other delegates. As such, it is 
believed that the research has made valid and useful contributions to the information system 
security field in both the healthcare context, as well as at a more general level. 
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11.2 Limitations of the research 
Despite having met the overall objectives of the research programme, it is nevertheless 
possible to identify a number of limitations associated with the work. The principal points 
are presented below. 
1. The generic protection methodology, whilst relatively complete in terms of the 
overall framework, cannot be considered practically viable due to the current lack 
of associated countermeasures. However, as noted in chapter 5, this problem will 
be overcome by efforts currently underway within another research programme 
(Warren 1995). 
2. Insufficient time was available to allow the investigation of further supervision 
techniques in a practical context. Preliminary work was started relating to the 
potential of other behavioural characteristics (for example, analysis of operating 
system command usage), but did not progress significantly beyond the stage 
presented in chapter 6. It was considered more beneficial to devote time to a 
detailed treatment of keystroke analysis (and the associated demonstrator) rather 
than attempt several high level studies of other techniques. 
3. It was not possible to conduct trials of the intrusion monitoring system within an 
operational HCE system, despite the fact that reference centre implementation of 
an IMS was originally one of the proposed goals of the SP07 workpackage 
within SEISMED. In the event, practical implementation work was 
deemed 
outside the scope of the workpackage by the project management team 
(AIM 
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SEISMED 1993d). Nevertheless, significant interest in the real-time supervision 
concept was expressed by both of the UK reference centres. 
11.3 Suggestions and scope for future work 
It is possible to identify a number of areas in which further work could be conducted to 
build upon that undertaken within the project. A number of ideas have already been 
covered at the end of chapters 8 and 9, as well as throughout chapter 10. However, this 
section presents some additional points which the author views as representing a more 
direct continuation of the research programme. 
1. Assessment of the applicability of the baseline security guidelines in practical 
trials, with associated updates to overcome any deficiencies. As previously noted 
in chapter 4, the guidelines would also require periodic updates to account for 
changes and advances in available protection technologies. 
2. Further investigation and potential development an expert system implementation 
of the generic protection methodology, as identified in chapter 5. This would 
further enhance the ease of use and applicability of the approach once the 
accompanying countermeasures have been defined. 
3. Enhancement of the keystroke analysis system to determine whether false 
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4. Investigation and inclusion of further supervision characteristics within an 
operational IMS. The incorporation of artificial intelligence techniques and 
implementation in a full LAN environment (as discussed in chapter 9) would also 
provide a very interesting basis for future development. 
5. Establishment of a more formal relationship between the IMS and CISS 
architectures, with the two concepts eventually being integrated into a functional 
system (initially in the context of an expanded demonstrator). 
6. The aforementioned practical trials in a healthcare establishment. 
11.4 The future for healthcare information systems and security 
It is now unquestionable that information systems are firmly established in the healthcare 
field. However, in many ways the key issue is not so much the pervasiveness of IT, but the 
fact that the role it plays has changed so significantly. Systems have moved on from 
handling statistical and administrative duties to holding sensitive clinical information relating 
to individuals. In the future, more and more patient care will be conducted on the basis of 
information provided by IT systems, with further aspects of the treatment itself also being 
computer-controlled. 
The future will see further growth and expansion of both applications and users, with the 
issues of multimedia and telemedicine playing an increasingly important role. In order to 
maintain confidence, security will need to be considered and developed in parallel with these 
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new systems, with each innovation being secure in itself and not compromising or degrading 
the protection that already exists (Sunday Times 1995). 
This research has served to highlight not only the need for security in these systems, but 
also suggested a number of suitable strategies for actually addressing and overcoming some 
of the main problems. 
The significant potential for system abuse in healthcare has been established in this thesis. 
This fact, in combination with the additional risks from accidental breaches, already means 
that healthcare systems are under threat 24 hours a day. The increasing reliance upon and 
use of IT systems in the future will simply mean that there is more to go wrong. 
However, it is also expected that the available methods of security will advance and it is 
envisaged that intrusion monitoring methods, such as those described in this thesis, will 
become increasingly suitable as a means of providing transparent protection that does not 
impose unwanted and unnecessary constraints upon users. 
In conclusion, computer security will always be required in healthcare to safeguard both the 
rights and safety of patients, as well as to allow the systems themselves to be used with 
confidence. In fact, as the applications become more complex, the importance of having 
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Appendix A: Surveys associated with the research programme 
As previously described in the main text, the results of two surveys were used to support 
the investigations in the research programme : 
1. the SEISMED questionnaire (previously described in chapter 3), which was 
distributed to HCEs across Europe in 1992 and contained questions relevant to 
the assessment of existing systems security (pages 372 to 376); 
2. the "Security Attitudes" questionnaire (previously described in chapter 6), which 
was distributed to staff within Derriford Hospital (Plymouth) in 1995 and 
contained questions relevant to the formulation of healthcare behaviour profiles 
(pages 378 to 382). 
The questionnaire sheets associated with both surveys are reproduced in the pages that 
follow. However, given that the full SEISMED questionnaire was quite large (running to 
23 pages), the appendix only reproduces those questions that related to the analysis of 
existing healthcare systems - namely those from sections one and two of the 
document. 
For completeness, this section also presents a list of the major HCE applications that were 
identified under the heading "other" in question 1.3 of the SEISMED survey. 
This can be 
found directly after the SEISMED questionnaire pages themselves (i. e. page 
377). 
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SECTION 1: PHYSICAL SECURITY DETAILS OF YOUR SYSTEM 
1.1 Indicate in the appropriate boxes below your computer type, operating system, and 
whether or not they are networked. 
1.2 Please give approximate answers to the following: 
" No. of terminals? ......................................................................... 
1 
" No. of users? ............................................................................... 
2 
" Disk storage capacity? ...................................................... 
(Mbytes) 3 
1.3 Indicate (Y/Nj which of the Main Systems listed below are present within your HCE and which of the 
security measures are used? 
SECURITY MEASURES 
















...... information) ............. 


















L J L U 
FI PI i1 1I 
" Pharmacy ........................ 
.......... 
5 
. " Admissions 
_. _.... ý 
. .......... 
" Financial Systems ............. 
6 l. ____ 
I 
t lJ tý 
1] II I 
" Other (please name) 
7 
" Other (please name) 1i 
J L 
TJ 
t 8 1.. _. 1 .ý 
" Other (please name) 
9 
A_ User authentication - identification 
B_ Audit trails - Intrusion detection mechanisms 
C Access control mechanisms 
D_ Physical security measure 
E= Disaster - recovery plans 
F_ Encryption 
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1.4 How is User Authentication carried out in up to 5 of the Main Systems answered y in Q. 13? Enter the row numbers from Q. 13 of these Main Systems in the 1st row of boxes and then tick the 






Group/Shared passwords ....... 2 
User name/password ............ 3 
System/user name/password... 4 
Challenge response exchange .5 
No authentication .............. 6 
Other (please name) 
O D D O O 
0 0 0 0 0 D D O O O 
O D D O O 
0 ö ö ö ö 
7 
11 11 1 





1.5 What physical security measures are used (please tick)? 
" Lock and key (Room)? .................................................................. 1Q 
" Swipe card entry (Room)? .............................................................. 2Q 
- Keypad entry (Room)? .................................................................. 3Q 
" Lock and key (Computer)? .............................................................. 4Q 
" Fire proof safe (Backups)? .............................................................. 5L! . 
" None? ....................................................................................... 6Q 
" Other ........................................................................................ 7 
F7 
Specify: 
1.6 Which of the following network type/configuration do you use (please tick)? 
" Local Area Network (LAN)? ............................................................ 
1Q 
" Wide Area Network (WAN)? ............................................................ 
2Q 
" X25? ........................................................................................ 
3Q 
" Token Bus? ................................................................................ 
4Q 
" Token Ring? .............................................................................. 
SQ 
" Star? ........................................................................................ 
6Q 
" Ethernet? ................................................................................... 
7F 
" Other (Please name)? 8 
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1.6.1 Which of the following type(s) of data base system(s) do you use (if any) (please 
tick)? 
" Relational? .............................................................................. 
" Netw k/Hi hi l? 
1 
El 
El or erarc ca ................................................................. 2 [J 
" Other (Please name)? 3 
" On micro(s)? ............................................................................ 
" On ma nf a ( )? 
4 L...,, I 
F 1 
r me i s ....................................................................... 
" Used f tiv ? 
5 - 
or coopera e .................................................................. 
"L c l DB ti li ? 
6 l_! 
o a app ca ons ............................................................... 
" Inte ted s st ? 
7 tt 
Q 
gra y em ..................................................................... 8 0 
" Distributed DB system? ............................................................... 9 
1.6.2 How is data base security controlled and maintained in your system (please tick)? 
a) by physically separating subsystems ........................................... 1Q 
b) other (please name) 2u 
If the answer to 1.6.2 is (a), how do you achieve reintegration (please tick)? 
" as part of a specific DB application ................................................ 1 LJ 
" by using a centralised DB as a generic application tool........... 2Q 
" by integrating at the network level ................................................ 3Q 
" other (please name) 4Q 
1.6.3 What overall Data Base security policy do you use (if the DB is seen as a 
technical tool for communication, eg. military, commercial, personal 
knowledge approaches etc) 
(please name) 
cri 
1.7 Please rank each of the following in terms of the frequency with which they causes problems 
(1 Often, 2 Occasionally, 3 Very occasionally, 4 Once ever, 5 Never) 
1 
Q 
" Unreliable hardware ...................................................................... Q 
" Unreliable software 
3 " Unreliable network ...................................................................... 
4 
Q 
" Physical protection of hardware ...................................................... Q 
" Insufficient backups ..................................................................... 
5 
1 
" Natural disaster ........................................................................... 
6 
7 
" Power loss ................................................................................ 
L 
Q 
" Abuse by authorized users .............................................................. 
8 
Q 
" Internal hacking .......................................................................... 
9 
0 


















" Other (please name) 
1 
1.8 For how many hours per day are your applications intended to 
be operational ? T1 
8-12 hrs. 12-20 hrs, 20-23 hrs. 23-23.75 hrs, 23.75-24 hrs ............ 0-8 hrs. 
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SECTION 2: DESIGN SECURITY DETAILS OF YOUR SYSTEM 
2.1 What kind of access control mechanisms do you use (please tick): 
- Access control lists? .................................................................... 
r write data? i ht t r ad "A 
1 
0 
'[2 ccess r o e o g s ................................................... 2 
- Captive accounts (No access to command line)? ................................... 3 L_.. 1 
" Alarms for access violations? ......................................................... 
rced as word ch s? "E f 
4 1_. _I 
p o s ange n ........................................................... 
m il? " El t i 
5 U 
ec c a ron .......................................................................... 




" Terminal locking when inactive? ..................................................... 8 
Q 
" Configuration management? ........................................................... 9 
Q 
" Other (please name)? 10 
Q 
" Other (please name)? 11 
Q 
Please indicate the name and telephone number of someone who would be willing to further discuss 
the security within your Hospital Systems. 
2.2 Do you have any of the following disaster-recovery measures (YIN) in your system: 
0 Backups (state type eg. weekly/daily) ............................................... 
1E 
" Duplicate computer system? ............................................................ 
2 LJ 
- 24-hour maintenance contract? ........................................................ 
3F 
-1 
" Mobile backup? ........................................................................... 
4 
" Other (please name) 5 
LJ 
2.3 Are your disaster-recovery procedures designed to cope with any of the following (YIN): 
" All systems recovery? .................................................................. 
1 
" Core systems? ............................................................................. 
20 
" Network? ................................................................................... 
3! 




" No disaster recovery procedures? .............................. 
Other (please name) 
6 
2.4 Does your organisation use any form of encryption (YIN): 
" of data in systems? ....................................................................... 
I 
" of messages on internal networks? .................................................. 
2 
" of messages on external networks? ................................................... 
3 
" of password files? ........................................................................ 
4 
" All systems recovery? ....................... ........................................... I t- I 
" Core systems? .................................. ........................................... 
2 
0 
" Network? ........................................ ........................................... 
3 t 
" Personal computers? .......................... ........................................... 
4 
" No disaster recovery procedures? ........... 
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2.5 How is Daxa Integrity maintained in up to 5 of the Main Systems answered Yin Q. 1.3. 
Enter the row numbers from Q. 13 of these Main Systems in the 1st row of boxes and then tick the 
relevant boxes below that for each such system. 









" Error detection and correction 
software ........................... 3 
11 II II II II 













" Data validation on data entry . 
" Selective sampling ............. 
6 
ý. 1I 
1. ý. _ 
I F1 ____ 
" On screen re-reading ............ 
7 
1I II I1 
U 
" No integrity checks ............ 
8 
" Other (please name) 
9 
1I II II II 
ti 







2.6 How is access controlled and maintained across the network (please tick)? 
1 
Q 
" Automatic dialback modems ........................................................... Q 
" Controlled access points ............................................................... 
2 
3 L1 " Terminal authentication ................................................................ 
4 
Q 
" Node authentication ..................................................................... Q 
" Encryption (state type) 
5 
6 
" Secured cabling ............. .......................................................... 
7 
Q 
" Wiretap detection ........................................................................ 
8 U 
" No restrictions ............................................................................ Q 
" Other (please name) 
9 
Q 
" Other (please name) 
10 
2.7 What is the acceptable delay for information to be delivered by the 
HCE in: 
1. Average cases? ....................................................................... 
2. Emergency cases? ................................................................... 
Use the following code: 
1= less than a second 
2=1 to5seconds 
3=5 to 10 seconds 
4= More than 10 seconds 
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1. Average cases? ............................................ 
.......... 
l. ý_..! 2. Emergency cases? ......................................................... 
Use the following code: 
1= less than a second 
2=1 to 5 seconds 
3=5 to 10 seconds 
4= More than 10 seconds 
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Other European healthcare applications 
The following is a list of 25 additional types of HCE application that were identified in the 
SEISMED survey and subsequently presented under the heading "other" in figure 3.1. The 
names given are as specified by the survey respondents themselves : 
1. Personnel System; 
2. Management Information System; 
3. National indicators; 
4. Waiting Lists; 
5. Administration; 




10. Contractor details; 
11. Donor Records; 
12. Radiology; 
13. Cancer registration; 
14. Child health; 
15. Human Resources; 
16. Materials Management; 
17. Out-patients; 
18. Meal supply; 
19. Contractor details; 
20. ECG system; 
21. CRAMM risk analysis reviews; 
22. Paramedic; 
23. Surgery Audit; 
24. Operation history; 
25. Abortion register. 
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Security Awareness Survey 
Thank you for taking the time to fill in this questionnaire, which is completely 
anonymous. 
It is intended to be completed by information system users, so that we may 
gain a better understanding of your attitude and awareness of security relating 
to the systems you use. If you answer the questionnaire in full it will give an 
accurate picture of your opinions on this subject and allow proper analysis and 
suggest possible improvements. 
The majority of the questions require a simple "yes" or "no" response, in 
which you should just tick the appropriate box for your answer. For the other 
questions, the style of response will be shown. 
In completing the questionnaire it should be recognised that information 
security relates to the maintenance of the following concepts : 
Confidentiality : the requirement that information about someone 
or something can only be accessed by authorised 
persons. 
" Integrity : the requirement that whatever you have stored on the 
computer system will still be the same when you come 
back to it. 
" Availability : the requirement that systems and / or data will be always 
accessible to any user with a legitimate need. 
Your help in completing this questionnaire is greatly appreciated. 
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General Information 
1. Please tick the appropriate boxes : 
Sex: - Q Male Q Female 
Age: - C7 




Under 20 11 20 - 29 
40-49 0 50-59 
)Rowing categories best di 




O 60 and over 
-scribes your role ? 
C7 Nurse 
D Secretary 
3. What are your typical hours of work (if fixed) ? From to 
4. On average, how long do you spend using the hospital computer systems 
hours each day ? 
5. Please indicate the types of computer system that you regularly use? 
Q Standalone PC Q Terminal to Hospital Computer 
0 PC on a Network Q Remote (non-Derriford) System 
Q Other (please specify) 
6. Please indicate which of the following types 
how frequently (1 whole of day, 2 part of 
blank if never used) 
Q PAS Q Clinical Workstation 
Q Radiology Q Financial Systems 
Q Other (please specify) 
7. ` dhich of the following types of data do you create (C), access (A), update 
(U) ? Please tick all boxes that apply : 
C A U 
Q Patient Care/Diagnosis 
Q Q Q Patient Administration 
Q Q Q Personnel 
Q Q Q Resource Management 
Q Q Q General Hospital Administration 
Q Q Financial 
Q Q Laboratory, Radiology or other service dept. 
8. Would you be able to continue your work if unable to use the hospital 
computer systems for 3 to 4 hours ? 
11 Yes 0 No 
of applications you use and 
day, 3 less frequently, leave 
C] Clinical Laboratory 
D Theatres 
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9. Are you aware of the possible consequences of passing on confidential 
information ? 13 Yes Q No 
10. If you needed help, do you know how to contact the main computer support 
staff ?D Yes CD No 
11. Do you normally access information systems from more than one 
workstation / terminal ?Q Yes Q No 
If yes, are these workstation / terminals in different areas of the 
Hospital ?Q Yes Q No 
12. What do you think information system security protects against ? 
On a scale of 1 to 5. (1 Least Important, 5= Most Important) 
Cl Fraud (e. g. Financial loss) 
D Misuse (e. g. Personal work or games) 
Patient safety (e. g. Accurate laboratory results) 
D Patient Confidentiality (e. g. Value of information) 
Cl Other reason (please state) 
13. Do you consider the present information system security restricts you in 
your work ? '0 Yes ® No 
if yes, how ? 
14. How do you feel about the information system security at this Hospital and 
the controls and processes that are in place at present? (Scale of 1 Unhappy 
to 5 Very Confident, please tick ) 
Logical 111 2Q 3Q 411 511 
Physical 1Q 20 311 4Q 50 
Personnel 111 211 3Q4Q5 
Physical security 
15. Do you always wear your ID badge at work ? C1 Yes 
11 No 
16. Would you challenge someone not wearing an ID badge who was gaining 
information ?0 Yes ® No 
17. Are any areas of the Hospital monitored / under surveillance ? Q Yes 11 No 
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18. How do you dispose of sensitive computer data such as printouts, tapes and 
disks ? 
Q Shred Q Green Bag Q General waste 
Q Other, please state 
Computer system security 
19. Do you know of anyone who has breached the computer system 
security ?Q Yes 13 No 
20. Do you know of anyone who has taken information off the system that they 
should not have ?Q Yes Q No 
If yes how ?Q Disk Q Print 
21. Are you aware of any controls to stop people deleting or changing 
information they should not ?Q Yes Q No 
22. Have you ever left your workstation / terminal logged on and unsupervised ? 
Q Yes Q No 
23. Have you ever used a workstation / terminal when logged in on someone 
else's password ? 11 Yes 
O No 
24. Do you legitimately share a group password ?Q Yes 
Q No 
25. Other than for legitimate purposes 
(a) Does anyone else know your password ?Q Yes 
Q No 
(b) Do you know other peoples passwords ?Q Yes 
Q No 
26. Could someone guess your password (e. g. is it related to your name, car, 
hobbies, or a dictionary word) ?Q Yes 
Q No 
27. Have you ever kept a written record of your password ? Q Yes Q No 
28. Do you have to change your password ?Q 
Yes Q No 
If yes, how often? Every days 
29. How often do you feel is a reasonable length of time between password 
changes? Every days. 
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Personnel issues 
30. Do you know of any clauses in your contract of employment regarding the 
security and use of information ?0 Yes 0 No 
31. Do you know if the data protection act applies to you or information that 
you use ? 11 Yes C0 No 
32. Does any local information system security documentation exist in your 
Hospital ?Q Yes Q No 
If no, is there a formal information system security document for users. 
Q Yes Q No 
33. Are you held personally responsible for certain data ? (i. e. are you the data 
owner) Q Yes Q No 
34. Do you promote information system security to your subordinates? 
Cl Yes n No 
35. Does your department ever review the security process in order to improve 
information system security ?Q Yes E No 
36. Have you been given information system security training ? 
© Yes 13 No 
If yes, by whom 
37. Are you given regular security awareness information ? QYes QNo 
If yes, by whom ? 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
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Appendix B: Security Guidelines, f or Existing Healthcare Systems 
The tables on the following pages present a comprehensive list of the AIM SEISMED 
guidelines for existing healthcare systems that were developed as part of this research 
programme and described in chapter 4. 
Each table corresponds to one of the ten protection principles that were identified and the 
titles of the underlying guidelines are listed in each case, along with an indication of their 
perceived applicability to the different categories of HCE staff - i. e. General (G), 
Management (M) and IT & Security Personnel (IS). 
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ESP0100 Security Policy & Administration G M IS 
ESGO101 Security policy document 
ESGO102 Security co-ordination 
ESGO103 Allocation of responsibility 
ESGO104 Information security advice 
ESGO 105 Management planning 
ESP0200 Physical & Environmental Security G M IS 
ESG0201 Physical security perimeters 4 
ESG0202 Physical access controls 
ESG0203 Procedural access controls 
ESG0204 Sensitive areas 
ESG0205 Location of equipment & assets 
ESG0206 Asset inventory ýj 
ESG0207 Movement & removal of HCE property 
ESG0208 Equipment security of site ýf 
ESG0209 Theft & damage prevention ,S 
ESG0210 Locks & code combinations 
ESG0211 Equipment procurement & maintenance 
ESG0212 Equipment disposal 
ESG0213 Clear desk policy 
ESG0214 Security of unattended entrances 
ESG0215 Protection of cabling 
ESG0216 Protection from fire 
ESG0217 Fire safety awareness 
ESG0218 Protection from water damage 
ESG0219 Lightning protection 
ESG0220 Power supply 
ESG0221 Air conditioning 
ESG0222 Safety inspections 
ESP0300 Disaster Nanning & Recovery G M IS 
ESG0301 Continuity planning 
ESG0302 Continuity plan development 
ESG0303 Continuity plan testing 
ESG0304 Continuity plan review & update 
ESG0305 Fallback procedures 
ESG0306 Post-disaster access control 
ESG0307 Public relations procedures 
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ESP0400 Personnel Security G M IS 
ESG0401 Recruitment procedures 
ESG0402 Confidentiality agreement 
ESG0403 Job practices 
ESG0404 Staff appraisal 
ESG0405 Trusted personnel 
ESG0406 Employment termination 
ESG0407 Use of external personnel 
ESG0408 Security variance reporting ,ý ý{ ,f 
ESPO500 Training & Awareness G M IS 
ESGO501 Job training 
ESGO502 Use of systems & applications 
ESC0503 HCE training programmes 
ESG0504 Specialist training courses -i 
ESG0505 Awareness of specific issues 
ESG0506 Training responsibilities 
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ESP0600 Information Technology Facilities Management G M s 
System Planning & Control 
ESG0601 Configuration management 
ESG0602 Operational change control 
ESG0603 Capacity planning 
ESG0604 External management of facilities 
ESG0605 Testing of security features 
ESG0606 Consistent security measures 
Back-up 
ESG0607 Back-up procedure 
ESG0608 Back-up retention & storage 
ESG0609 Back-up administration 
ESG0610 Recovery from back-up 
Media Controls 
ESG0611 Inspection of media sent and received 
ESG0612 Handling sensitive media 
ESG0613 Security classification labelling 
ESG0614 Control of removable media 
ESG0615 Security of media in transit 
ESG0616 Media disposal 
Auditing & System Monitoring 
ESG0617 Mandatory auditing of activity 
ESG0618 Audit trail inspection 
ESG0619 Restricted audit trail access 
ESG0620 Operator log maintenance 
ESG0621 Security variance management 
Virus Controls 
ESG0622 Anti-virus policy 
ESG0623 Virus prevention 
ESG0624 Virus detection 
ESG0625 Virus containment 
ESG0626 Virus recovery 
ESG0627 Virus awareness 
Documentation 
ESG0628 Documentation availability 
ESG0629 Documented operating procedures 
ESG0630 Documentation of operating system features 
ESG0631 Security of system documentation 
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ESP0700 Authentication & Access Control G M IS 
ESG0701 User identification 
ESG0702 User authentication 
ESG0703 Secure login procedure 
ESG0704 Suppression of information 
ESG0705 Account integrity messages 
ESG0706 Passwords 
ESG0707 Password secrecy 
ESG0708 Password selection 
ESG0709 Password monitoring 
ESG0710 Password changes 
ESG0711 Password issuing 
ESG0712 Encrypted password storage 
ESG0713 System management authentication 
ESG0714 Least privilege operation 
ESG0715 Documented access control policy 
ESG0716 Object access restrictions 
ESG0717 Enforced access paths 
ESG0718 Unauthorised access attempts 
ESG0719 Resource usage limits 
ESG0720 Timed terminal lock-out 
ESG0721 Review of access rights 
ESG0722 Restriction of temporary staff access 
ESG0723 Restriction of third party access 
ESG0724 User-defined file protection 
ESG0725 Sensitive system isolation 
ESG0726 Control of system utilities 
ESG0727 Prohibition of compromised controls 
ESG0728 Implementation of manufacturer security patches 
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ESP0800 Database Security G M IS 
ESG0801 Demarcation 
ESGO802 New systems 
ESG0803 Operational versions 
ESG0804 Back up 
ESG0805 Change log 
ESG0806 Database software specifications 
ESG0807 Database software testing 
ESG0808 Database software maintenance 
ESG0809 Corrective maintenance 
ESGO810 Adaptive and enhancing maintenance 
ESG0811 Copies 
ESG0812 Scope of security 
ESG0813 Database security policy 
ESG0814 Database administration 
ESG081 S Access control 
ESG0816 People 
ESG0817 Education and awareness 
ESG0818 User authentication 
ESG0819 Auditability 
ESG0820 Inference control 
ESG0821 Database recovery 
ESP0900 System Maintenance G M IS 
ESG0901 Source program access control 
ESG0902 Controlled modification 
ESG0903 Changes to vendor software 
ESG0904 Testing and acceptance 
ESG0905 Review of operating system changes 
ESP1000 Legislation Compliance G M IS 
ESG1001 Data Protection legislation 
ESG1002 Information system misuse 
ESG1003 Copyright software 
ESG1004 HCE security policy 
ESG1005 Protection of business records ýi ýi 
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Appendix C: Data Mappings of Operational Healthcare Systems 
The following pages present a series of data mappings to further illustrate how the data 
requirements of genuine operational healthcare systems can be encompassed by the generic 
data model that was described in chapter 5. The systems shown are from HCEs in 
Plymouth and Thessaloniki who collaborated with the SEISMED project, and the following 
applications are represented : 
" Radiology (Plymouth); 
9 Mental Health (Plymouth); 
" Staffing (Thessaloniki); 
" Accounting (Thessaloniki); 
" Pharmacy (Thessaloniki); 
" Patient Administration (Thessaloniki). 
The data requirements of the Thessaloniki Patient Administration system can be contrasted 
with those of the Plymouth equivalent that was presented in chapter 5. 
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The following pages present details of the three text samples that were used in the 
experimental study of keystroke analysis described in chapter 8. These texts were used to 
provide : 
" the reference text; samples of which were used to create the user typing profiles; 
" the two test sample texts; samples of which were used to determine 
authentication thresholds for legitimate subjects and represent impostor typing 
attempts. 
In each case the full text passage is reproduced, along with an associated table listing the 
frequency of characters and character digraphs within it. This analysis is particularly 
relevant in the case of the reference text, as it shows the significant representation of the 
most common English language digraphs (which is important in relation to the issue of text 
composition that was discussed in section 8.3.3.1). 
All of the texts were taken from existing literature and the source is cited in each case. It 
should be noted the text composition criteria were only applied in the case of the reference 
text. The other texts were simply required to be of a sufficient length to allow a reasonable 
typing sample to be obtained (thus allowing somewhat more arbitrary selection). 
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Reference Text (2202 characters) 
DIFFERENT PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES IN THEIR QUEST FOR FITNESS. TO AN ATHLETE ITS 
SECONDS SHAVED OFF A MILE OR THAT EXTRA BURST OF SPEED IN THE LAST MINUTE OF THE GAME. 
TO A LAWYER ITS ALERTNESS AFTER HOURS OF HARD BARGAINNING. TO A HOUSEWIFE A DRESS 
TWO SIZES SMALLER OR MAYBE JUST THE SENSE OF ABUNDANT WELL BEING THE POSITIVE 
OUTLOOK AND REGAINED YOUTHFULNESS THAT COMES FROM BEING REALLY FIT. NO MATTER 
WHAT YOUR PARTICULAR EXERCISE AIM MAY BE THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO ACHIEVE IT 
SAFELY. AFTER ALL YOU WANT TO GAIN YOUR HEALTH NOT LOSE IT. THATS WHY A THOROUGH 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION SHOULD BE THE VERY FIRST STEP ON YOUR ROAD TO FITNESS. 
EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH AN EXAMINATION IS THE FOLLOWING TRAGIC INCIDENT. 
ON JULY 22 A LEADING WEST COAST NEWSPAPER EXPLODED A BANNER HEADLINE : TWO MORE 
JOGGERS ! OTHER NEWSPAPERS ACROSS THE COUNTRY PICKED UP THE STORY. OCCURRING 
SHORTLY AFTER A WAVE OF ENTHUSIASM HAD MADE JOGGING SOMETHING OF A NATIONWIDE 
SPORT THE TRAGEDY SUDDENLY FOCUSED NATIONAL CONCERN ON THE PROBLEM OF SAFETY IN 
EXERCISE. MY PHONE RANG ALMOST CONSTANTLY. PHYSICIANS AND LAW PEOPLE ALIKE WERE 
ANXIOUSLY ASKING UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS EXERCISE MIGHT BE DANGEROUS AND PROMINENT 
DOCTORS WERE WONDERING OUT LOUD IN NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES WHETHER PERHAPS THE 
IDEA OF EXERCISE HAD BEEN OVERSOLD TO THE PUBLIC. IN RESPONSE TO THIS WIDESPREAD 
CONCERN I DECIDED TO INVESTIGATE MORE CLOSELY THE CASE OF THE TWO JOGGERS WHO HAD 
SUFFERED FATAL HEART ATTACKS DURING THE EXERCISE. BOTH IT TURNED OUT HAD SEVERE 
HEART DISEASE AND ONE OF THEM HAD BEEN TOLD BY A PROMINENT WEST COAST PHYSICIAN THAT 
HE SHOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ENGAGE IN VIGOROUS EXERCISE. YET CONTRARY TO 
MEDICAL ADVICE THE MAN STARTING JOGGING AT A STRENUOUS RATE MISTAKENING BELIEVING 
THAT THIS WOULD HELP HIM OVERCOME HIS HEART CONDITION MORE QUICKLY. INSTEAD JOGGING 
AT A HARD PACE STRAINED HIS WEAK HEART BEYOND ITS LIMITS. THE ONE GOOD THING GROWING 
OUT OF THIS TRAGEDY WAS THE REALIZATION ON THE PART OF PHYSICIANS THAT ANYONE 
ENTERING AN EXERCISE OR PHYSICAL CONDITIONING PROGRAM SHOULD HAVE A MEDICAL CHECK 
UP BEFORE STARTING. SO BEFORE YOU EMBARK ON ANY EXERCISE PROGRAM GET YOUR DOCTORS 
APPROVAL. 
Source : "The New Aerobics" by K. H. Cooper, M. D. 1970 (reprinted in "Cryptography -A Primer", 
A. G. Konheim, John Wiley & Sons: 69). 
Sample Text 1 (574 characters) 
JIM GARRISON SERVED AS DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF NEW ORLEANS FOR TWELVE YEARS. THREE 
YEARS AFTER PRESIDENT KENNEDYS MURDER IN DALLAS IN NOVEMBER NINETEEN SIXTY THREE HE 
HEADED THE INTENSIVE INQUIRY THAT YIELDED THE ONLY CRIMINAL PROSECUTION EVER 
BROUGHT IN THE KENNEDY CASE. IT WAS THE BEGINNING OF A RELENTLESS SEARCH FOR THE 
TRUTH, A TRUTH SO SHOCKING THAT MANY PEOPLE WILL BE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT IT. IT IS A 
HARROWING ACCOUNT OF HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA SPENT TWENTY FIVE 
YEARS TRYING TO GET THE WORLD TO BELEIVE A FAIRY TALE AND HOW THEY VERY NEARLY 
SUCCEEDED 
Source : Publicity material for "On the trail of the Assassins" by Jim Garrison (Penguin Books 1992). 
Sample Text 2 (389 characters) 
FOUR OUT OF FIVE ORGANISATIONS ARE NOW BEING HIT BY IT SECURITY BREACHES WHICH COST 
BUSINESS 1.2 BILLION A YEAR. THE STATISTICS COME FROM A NEW SURVEY BY THE DEPARTMENT 
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, ICL AND THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTRE. THE LOSSES ARE UP ON A 
SMLAR SURVEY TWO YEARS AGO. IT SHOWS THAT FIRE WAS THE MOST FEARED IT SECURITY 
THREAT, WITh EQUIPMENT FAILURE THE COMMONEST PROBLEM. 
Source : "IT security breaches hit 80% of UK firms", Computer Weekly, 14 April 1994: 
1. 
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Reference Text 
Rank Unigraph Freq. Digraph Freq. 
1 368 E 70 
2 E 223 T 53 
3 T 162 TH 43 
4 A 151 IN 43 
5 0 147 A 42 
6 N 130 T 42 
7 1 129 ER 40 
8 S 121 S 37 
9 R 113 HE 35 
10 H 88 D 34 
11 D 67 O 33 
12 L 57 ON 28 
13 C 57 NG 26 
14 G 54 S 25 
15 U 48 N 25 
16 P 43 AN 24 
17 M 41 OU 24 
18 F 39 H 22 
19 Y 38 ST 22 
20 W 29 G 22 
21 B 22 R 22 
22 V 16 I 21 
23 X 13 AT 21 
24 K 10 HA 20 
25 J 8 SE 20 
26 Z 4 P 20 
27 2 NE 19 
28 RE 18 
29 OR 18 
30 E 17 
31 M 17 
32 IS 17 
33 W 17 
34 O 17 
35 Y 17 
36 B 16 
37 ES 16 
38 C 15 
39 AL 15 
40 A 15 
41 EA 14 
42 ED 14 
43 ND 14 
44 OF 14 
45 CI 14 
46 TI 14 
47 EN 14 
48 TO 14 
49 AR 14 
50 IT 14 
51 F 14 
52 Ic 13 
53 CO 13 
54 RO 13 
55 NT 13 
56 RT 13 
57 AD 12 
58 BE 12 
59 DE 12 
60 VE 12 
61 EX 12 
62 TE 11 
63 BA 10 
64 RC 10 
65 HI 10 
66 RS 10 
67 TA 9 
68 F 9 
69 DI 9 
70 MI 9 
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Sample Text I 
Rank Unigraph Freq. Digraph Freq. 
1 97 T 22 
2 E 73 E 18 
3 T 47 TH 15 
4 N 41 IN 13 
5 R 36 T 12 
6 I 35 A 11 
7 A 33 HE 11 
8 0 25 Y 11 
9 S 24 VE 9 
10 H 23 I 9 
11 L 18 EN 9 
12 Y 17 S 9 
13 D 17 ED 8 
14 C 13 ER 8 
15 W 10 EA 7 
16 G 10 AR 7 
17 V 9 S 7 
18 U 9 NT 7 
19 M 8 N 7 
20 F 8 LE 6 
21 P 6 NE 6 
22 B 5 D 6 
23 K 3 R 6 
24 X 1 DE 5 
25 1 NG 5 
26 3 1 H 5 
27 AN 5 
28 O 5 
29 OR 5 
30 A 5 
31 G 5 
32 B 4 
33 BE 4 
34 EE 4 
35 RE 4 
36 SE 4 
37 F 4 
38 RI 4 
39 EL 4 
40 N 4 
41 TO 4 
42 TR 4 
43 AS 4 
44 RY 4 
45 Y 4 
46 O 4 
47 HA 3 
48 CC 3 
49 ME 3 
50 TE 3 
51 YE 3 
52 OF 3 
53 G 3 
54 SI 3 
55 WI 3 
56 AL 3 
57 LL 3 
58 RL 3 
59 M 3 
60 NN 3 
61 ON 3 
62 HO 3 
63 RO 3 
64 P 3 
65 15 3 
66 RS 3 
67 AT 3 
68 IT 3 
69 UT 3 
70 IV 3 
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Sample Text 2 
Rank Unigraph Freq. Digraph Freq. 
1 69 E 13 
2 E 37 T 11 
3 T 34 T 10 
4 S 25 TH 9 
5 I 25 A 8 
6 A 24 RE 8 
7 R 23 S 8 
8 0 22 HE 7 
9 N 17 AR 7 
10 H 14 S 7 
11 U 12 IT 7 
12 C 11 B 6 
13 M 10 UR 6 
14 Y 9 ST 6 
15 L 8 Y 6 
16 F 8 EA 5 
17 W 7 C 5 
18 B 7 F 5 
19 D 6 I 5 
20 P 5 ON 5 
21 Y 3 O 5 
22 G 3 AT 5 
23 1 TI 4 
24 OM 4 
25 Co 4 
26 ES 4 
27 IC 3 
28 ND 3 
29 ME 3 
30 NE 3 
31 SE 3 
32 VE 3 
33 IL 3 
34 AN 3 
35 EN 3 
36 IN 3 
37 N 3 
38 10 3 
39 TR 3 
40 OS 3 
41 NT 3 
42 W 3 
43 A 3 
44 D 3 
45 R 3 
46 NA 2 
47 EC 2 
48 DE 2 
49 YE 2 
50 OF 2 
51 CH 2 
52 Fl 2 
53 HI 2 
54 RI 2 
55 SI 2 
56 MO 2 
57 RO 2 
58 IS 2 
59 SS 2 
60 US 2 
61 UT 2 
62 CU 2 
63 OU 2 
64 SU 2 
65 RV 2 
66 OW 2 
67 BY 2 
68 EY 2 
69 TY 2 
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Appendix E: IMS Demonstrator module descriptions and source listings 
The IMS Demonstrator system was developed using Borland Turbo C for DOS (version 
3.0), running on an IBM PC-compatible system. 
A summary of the various code modules involved is presented in the table overleaf. In each 
case the title of the module is given, along with an indication of its type (normally an 
executable program or a function / code library) and a brief description. The majority of the 
descriptions are taken from directly from the module headers. 
The full source code for each of these modules is provided on the accompanying diskette 
that is bound with the thesis. 
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Appendix E: S Demonstrator module descriptions and source listings 
Module Type Description 
MENU Executable The IMS menu system. Specifies each of the user menus 
and also includes code for the various checklists and 
configuration options found in the system. Creates default 
IMS configuration file if one does not already exist. All 
other modules associated with the Host side of the 
demonstrators functionality are called from this module. 
CLIENT Executable Keystroke monitoring and authentication module for IMS. 
Runs on local PC as Terminate Stay Resident (TSR) code. 
Keystroke timings transmitted to remote SMC for analysis. 
Collects current system configuration data, performs virus 
scan and accepts user id and password (validated by IMS 
Host) before entering TSR state. Sends regular signal to 
Host whilst operational to it to detect when Client system is 
reset. 
HOST Executable IMS Host monitoring / authentication module. Monitors 
keystrokes from IMS client and compares to profile. 
Profile comparison performed dynamically in real-time. 
Plots real-time graph of test subject performance. Client 
system configuration audit, virus scan and user 
authentication performed before monitoring session begins. 
Can detect reset of Client system and restart monitoring. 
MOM SET 
r 
Executable Allows update of monitor configuration settings (settings 
used by HOST). 
PROF SET Executable Allows update of profiler configuration settings (settings 
used by REG USER). 
REG USER Executable User profiling / registration module. Calculates & stores 
keystroke characteristics of named users. Also stores 
password and question / answer for use in logins and 
authentication challenges. Filters out high & low 10% of 
sample times for digraphs if standard deviation of times 
exceeds the mean. Reports profiling statistics and typist 
classification to a file. Automatically detects end of sample 
input & disables RETURN. 
VIEWUSER Executable Allows inspection of the IMS profile database. 
TESTPROF Executable Obtains test samples from profiled users in order to 
determine user-specific authentication thresholds. Profiles 
are then updated with the new values. 
UPD USER Executable Allows update of user record in IMS profile database. Can 
modify password, challenge data and authentication 
thresholds. 
DEL USER Executable Allows deletion of user record from IMS profile database. 
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Module Type Description (cont. ) 
(cont. ) (cont. ) 
SET_TEXT Executable Accept text pattern for use in user profiling or test 
sampling. Statistical analysis of unigraph and digraph 
frequencies stored in a report file. 
TEXTEDIT Executable Allows an existing IMS text to be edited (using DOS 
EDIT). This option is intended to allow a means of 
correcting typing errors etc from the original text entry as 
opposed to a too] for making major changes. 
TEXTANAL Executable Standalone text analyser to allow existing text files to be 
assessed for suitability for IMS usage. 
Statistical analysis of unigraph and digraph frequencies 
stored in a report file. 
VIEW_LOG Executable Allows inspection of the IMS audit log. Includes limited 
search facility based on date field. 
IMS HEAD Header Common definitions required by other IMS modules. This 




Library General functions called by other IMS modules. Whilst 
originally developed for use in IMS, these functions might 
also be usefully employed in other applications. Examples 
include routines for direct video output, character code 
conversion and menu display. 
IMSINCL2 Library Common routines for inclusion in other modules 
(conceptually distinct from IMS_ FUNC in that the routines 
are all IMS-s, ecific . 
IMS GRPH Library Graph routines used by the IMS demonstrator. These are 
_ also coded in an IMS-specific manner, and are separated 
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During the course of this research the author has contributed to eight published papers, as 
detailed below. 
1. Sanders, P. and Furnell, S. 1993. "Data Security in Medical Information Systems 
using a Generic Model", In Proceedings of MIE `93 - 1I th International Congress of 
the European Federation for Medical Informatics (Jerusalem, Israel, Apr. 18-22): 
410-414. 
2. Furnell, S. M.; Gaunt, P. N.; Pangalos, G.; Sanders, P. W.; and Warren, M. J. 1994. "A 
Generic Methodology for Health Care Data Security", In Medical Informatics 19, no. 
3: 229-245. 
3. Furnell, S. M.; Sanders, P. W.; and Stockel, C. T. 1994. "An Expert System for Health 
Care Data Security :A Conceptual Outline", In Proceedings of 11TNESMED `94 - 
International Conference on Neural Networks & Expert Systems in Medicine and 
Healthcare (Plymouth, UK, Aug. 23-26): 346-352. 
4. Furnell, S. M.; Sanders, P. W.; and Stockel, C. T. 1995. "The use of Keystroke Analysis 
for Continuous User Identity Verification and Supervision", In Proceedings of 
MEDIACO 95 - International Conference on 
Multimedia Communications 
(Southampton, UK, Apr. 11-12): 189-193. 
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5. Furnell, S. M.; Salmons, N. J.; Sanders, P. W.; Stockel, C. T.; and Warren, M. J. 1995. 
"Secure Multimedia Systems in Healthcare and Medicine", In Proceedings of 
1'VIEDIACIMM 95 - International Conference on Multimedia Communications, 
(Southampton, UK, Apr. 11-12): 103-107. 
6. Furnell, S. M. and Sanders, P. V. 1995. "Security Management in the Healthcare 
Environment", To be presented at MEDINFO `95 - 8th World Congress on Medical 
Informatics (Vancouver, Canada, July 23-27). 
7. Furnell, S. M.; Sanders, P. W.; and Stockel, C. T. 1995. "The use of Simulation in 
Computer-based Security Systems", To be presented at SCSC `95 - 1995 Summer 
Computer Simulation Conference (Ottawa, Canada, July 24-26). 
8. Salmons, N. J.; Furnell, S. M.; Sanders, P. W.; and Stockel, C. T. 1995. "Simulation of 
a multimedia patient records system", To be presented at SCSC `95 - 1995 Summer 
Computer Simulation Conference (Ottawa, Canada, July 24-26). 
In addition, two further papers have been written relating to the security guidelines 
for 
existing healthcare systems that were developed for the SEISMED project and described in 
chapter 4: 
" Furnell, S. M.; Sanders, P. W.; and warren, MI "Development of 
Security Guidelines 
for Existing Healthcare Systems". Submitted to Medical Informatics for publication 
in 1995. 
410 
Appendix F: List of f Publications 
0 Furnell, S. M. and Sanders, P. W. "The SEISMED Guidelines for Host Systems 
Security". To appear in an IOS publication presenting the proceedings of the 
SEISMED workshop "Security and Legal Aspects of Advanced Telematics Systems" 
(Brussels, Belgium, 11 July 1994). 
Copies of each of these papers are bound within this appendix of the thesis. 
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Data security in medical information systems using a generic model 
P. Sanders and S. Furnell 
University of Plymouth, Plymouth, U. K 
Abstract 
The content of this paper is based upon work currently being carried out as part of the Commission of European 
Communities SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in MEDicine) projem the aim of which is to 
provide recommendations on security for existing systems in European Health Care Establishments (HCEs). 
1. Introduction 
The need for adequate data security in the 
medical environment is obvious, given that the 
maintenance of patient confidentiality and safety are 
of paramount importance to retaining a relationship 
of trust between patients and the HCE. In addition, 
the transition to the purchaser-provider system of 
funding now present in parts of the European 
Community means that more traditional business- 
type data also require protection. 
A number of methods of protection may be 
suitable for adoption in the medical field, ranging 
from technical measures (achieved either via 
software or hardware) on the systems themselves to 
procedures implemented across the HCE [1]. In 
broad terms the methods fall into 3 main categories, 
as below: 
- External control mechanisms 
Safeguards against fire, flood, theft, 
equipment or power failure and such like. 
Emphasis of security through staff awareness 
programmes. 
- User interface control mechanisms 
Provision of authentication / access control 
features (e. g. the use of passwords, tokens, 
and related issues). 
- Internal control mechanisms 
Including such concepts as data encryption, 
virus prevention, system auditing. 
These general ideas have been explored in detail 
in previous publications in a piecemeal approach. 
What is now required is a set of guidelines on where, 
what and how to put security into HCE systems in 
general. It would then be possible for individual 
system administrators to select solutions appropriate 
for their own particular arrangements. 
The provision of security for medical data on a 
large scale is a complex issue, given that a myriad of 
different computer systems (in terms of hardware, 
networking and actual applications) may be 
identified within a single country, let alone in the full 
European scenario. The issue is further complicated 
by the variety of information that may be held, and 
the fact that several different levels of sensitivity 
may exist. As the desired protection will depend 
upon the risks associated with the information, it is 
impossible to assert a single level of security that 
will be appropriate for all data. 
In order to address these problems there is a 
requirement for a flexible system which is able to 
integrate security into the multiple networks and 
databases' in an open systems type environment. In 
addition, a method is needed to simplify the 
identification of security requirements for individual 
systems. 
2. Method of implementation 
In consultation with a number of Health Care 
Establishments (HCEs) within Europe, the general 
care activities carried out by hospitals, general 
practitioners, community health care centres, and 
various other support services have been examined. 
This has enabled a generic model of the medical 
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Fig. 1: General patient care activity 
environment to be produced that can be used as the 
basis for further investigation [2]. 
The analysis established that, at a high level, all 
medical environments are of a similar nature (i. e. 
their aim is to provide a very similar set of services, 
albeit in slightly different ways, with differing levels 
of sophistication). The activities involved in the 
provision of health care can be seen to fall into the 
basic sequence of operations shown in Fig. 1. 
At each stage of this sequence a variety of 
patient care or administration data may be generated 
or utilised from existing knowledge (i. e. medical or 
organisational). The type and quantity of information 
involved will be dependant upon the problems and 
requirements of the individual patients. In addition, 
the support services that surround the main care 
activities may also produce or use further data of 
their own. 
This information may be of varying levels of 
sensitivity, and this will again be highly dependent 
upon the cases involved. Data relating to the clinical 
side of care delivery may be considered to fall into 
four main classifications in terms of sensitivity: 
Operational: 
Information used directly to make / govern 
patient care decisions. Can be subdivided into: 
- General (the vast majority of patients) 
" Special (e. g. HCE staff or special 
groups in the community) 
- Sensitive (e. g. patients with sensitive 
problems such as AIDS or psychological 
disorders). 
Non-Operational : 
Information that does not directly govern 
patient decisions but is used for planning and 
resourcing purposes (e. g. analysis of 
workloads). 
An overall view of the data involved is given by 
grouping them into the categories shown in Fig. 2. 
Obviously the categories shown are of a 
(necessarily) broad nature, but they may be broken 
down into further levels of detail as required. For 
example: 
Patient Care 
This group would contain the medical history, 
diagnosis, care decisions and treatment information 
that relate to individual patients. Data examples 
could be: 
Episode Information Specific needs 
Dates of admissions / discharges Health cue delivered 
Staff involved Drug therapy 
Diagnosis including clinical coding/s Outcome of the treatment 
Care plan Consultant and 
anaesthetist reports 
The above groups now provide a generic 
framework encompassing all data required by a 
HCE. Specific medical applications may utilise 
information from all of the data groups, or simply a 
subset of them. It is consequently possible to map 
such applications onto the model, indicating the data 
groups that are involved. This can be used to 
highlight any weaknesses in the systems, and hence 
suggest the security services that may be required. 
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Fig. 3 shows how the Patient Administration System 
(PAS), as used by the Plymouth Health Authority, 
can be incorporated into such an arrangement. 
At this stage the risks or threats that may be 
associated with each type of data in the system may 
be considered in terms of the core elements of 
security: disclosure of the information to either HCE 
staff or outsiders (confidentiality), denial of access to 
the information over various periods (availability) 
and modification or destruction of data (integrity) 
and user authentification. Several categories of risk 
can be identified, all of which must be considered in 
order to determine how serious their impact would 
be in each case: 
- Commercial confidentiality 
- Disruption - Legal 
- Embarrassment - Personal privacy 
- Financial Loss - Safety 
For example, the disclosure of sensitive patient care 
information to HCE outsiders could be seen as a 
serious risk in terms of legal action, patient personal 
privacy and embarrassment to both the patient and 
the HCE. 




Patient ruuvr n Administration Identification (General) 
(General) Waiting «, Wo Theaka mpml 
Demopaphfo Wamdlon ward and sod mgml 
Transpod roqukertmsnt$ 
Referral 0. fdls 
Discharge D. I. W. 
PAS 
wie 









Payroll Hospital supplies 
I 
Mvaemp Cd. An P«saewl P 
lo 



















Fig. 3: Plymouth PAS mapping 
measures that should be incorporated into a system. 
For example, in the cases of Embarrassment and 
Safety the following security services are suggested: 
Embarrassment: 
This requires a low to medium confidentiality 
service to be provided. In a low level system, 
standard password authentification with access 
limitation may be appropariate. For medium 
confidentiality the addition of card 
identification and audit may be more practical. 
Safety: 
This is the most important aspect from the 
patient care viewpoint, and warrants the highest 
possible levels of integrity as well as a strong 
backup source. Use of check codes and 
encryption, as well as full auditing and a high 
level of user authentication seems necessary. 
A practical method of realising these security 
services in existing or new systems is to incorporate 
them as an add-on service. The use of a 
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Comprehensive Integrated Security System (CISS) 
overlay arrangement implemented in a modular 
fashion would allow the provision of a full range of 
services / mechanisms to users and applications [3]. 
The security requirements of a range of systems 
could be catered for by appropriate combinations of 
the generalised modules, thus allowing sufficient 
flexibility to suit different computing environments. 
The development of the CISS on a standardised 
architecture, such as the ISO OSI (Open Systems 
Interconnection) model, would in turn facilitate 
integration between different security domains. 
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Abstract. The aim is to outline the framework of a generic methodology for specifying 
countermeasures in health care environments. The method is specifically aimed at the 
enhancement of security in existing health care systems, and a key element is the use of 
predetermined `profiles' by which these may be classified. Example scenarios are presented 
to illustrate how the concept could be applied in practice. The paper is based upon work 
that was initially carried out as part of the Commission of European Communities 
SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in MEDicine) project, the aim 
of which is to provide security recommendations for European health care establishments 
(HCEs). 
Keywords: Risk analysis; System profiling. 
1. Introduction 
During the past few decades the use of information technology (IT) has become 
more widespread in all areas of society, and the types of activities that it performs 
or supports have become increasingly more important. As a result, information 
systems are now heavily utilized by all levels of staff, and relied upon to the extent 
that it would be difficult to manage without them. 
The health care field has been no exception to the trend, as witnessed by the wide 
variety of applications that now handle many types of health data (1]. These systems 
contain vast amounts of information, much of it relating to individuals and of a 
sensitive nature. In addition to direct care applications, some parts of the European 
Community are now making the transition to a purchaser-provider funding system, 
meaning that an increasing volume of traditional business type data must also be 
maintained. 
The combination of these points serves to make the protection of health 
information systems a vital concern, and necessitates that security is now considered 
as an essential aspect of the information technology field. 
At a high level, information security is defined as being the combination of the 
following key factors (2): 
(1) Confidentiality. This refers to the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of 
information. All access to data must be restricted to authorized users who 
have a legitimate `need to know'. Confidentiality is fundamental in health 
care since certain categories of data may be of a particularly sensitive nature, 
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and disclosure could result in significant embarrassment or prejudice to the 
individual concerned. 
(2) Integrity. The prevention of unauthorized modification of information. 
There is a requirement to be able to trust the system and be confident that 
the same information can be retrieved as was originally entered. For example, 
the accidental or deliberate alteration of patient-related data could have 
serious implications for care delivery. 
(3) Availability. Data and systems should be accessible and usable (by 
authorized users) when and where they are required. This requirement 
necessitates both prevention of the unauthorized withholding of information 
or resources, and adequate safeguards against system failure. In some 
medical environments, for example, critical systems may be required to be 
in operation 24 ha day, 7 days a week. 
Security breaches may result from a variety of accidental or deliberate acts, with 
potential threats being posed by outsiders and from staff within the organization. 
Deliberate acts may include activities such as fraud, theft, hacking and virus 
infection. The health care field has certainly not been immune to these threats, with 
the most recent UK survey [3] showing that 10% of reported security incidents were 
related to health care systems (with roughly an even split between the above 
categories). 
The introduction of information security seeks to eliminate or, more realistically, 
reduce the vulnerability to any risks that may be present. Protection must encompass 
the computer system and everything associated with it (e. g. from the computer unit 
itself to the building in which it is housed). Most important, however, is the 
protection of the information stored in the systems. These goals may be realized via 
a variety of measures (4], of both a technical and non-technical nature (e. g. physical, 
personnel and administrative controls). 
In a health care establishment (HCE), any part of the computing system could 
provide the basis for a security breach, and this multiplicity of targets makes medical 
si security a difficult issue. Large-scale 
introduction is complicated by the myriad of 
different system configurations (in terms of hardware, networking and actual 
applications) that may be identified within a single country, let alone within the full 
European scenario [5). The issue is further complicated by the variety of information 
that may be held, and the fact that several different levels of data sensitivity may exist. 
The desired protection will depend upon several factors including the computer 
configuration, the operational environment and the information itself. As such it is 
impossible to assert a single level of security that will be appropriate for all cases 
without it being excessive in some applications. 
Introducing security is a balancing process between providing the desirable level 
of protection against the maintenance of an adequate level of availability and 
performance (so that legitimate users have easy access to the data). Specifying the 
level of security that should be included involves some judgement about the dangers 
associated with the system, the required level of availability and the resource 
implications of various means of avoiding or minimizing those dangers. 
Guidelines are therefore required on the selection of appropriate security 
measures, as well as on where and how to put them into HCE systems in general. 
The commonly accepted means of achieving this is to conduct a risk analysis 
investigation. However, this can be a time-consuming and costly proposition, and 
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may consequently be prohibitive in many cases. It would obviously be undesirable 
for security to be overlooked when this occurs. Given that many of the threats and 
vulnerabilities of individual HCEs are not unique, a full risk analysis in each case 
may also be largely unnecessary. 
This paper proposes the framework of a methodology that is able to simplify the 
identification of security requirements for individual systems. This provides a 
straightforward means by which system administrators/security officers can select 
solutions appropriate for their own particular arrangements. 
2. A conceptual overview of the generic methodology 
Security should be examined from the perspective of the whole system, with all 
factors that influence protection requirements being considered. In general terms the 
security-relevant elements of existing systems are characterized as follows: 
Information system = Computer configuration + Operational environment 
+ Data sensitivity 
These elements have been incorporated into the framework of a system protection 
methodology as shown in figure 1. This illustrates (at a high level) the steps involved 
in profiling existing systems to determine their requirements and select appropriate 
countermeasures. 
The rationale of the methodology is that similar organizations/systems will have 
similar security requirements and a key factor in the approach was to devise a number 
of predetermined security 'profiles' for each element of existing systems. What the 
methodology proposes is a 'mix-and-match' approach to countermeasure selection, 
based upon a comparison of existing systems against general profiles. Using 
appropriate combinations it is possible, at a high level, to generate existing system 
profiles/categorizations that could then account for the majority of health care IT 
scenarios. From these it should be feasible to specify appropriate protection 
measures to meet the security requirements in each case. 
The main elements of the methodology are now considered in more detail. wk el-'ý 
2.1. Computer configuration 
This refers to the IT assets (both hardware and software) of the organization. 
At a high level it is possible to identify a relatively small number of elements which 
may be included in any given computer configuration, as shown in figure 2. 
Individual systems would be considered to determine which elements are applicable, 
and countermeasures selected accordingly. Examples of associated baseline 
countermeasures have been identified for each configuration, and are grouped as 
shown in table 1. 
2.2. Operational environment 
This considers the nature of the environment in which the IT assets are actually 
located and used, which may also affect the type and level of protection that is 
required. Table 2 indicates the main environmental considerations that may have 
security bearing. Appropriate combinations of these factors can be used to describe 
the majority of health care establishments (i. e. from GPs to general hospitals). 
Again. appropriate baseline countermeasures can be specified for each type of 
environment, and the key issues are indicated in table 3. 













Figure 1. Existing system protection methodology overview. 
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Figure 2. Computer configuration groups. 
Table 1. Computer configuration countermeasure categories. 
"ixti, .ý 
Category Example issues 
Physical Physical access, theft prevention 
Disaster planning Maintenance contracts, alternative systems, backup arrangements 
System Authentication, logical access controls 
Procedural Backup/recovery policy, software usage, hardcopy control 
Personnel Operational training, computer-related awareness 
2.3. Data sensitivity 
The sensitivity of data is determined by two major factors, as shown in 
figure 3. These factors, and the means of rating sensitivity, will now be considered 
in more detail. 
2.3.1. Data type. In consultation with a number of HCEs within Europe, the 
general care activities carried out by hospitals, general practitioners, community 
health care centres, and various other support services were examined. This enabled 
a generic model of medical data to be developed as the basis for further investigation 
[6]. The model is composed of 12 main data groups, as described in table 4. 
The purpose is to allow a simple means of specifying what data are available within 
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Table 2. Operational environment categories. 
Factor Options Comments 
Location Fixed/mobile Variable environment (e. g. portable 
computer system) limits environmental 
measures 
Rural/urban/city Local environment is an indicator of local 
population density, crime potential and 
likelihood of natural disasters 
Buildings Single/multiple Number of buildings will determine access 
control, site security requirements 
Old/modern Age of building may indicate risk of fire, 
natural damage, etc. 
People Number Number and mixture of people influences 
(low, medium, high) access controls and personnel-related 
measures 
Staff/contract/public 
Table 3. Operational environment countermeasure categories. 
Category Example issues 
Site security Building/site access, theft prevention 
Disaster planning Fire, flood, natural disasters 
Procedural Control of visitors, controls on smoking, eating/drinking 





Figure 3. Factors of data sensitivity. 
a system and help in the allocation of appropriate sensitivities, thus simplifying the 
process of identifying how and where data are located in different computer systems 
and networks. The information used by the HCE may be of varying levels of 
sensitivity, and this will again be highly dependent upon the cases involved. 
The models groups are of a (necessarily) broad nature, but they may be broken 
down into further levels of detail as required. For example: 
Patient care: Episode information, Dates of admissions/discharges, Staff 
involved, Diagnosis including clinical codings(s), Care plan, Specific needs, 
Health care delivered, Drug therapy, Outcome of the treatment. Consultants' 
and anaesthetists' reports. 
The model provides a generic framework that should encompass all data required 
by a HCE. Specific medical applications may store and communicate information 
from all of the data groups, or a particular subset of them. It is consequently possible 
to map such applications on to the model, indicating the data groups that are 
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Table 4. Generic data group descriptions. 
" ; #", 
4 
Data group Description 
Patient identification General information held regarding individual patients 
referred to the health care service. Often utilized by a 
number of different systems/applications 
Patient administration Information used in the day-to-day scheduling of various 
non-clinical care activities related to patients (i. e. 
concerned with the delivery of resources that in turn 
facilitate clinical care) 
Patient care Contains medical history, diagnosis, care decisions and 
treatment information relating to individual patients 
Clinical services Information related to the functioning of service 
departments of the HCE. Data are for the department's 
internal use (not patient-related) 
Finance Information covering all aspects of finance that are 
involved in the operation of HCEs 
Hotel services Information stored on all the basic 'housekeeping' 
functions of health care systems 
Staff Personnel information relating to all grades of HCE staff 
Resource management and planning Information used in the management, monitoring and 
planning of health care organizations 
Library and information services Encompasses the existing medical knowledge that is 
referenced by clinical staff, and national/local 
protocols for clinical management 
Expert systems Information utilized by decision support tools and/or 
neural networks within the HCE 
Communication services Identifies the process of communication within the lICE. 
Could contain a variety of additional data generated 
during organizational communication (e. g. activity 
requests, transaction information 
External systems Recognizes potential data relationships (interfaces) that 
may exist with other HCE applications/systems 
Table 5. General categories of medical data usage. 
Data use Description 
Operational clinical Planning, delivery and monitoring of health care 
Emergency care Provision of care in a clinical emergency, where optimal 
conditions/information cannot be guarantied 
Critical clinical Control of instrumentation/systems in direct feedback loops 
Expert systems Use in decision support tools or neural networks 
Operational non-clinical Supporting HCE infrastructure, but not directly influencing 
care of individuals 
Financial Contract management, purchasing and billing 
Planning and resource managment Aggregation of data for planning and review purposes 
Quality management Clinical audit, assessment of care efficiency and outcome 
Clinical research Identifiable or anonymized data used for research purposes: 
usually utilizes aggregated data 
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involved, and from this derive the basic sensitivity of the information. Examples of 
such mappings are given later in the text. 
2.3.2. Data use. Incorporating this factor of data sensitivity into the methodology 
demands that an appropriate range of general uses can be identified. Related work 
within the SEISMED project [7] has determined a high-level set of data uses that 
are appropriate for our purposes. A total of nine categories is considered, as described 
in table 5. 
2.3.3. Sensitivity ratings. Sensitivity is quantified in terms of several different 
types of impact that may relate to the data in the system. Four main types of impact 
can be identified, with appropriate countermeasures being given in each case. 
(1) Disclosure. Unauthorized disclosure of information to HCE staff or 
outsiders. 
(2) Denial. Denial of access to the information for varying periods. 
(3) Modification. Accidental or deliberate alteration of the information. 
(4) Destruction. Destruction of the system or information. An extreme form of 
unavailability. 
The type and use of the data will have different influences over the protection 
requirements in each of these cases. 
Disclosure. Data type is the most significant factor in determining the 
confidentiality requirement, as data will generally portray the same 
information in all contexts. The protection afforded should therefore remain 
constant regardless of which application uses it. However, data usage may still 
have some effect as it can influence problems arising through data aggregation. 
It is conceivable that, if certain data elements are combined, then the impact 
of disclosure may be greater than that of any one element in isolation. 
A&;.;; Denial, modification and destruction. The requirements for these are primarily '`ýr determined by the data usage, as the context will determine the seriousness of 
the impact. 
Impacts are rated low, medium or high (where low indicates that the baseline 
countermeasure level is satisfactory, and high is the maximum protection that 
can be provided). The level is determined by considering a number of 
potential influencing factors: (a) confidentality (both personal and commercial), 
(b) disruption, (c) embarrassment, (d) financial loss, (e) legal, (f) personal safety. 
For example, the disclosure of sensitive patient care information to HCE outsiders 
could be seen as a serious risk in terms of legal action, patient personal privacy and 
embarrassment to both the patient and the HCE. The level of impact will in turn 
determine the level of countermeasure. 
Medical opinion from within various European HCEs was sought in obtaining 
the impact valuations (using a small survey distributed to appropriate personnel). 
Nevertheless, it is recognized that, because of the inherent subjectivity in any 
judgements (based largely on individual roles and/or perceptions of the problems), 
the resulting figures represent 'reasonable' rather than 'correct' values (i. e. values 
which the majority of health care professionals would be prepared to accept as an 
adequate representation of the situation). 
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2.4. Other factors 
This element of the methodology highlights the fact that whilst the `appropriate 
countermeasures' suggested may be suitable when considering the existing system 
in isolation, a number of real-world factors are also likely to influence the final 
selection process. Such factors are principally considered to include the following: 
(1) Cost constraints. The cost of adopting particular countermeasures may be 
considered from several angles (e. g. financial, performance, practicality, 
etc. ). The acceptable levels will obviously be highly dependent upon 
individual environments and their priorities. Financial cost is perceived as 
being a particularly key factor in security-related decision-making for the 
majority of health care establishments. 
(2) Operational constraints. The selection of countermeasures will also be 
influenced by the nature of the organization itself. Any proposals must fit in 
with what is likely to be tolerated/accepted within the particular health care 
environment, and should not conflict too greatly with established practice. 
This relates to the `business culture' of the organization. 
(3) Existing countermeasures. Any security countermeasures that are already in 
place in relation to the existing system will obviously influence whether some 
of the suggested countermeasures need to be considered/adopted. 
These would obviously be very subjective elements in the application of the 
methodology, and it is not possible to formalize them further. 
2.5. Countermeasures 
Actual security countermeasures are identified and refined at various stages 
within the methodology, and it can be seen from figure 1 that they are categorized 
under three headings. These are distinguished as shown below. 
(1) Baseline countermeasures. Represents the minimal security considerations 
for a given computer configuration in a particular environment, and should 
be considered irrespective of the data held or the purpose(s) the system is 
used for. 
(2) Appropriate countermeasures. Represents the overall set of countermeasures 
that may be appropriate for a given system, considering what data are used 
and how, but not taking into account any practical constraints that may apply 
in respect to implementation. 
(3) Selected countermeasures. Represents the final output of the methodology, 
namely a set of countermeasures that may be added to the existing system 
to address the security requirements (having considered any imitations of the 
individual HCE). 
The countermeasures used with the methodology are derived from a representative 
set that are being developed for use within the SEISMED project [8]. 
3. Methodology implementation 
This section describes the specific steps by which the methodology would be 
implemented when considering individual existing systems. 
In order to apply the method the following factors would need to be identified 
for the specific system/application being considered: (a) computer configuration 
involved, (b) type of operational environment(s), (c) data groups involved, 
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Figure 4. Methodology implementation steps. 
(d) purpose of application (data use(s)). Countermeasures would then be derived as 
shown in figure 4. At each stage appropriate countermeasures would be selected from 
corresponding categories (NB: It is likely that some duplication may occur in terms 
of the countermeasures suggested within different categories). 
The stages of the methodology may be more formally described as follows: 
Stage 1: Determine basic system profile 
Input: none. 
Output: baseline countermeasures. 
Description: categorize computer configuration and operational environment of the 
existing system according to predetermined profile categories. For computer 
configuration choose appropriate elements from: (a) laptop/portable, (b) desktop 
PC, (c) mini/mainframe, (d) network. For operational environment categorize 
elements of: (a) location, (b) buildings, (c) people. 
Stage 2: Determine data sensitivity 
Input: none. 
Output: data-related countermeasures. 
Description: establish data types and uses. Select countermeasures based upon 
sensitivities encompassed. Choose appropriate levels from each of. (a) disclosure 
countermeasures, (b) denial countermeasures, (c) modification countermeasures, 
(d) destruction countermeasures. This stage is described in more detail below. 
Stage 3: Determine appropriate system countermeasures 
Input: baseline countermeasures, data-related countermeasures. 
Output: appropriate system countermeasures. 
Description: generate countermeasure set that would satisfy the requirements of the 
existing system. 
Stage 4: Select system countermeasures 
Input: appropriate countermeasures. 
Output: selected (final) system countermeasures. 
Description: refine countermeasure set by considering any HCE specific 
factors/constraints that may apply. 
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Figure 5. Determining data sensitivity. 
3.1. Determining data sensitivity 
Determining the data sensitivity countermeasures for an existing system is the 
most complex stage of the methodology, as they will be based upon a variety of 
impact values derived from the data involved. All data groups in the system must 
be considered to establish: (a) impact valuations for disclosure (based on data type 
only); (b) impact valuations for denial, modification, destruction (based on data 
type and use). The specific procedure involved is illustrated in figure S. These stages 
and descriptions are listed below: 
2.1. Identify the data groups involved using generic data model. 
2.2. Determine disclosure impacts from model group valuations. 
2.3. Identify general data usage category(s) that applies to the system. 
2.4. Determine denial, modification and destruction impacts from usage 
valuations for each data group involved. 
2.5. Derive overall sensitivity values for application by selecting 'worst-case' 
values from component groups (four values in total). 
2.6. Determine appropriate data sensitivity countermeasures using values from 
2.5. 
4. Illustrative examples 
The following section presents two basic examples to illustrate how the 
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methodology may be applied in practice. These are based on typical information 
system scenarios that may be found within the UK health service. 
Note that the countermeasures and impact levels given in the examples are 
selected from predetermined lists. However, listing a full set of countermeasures is 
outside the scope of this paper, and the examples therefore provide only a small 
representative selection. It should also be noted that the examples only proceed to 
stage 3 of the methodology. The reason for this is that stage 4 is very much related 
to the subjective factors of real-world environments, and imposing artificial 
constraints would add little to the examples. 
I. Example I 
4.1.1. Scenario. A patient records system maintained by a small GP practice. 
The system is primarily based upon a standalone PC, although selected data may 
be transferred to and from this using a portable computer that the GP takes on 
general visits and emergency call-outs. The practice is based in a single, modern 
building located in an inner city. 
4.1.2. Methodology implementation 
Stage 1: Determine basic system profile 
Computer configuration: Laptop/portable-standalone; Desktop PC-standalone. 
Patient Patient 
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Figure 6. GP records system mapping. 
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Operational environment: Location-fixed and mobile, city; building-single, 
modern; People-staff, public, low. 
Stage 2: Determine data sensitivity 
Stage 2.1: Identify data groups. Three data groups are encompassed, and can be 
identified from the existing model as shown in figure 6. 
Stage 2.2: Determine disclosure impacts 
Data group Impact level 
Patient identification Low 
Patient administration Medium 
Patient care High 
Stage 2.3: Identify data uses. Potential data uses are identified as follows: 
(a) operational clinical, (b) emergency care. 
Stage 2.4: Determine denial, modification and destruction impacts 
Data group Use Denial 
Impact levels 
Modification Destruction 
Patient identification Operational clinical Medium Medium Low 
Emergency care Low Medium Low 
Patient administration Operational clinical Low Low Low 
Emergency care Low Low Low 
Patient care Operational clinical Medium High High 
Emergency care Low High Medium 
Stage 2.5: Derive overall sensitivity ratings. The 'worst-case' impacts from the 
previous tables are extracted to determine the overall sensitivity: disclosure, high; 
denial, medium; modification, high; destruction, high. 
Stage 3: Determine appropriate system countermeasures 
Computer configuration 
Example countermeasures 
Countermeasure Laptop/portable Desktop PC 
category (standalone) (standalone) 
Physical Casing locks Locks and/or alarms 
Property markings (visible and UV) Property markings (visible and UV) 
Protective carry case Site to deny casual access 
Disaster planning Service warranty 
Maintain/store data backups 
Carry spare batteries, etc. 
System Use of any standard features 
Password protection 
Virus checking 
On-site service contract 
Maintain/store data backups 
Documented/tested recovery strategy 
Use of any standard security features 
Password protection 
Virus checking 
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Hard disk encryption 
Procedural Store sensitive data on separate media 
Care of floppy disks 
Lock away when not in use 
Regular backup to desktop machine 
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Menu-only access (no DOS) 
Integrity checksums 
Ban unauthorized software 
Control software updates 
Regular (automatic? ) backups 
Care of floppy disks 
Personnel Stress individual accountability for Provide software training 





category Single-building/modern/city Mobile 
Site Use of staff ID badges The nature of this environment is. by 
Receptionist/guard at main entrance definition, variable, making it difficult 
Room access control (locks) to cite environment-specific 
Alarm systems countermeasures. 
Disaster planning Smoke and moisture detectors , 
Additional attention should therefore be 
Fire alarm (linked to fire station) devoted to the physical countermeasures 
relating to the computer configuration. 
Procedural Visitors escorted (non-public areas) with the level of protection being 
Strangers challenged appropriate to account for the 
(non-public areas) 'worst-case' scenario. 
Prohibit smoking 
Personnel Controlled access hours 
Defined responsibilities 




level Disclosure Denialldestruction Modification 
Medium File-level passwords Regular recovery checks File-level passwords 
SMART cards Alternative processing Integrity checksums 
Hard-copy controls arrangements Auditing 
Disk shadowing 
Resource control 
High Encrypted transmission Backup generators Digital signature 
Encrypted storage Separation of key assets Data encryption 
Removable storage media 
Secure disposal of 
media/paper 
TEMPEST protection 
4.2. Example 2 
4.1.1. Scenario. A pharmacy department serving a large general hospital uses a 
minicomputer-based system for drug administration. The system may be accessed 
from a number of locations within the HCE over a local area network. 
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Figure 7. Drug administration system mapping. 
4.1.2. Methodology implementation 
Stage 1: Determine basic system profile 
Computer configuration: mini/mainframe; Network-LAN. 
Operational environment: location-fixed, urban; building-multiple, modern, 
people-staff, public, contract, high. 
Stage 2: Determine data sensitivity 
Stage 2.1. Identify data groups. Three data groups are encompassed, and can be 
identified from the existing model as shown in figure 7. 
Stage 2.2: Determine disclosure impacts 
Data group Impact level 
Clinical services Low 
Finance Medium 
Library and information services High 
Stage 2.3: Identify data uses. Potential data uses are identified as follows: 
(a) operational non-clinical, (b) financial, (c) planning and resource 
management. 
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Stage 2.4: Determine denial, modification and destruction impacts 
Impact levels 










Planning and resource 
management 
Low Medium Medium 
Low Medium Medium 
Low Low Low 
Low Medium Medium 
Medium Medium Medium 
Low Medium Low 
information services Operational non-clinical Medium Medium Medium 
Financial Low- Low Low 
Planning and resource 
management Low Medium Low 
Stage 2.5: Derive overall sensitivity ratings. The `worst case' impacts from the 
previous tables are extracted to determine the overall sensitivity: disclosure, 
medium; denial, medium; modification, medium; destruction, medium. 








category Example countermeasures 
Physical Control access to computer Physical Protect cabling from 
suite interference/tampering 
Identifiable marking on (data and power) 
terminals Provide alternate routeing 
Site to deny casual 
access/viewing 
Disaster planning 24-hour maintenance System Monitor for 
contract overuse/failure 
Duplicate/alternative system Automatic re"routeing 
Maintain/store data backups Integrity checking on 
transmission 
Prioritize recovery options Secure WAN gateways 
Documented/tested recovery 
plans 
System Use OS security features Procedural Maintain list of network 
Access time/location controls assets/access points 
Enforced password criteria 
Automatic terminal logout 
Auditing of activity 




Formal testing of new programs 
Personnel Provide software training 
Disciplinary procedures for 
misuse 





S. M. Furnell et al. 
Multi-building/modern/urban 
Countermeasure 
category Example countermeasures 
Site Security patrols 
Closed-circuit TV monitoring 
Use of staff ID badges 
Receptionists/guards for sensitive areas 
Room access control (locks) 
Alarm systems 
Disaster planning Smoke and moisture detectors 
Fire alarm (linked to fire station) 
Backup generator 
Procedural Visitors escorted (non-public areas) 
Strangers challenged (non-public areas) 
Prohibit smoking 
Personnel Defined responsibilities 
Controlled access hours 
Monitor maintenance work 
Example countermeasures 
Countermeasure 
level Disclosure Denial/destruction Modification 
Medium File-level passwords Regular recovery checks File-level passwords 
SMART cards Alternative processing Integrity checksums 
arrangements 
Hardcopy controls Resource control Auditing 
Disk shadowing 
S. Future enhancement 
The most significant extension that is planned is to develop an expert system to 
be used in conjunction with the methodology. This would contain the expert 
knowledge necessary to apply the methodology, as well as a knowledge base of 
appropriate countermeasures. 
An expert system would contribute further to the user-friendliness and general 
accessibility of the method, as it would allow the techniques to be used by health 
care staff who were not necessarily security-trained (e. g. a hospital general manager). 
A major advantage of this would be cost, as expensive consultancy would not be 
required to carry out security reviews. If the system was developed for PC 
environments it could be made available in nearly all HCE environments. 
6. Conclusions 
The paper should have served to illustrate how high-level categorizations of 
health care systems may be used to simplify considerably the process of security 
selection. Such an approach would be valuable in cases where a full security review 
has been denied on the grounds of budget or inconvenience. 
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It is envisaged that the overall methodology should be compatible with the 
majority of systems, catering for a range of general existing system categorizations. 
Despite this, however, it is still conceivable that systems will be encountered that 
do not fit comfortably within the profiles suggested. In these cases it will be necessary 
to perform a more detailed risk analysis to determine the specific requirements of 
the system/environment. Additionally, in systems where extremely high levels 
of risk are identified, more detailed study is also advisable. 
The methodology itself is at an early stage of development, and requires further 
refinement before it can be considered practically viable. The next stage of 
development will be to encompass it within an expert system so that it can be used 
within various HCE environments. This will serve to test the methodology and allow 
adjustments to be made accordingly. 
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ABSTRACT 
Information systems security is now an important consideration in modern health care 
establishments (HCEs), given their increased reliance on information technology in both 
direct care and administration activities. The paper outlines the basic framework and 
functions of an expert system tool to assist with the specification and selection of security 
countermeasures in HCEs. The discussion is based upon a generic protection 
methodology that has been developed as a means of categorising existing medical 
information systems according to pre-determined protection "profiles" and identifying 
their security requirements. It is envisaged that the incorporation of this method within 
an expert system framework could potentially enhance countermeasure selection and 
allow requirements to be established by non-professionals. 
The content is based upon work initiated as part of the Commission of European 
Communities SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in MEDicine) 
project, the aim of which is to provide security recommendations for European Health 
Care Establishments (HCEs). 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern Health Care Establishments (HCEs) now place a great reliance upon information 
technology, and contain a large number of systems processing many types of health data 
[1). In many cases the information held is directly related to patients and care delivery 
and can, therefore, be of a sensitive nature. In addition, much information exists that is 
vital to the smooth operation of the HCE in general. These considerations dictate an 
obvious need for data security within the environment, which is not present in many 
existing systems [2]. 
The objective of information security is to protect all aspects of the computing system 
(e. g. the computer itself, the building in which it is housed and the data that is stored). At 
the highest level, the security of information systems dictates the following requirements : 
" confidentiality (i. e. information is only disclosed to authorised users); 
" integrity (i. e. information can only be modified by authorised users); 
" availability (i. e. information and other IT resources can be accessed whenever 
needed). 
Health care computing systems provide many potential targets for a security breach, 
complicating the protection issue. The myriad of different system configurations and 
types of information render it impossible to assert a single level of security that will be 
appropriate for all cases. 
As a result, individual HCEs must determine the level of security that is appropriate for 
their environment, as well as where and how measures should be introduced. The 
standard approach is to conduct a risk analysis investigation, often using outside 
consultants. Unfortunately, this can be a time consuming and costly proposition and may 
consequently be prohibitive in many cases, resulting in the potential compromise of 
security. However, given that many threats and vulnerabilities are not unique to individual 
HCEs, a full risk analysis in each case may also be largely unnecessary. 
This paper begins by introducing a methodology that has been developed to simplify the 
identification of security requirements for existing systems. It then proceeds to consider 
the potential for implementing these concepts within an expert system framework, and the 
advantages that this would provide. 
A GENERIC PROTECTION METHODOLOGY 
A methodology has been developed that enables security requirements of existing 
information systems to be established by analysing the following key elements : 
(1) computer configuration; 
(2) operational environment; 
(3) data sensitivity. 
A number of pre-determined security profiles have been devised for each system element, 
and using appropriate combinations of these it is possible to specify suitable high level 
system profiles to describe the majority of application areas. 
The computer configuration and operational environment elements are considered to 
determine the baseline security requirements of a system. Consideration of data 
sensitivity builds upon this, examining the additional security measures demanded by the 
nature of the data involved. 
The key information system elements recognised by the methodology will now be 
described in more detail. 
" Computer Configuration 
This refers to the IT assets (both hardware and software) of the organisation. At a 
high level it is possible to identify a relatively small number of elements which may be 
included in any given computer configuration : 
0 mini-computer; 0 desktop PC; 0 LAN; 
0 mainframe; 0 portable / laptop; 0 WAN. 
Individual systems would be considered to determine which elements are applicable, 
and associated countermeasures selected accordingly. 
" Operational Environment 
The nature of the environment in which IT assets are located and used will also affect 
the type and level of protection required. The main environmental considerations that 
have security bearing are : 
0 location (e. g. fixed / mobile; rural / urban / city); 
0 buildings (e. g. single / multiple; old / modern); 
0 people (e. g. low / medium / high number; staff/ contract / general public); 
Appropriate combinations of these factors can be used to describe the majority of 
health care establishments (i. e. from GPs to general hospitals). Security 
countermeasures have again been specified for each type of environment. 
" Data Sensitivity 
Sensitivity is determined by the types and uses of data within a system. In 
consultation with a number of European HCEs, a generic model of medical data was 
developed [3], providing a high level means of specifying the types of data utilised 
within any system. The model comprises 12 main data groups and applications may 
use information from all groups, or a particular subset. The issue of data use was 
addressed by related work within the SEISMED project [4], which determined a 
similarly high level set of 9 generic data uses that are compatible with the model. The 
data types and uses are listed in table 1. 
DATA TYPES DATA USES 
Patient Identification Operational Clinical 
Patient Administration Emergency Care 
Patient Care Critical Clinical 
Clinical Services Expert Systems 
Finance Operational non-clinical 
Hotel Services Financial 
Staff Planning & Resource Management 
Resource Management & Planning Quality Management 




Table 1: Generic Data Types and Uses 
Sensitivity is rated by considering four types of potential impact related to the data 
types and uses identified in the system, as listed in table 2. 
IMPACT DEFINITION DERIVED 
TYPE FROM 
Disclosure Unauthorised disclosure of data to HCE staff or outsiders Data type 
Denial Denial of access to data for varying periods Data use 
Modification Accidental or deliberate alteration of the data Data use 
Destruction Destruction of the system or data (an extreme form of denial) Data use 
Table 2: Data impacts 
The impacts are rated low, medium or high (where low indicates that the baseline 
countermeasure level is satisfactory and high is the maximum protection that can be 
provided). The level in each case was determined by considering potential threats to 
the HCE that may result (e. g. breach of confidentiality, embarrassment, disruption of 
activity, financial loss, legal action, threats to personal safety), with opinions being 
gathered from various European HCEs. Example ratings are given in table 3. 
DATA TYPE / USE IMPACT TYPE RATING REASON 
Patient Care Disclosure High confidentiality, embarrassment. legal 
Operational Clinical Denial Medium disruption, safety 
Modification High safety, legal 
Destruction Medium disruption. safety 
Table 3: Sensitivity ratings 
The level of impact will in turn determine the level of countermeasure (with the 
countermeasures used being derived from a representative set that are being 
developed for use within the SEISMED project [5]). 
These elements have been incorporated into the methodology framework as shown in 
figure 1, illustrating (at a high level) the steps involved in profiling the security 
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Fig 1: Existing System Protection Methodology Over view 
A more comprehensive description of the methodology and its application can be found 
in [6]. 
EXPERT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
This section describes the potential for implementing the methodology as an expert 
system. 
The main purpose would be to provide an intelligent decision support tool to assist in 
applying the methodology. It is considered that the most appropriate approach would 
be for the system to be based around a "consultation" style of interaction, guiding the 
user through each stage of the security analysis process. 
The expert system knowledge base would contain a full range of countermeasures and 
selection rules, based upon the existing set associated with the methodology and 
additional expertise gathered from security consultants to enable further inferences (the 
latter would related more to selection rules than actual countermeasures, being based 
upon the experts own experiences). 
The principal stages of the expert system analysis would correspond closely to the 
normal steps in applying the methodology. The system would need to elicit a 
fundamental system description from the user by identifying the following factors : 
" computer configuration involved; 
" type of operational environment(s); 
" data groups involved; 
" purpose of application (data use(s)). 
The majority of the user interaction would occur at this stage, with the system querying 
the user to establish which elements are present. The level of expertise employed would 
be dependent upon the security and IT experience of the user. Therefore, in the case of 
the analysis being driven by a relatively novice user, the system would rely upon a 
detailed style of consultation in order to elicit the required knowledge. Conversely, 
experienced staff would be more likely to utilise the system as an automated 
methodology tool. 
An initial system profile would be derived from the consultation using a series of basic 
selection rules associated with each methodology category, for example : 
IF computer configuration includes Desktop PC 
THEN countermeasure I 
countermeasure 2 etc. 
IF computer con figuration includes LAN 
THEN countermeasure 3 
countermeasure 4 etc. 
At this stage countermeasures could be extracted directly from the knowledge base 
without any need for further inference. 
The basic profile would not take into account any practical constraints that may apply 
with regard to countermeasure implementation (e. g. financial limitations, operational 
constraints and / or existing countermeasures). Further consultation to establish such 
constraints could be used as the basis for filtering of the countermeasure suggestions (as 
represented by the transition from appropriate to selected countermeasures in figure 1). 
This would, however, demand that the data in the knowledge contained information 
about both "implementation difficulty" and costs (the latter of which would need to be 
updated regularly in order to be practical). 
Having established the basic profile and any constraints, more advanced selection rules 
could be utilised to allow inferences based upon information from across several 
categories (which would be based upon the additional knowledge gathered from the 
experts). This would potentially allow the identification of additional requirements that 
may have been missed during the initial consultation. Examples of these further rules 
may be as follows : 
IF LAN AND High Disclosure rating 
THEN transmission encryption. 
IF Minicomputer AND High Integrity rating 
THEN file checksums. 
It is anticipated that the overall structure of the system, and the process of user 
interaction involved, would be as illustrated in figure 2. 
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Fig. 2: Expert System Structure and Interaction 
It is envisaged that the use of expert system technology would provide a number of 
advantages. At the most basic level it would serve to ensure the correct and consistent 
application of the methodology concepts. 
However, the encapsulation within this framework would offer opportunities beyond the 
simple automation of the methodology. Having established the basic system profile by 
following through the key methodology stages, the specification could then be enhanced 
using inferences based upon the advanced rules in the knowledge base. The 
countermeasure recommendations would then be narrowed, making them more specific 
to the system under consideration. 
Finally, an expert system would improve the user friendliness and general accessibility of 
the method. It would offer a significant opportunity for the techniques to be employed 
by health care staff who were not necessarily fully security-trained (e. g. the hospital IT 
manager). A major advantage of this would be reduced cost, eliminating the need for the 
expensive consultancy normally involved in carrying out security reviews and allowing 
them to be conducted "in-house". If such a system were to be developed for the PC 
environment then this would guarantee the maximum potential for adoption, given that 
this platform is available in nearly all HCE environments. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The issue of information security cannot be ignored within the health care field. The use 
of a specifically tailored methodology as described will simplify the security selection 
process and would be valuable in cases where a full security review may have been 
denied. 
The discussion of the potential for expert system implementation highlights additional 
benefits that may result, and further extends the scope of the methodology. However, it 
must be acknowledged that any advantages are theoretical at this stage, and that the 
expert system design must be trailed in practice to provide any empirical evidence of its 
true worth. 
The development of an actual system (in conjunction with further refinements to the 
underlying methodology) is viewed as the next stage in the evolution of the concept. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes the concept of dynamic keystroke 
analysis as a means of enhancing user authentication in 
modern information systems. Whilst existing password- 
based schemes normally rely upon a single authentication 
judgement, the use of keystroke analysis would allow 
supervision to occur continuously throughout user 
sessions. In addition, the concept may be implemented 
transparently so as not to unnecessarily disrupt user 
activity. These points make it suitable for application in 
modern, user-friendly contexts such as multimedia. 
The theoretical discussion is supported by the findings of 
an experimental study mounted within our group using 
26 typists and a prototype authentication system. The 
results demonstrate considerable success, with an 
impostor detection rate of 85%. However, a number of 
potential problems identified in the discussion suggest 
that keystroke analysis would be best implemented 
alongside other supervision techniques rather than as a 
standalone system. 
INTRODUCTION 
A key issue in the implementation of secure information 
systems is user authentication. The password remains the 
popular and widespread technique (National Computing 
Centre 1994), having the advantage of simplicity for both 
systems designers and end users. However, a 
disadvantage is the ease with which its protection is often 
compromised, either deliberately, by accident or by 
guesswork. In recent years the reliability of passwords 
has been repeatedly questioned (Jobusch and Oldehoeft 
1989) and it is now widely accepted that stronger means 
of authentication may be necessary, using techniques that 
are more difficult to forge. In addition, password 
techniques can only verify user identity at discrete points 
within a session (and are normally only incorporated at 
the beginning). With the increasing advancement of 
information systems, as witnessed by the progression to 
multimedia, it is both desirable and appropriate to have a 
means of identity verification that can deliver a 
continuous assessment of user legitimacy (and thereby 
provide greater protection against compromise). 
This paper proposes a behavioural biometric 
measurement based upon the analysis of users typing 
characteristics. It has been established that users may 
exhibit significant differences in terms of typing styles 
and abilities (Card et at. 1980), which may consequently 
be used to determine reasonably unique typing 
"signatures" (analogous to those which can be identified 
with normal handwriting (Fairhurst et al. 1994)). These 
signatures may then be used as the basis for real-time 
user supervision, providing a continuous and transparent 
(i. e. non-intrusive) means of verifying user identities in 
conjunction with their normal working activities. 
CONCEPTUAL SUMMARY 
Several typing characteristics may be considered as the 
basis for determining keystroke signatures, including the 
intervals between keystrokes, the duration of keystrokes 
and the frequency of typing errors. The chosen factors 
must be assessed to create a typing profile for each 
legitimate user. Subsequent authentication / supervision 
is then based upon a comparison of the current users 
typing characteristics against the profile associated with 
his / her claimed identity (%kith any significant departures 
triggering impostor alerts). 
Keystroke analysis may be implemented in two ways 
(referred to as static and dynamic verification 
approaches), which differ in how they attempt to use the 
technique. In the static scenario, analysis is based upon a 
constant text string and is normally used for a single 
authentication judgement (e. g. in conjunction %%ith the 
entry of a normal user id and password). By contrast, the 
dynamic approach attempts to analyse any arbitrary text 
input, allowing much greater scope for user supervision 
as the authentication period may become continuous. 
The majority of previous studies have concentrated upon 
the static verification approach (Bleha et at. 1990; Joyce 
and Gupta 1990). 
As with other biometric systems, the effectiveness of 
keystroke analysis is judged on the basis of two factors : 
" False Acceptance Rate (FAR) 
The proportion of cases in which impostors are 
falsely authenticated by the system (also referred 
to as Impostor Pass Rate). 
" False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
The proportion of cases in which legitimate users 
are rejected by the system (also referred to as 
False Alarm Rate). 
Acceptable figures for these measures are heavily 
dependant upon whether a static or dynamic verification 
strategy is employed. In the static scenario, minimising 
the FAR should be the most important consideration, as 
any successful impostor could potentially go unchecked 
for a whole session. However, in the dynamic scenario, 
with continuous assessment, a greater window for 
impostor detection is available and so the prime concern 
becomes to minimise the FRR (as rejections during a 
session could irritate and disrupt a legitimate user more 
significantly than occasional false login failures). 
PRACTICAL STUDY 
This section details the research teams implementation of 
a prototype keystroke authentication system based on the 
dynamic verification approach. 
Experimental System 
An experimental system has been developed for the PC 
environment to allow an evaluation of the concept in 
practice. It is comprised of three modules, as follows : 
Profiler 
Accepts the initial typing samples used to create 
profiles for legitimate users. PC hardware 
interrupts are used to detect key depression and 
release with one millisecond accuracy. 
Sampler 
Accepts user test samples and stores all 
keystrokes and associated timings for later use. 
Monitor 
Compares the test samples against typing profiles 
to determine the effectiveness of the system. 
Typing profiles were based upon inter-keystroke times for 
specific character pairs (digraphs), storing the mean time 
and standard deviation for each profiled digraph (note : 
inter-keystroke time was found to be the most distinctive 
typing characteristic in a provisional study, with the 
keystroke duration and typing error frequency measures 
exhibiting FARs significantly high enough to warrant 
exclusion from further investigation). Analysis was 
restricted to digraphs involving alphabetic and "space" 
characters, as these were considered the most likely to 
reveal any characteristic keystroke rhythm and were 
found to produce the best results in a previous study 
which conducted a comprehensive investigation of this 
aspect (Leggett and Williams 1988). 
The profiling procedure demanded that users enter two 
samples of a 2200 character reference text. A significant 
length was necessary to ensure that each users "natural" 
typing style emerged and that sufficient samples of each 
digraph were obtained to enable appropriate mean and 
standard deviation values to be established (note that at 
least five samples were required for profile entries to be 
usable in monitoring, as any less could result in them 
being unrepresentative of the users normal style). 
Another property of the reference text was that the 
relative frequencies of character digraphs within it 
corresponded closely to those of normal English (Beker 
and Piper 1982), with the 30 most common digraphs all 
significantly represented (ensuring strong profile entries 
for the digraphs most likely to be encountered). 
The profiler attempted to further ensure representative 
profiles by filtering out potentially uncharacteristic 
typing. This was achieved in two ways : firstly, deleted 
keystrokes were ignored, as any entries resulting from 
mis-strokes could be unrepresentative. Secondly, inter- 
keystroke times exceeding 7S0ms (i. e. Card et al's speed 
classification for a user unfamiliar with the keyboard) 
were disregarded, being considered more likely to 
represent unnatural pauses than part of the users typing 
rhythm. 
The monitoring / supervision system compared incoming 
inter-keystroke times (from the test samples) against user 
profiles, with times being judged invalid if they fell 
outside 1.5 standard deviations of the relevant profiled 
value. Invalid keystrokes were then analysed in two ways 
to detect intrusions : 
1. monitoring the percentage of invalid keystrokes 
during the 100 most recently typed; 
2. monitoring the number of consecutive invalid 
keystrokes. 
However, even legitimate users will generate some 
invalid keystrokes and, as a result, the monitor 
incorporates user-specific authentication thresholds 
which specify the maximum levels for percentage invalid 
keystrokes and consecutive invalid keystrokes that are 
tolerated against each profile (note that the use of 
common threshold levels for all users was found to be 
less effective). The appropriate levels were determined 
using the two further text samples (of 574 and 389 
characters) entered by each user, which were run against 
their initial profile. The peak values observed for 
percentage invalid keystrokes and consecutive invalid 
keystrokes across the two tests were then used as the basis 
for establishing the thresholds. If either threshold was 
exceeded during monitoring, an intrusion alert was 
generated. 
Given that the dynamic verification approach was being 
tested, minimising the FRR was considered important. 
The user-specific thresholds were, therefore, set to ensure 
that no false rejections would arise from the test samples. 
The advantage of this was that the resulting FAR would 
then effectively represent a "worst case" figure. 
Test Subjects 
A total of 26 subjects were involved in the tests, with 
abilities ranging from experienced typists to comparative 
novices. 
The two additional text samples that had been used to 
determine the authentication thresholds for legitimate 
users were also used to represent impostor attempts (by 
running them against all other profiles). The final results 
were, therefore, derived from approximately 1300 
impostor attempts. 
Results and Analysis 
With the FRR having been eliminated, the aims of the 
study were to determine the FAR and the speed of 
successful impostor detection. 
In terms of overall impostor detection effectiveness, the 
experimental system exhibited a FAR of 15%, as shown 
in figure 1. However, given that each subject provided 
two test samples, it was also possible to investigate 
impostor consistency. This was established by sub- 
dividing the test samples into the pairs that were 
generated by the same subjects and then determining the 
proportion of cases where both samples were able to pass 
as another user against those where only one attempt was 
successful. This information is also illustrated in figure 1. 
It can be conjectured that, given longer test samples, the 
impostors who were successful in only one attempt would 
eventually be detected at some point (albeit after a 
significant number of keystrokes) and that the FAR 
would, therefore, be somewhat less. 
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Fig. 1: Impostor detection performance 
The performance of the two detection methods employed 
was found to be very similar, with 49% of impostors 
being detected as a result of their percentage of invalid 
keystrokes, against 51% due to consecutive invalid 
keystrokes. As such, both methods can be considered to 
be useful authentication measures. 
Given that impostor detection is actually possible, the 
next most important consideration is the speed with 
which it can be achieved (i. e. how many kcystrokes 
would an impostor be able to enter before being detected - 
a factor which does not appear to have been addressed in 
previous studies). The experimental findings on this 
aspect are shown in figure 2 below. This shows the 
percentage of impostors detected within five distinct 
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These results indicate that the vast majority of impostors 
would be detected within 160 keystrokes (the equivalent 
of 2 standard lines of text), with detection in under 40 
keystrokes in 25% of cases. Whilst this may not combat 
the most destructive scenarios (e. g. the immediate entry 
of "delete *. *" would very likely be unchallenged), it 
should be sufficient to identify the more common types of 
intruder who generally require sustained access in order 
to effect a serious breach. 
It should also be noted that these figures essentially 
characterise the impostor detection performance that 
would be observed from the point of initial login (i. e. 
beginning with 0% invalid keystrokes). However, in 
scenarios where an impostor takes the place of a 
legitimate user it is likely that detection would be quicker 
and more frequent, as a certain percentage of invalid 
keystrokes would already have been registered (by the 
legitimate user) and, therefore, the rejection threshold 
would be reached more easily. 
A FAR of 15% would be of less significance if the 
preliminary user identification phase was still to include 
some other form of authentication as well (e. g. a standard 
password system) as the combination would almost 
certainly serve to foil the majority of intrusion attempts. 
A FRR of 0% is of course somewhat artificial, as some 
false rejections would be almost bound to occur in 
practice. However, with authentication thresholds set 
correctly, it is envisaged that these cases would not be 
frequent enough to significantly trouble legitimate users. 
suggested authentication enhancement schemes (e. g. 
Smart cards, other biometric methods) are reliant upon 
specialised equipment. This makes the technique 
particularly suited to financially constrained 
environments. Cost may also be an important 
consideration in multimedia systems, as these require 
expensive base technologies which may leave little scope 
for additional expenditure on security. 
Finally, user convenience comes from the fact that 
identity verification can be performed transparently, in a 
non-intrusive manner. This is an important 
consideration, particularly in a multimedia context, and 
is illustrated in figure 3. This shows a potential means of 
implementing keystroke analysis, with the existence of 
the monitor remaining transparent to the user unless an 
intrusion is suspected. 
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ADVANTAGES OF KEYSTROKE ANALYSIS 
Fig. 3: Implementation of Keystroke Analysis 
The principal advantages of the approach are improved 
security, reduced cost and user convenience - some of 
which cannot be claimed for many alternative 
authentication methods. 
Improved security is advantageous in any information 
system, and is achieved here as authentication is no 
longer restricted to a single judgement, but may become 
continuous throughout the session. In addition, the 
biometric nature of the approach makes it more difficult 
for users themselves to undermine security (e. g. by 
allowing colleagues unauthorised access to their 
accounts) as typing abilities cannot be passed on to 
someone else in the same way as a password. 
Cost advantages result from the fact that it is possible to 
implement the concept entirely in software (with the 
necessary recognition hardware already present in the 
form of existing PCs), whereas many frequently 
This approach may again be contrasted with other 
authentication methods, which often place an increased 
burden upon the user (e. g. requiring that additional tasks 
be performed in order to be authenticated), which may be 
both time consuming and generally inconvenient 
(Sherman 1992). However, modern multimedia-based 
information systems demand security mechanisms that 
are as transparent as possible in order to complement the 
otherwise user-friendly nature of the environments. 
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
In addition to the false acceptance window, a number of 
further potential problems can be identified with 
keystroke analysis. These were outside the scope of this 
investigation, but will need to be addressed in future 
work. 
" Consistency of users 
Users typing performance may be adversely 
affected by many factors (e. g. fatigue, injury, 
keyboard variations, interruptions), leading to 
departures from their profiled level. 
" Mimicry 
It may be possible for impostors to deliberately 
imitate the keystroke "signatures" of legitimate 
users (particularly poor typists). 
" Timing accuracy 
The concept can only be implemented in 
networked environments if accurate inter- 
keystroke timings can be obtained at the local 
terminals. 
" User acceptance 
Some users may object to the idea of their 
activities being continuously monitored, leading 
to potential resistance. 
" General applicability 
A keyboard-intensive context is required if 
monitoring is to be effective. However, some 
applications (particularly in multimedia) 
significantly reduce the role of the keyboard. 
It would be possible to compensate for this last ; )oint by 
specifically profiling and monitoring words or key 
combinations that are still known to be frequently typed 
(thereby applying a static verifier approach in a dynamic 
context). 
CONCLUSIONS 
We believe that the experimental study has served to 
confirm the significant potential of keystroke analysis as 
a means of user supervision. Whilst it cannot be 
regarded as a panacea to the authentication issue, it 
should, at the very least, provide considerable protection 
over the use of a simple password alone. 
The experimental system is currently being enhanced to 
enable more extensive investigation. Firstly, a full 
implementation of the system has been developed that 
runs transparently on a user workstation. In this scenario 
keystroke data is collected locally and then analysed by a 
monitoring system operating on another machine. 
Secondly, neural network techniques are being 
incorporated to allow the system to learn how best to 
conduct its analysis (for example, to determine which 
character digraphs are the most distinctive for a 
particular user). Once these enhancements have been 
completed, the resulting system will provide a much 
better indication of the concepts real-world potential. 
It is considered that the FAR could be reduced by 
generating more representative profiles of legitimate 
users. Whilst this would require larger text samples 
(which could be collected via a background process to 
reduce the user burden), it would potentially allow more 
accurate authentication thresholds to be set and reduce 
the number of unrepresented digraphs in the profiles 
(therefore allowing more keystrokes to be analysed). 
Despite this, it is felt that keystroke analysis would be 
most effectively used in conjunction with other forms of 
supervision, as a supplementary means of authentication 
(with passwords, or some other appropriate technique, 
still being employed as the primary mechanism). This 
would provide an opportunity to combat the FAR and 
could also reduce the significance of the potential 
problems identified above. As such, the eventual aim of 
the research is to incorporate the concepts into a more 
comprehensive intrusion monitoring framework, using a 
number of additional behaviour parameters to identify 
departures from normal system usage. 
REFERENCES 
Beker. H. and F. Piper. 1982. Cipher Systems: The protection of 
communications. Northwood Books. London. UK. 
Bleha. S.; C. Slivinsky; and B. Huasien. 1990. "Computer-Access Security 
Systems Using Keystroke Dynamics", /ZEE Transactions on Pattern 
Analysis and Machine Intelligence 12. no. 12 (Dec. ): 1217-1222. 
Card, S. K.; T. P, Moran; and & A. Newell. 1980. "The keystroke level 
model for user performance time with interactive systems", 
Communications of the ACM 23. no. 7 (Jul. ): 396.410. 
Fairhurst. M.; K. Cowley; and E. Sweeney. 1994. "KAPPA Automatic 
Signature Verification: Summary". British Technology Group Ltd, 
London. UK (May). 
Jobusch. D. L. and A. E. Oldehoeft A E. 1989. "A Survey of Password 
Mechanisms : Weaknesses and Potential improvements. Part 1". 
Computers & Security 8. no. 7: 587.604. 
Joyce. R. and G. Oupta. 1990. "Identity Authentication fused on Keystroke 
Latencies", Communications of the ACM 33, no-2 (Feb. ): 168.176. 
Legget. J. and O. Williams. 1988. "Verifying Identity via keystroke 
characteristics", International Journal of Man- Machine Studies 28: 67- 
76. 
National Computing Centre. 1994.1T Security Breaches Survey 
Summary. National Computing Centre. United Kingdom. 
Sherman, R L. 1992. "Biometric Futures", Computers and Security 11, 
no. 2: 122.133. 
SECURE MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMS IN HEALTHCARE AND MEDICINE 
Steven M Furnell, Nichola J Salmons, Peter W Sanders, Colin T Stockel and Matthew J Warren 
Network Research Group 
Faculty of Technology 
University of Plymouth 
Plymouth, United Kingdom 
E-mail : nichola@soc. plym. ac. uk 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to examine the increasing 
potential for applying multimedia technology within the 
medical community. Multimedia is considered to be a 
particularly appropriate means for information delivery 
within Healthcare Establishments (HCEs), especially for 
that relating to patient care, and the paper considers the 
principal advantages in this area. The discussion then 
proceeds to highlight the fact that adoption of multimedia 
dictates new requirements for information security and, 
by the nature of the technology involved, also allows new 
approaches to be explored. On this premise, the outline 
of a security strategy for future multimedia healthcare 
networks is proposed. The discussion is supported by an 
example scenario and a brief examination of our own 
research groups efforts in this area. 
INTRODUCTION - MULTIMEDIA IN MODERN 
MEDICAL CARE 
Over the past twenty years computerised information 
systems have gradually been introduced to, and utilised 
within, a large number of healthcare establishments 
(HCEs). Information Technology (IT) now enables 
modern HCEs to provide more comprehensive medical 
care, comprising more numerous and more complex 
procedures. As such, HCE systems now process and 
handle information beyond simple text and graphics and 
more advanced medical applications may also generate 
digital images, full motion video and audio. The use of 
this multimedia information can considerably aid patient 
diagnosis and treatment (Ceusters et al. 1993). 
As a result of recent advances in desktop processing 
power, the large scale use of multimedia-based healthcare 
systems is closer to being an achievable goal, with the 
presentation and delivery of multimedia information 
becoming possible at a viable price. This is largely due to 
the fact that PC-based systems can now represent a 
realistic platform for multimedia and can be found in 
numbers in most HCEs. In addition, 
telecommunications networks are now capable of 
handling the high speeds necessary to transfer large 
amounts of multimedia data, allowing further 
improvements to the speed of information delivery within 
and between HCEs. 
In terms of advantages, the presentation of medical data 
in a multimedia format is considered to be ideally suited 
to the healthcare field as it inherently provides more 
information (Orozco-Barbosa et al. 1992), and in a form 
that is more easily comprehended than traditional text- 
based reports. This should indirectly help to improve the 
quality of care, as clinical decisions are made on the basis 
that the clinician has direct access to the most 
comprehensive information possible. In addition, it will 
allow the seamless integration of existing operational 
systems, with the ability to maintain a standardised 
viewing structure. As such, the potential applications of 
multimedia in healthcare are wide-ranging. For 
example, an area of significant potential will be the 
establishment of composite electronic health records, 
bringing together various types of multimedia patient 
data into a single entity (Arnold and Peter 1993). Such 
electronic multimedia record systems have the potential 
to significantly improve care delivery as they will allow 
immediate access to full patient data at any time, with 
flexible options for retrieval (whereas the same data may 
currently be held in several different places, making it 
difficult for clinicians to obtain all of the information that 
may be available). 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY 
It is important to recognise that a major consequence of 
the progression to multimedia will be an extension of the 
already significant reliance upon IT in healthcare 
establishments. This reliance stems from the increasing 
number of healthcare IT applications, particularly those 
relating to clinical care, that are now fundamental to 
routine clinical practice (Barber 1991). A number of 
future trends are predicted (European Commission 1994), 
with European project sponsorship (in the 4th 
Framework) under way, that will further increase this 
dependency. These include : 
9 increased intra and inter-HCE networking: 
" increased exchange of data between HCEs; 
" increased potential for sharing of facilities 
between HCEs; 
" establishment and adoption of the composite 
electronic health record. 
Due to the comprehensive nature of the information 
presented, it is envisaged that there is likely to be a even 
greater level of implicit trust in the correctness of the 
system. As such reliance upon IT increases, so too does 
the potential impact of any system unavailability or 
erroneous data. This, therefore, heightens the 
requirement to ensure that the availability and integrity of 
medical systems can be maintained. 
In addition, further considerations arising from the 
increasing variety and complexity of data dictate a 
greater need for confidentiality controls. Firstly, the 
amalgamation of different forms of data into the 
composite record may potentially increase the sensitivity 
of the information beyond that of any of the component 
parts. Secondly, information that would previously have 
been held (and potentially secured) by separate 
applications would now be placed together, and thus the 
impact of a security breach would be significantly higher. 
The use of multimedia can, therefore, be seen to affect all 
three main principles of information security (i. e. 
confidentiality, integrity and availability). 
As a result of these considerations, the authors believe 
that a different approach may be necessary to integrate 
security into multimedia systems and that the 
environment may also allow new opportunities to be 
explored. 
A SECURITY STRATEGY FOR MULTIMEDIA 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS 
Whilst many areas of security (e. g. physical, 
environmental and personnel considerations) will not be 
directly affected by the multimedia context, there will be 
noticeable effects in others; some significant, some less so 
(e. g. the quantity of data involved will affect the backup 
process in terms of increased storage requirements and, 
potentially, the time required to perform the task). The 
paper concentrates upon two aspects in particular which 
should be re-examined in light of the trends predicted 
above; namely user authentication and data 
communications. In both of these cases, an important 
issue will be the transparency of protection mechanisms 
employed. One of the main advantages of multimedia 
systems is that data can be presented in a more natural 
and "user-friendly" context. As such, there is a dilemma 
that whilst the systems must be easy to use and effective, 
they must at the same time be made secure. This does not 
necessarily mean that users should be totally unaware of 
security (indeed, it will probably increase trust in the 
system if some security is seen to be present), but it must 
not interfere with their work and should be compatible 
with the general "feel" of the system. 
User Authentication 
User authentication mechanisms will still be required to 
prevent impostors masquerading at local terminals and 
workstations. However, two factors suggest that 
traditional password-based methods alone will no longer 
be sufficient protection : 
multimedia systems will significantly reduce the 
role of keyboard input in some contexts (e. g. 
information retrieval), such that it may not be 
required at all HCE terminals. As having to 
retain a keyboard simply for user authentication 
purposes would hardly constitute transparent 
security, an authentication mechanism not 
requiring this aspect would be desirable; 
the increased data sensitivity that could 
potentially result from the composite record 
context adds weight to the argument that 
passwords (which often provide a weak / 
unreliable basis for authentication anyway 
(Jobusch and Oldehoeft 1989)) should be 
supplemented by other mechanisms. 
The use of smart card systems may have a place in 
overcoming these problems, but may not be practical as a 
compulsory measure as this would introduce an 
immediate financial burden across the whole system 
(which most HCEs would not be able to tolerate at the 
present time). 
A appropriate alternative would be to utilise advanced 
user supervision systems which could operate 
transparently and in real-time throughout each session 
(Lunt 1993). A number of factors could potentially be 
encompassed by the supervision, including : 
" times and locations of system usage; 
" typical applications used, 
" types of data accessed and how it is used, 
" analysis of the users typing style (if a keyboard is 
still used). 
The use of neural network techniques could allow 
appropriate information on these (and other factors) to be 
gathered automatically, with subtle behaviour patterns 
being learnt in order to develop profiles for legitimate 
system users. Current user activity could then be 
continuously compared against the profile for the users 
claimed identity (with significant departures causing an 
alert to be generated). 
In addition to the above, multimedia systems may allow 
many new options to be introduced for improving 
authentication. For example, appropriate hardware for 
implementing several biometric identification methods 
may already be present "as standard" in a multimedia 
configuration (e. g. cameras which may be used for image 
/ "faceprint" recognition, microphones and audio 
processing facilities for voice recognition). These 
techniques have been successfully implemented 
elsewhere, delivering adequate authentication 
performance and gaining a high degree of user 
acceptance (Sherman 1992). As such they should 
integrate well with multimedia systems. However, the 
presence of such hardware enhancements should not be a 
prerequisite of the authentication strategy for the same 
reasons as smart cards. Nevertheless, some mechanism 
should be incorporated to allow extra facilities to be 
utilised if they are present. 
Future multimedia systems may, therefore, demand that 
a variety of authentication technologies are actually 
employed, based around an approach that is primarily 
software-oriented. These may then be linked / managed 
by an intelligent supervision system which can select the 
most appropriate mechanism to be invoked at any given 
point according to the current user activity and the type 
of system being used (e. g. keystroke analysis could be 
used in any text-intensive activity; facial recognition 
could be used if the host system is equipped with a 
camera). Note that once authentication has been 
conducted, any underlying data / application access and 
auditing controls could still be implemented in a 
traditional manner to restrict and monitor the activities of 
different classes of user. 
Data Communications 
One of the trends likely to result from the availability of 
more and better information is the increased sharing and 
exchange of data between HCEs. In the UK, the National 
Health Service (NHS) already plans to bring all aspects of 
voice and data communications together into a common 
framework, with all major HCEs having the facility to 
communicate electronically by 1996 (NHS Management 
Executive 1992). However, the transmission of 
composite records again raises the concerns of 
confidentiality and integrity (i. e. the need to protect 
messages against unauthorised interception, modification 
and falsification). Hence the requirement to have secure 
data communications will also be correspondingly 
greater. A strategy is proposed that would introduce 
layered security at local, national and international levels 
with encryption of data between different security 
domains (based upon a Trusted Third Party (TU) 
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Fig. 1: Secure Data Communications using a TTP 
hierarchy 
The TTP would be capable of providing three main types 
of security service in relation to data transmission : 
" integrity (e. g. checksums); 
non-repudiation (e. g. digital signatures); 
" confidentiality (e. g. encryption). 
These services would be applied, as appropriate, to 
communications at all levels of the TTP hierarchy. In 
addition, encryption could be used to protect stored data 
where workstations in the local domains cannot be 
physically secured. However, it should be noted that 
whilst the facility for encryption would exist, its use in 
healthcare is currently restricted in some EC countries. 
The operation of all data communications services could 
theoretically be made completely transparent to the end 
user (although in some cases, such as the use of digital 
signatures, users should be given some indication that a 
security service is being provided). 
As can be seen from the figure, the Security Management 
Centre (SMC) introduced to handle the authentication 
system will also assume responsibility for securing 
communications in each local domain. The SMC 
facilities could be incorporated as part of an overall 
Network Management Centre. 
This strategy would increase the importance of 
maintaining availability, with a reliance upon the 
availability of interconnected systems as opposed to 
earlier isolated ones. The hierarchy would, therefore, be 
designed to be fault tolerant to enable secure operations 
to continue even in the event of individual TTP failure. 
However, this strategy obviously depends upon the 
overall TTP infrastructure being in place before it can be 
realised. Therefore, in the short to medium term, 
individual HCEs and co-operating establishments will 
require alternative means by which their communications 
can be secured (AIM SEISMED 1994). In addition, due 
to the enormous volume of data involved in multimedia 
data communications, there are also questions that must 
be addressed regarding the need for compression and how 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) may then be 
used. In the longer term, the fact that uses of the TTP 
would not be restricted to the healthcare domain could 
aid its introduction and acceptance at the national and 
international levels. The use of UPs in the healthcare 
context is described in more detail in (Purnell and 
Sanders 1995). 
EXAMPLE SCENARIO 
This section presents an example scenario to illustrate 
how future multimedia data exchange would be likely to 
function within and between HCEs. This is, in turn, used 
to highlight the need for security at the various stages 
involved. To this end, the information flows involved in 
a potential multimedia healthcare system are illustrated 
in figure 2 and explained in the description below. 
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Fig. 2: Multimedia Healthcare Application 
The neurology department in one establishment (I-ICE A) 
performs a series of tests which produce a set of "raw" 
results data. However, HCE A lacks the equipment 
required to process and visualise the data, making it 
necessary to involve another site (HCE B). Once 
visualisation has been performed the results are 
transmitted back and stored in a database, from where 
they are subsequently accessed by a consultant at HCE A. 
However, further expert opinion is required and advice is, 
therefore, sought from another neurological consultant 
located at HCE C. Hence, the data is exchanged 
further, with the additional interpretation finally 
coming back to the originating consultant (allowing a 
more informed care decision to be made at HCE A). The 
consultants at HCEs A and C have access to a video 
conferencing link from their camera-equipped 
workstations, whilst the other parties in the scenario use 
standard workstations without such a facility. 
From this basic outline, a general security specification 
can be given based upon the strategy described earlier. 
The different HCEs would communicate via local and 
national level TTPs, with all parties being authenticated 
by their local SMCs. Given that their workstations are 
equipped with cameras, the two consultants could 
potentially be authenticated by an image recognition 
system. However, the data production and data 
processing centres, utilising standard workstations, would 
have no facility for multimedia-enhanced authentication 
methods. Authentication of these parties would, 
therefore, be reliant upon the SMC facilities for activity 
supervision (possibly alongside traditional methods). 
The example is heavily communications oriented and the 
SMCs would communicate via the TTP hierarchy to 
authenticate and validate the various data exchanges and 
messages. The principal services required between HCEs 
A and B would be data integrity and confidentiality, 
whereas the HCE A/ HCE C link would also require that 
the consultants were unable to repudiate information 
messages added to the system. 
The example primarily illustrates the types of 
information exchange and consultations that the use of 
multimedia in healthcare will make possible. It also 
serves to underline the need for secure data 
communications between the various parties involved. 
The use of the TI'P / SMC hierarchy would ensure that 
security was consistent across the three sites involved; a 
factor that considerably reduces the potential problems of 
sharing data and facilities as discussed. 
CONCLUSION 
The need for security is not unique to multimedia-based 
systems - indeed, similar demands already exist in many 
operational healthcare applications. However, the 
important point is that introduction of multimedia will 
serve to increase the demands significantly. Neither is 
the proposed security strategy restricted to applications 
within healthcare establishments. However, the primary 
reliance upon software methods makes it particularly 
suited to HCEs, which are often more significantly 
financially constrained in relation to security than other 
types of organisation. 
Our group is currently involved in the development, 
implementation and evaluation of a prototype multimedia 
patient records system in co-operation with a local HCE. 
Security is being considered as a key issue the project, 
with elements of the proposed strategy being addressed. 
It is hoped that the research will also help to identify 
other considerations that arise from the practical 
implementation of multimedia in healthcare. 
The adoption and utilisation of multimedia technologies 
in healthcare is accelerating and it is likely that there will 
be a period of transition as research projects and pilot 
programmes (such as the EC 4th Framework) proceed in 
this area and produce their recommendations. From 
these, the principal uses and benefits of multimedia 
within healthcare will be established. We believe that it 
will be important for security issues to be considered 
during the planning and development of future systems, 
as the nature of the environment could well make it more 
difficult to securely integrate suitable protection later (or 
at least without it appearing to be an obvious 
afterthought). 
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SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN THE HEALTHCARE ENVIRONMENT 
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ABSTRACT 
Modern healthcare establishments are increasingly reliant upon information systems in all aspects of work 
and any compromise of their security may represent a significant threat to both the organisation and the 
patient. This paper discusses the increasing need for standardised levels of protection in healthcare 
computing systems and networks, outlining steps that have been taken to achieve this within European 
establishments. The paper then considers specific technical concepts that may be applied to improve security 
in healthcare at both local and international levels. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As with many other areas of society, the healthcare field has been significantly affected by the adoption of 
information technology. Modern establishments now utilise a wide variety of equipment, ranging from 
standalone PCs to minicomputer or mainframe systems, representing significant assets of the business. In 
addition, many organisations now incorporate links to remote sites via Wide Area Network (WAN) 
arrangements, with increasing volumes of data transmitted between different establishments. This is likely to 
increase still further with the proposed standardisation of computerised health records using a common data 
structure [1]. 
The adoption of information technology has been accompanied by an increase in the number and variety of 
medical applications, which now affect most areas of operation (including patient care, finance, staffing, 
administration and many more). As a result, healthcare professionals have become increasingly dependant 
upon the availability of computer systems and reliant upon the correctness of the data that they hold. 
The above trends highlight an increasing need for security in healthcare systems. Information systems 
may be compromised by a variety of accidental acts or by deliberate, malicious activity (e. g. hacking, fraud, 
virus infection and the like). As such it is now recognised that security issues must be considered during the 
design and development of new health information systems. In addition. security must also be added or 
enhanced in many existing systems, which were originally implemented without such considerations in mind 
and consequently have no standard arrangements. 
2. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN HEALTH CARE 
As with many other application areas, security requirements in healthcare are centred around the issues of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (2). These may be achieved by incorporating security services for 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation as defined by ISO [31. 
The nature of the healthcare environment tends to impose constraints on the types of protection that will 
be considered acceptable. For example, measures that greatly interfere with users abilities to perform their 
primary duties (e. g. care delivery) will not be tolerated. This points to a requirement for measures that are as 
simple and transparent as possible. In addition, financial cost is an important consideration as investment in 
security is often hard to justify against expenditure that would improve patient care. As a result, the use of 
software-based technologies may be a more realistic approach for widespread adoption than expensive 
hardware-oriented methods. 
Despite these constraints, the increased interconnection and sharing of data between different 
establishments heightens the need for uniform levels of protection throughout the healthcare community. 
3. BASELINE SECURITY FOR HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS 
The need for improved security is already recognised within Europe and has been addressed by the CEC 
SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in MEDicine) project, with which our group has 
been involved [4]. The objective of SEISMED is to provide practical security advice and guidance to all 
members of the healthcare community who are involved with the development, operation and management of 
information systems. 
Part of the project has been dedicated to the development of baseline security standards for existing 
systems and networks, describing the levels of protection that are considered appropriate for the healthcare 
environment. It is envisaged that these will eventually help to form a common reference for the security of 
healthcare systems within Europe. 
The guidelines for existing systems highlight ten key principles of security which must be considered : (1) 
security policy and administration; (2) physical security; (3) disaster planning and recovery; (4) personnel 
security; (5) information technology facilities management: (6) user identification and authentication; (7) 
system access control; (8) database security; (9) system maintenance: (10) legislation compliance. These 
principles encompass a very wide range of considerations, with coverage ranging from general security 
concepts to more specific technical measures. In addition, the networking of medical systems has been 
recognised as an important issue in its own right. Whilst networks offer significant opportunities for 
improving healthcare services (thanks to the increased availability and sharing of information), there are also 
inherent security considerations. Examples of network threats include wiretapping, message replay, message 
repudiation and user impersonation. The SEISMED guidelines for networks present a further set of baseline 
standards to counter these and other threats and are primarily based upon encryption. 
The definition of a health care baseline represents a significant step in achieving the desired 
standardisation of protection in the field. However, whilst the baseline standards provide comprehensive 
guidelines on "what" aspects of security should be considered, they do not attempt to describe in any great 
detail "how" technical measures may be best implemented. A comprehensive and flexible security system is 
needed that can be integrated into applications as required. The remaining sections outline how such a system 
may be realised in the health care environment. 
4. USE OF TRUSTED THIRD PARTY TECHNIQUES 
To meet the more specific network security requirements for both local and wide area systems a unique 
and unforgable identification of all potential users (perhaps on a global scale) is necessary. These identities 
must be authenticated and "binded" to the activity or data used in that session. A naming and registration 
policy and infrastructure based on the international standards and technical framework of X509 / ISO 9545.8 
[5] may be appropriate. Non-repudiation of the activities is required, together with confidentiality and data 
integrity during communication. Most methods to achieve these services are based on secret key cryptography 
and involve digital signatures, the encryption of data and the support of Trusted Third Party (ITP) 
infrastructures for wide scale use. 
The implementation of such an arrangement involves public key systems, such as the RSA algorithm, with 
smart card technology for transparency and case of use by the healthcare staff. The cards perform various 
cryptographic functions (the creation and verification of signatures, encryption / decryption of data, storage of 
secret keys and other sensitive data) and perform other special functions particular to the application. The 
TTPs act mainly as Certification Authorities for the digital signatures that they provide and, whilst they give a 
value-added service, must be trustworthy beyond the level of normal computer systems. 
In order to provide all the necessary functions on an international scale a network of TTPs is required, as 
shown in figure 1. At this level the infrastructure will be generic for all applications, but at the local domain 
and sub-domain levels (as shown in figures 2 and 3) specific operations can be incorporated to satisfy HCE 
security policies, with the UP being extended to a more comprehensive Security Management Centre (SMC) 
















Figure 2. TTP infrastructure at a national level 
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Figure 3. TTP infrastructure at a local level 
In order to guarantee the authenticity of certificates a hierarchical certification structure is used. This is 
shown in figure 4, along with the format of the certificates, illustrating how additional certification occurs at 
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Each TTP in the hierarchy is certified by the TTP in the next layer up, which not only provides credibility 
of the complete system by defining the individual certification path within a certificate. but allows for the loss 
of a hierarchical level under fault conditions (with the next higher order certificate being used). The 
arrangement is common to the X509 Directory services architecture. 
The TTP network can provide or verify signatures via the certificates, facilitating authentication and non- 
repudiation services. In addition, secret keys can be passed between users in a hybrid system where a 
symmetrical algorithm is used to provide confidentiality. Finally, integrity of data can be confirmed by the 
signing of a Message Authentication Code that is a hash function of the message. 
As previously mentioned, additional security services can be incorporated into the TTP overlay in the local 
HCE security domains. This is discussed in the next section. 
5. REAL-TIME SUPERVISION 
Whilst the UP will ensure the integrity and confidentiality of operations, an additional mechanism may 
be required within the local HCE domains to ensure that users are continually authenticated during their 
session and that they do not act outside their permitted bounds. A solution is to incorporate a real-time 
supervision system to detect unauthorised activity and strengthen standard authentication and access controls. 
The supervisor would use expert system techniques to compare user and process activities within the 
domain against models of normal and suspicious behaviour, thus revealing any potential security problems 
(i. e. if an activity is incompatible with normal behaviour or is compatible with suspicious behaviour then it 
may be an intrusion). These models may be represented by maintaining behavioural profiles (for normal 
activity) and using pre-determined intrusion indicators (for suspicious activity). 
It is considered that behaviour profiling may operate at 2 levels. At a high level it is possible to classify 
users according to their role within the HCE, developing general rules for acceptable activities within each 
class. In addition, lower level profiles can be developed for individual users by analysing their use of the 
system. Measurable characteristics may include application and file usage, typical access times and locations. 
individual keystroke / typing patterns and instances of login failures or access violations. Validation of 
activity against the high level profile should ensure that users are operating within their legitimate bounds, 
whilst the lower level also allows authentication of the subject according to the behavioural characteristics. 
The user-specific profiles would need to be refined over time to account for legitimate changes in behaviour. 
In addition to using profiles, the supervisor would monitor the system at a more general level to identify 
suspicious activities that may form part of compromise attempt. Examples of such indicators may include 
access of infrequently used files, consecutive access violations and extensive / frequent use of "help" systems. 
Whilst none of these events alone would be conclusive of an intrusion, they could be used as a trigger for more 
detailed monitoring or investigation. The disadvantage of this approach is that it will only cope with known 
intrusion scenarios. 
Supervision could operate continuously throughout a session or at random periods, depending upon factors 
such as system load and application sensitivity. In either case, it would operate transparently unless an 
intrusion was suspected (in which case the system manager would be alerted and / or other appropriate 
safeguards would be taken). 
The implementation of supervision in this manner is compatible with the desire for a software oriented 
approach to security as described in section 2. 
6. CONCLUSION 
A European-wide network is already operating on a prototype scale [7], with extensions to the HCE being 
designed at present. It is expected that this approach will provide a relatively cheap and simple to use 
service, facilitating effective security for health care establishments. 
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smart cards, require significant positive action on the 
part of users in order to be authenticated and may also be 
costly to implement on a large scale. 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to examine the applicability of 
simulation techniques to the testing and evaluation of 
computer security systems. Attention is specifically 
focused upon a relatively new area of security, namely 
advanced user authentication and supervision systems 
that are able to detect intrusions in real-time, based upon 
the comparison of user activities to predetermined 
behaviour profiles. The discussion is supported by the 
examination of a prototype monitoring system, based 
upon a simulation of the real-time analysis of user's 
typing characteristics. The paper also considers a 
number of inherent problems in simulating the operation 
of a security system. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in the complexity of information 
systems, networking and telecommunications 
technologies have dictated an increasing requirement for 
more advanced security systems to safeguard against 
accidental and deliberate damage to systems and data. 
Traditional approaches to user identity verification 
(principally passwords) can be considered increasingly 
inadequate as information system usage becomes an ever 
more routine part of society. The ability to utilise one 
system to access a multitude of others via global 
networks requires that user authentication be dependant 
upon more than just one (or a small series of) discrete 
judgement(s). In addition, it is desirable that 
mechanisms are incorporated that do not overburden the 
user with security responsibilities. However, even the 
more secure techniques available, such as the use of 
In light of such considerations it is increasingly desirable 
to redirect the focus of identity verification away from 
the user to being more of a system responsibility. An 
area of activity that supports this view is the 
development of advanced user authentication and 
supervision systems that aim to detect computer-based 
intrusions in real-time. These attempt to categorise 
various behavioural characteristics of legitimate users to 
form profiles of their normal system usage that can then 
be used as the basis for future identity verification and 
supervision (Lunt 1990; Bauer and Koblentz 1988). 
However, such intrusion detection systems are, by 
definition, more complex than traditional means of 
authentication and access control and, as a result, the 
issue of effectively testing them may be considered 
problematic. Testing can no longer be regarded as being 
simply a question of determining whether a particular 
security measure can be easily broken or bypassed 
(Robertson 1992). It is also necessary to get a measure 
of effectiveness (i. e. how successfully can genuine 
intrusions be detected without mistakenly disrupting 
legitimate activity). In addition, testing cannot be 
effectively conducted by an individual or even a small 
team. The very nature of the concept requires that many 
genuine examples of user activity must be used as the 
basis for testing which, in turn, dictates that a reasonably 
large and diverse group of test subjects must be involved. 
However, it would be impractical (and probably 
undesirable) to introduce such a system into a "live" 
environment until it is known to work effectively, 
otherwise its presence could disrupt legitimate work (e. g. 
by causing the false rejection of valid users). There is 
also the consideration that the use (or simulation) of 
intrusion scenarios in an operational environment would 
be a questionable proposition, as it could adversely affect 
system operation and potentially damage data. 
SIMULATION IN SECURITY SYSTEM TESTING 
& EVALUATION 
The considerations identified above highlight a 
significant requirement for off-line testing and 
evaluation of security systems, but in a context that will 
still provide a realistic measure of effectiveness. 
An approach to the problem is to carry out the testing of 
such new security systems in a simulation environment, 
but using behavioural information taken from actual user 
sessions. In this way, data relating to user actions could 
be "recorded" from genuine sessions and then 
subsequently replayed, off-line, into the security system 
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Fig. 1: Simulation in security system testing 
This approach has the advantage that testing can then 
occur away from any live operations, whilst still 
retaining the characteristics of genuine usage. In 
addition, the stored session data may be used to represent 
both legitimate users (when compared against the 
behaviour profile of their originator) and impostors 
(when compared against anyone else's profile). This 
latter point assumes that the profiled characteristics of 
any two users should not normally be similar enough to 
result in their behaviours being indistinguishable. 
However, whilst using genuine activities to represent 
impostors in this way would be sufficient to test the 
system from an identity verification viewpoint, it is 
unlikely that any examples of attempts to compromise 
system security would be observed. Therefore, in order 
to provide a comprehensive test of supervision, it is also 
desirable to introduce examples of deliberate intrusion 
attempts. A method by which these could be obtained 
would be to record the activities of professional "Tiger 
Teams" as they attempt to test security (Goldis 1989). 
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
This section describes the research teams 
implementation of a prototype intrusion monitoring 
application based on the concept of real-time keystroke 
analysis, highlighting areas in which simulation aspects 
were utilised (it should be noted that as the experimental 
study focuses upon a more specific aspect of intrusion 
monitoring than is discussed elsewhere in the paper, 
some of the points raised in other sections do not strictly 
apply to this system). 
Keystroke analysis provides a behavioural biometric 
measurement based upon distinctive characteristics of 
the users typing styles. When used in the context of an 
intrusion monitoring application, the technique may be 
used to provide a continuous and transparent means of 
verifying user identities in conjunction with their normal 
system activity. 
An experimental system, comprising three modules as 
listed below, was developed for the PC environment to 
allow an evaluation of the concept in practice : 
" Profiler 
Accepts reference typing samples in order to 
create profiles for legitimate users. 
Sampler 
Accepts additional user typing samples and 
stores all keystrokes and associated timings for 
later use. 
" Monitor 
Compares the typing samples against profiles to 
determine the effectiveness of the system, 
simulating the real-time entry of the sampled 
keystrokes. 
These elements fit broadly into the structure that was 
presented in figure 1, with sample entry equating to the 
on-line activity and the monitor module representing the 
off-line security system simulation. 
Tests were conducted involving 26 typists, with typing 
profiles being created based upon the average inter- 
keystroke times exhibited when entering specific 
character pairs (digraphs), with mean and standard 
deviation values being maintained for each pair. 
Subsequent supervision attempted to verify user identity 
by comparing incoming keystrokes against the relevant 
profiled values, with incompatible times being judged as 
invalid. If either the overall percentage or number of 
consecutive invalid keystrokes exceeded certain user- 
specific thresholds an impostor alert was raised. 
The aim of the investigation was to establish the 
impostor false acceptance rate (FAR) with a false 
rejection rate (FR. R) for valid users of 0%. 
Uses of simulation elements 
Simulation aspects were incorporated into the study in a 
number of ways : 
" the use of stored user typing samples (including 
inter-keystroke timing data) to simulate the entry 
and analysis of keystrokes in real-time; 
" the simulation of intrusion scenarios by using 
"non profile owner" typing samples as impostor 
inputs to the system. This allowed 
approximately 1300 impostor test cases to be 
derived from just 26 test subjects; 
A further potential use of simulation that was identified 
(although not extensively explored) was the ability to 
generate simulated impostor typing samples based upon 
data from the initial user profiles. This process would 
work as follows. After selecting some text as the basis 
for the test sample, the character digraphs within it could 
be extracted and matched against the associated mean 
and standard deviation values held in the profile chosen 
to represent the "impostor". Using the upper and lower 
limits of the standard deviation from the mean to define 
a valid range, a random value could then be generated to 
represent the impostor's inter-keystroke time for that 
digraph. For example, if the text contained the digraph 
"TH" and this had been profiled with mean of 121ms 
and standard deviation of 47ms, a valid range would be 
defined as below : 
74ms <--------- TH ----------> 168ms 
So a typical inter-keystroke time generated by this 
impostor might be 106ms. This process would continue 
throughout the entire text to create an appropriate test 
sample simulation. 
To make the sample even more realistic, the simulation 
could also take into account the maximum percentage of 
invalid keystrokes that the `"impostor" would generate 
against his / her own profile (given that profiles also 
maintain this value, for use as an authentication 
threshold). To this end, a further random element could 
be introduced by generating an appropriate proportion of 
keystroke times in the test sample incompatible with the 
host profile. 
Once generated, these simulated test samples could be 
used as a realistic means of testing the false acceptance 
rates against other user profiles (thus allowing a much 
more comprehensive test of the systems impostor 
detection effectiveness without requiring any further test 
subject involvement). It should be noted, of course, that 
these artificial samples would only be useful as 
"impostor" attempts. They could not be used to test 
legitimate user performance as the creation process 
would always ensure that they were compatible with the 
host profile. 
The desirability of using such artificially created samples 
has previously been identified by other research in this 
area (Brown and Rogers 1993), but in the more limited 
context of user name entry. The technique was not used 
to contribute to the results from our study that are 
described below, but would have been particularly useful 
had insufficient genuine test subjects been available to 
participate. 
Results and discussion 
The results obtained provided a number of useful 
indications regarding the effectiveness of keystroke 
analysis as an intrusion detection technique. From the 
1300 impostor cases that were used, a FAR of 15% was 
observed (which can be regarded as a "worst case" figure 
given that no false rejections occurred). Although this 
value is somewhat high, it should be remembered that 
keystroke analysis could be implemented as just one 
aspect of a more comprehensive intrusion monitoring 
system and, therefore, other factors could also be 
introduced that would compensate for the currently 
undetected cases. Of the detected cases, 49% were due 
to the percentage of invalid keystrokes observed, whilst 
the other 51% were due to consecutive invalid keystrokes 
entered by the impostors. 
Given that impostor detection was achieved in the 
majority of cases, the other important consideration was 
how quickly it occurred (i. e. how many keystrokes would 
the impostor have been able to enter before detection). 
This issue was also addressed by the study, and the 
results observed are shown in figure 2. This indicates 
the proportion of detections that occurred within each of 
five distinct keystroke ranges (based around 40 character 
blocks - equivalent to half a standard line of text). 
Fig. 2: Keystrokes before impostor detection 
It can be seen from this that the vast majority of 
impostors would be detected within 160 keystrokes. This 
result was also considered reasonably encouraging, 
although it is acknowledged that if intruders were of a 
particularly malicious nature, then they would possibly 
require somewhat less than 160 keystrokes in order to 
cause significant damage. 
The experimental study itself would have been 
considerably more difficult to conduct had the simulation 
element not been involved. With the test samples being 
obtained and stored, the study only required that subjects 
were available for a maximum of around an hour (much 
less with the faster typists). If the testing had had to be 
conducted in real-time, on an individual basis, it would 
have entailed repeated test sample entry and increased 
the subject availability requirements to such an extent as 
to make a large test group impractical. In addition, the 
prototype authentication system would need to have been 
installed on individual user systems - potentially 
disrupting their normal activities. 
A further point is that the simulation-based environment 
provided the ability to re-mount the experiment after re- 
configuration of various aspects of the system (e. g. user 
authentication thresholds, the number of recent 
keystrokes monitored, valid inter-keystroke ranges). 
This facility was used to allow the optimum monitoring 
configuration to be established. 
Finally, the establishment of a "worst case" FAR rating 
would not have been possible outside of a simulation 
environment. The ability to specifically configure the 
system allowed an FRR of 0% to be ensured, with 
successful impostor performance then being observed at 
this level. Conversely, the simulation could have been 
used to determine the level of false rejections with a 
guaranteed FAR of 0% (however, this approach was not 
pursued as rejection of legitimate users would be 
extremely undesirable in the context of a continuous 
monitoring system). 
A more detailed description of this study, the methods 
involved and the results obtained can be found in 
(Furnell 1995). 
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF SECURITY 
SYSTEM SIMULATION 
Even with simulated environments and intrusions there 
are still a number of considerations that complicate the 
issue of security testing. A principal point here is that 
many successful intrusions / system security breaches 
result from scenarios that were either unanticipated or 
overlooked by system designers. This is evidenced by 
the details of known abuse cases (Audit Commission 
1990) and also by the fact that, despite the many controls 
that are present in existing systems, around half of the 
detected cases of computer abuse are only discovered by 
chance (Audit Commission 1994). 
In addition, there may be difficulties associated with 
simulating the security environments. Keystroke 
analysis is quite a trivial example in this respect, 
whereas most other potential candidates for behaviour 
profiling (e. g. usage of operating system commands and 
applications) would require more complex simulation 
environments and would also demand that profiles were 
developed over a longer period than in the study 
described. 
Finally, there are a number of important aspects that the 
approach (as discussed) cannot address. These include 
issues such as the systems compatibility with other 
applications, processing overheads that may be incurred 
in a live environment and acceptability to end-users. As 
a result, there is still a need for system evaluation in the 
context of a live "pilot" study, but with the major 
question of effectiveness having largely been answered. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The provision of effective security still remains a key 
issue in the implementation of information systems. 
Whilst information technology has already affected most 
aspects of society (e. g. government, healthcare, policing 
and commerce), this has largely occurred in the context 
of "closed" systems. As formerly independent domains 
merge and share common global networks, the 
requirement for adequate security will increase still 
further. 
It is hoped that this paper has served to highlight how 
simulation techniques may have a useful role to play in 
the security field, targeting an approach to protection 
that is considered appropriate to the perceived needs of 
future systems. 
Our own study served to demonstrate various areas in 
which simulation could be involved in a practical context 
and proved how it could vastly improve the ease of 
testing in this type of system (with the results of the 
evaluation indicating the significant potential of 
keystroke analysis as an intrusion monitoring / user 
supervision technique). 
As information systems advance, it is envisaged that 
intrusion monitoring systems at this level and beyond 
will become increasingly more attractive. As such, the 
use of simulation approaches similar to that discussed 
will be ever more appropriate. 
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ABSTRACT 
The paper highlights the need for, and the benefits of 
using, simulation during the development and 
implementation of modern healthcare systems. Whilst 
healthcare establishments already utilise information 
systems in a wide variety of disciplines, the majority of 
systems are currently isolated, with patient records 
largely based upon manual methods. As such, it is 
envisaged that the establishment of composite, 
multimedia-based patient records would considerably aid 
care delivery. After a brief discussion of the advantages 
that this would bring, the paper proceeds to highlight 
how simulation can be employed to aid system design 
and development in a number of areas (including the 
user interface, records structure, security, networking 
requirements and the profiling of future application 
demands). The discussion is based upon work currently 
being conducted by the authors within a practical 
research project. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past twenty or more years computerised 
information systems have gradually been introduced to, 
and utilised within, a large number of Health Care 
Establishments (HCEs). Modern medical care requires 
the use of computerised systems to process, visualise and 
store vast amounts of information. The data produced by 
these more advanced medical systems consists of not 
only simple textual data but also digital images, full 
motion video, audio and visualised graphics (Nelson and 
Todd Elvins 1993). The use of computerised systems, 
both centralised and departmental, has resulted in HCEs 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN MODERN 
HEALTHCARE 
Computers now form an integral part of the process of 
administering and monitoring patient care. 
Additionally, computerised systems have also enabled a 
wide range of complex scanning and diagnostic 
procedures such as Computer Tomography (CT), 
Magnetic Resonance Image (MRI) and Ultrasonic 
Imaging to be offered (with the information gained then 
being utilised in the planning and delivery of further 
medical procedures). The increased use of information 
technology has resulted in clinicians being able to 
collect, generate, analyse and interpret ever greater 
amounts of patient data. The availability and quality of 
this data then enables the clinicians to prescribe and 
administer the most appropriate healthcare programme 
for the patient. 
However, at present, within many HCEs there are 
growing problems associated with the management and 
organisation of the rapidly proliferating amounts of both 
patient data and management / administrative 
information. Due to the fragmented development and 
implementation of the HCE information systems, there 
tends to be little or no integration or exchange of data 
between systems. The lack of information organisation, 
in conjunction with the sheer volume of data, can often 
result in decreased clinical efficiency, as more time is 
spent attempting to search for and retrieve data from 
different systems. Thus the benefits offered by the 
availability of increasingly comprehensive patient data 
are diminished and, therefore, in order to improve the 
situation data needs to be made more portable, 
accessible. comprehensible, and appropriately structured. 
It is widely envisaged that these problems could be 
overcome by the adoption of composite patient 
healthcare records, based around multimedia technology 
(Treves et al. 1992). 
ADVANTAGES OF A MULTIMEDIA-BASED 
HEALTHCARE RECORD 
The use of multimedia patient data in healthcare has 
already begun and will inevitably increase as more 
clinicians are afforded the opportunity to produce and 
utilise high quality data at a relatively low cost. There 
are currently two developmental paths to the production 
and utilisation of multimedia data within healthcare. 
The first is that offered by the ability to obtain "raw" 
data via advanced techniques such as MRI and CT, 
which can then be visualised, manipulated, rendered and 
animated by powerful workstations, to generate the 
desired end result. At present this route is expensive due 
to the data collection and manipulation tools required, 
although it is already implemented in larger HCEs. The 
other path is that offered by the PC, where technological 
advancement is now reaching the point where clinicians 
can produce high quality multimedia data (including 
video, audio, graphics, images and text) both easily and 
relatively inexpensively, 
Thus the way is clear for clinicians to be able to create 
and utilise multimedia clinical data. A composite 
multimedia record would improve the provision of 
patient care, as clinical decisions would be made with all 
the multimedia patient data available on one system, in 
the most easily comprehensible and informative manner. 
The ability to view patients records easily will in turn 
enable clinicians to more comprehensively assess patient 
needs, responses to treatments, and on-going progress 
and may aid clinical decision making. Thus the patient 
will benefit from the use of multimedia data, in that they 
will be prescribed the most appropriate care plans. In 
addition, the healthcare providers benefit from the 
comparative cost reductions facilitated by the 
administering of the most suitable patient care. 
The proposed system would ideally be able to integrate 
with any existing systems holding patient data, meet the 
desired user requirements, be secure against malicious or 
accidental intrusion, facilitate data communications 
within and between HCEs and be able to accommodate 
future medical advances and changes in working 
practices (Orozco-barbosa et al. 1992). 
However, the introduction and implementation of 
multimedia patient records may prove to be problematic 
if there are not accompanying advances and 
improvements in the structuring, integration, portability, 
accessibility and comprehensibility of the data generated. 
DEVELOPMENT OF A SIMULATION-BASED 
PROTOTYPE SYSTEM 
This section examines practical work that is being 
undertaken by the research team to help realise the 
composite multimedia healthcare record concept. The 
general background is discussed, followed by a 
description of the simulation aspects involved. 
Project Aims and Background 
The remit of the'project was to establish where the use of 
multimedia would be most applicable in healthcare and 
to define the structure, content and interfaces required 
for a multimedia-based records system. Additional 
considerations were the definition of most effective 
systems working practices, with the procedures required 
for the creation, appending, manipulation and 
management of the patient data. 
The systems development was based at Derriford 
Hospital, a major HCE local to the research team. In 
terms of information systems, this establishment is 
similar to numerous others in the UK. Apart from a 
centralised Patient Administration System (PAS - which 
is accessible from all departments), a few independent 
departmental systems and a number of specialised stand- 
alone machines, the majority of patient data is generated 
and maintained manually. 
It was established through interviews (described below) 
that the use of computers is alien to the majority of 
hospital personnel, with a worrying (and widely held) 
perception that computers will not form part of the future 
for healthcare. This view was generally based upon the 
belief that the computerisation of many operations and 
working practices would be costly and offer no real 
advantages. These factors suggested that the 
development of a simulation-based prototype would be 
the best way for the project to proceed, as this would 
allow an opportunity to demonstrate the future 
possibilities and benefits that would be offered, breaking 
down the resistance of the users. 
Research Methodology 
The task of developing a composite, multimedia records 
system is obviously immense. For this reason the scope 
of the study was limited, with a single department being 
selected to act as the "base" for the project. It was 
considered that the base should be a department in which 
there would be a number of opportunities for the 
introduction and use of multimedia patient data and one 
in which the patients are often referred to and between a 
number of closely associated departments over long 
treatment periods. As such, the Ear Nose and Throat 
(ENT) department was selected, with Radiology, Speech 
Therapy, Plastics, Microbiology, Dental Specialities and 
Maxillo-Facial departments as peripheral or closely 
associated referral departments. 
The research method selected was that of performing 
discursive interviews throughout the selected 
departments. A range of staff were covered, from 
consultants to secretaries, so that the full scope of the 
departmental operations could be assessed. The data 
obtained was then used to create a prototype system 
which would then undergo recursive refinements. The 
desired system requirements and established working 
practices, along with user and departmental data 
exchanges and paths, were then abstracted and modelled 
from the interview results. 
A significant issue in the design of the system was 
ensuring integration with current, and possible future, 
clinical practices. To this end, clinical staff were asked 
to identify "core non-flexible" and "core flexible" 
clinical and administrative practices and procedures. 
The "core non-flexible" practices and procedures were 
those which it would be impractical to change to any 
extent and which must, therefore, be maintained whether 
the patient records system was computerised or not. The 
"flexible" practices were those which could be re- 
engineered so long as the desired end result was still 
achieved. 
The "non-flexible" practices tended to be made so by 
being either time sensitive (e. g. the requirement for 
immediate clinical reporting of results within the 
Radiology department, as delays could potentially 
compromise patient health) or a matter of established 
medical convention or clinical practice (e. g. that 
departmental appointments are always made internally). 
As such, the departments involved would find it 
impractical to perform them in any other way. 
The "flexible" practices were those which could be made 
easier by the computerisation of the Patient Records 
System. These included the ordering and tracing of 
patient notes, the appending of data, and the searching 
for clinical details. 
The interviews also established where it would be 
clinically appropriate to generate the multimedia data 
which would be used within the proposed records 
system. The selected departments each considered 
where, within their clinical discipline, it would desirable 
to obtain multimedia patient data (for instance, when 
would it be desirable to have video data of the patient, 
and what were the practicalities of generating it 7). 
Uses of Simulation 
Having used the interviews to establish the basic system 
requirements, the study could proceed to consider 
prototype implementation. 
It is envisaged that once an initial prototype is developed 
and in-place at the hospital, simulation will form the 
core of its future development. A cross section of users 
will initially simulate the typical everyday use of a small 
number of demonstration multimedia patient records. 
From this the desired systems interface can be 
established. A number of different records structure 
styles can be offered, with the users then determining 
which is easiest to use. Different clinical scenarios will 
be simulated, which will require the records to be 
manipulated in a number of different ways, 
From the record usage simulations a comprehensive 
range of individual record search options will be defined. 
These will indicate and define those data items and 
criteria (such as previous surgery, previous treatments, 
current and past medication, family history, noted 
medical conditions, etc. ) by which the records need to be 
searched. 
Once the use of individual records has been simulated, 
the project will move on to simulate a system dealing 
with a number of records, defining the functionality 
required with respect to multiple records. The users will 
be able to define the searches, and other functions, which 
the system must be able to perform between separate 
multimedia patient records. Thus at the end of the 
record usage simulation stage the preferred user 
interface, record structure, and intra and inter"rccord 
functionality will have been defined. 
The next stage will be to simulate record creation and 
maintenance. Simulation in a real clinical environment 
will enable the clinicians to determine where, and when, 
it is practical to obtain multimedia patient data. The 
data collection processes must not intrude upon, or 
compromise, clinical working practices. The staff must 
then simulate the editing of the patient data, and the 
record appending practices required, again in a manner 
which integrates with other working practices. 
Simulation will, therefore, enable the users to define and 
develop the most suitable practices for the collection, 
processing and maintenance of the multimedia patient 
record data. If these procedures can be made as simple 
and easy as possible then users, both clinical and 
administrative, will be far more inclined to pursue the 
use of multimedia in healthcare. The simulation 
environment may then be extended beyond this to 
consider other important aspects relating to multimedia 
records system implementation, including security, 
network requirements and additional functionality. 
The requirements for data security can be considered and 
various approaches simulated. It is envisaged that the 
multimedia context will require an approach to security 
that is as transparent as possible, so as not to 
unnecessarily detract from the otherwise user-friendly 
nature of the environment (Furnell et al. 1995). 
As an example, whilst user authentication could 
principally be based around a traditional password 
approach, it might be desirable to evaluate more friendly 
(and secure) methods within the context of the 
simulation environment. Alternatives could include the 
use of smart cards, real-time supervision systems 
(verifying identity by analysing factors of user behaviour 
such as typing styles and application usage) and / or 
various biometric identification techniques that might be 
feasibly implemented using existing multimedia 
hardware (e. g. faceprint or voice recognition). Through 
the simulation study, appropriate techniques or 
combinations could be established as required by 
different user groups. 
There will also be a need for security restrictions at the 
departmental and user levels to control access, 
modification and deletion of different aspects of the 
overall records. 
Once the security aspect has been simulated, the study 
can move on to define aspects of the systems network 
requirements and possible additional functionality. The 
users will continue to simulate the everyday use of the 
system, but it will be extended to include additional 
features. These will include a range of departmental 
administrative, clinical audit, and management 
functions. A number of the proposed functions will 
reference the patient records data, whilst others will 
reference other data sources, some localised and some 
remote. 
At this point the prototype simulation will not only be 
defining the desired additional system functionality, but 
will be helping to determine the systems integration and 
network requirements. By simulating the additional 
system functionality, the simulation will be able to 
establish those existing, or proposed, hospital systems 
from which data will need to be accessed. Thus the 
system integration requirements will be defined. The 
systems networking requirements will also be eluded to 
by the simulation of the additional functionality. From 
the use of the prototype it will be possible to determine 
the quantities of non-localised data required by the users, 
the data types required over the networks, and the 
acceptable system data throughput and response times, 
as well as the types and quantities of data transmitted by 
the users. Hence the simulation will give an indication 
of the systems network requirements. Security of data 
communications could also be considered here, with the 
simulation study considering various techniques that 
may be appropriate to ensure the confidentiality and 
integrity of transmitted data, as well as requirements for 
non-repudiation services (AIM SEISMED 1994). 
The system simulation will also provide a valuable 
insight into the systems usage patterns with respect to 
the user types and help to determine the optimum 
working practices and duty ranges, for the different user 
types within the base department. Different systems 
operational modes may be simulated, in which the 
different user groups have subtly varying roles and duty 
ranges. From the simulation results the departments 
optimal operational mode can be established, thereby 
maximising systems and departmental efficiency. 
CONCLUSIONS 
At the end of the project, after the use of simulation as a 
development technique, in conjunction with the 
progressive implementation, extension and refinement of 
the prototype system, the users will obtain not a fully 
defined system but one which a least starts to address 
and overcome the numerous problems associated with 
the development of a multimedia healthcare records 
system. 
A simulation study as described would allow time for 
end users to become more familiar with the technology 
involved and would hopefully result in the development 
of a system which is of real benefit to them. The 
experimental period would also enable the clinicians to 
determine where, and to what extent, the use of 
multimedia patient data is most advantageous. The in- 
place use of a simulated prototype appears to be the only 
real option for the development of suitable systems as it 
is only through such an approach that the desired end 
result will be achieved. 
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Abstract 
As modern healthcare establishments become increasingly dependent upon information 
systems it is vital to ensure that adequate security is present to safeguard the 
confidentiality and integrity of data and the availability of systems. Whilst this is now 
generally recognised in the design of new systems, many existing operational systems 
have been implemented without security in mind. This paper describes the need for a 
standardised approach in the protection of existing healthcare systems within Europe 
and presents an overview of a new set of information security guidelines that have been 
developed specifically for the medical community. 
The guidelines discussed have been produced as a deliverable of the Commission of 
European Communities (CEC) SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information 
Systems in Medicine) project, under the Advanced Informatics in Medicine (AIM) 
programme. 
1 Introduction 
The increasing accessibility of information technology (IT) systems during recent years 
has had a significant effect upon the healthcare field. Many healthcare establishments 
(HCEs) now operate heterogeneous IT environments with equipment ranging from 
standalone PCs to minicomputer and mainframe installations. 
The influence of information systems can now be seen in most areas of healthcare 
operation, with an ever increasing number and variety of medical applications. In 
addition, IT also facilitates the exchange of medical data between different HCEs at 
both national and international levels. A significant result of these advances is that 
healthcare professionals have become increasingly dependant upon the availability of 
systems and reliant upon the correctness of the data that they hold. 
As the adoption of information technology has increased so too has the requirement to 
protect the systems and the information they store. Healthcare systems may be 
vulnerable to a variety of accidental or deliberate threats and, as such, it is now 
recognised that security issues must be considered during the development and 
implementation of new health information systems to maintain the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the data held. Unfortunately, a significant proportion of 
operational healthcare systems were originally designed and implemented with 
inadequate security and, as a result, security must also be added or enhanced in many 
existing systems. 
2 The AIM SEISMED Project 
The issue of information security in healthcare has been addressed by the CEC 
SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in Medicine) project, part of 
the Advanced Informatics in Medicine (AIM) programme [1]. 
The objective of SEISMED is to provide practical security advice and guidance to all 
members of the healthcare community who are involved in the management, 
development, operation or maintenance of information systems. The eventual aim is to 
establish a consistent framework for the protection of medical data across the 
European Union. 
The project commenced at the beginning of 1992 with an original duration of 3 years, 
but this was subsequently extended for a further 6 months (until mid-1995). A total of 
14 workpackages were established, each addressing a separate aspect of healthcare 
security. Five European HCEs (located in the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
the Czech Republic) were selected to act as Reference Centres for the project, 
commenting upon and ensuring the viability of the recommendations made. 
The problem of securing existing systems was addressed by workpackage SP07, the 
scope of which was to produce a comprehensive set of recommendations for the 
addition (or enhancement) of security in operational healthcare systems and 
environments. The principal objectives of this workpackage were : 
" to produce guidelines on the level of protection that should be attached to 
existing operational healthcare systems; 
" to provide guidance as to how this level of security may be achieved; 
" to revise the approach based upon Reference Centre feedback. 
Whilst various guidelines and standards for IT security have previously been 
developed, none have specifically targeted the needs of the medical community at a 
European level. The new guidelines are intended to provide a common source of 
reference for European healthcare establishments and are relevant to (and will affect) 
all categories of personnel. 
3 Baseline Security Recommendations for Healthcare Establishments 
In order to assess current security practice and attitudes within European 
establishments a survey was distributed to HCEs in 11 community countries [2]. 
Amongst other things, this allowed a broad assessment of existing systems to be made 
and revealed a significant variety in both the types of system in use (i. e, hardware, 
operating systems and applications) and the levels of security provided. For example, 
whilst virtually all systems included some form of user authentication mechanism (even 
if only a simple password in some cases), the attention given to other aspects of 
security (e. g. disaster recovery, physical protection and auditing) was, in general, 
significantly less. Furthermore, the variety of techniques used to address a single 
aspect of protection indicated anything but a standardised approach (e. g. the types of 
authentication mechanisms variously utilised include individual passwords, shared 
passwords, challenge-response mechanisms and other methods - with likely 
inconsistency between similar systems). 
It was considered that, in many cases, the disparity indicated by the survey had resulted 
from the lack of appropriate standards and guidance, with HCEs being unclear over 
both general security issues and the level they should aim for. The most appropriate 
strategy for improving the situation was, therefore, considered to be the definition of 
baseline recommendations for security, to provide a common foundation for all HCEs. 
This immediately raises the question of what level of security should be specified. The 
nature of the healthcare environment, with the inherent requirements to maintain 
patient safety and confidentiality, demands that protection should generally be higher 
than in many other domains. As a result, the security requirements extend beyond the 
levels proposed by many existing standards. 
The new baseline recommendations have been developed to satisfy the following aims : 
" to represent a minimum acceptable standard for the security of operational 
healthcare systems and their associated environments; 
" to be usable by all HCEs and staff within Europe; 
" to allow a straightforward means of validating existing systems security to 
ensure compliance. 
The development of the resulting guidelines was based upon an interactive approach, 
in close co-operation with the SEISMED Reference Centres and in consultation with 
other independent healthcare professionals. 
From the outset it was established that the recommendations should address more than 
the just the host system in isolation. Indeed, to provide comprehensive protection, 
several aspects of security must be considered : 
" logical / system-based controls; 
" physical and environmental protection; 
" personnel procedures; 
" policy and administration issues. 
On the basis of these high level requirements, existing IT security guidelines and 
standards [3,4,5] were used in conjunction with suggestions from within the project to 
formulate initial recommendations. These were progressively refined and enhanced 
over time on the basis of Reference Centre feedback and comments from independent 
healthcare personnel. This procedure provided the principal criteria for retention, 
addition or removal of guideline recommendations. 
4 An Overview of Existing Systems Guidelines 
The final Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems [6] are grouped under 
10 key principles of protection, representing the main elements governing the security 
of existing healthcare information systems (having been agreed in detail with the 
Reference Centres). The principles are denoted by ESP followed by a unique reference 
code, as listed in table 1 below. 
Code Title 
ESPO100 Security Policy & Administration 
ESP0200 Physical & Environmental Security 
ESP0300 Disaster Planning & Recovery 
ESP0400 Personnel Security 
ESP0500 Training and Awareness 
ESP0600 Information Technology Facilities Management 
ESP0700 Authentication & Access Control 
ESPO800 Database Security 
ESP0900 System Maintenance 
ESP1000 Legislation Compliance 
Table 1: Existing Systems Security Principles 
Each of the principles has a number of associated guidelines. These represent the 
specific security concepts or countermeasures that should be considered by the HCE to 
meet the requirements of a given principle. As established earlier, the consideration of 
existing systems encompasses a very broad range of issues and the overall coverage 
consequently extends from general concepts to specific technical measures. 
The 10 protection principles are described in more detail below. In each case the 
general purpose of the principle is stated, along with a list of the main issues that are 
covered by the underlying guidelines (the overall number of guidelines pertaining to 
each principle is given alongside its title). 
1. Security Policy & Administration (5 guidelines) 
General Principle 
A formal policy will provide clear direction and support for security within the 
HCE. Policy is formulated from the senior managerial level, with subsequent 
guidance provided to all levels of staff. Correct administration of and adherence 
to the policy should ensure the effectiveness of HCE security controls. 
Main issues : 
" the need for a security policy; 
" policy awareness issues; 
" co-ordination and administration of security; 
" use of specialist security personnel. 
2. Physical & Environmental Security (22 guidelines) 
General Principle 
The generally open nature of HCEs and their high degree of public access dictates 
that physical security measures are a vital first stage of protection to prevent 
unauthorised access to computing equipment and facilities. Systems must also be 
safeguarded against a variety of environmental hazards that may adversely affect 
operation. 
Main issues : 
" physical access control; 
" security of HCE equipment; 
" protection against natural disasters; 
" environmental controls; 
" various procedural measures. 
3. Disaster Planning & Recovery (7 guidelines) 
General Principle 
The continuous availability of Information Systems is essential to the operation of 
a modern HCE. It is essential that adequate plans are made to ensure the level of 
availability needed by the HCE can be maintained in the event of any catastrophe. 
Recovery of IT systems should be a component of an overall HCE disaster 1 
recovery plan. 
Main issues : 
continuity planning (development, testing and update); 
fallback arrangements; 
post-disaster procedures and controls. 
4. Personnel Security (8 guidelines) 
General Principle 
The major security weakness of many systems is not the technology but the people 
involved. Many organisations are extremely vulnerable to threats from their own 
staff and, as a result, even the most comprehensive technical controls will not 
guarantee absolute security. There are, however, a number of personnel-related 
measures that can be introduced to help reduce the risks. 
Main issues : 
" staff recruitment; 
" contractual agreements promoting security; 
" security during normal working practices; 
" staff appraisal and monitoring; 
" termination of employment. 
5. Training & Awareness (6 guidelines) 
General Principle 
Information systems security can only be maintained if all personnel involved in 
their use know, understand and accept the necessary precautions. Many breaches 
are the result of incorrect behaviour by general staff who are unaware of security 
basics. The provision of security training and awareness will make it possible for 
staff to consider the security implications of their actions and avoid creating 
unnecessary risks. 
Main issues : 
" the need for general security awareness; 
" specific areas that must be addressed (job training, use of information systems); 
" recommendations for internal / HCE training and awareness initiatives; 
" use of specialist training courses; 
" assignment of responsibilities for training. 
6. Information Technology Facilities Management (31 guidelines) 
General Principle 
A variety of activities can be identified that are related to the normal day-to-day 
use and administration of information systems. All categories of HCE personnel 
(management, technical and general users) have responsibilities that must be 
addressed in order to maintain security in this area. 
Main issues : 
" system planning and control; 
" the importance of maintaining back-ups; 
" media controls; 
" auditing and system monitoring; 
" virus controls; 
" documentation issues. 
7. Authentication & Access Control (28 guidelines) 
General Principle 
It is essential that IT systems are protected by comprehensive logical access 
controls. Access should be guaranteed for legitimate users and denied to all others. 
All classes of user must be identified and authenticated before any access is 
granted and further mechanisms must control subsequent reading, writing, 
modification and deletion of applications and data. There should be no method for 
bypassing any authentication or access controls. HCE users are unlikely to be 
satisfied with controls that intrude upon working practices and chosen schemes 
should be transparent and convenient in order to gain acceptance. 
Main issues : 
" requirements for user identification and authentication; 
" password issues; 
" system and object access restrictions; 
" methods of control; 
" access in special cases (e. g. system management, third parties, temporary staff). 
8. Database Security (21 guidelines) 
General Principle 
Database security is concerned with the enforcement of the security policy 
concerning the disclosure, modification or destruction of a database system's data. 
Databases are fast becoming very important for HCEs. Over 90% of today's IT 
systems contain some kind of database and the value of information stored is now 
widely recognised as a major asset, far more important than any other software. 
However, databases also introduce additional security concerns (e. g. granularity, 
inference, aggregation, filtering, journaling etc. ) and therefore warrant specific 
consideration. 
Main issues : 
" control of medical database software; 
" organisation and administration of HCE database systems; 
" database operation issues. 
9. System Maintenance (S guidelines) 
General Principle 
System maintenance activities merit special consideration given the opportunities 
that exist to affect the operation of the system. Unauthorised or uncontrolled 
changes to any aspect of an operational system could potentially compromise 
security and, in some cases, endanger life. Maintenance must therefore be carried 
out in accordance with well-defined procedures. 
Main issues : 
controls to prevent unauthorised changes to and upgrades of HCE software, 
vendor software and operating systems; 
requirements for testing and acceptance. 
10. Legislation Compliance (S guidelines) 
General Principle 
Specific levels of protection may be demanded in order to comply with national 
and European legislative requirements, as well to satisfy internal HCE policy. 
Whilst the guidelines highlight the most basic requirements, this principle 
represents an ongoing process which must take account of any new legislation that 
may be relevant, as well as ensuring compliance with existing standards. 
Main issues : 
" data protection; 
" abuse of information systems; 
" prohibition of "pirated" software; 
" compliance with internal security standards; 
" retention and protection of business records. 
5 HCE Target Audiences 
It should be evident that many of the issues covered are not relevant to all HCE staff 
As such, the Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems are targeted at three 
main staff groups (as shown in figure 1), with separate guideline sets having been 
developed for each audience. 
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Fig. 1: HCE target audiences 
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Whilst all three sets draw upon the same core principles, they nevertheless differ 
dramatically in terms of the type and quantity of information presented. The anticipated 
readership and general content of each set is as follows : 
The General guideline set is aimed at the majority of HCE staff; ', including 
clinicians, administrators and general system users. Guidelines are 
presented for user reference during day-to-day use of HCE information 
systems, highlighting what they can do to safeguard security. 
The Management set primarily targets the senior decision makers within 
the HCE, who will be responsible for defining security policy (although a 
significant number of points will also be relevant at department / line 
management level). This set is intended to highlight areas in which 
management should be directly involved and also improve management 
security awareness by explaining /justifying the importance of other more 
technical guidelines (for which management approval will be required). 
The IT & Security Personnel set is aimed at IT staff, system 
administrators, security officers and other support staff who will be most 
likely to have the lower level responsibilities for implementing security. 
This is the most detailed of the subsets and should be a key source of 
reference for implementation and validation of security. 
The Management and IT & Security audiences would also be expected to read and 
observe the General guideline set. 
6 Implementing the recommendations 
The Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems should be applied in any 
European Healthcare Establishment with existing operational information systems 
(where the term Healthcare Establishment refers to any establishment providing 
medical services, research, training or health education). They will be relevant even 
where systems are thought to include security provision, so that the level of protection 
can be validated against the recommendations. 
However, given the diverse nature of European healthcare environments and systems, 
it is impossible to specify precise guidelines for implementation. Establishments will 
differ in terms of both the information systems used, as well as financial, operational 
and other constraints that may apply. These issues will all have bearing on the 
applicability of the recommendations and the guidelines therefore concentrate more on 
describing what aspects of security should be considered rather than how they may be 
best implemented (with broad recommendations that should be compatible, to at least 
some degree, with the majority of systems and environments) 
Despite these attempts to ensure applicability, it is still conceivable that some 
guidelines may not be suitable for all systems. As such, implementors must use their 
discretion in cases where guidelines are genuinely inappropriate to the environment. 
However, recommendations should be followed as closely as possible and in some 
cases the implementation of a guideline will depend upon others already being in place 
(which is made clear from the guideline context and / or cross-references to other 
points). 
As for the implementation strategy itself, it would obviously be impractical to attempt 
to address all of the suggestions at once due to constraints of cost and likely disruption 
to services. A phased approach is, therefore, advised in which each principle is 
considered in turn to identify the areas in which the HCE / department is currently 
deficient. The individual guidelines may then be assessed to determine implementation 
priorities based upon local requirements. 
Further work within the SEISMED project has resulted in the development of the 
methodology SIM-ETHICS (Security Implementation Methodology - Effective 
Technical and Human Implementation of Computer based Systems) which may be used 
to assist with the implementation of these and other SEISMED guidelines [7]. The 
methodology is based upon the concept of participational management, using groups 
of users and managers to carry out a hypothetical implementation of chosen security 
countermeasures. This provides a means of highlighting any problems which may 
occur, which may then be overcome in advance of the actual implementation. 
Finally, the Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems should not be 
considered in isolation and a number of the other SEISMED guideline deliverables are 
also relevant in the context of existing systems. These include specific guidelines 
relating to high-level security policy, system development and implementation, network 
security and data encryption. 
7 Potential Problems 
Whilst the new recommendations are intended to provide a simple and straightforward 
means of addressing healthcare security issues, it is recognised that problems may 
exist. 
Firstly, many establishments may currently be operating with security significantly 
below the recommended level and progression to the required level may be a non- 
trivial task. As mentioned in the discussion of implementation, HCEs may face a 
number of constraints that affect their ability to address security requirements. For 
example, cost (in terms of finance, performance and practicality) will be a significant 
factor in determining acceptability. Financial cost will be particularly relevant, given 
that expenditure for direct care activities is likely to receive higher priority than 
security. In addition, organisational constraints will play a role in so far as 
recommendations will need to integrate with existing practice (or at least not conflict 
too greatly) in order to gain acceptance. If such constraints are present, establishments 
should bear in mind that every guideline implemented will improve the security of their 
systems. 
Conversely, some environments and / or applications may demand a level of security 
significantly higher than the proposed baseline. In these cases a risk analysis review is 
recommended in order to determine the level of additional protection that is necessary. 
A specifically designed healthcare protection methodology, that has also been 
developed by this group, could be utilised for this purpose [8]. 
8 Conclusions 
In conclusion, it is believed that the guidelines have fulfilled the objectives of this phase 
of the SEISMED project and will provide a solid foundation for the improvement of 
security within existing HCE systems. 
Whilst the principles will remain relatively static, it is expected that the underlying 
guidelines will require periodic updates to account for changes within the healthcare 
field or in the types of information system technology available (e. g. the increasing use 
of multimedia systems may introduce new considerations). Changes within the local 
HCE (e. g. organisational structure, medical applications and practices) may also 
necessitate re-evaluation of some recommendations. 
The guidelines will now form the basis of a further SEISMED workpackage dedicated 
to the validation of the projects recommendations. This will include full trials of the 
guidelines at the Reference Centres and will provide an extensive test of their 
applicability in practice. It is anticipated that the Reference Centres themselves will 
then be able to document their findings in due course. 
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The increasing use of and reliance upon information technology within modern 
healthcare establishments underlines a need for adequate security controls to protect 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of systems and data. Whilst the 
consideration of security is now generally accepted as part of the design and 
implementation of new systems, many systems are already in operation in which these 
needs have not been adequately addressed. This paper presents a summary of the 
recommendations arising from the AIM SEISMED (Secure Environment for 
Information Systems in MEDicine) project relating to the addition and enhancement of 
security in existing healthcare systems. 
The paper is based upon material originally presented at the SEISMED Workshop 
`Security and Legal Aspects of Advanced Health Telematics'; Brussels, 11 July 1994. 
The content has been revised in light of the workshop discussion and the further 
development of the guidelines since that time. 
1 Introduction 
The adoption of information technology has had a significant effect upon modern 
healthcare establishments (HCEs). Information systems are now utilised in most 
aspects of HCE operation, affecting areas from administration through to direct clinical 
care. It is, therefore, likely that healthcare professionals will become increasingly more 
reliant upon such systems to support routine working practices. As such, there is an 
increasing need for security controls to preserve the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of systems and data. 
However, a significant proportion of operational healthcare information systems were 
originally implemented without security needs having been properly addressed. This 
point was underlined by the results of the Survey and Risk Analysis investigations 
conducted within the SEISMED project, both of which revealed significant variety in 
the types of information systems in use and the levels of security currently provided. 
As a result, methods are required by which security may be added or enhanced in these 
scenarios without rendering the systems unusable or uneconomic. 
Presented at SEISMED Workshop by Dr Barry Barber, NHS Information Management Centre, 
Birmingham, United Kingdom. 
2 Security in Existing Healthcare Systems 
The security of existing systems was addressed within SEISMED by workpackage 
SP07, `Security in Existing Operational Systems" The stated objectives of the 
workpackage from the outset of the project were as follows : 
" to provide guidelines on the level of protection that should be attached to 
existing operational health care systems; 
" to provide guidelines as to how the appropriate level of security in existing 
systems may be achieved; 
" to revise the approach based on Reference Centre feedback. 
The final deliverable of the workpackage was a comprehensive set of guidelines for 
adding security into existing systems. 
2.1 Approaches for securing existing systems 
As a result of discussions within the project two approaches were determined for 





Fig. I: Approaches to existing systems security 
It is proposed that baseline guidelines should be considered in all cases, with protection 
profiles being utilised in especially sensitive scenarios. Both approaches are outlined in 
the sections that follow. 
3 Baseline Security Guidelines 
An early realisation was that the nature of the healthcare environment demands a 
standard (or baseline) level of security that is considerably higher than in many other 
fields. 
Whilst various guidelines already exist for IT security in general, none have specifically 
targeted the medical community at a European level. A healthcare-specific baseline 
was, therefore, developed in close consultation with the SEISMED Reference Centres 
(and other independent healthcare professionals) to satisfy the following aims : 
" to represent the minimal acceptable standard for security in healthcare 
establishments; 
" to be usable by all HCEs and staff; 
" to allow straightforward validation of existing systems against the baseline to 
ensure compliance. 
Several interim generations of guidelines were produced during the course of the 
project for consideration by the Reference Centres. These were progressively refined 
and enhanced until a suitable set of final recommendations were produced [1]. 
3.1 Guideline Content 
It was established from the outset of the work that, in order to provide comprehensive 
protection, any security guidelines for host systems would need to address more than 
just recommendations relating to a system in isolation. As such, the inclusion of 
guidelines for physical protection, personnel security and policy measures were all 
considered equally important. 
On this basis a total of 138 guidelines for host systems security were developed. These 
are logically grouped according to 10 key principles of security as listed in table 1 
below. The principles were chosen to represent the main elements governing the 
security of existing healthcare information systems. 
Principle 
Code 
Title Number of 
Guidelines 
ESP0100 Security Policy and Administration 5 
ESP0200 Physical & Environmental Security 22 
ESP0300 Disaster Planning & Recovery 7 
ESP0400 Personnel Security S 
ESP0500 Training and Awareness 6 
ESP0600 Information Technology Facilities Management 31 
ESP0700 Authentication & Access Control 28 
ESP0800 Database Security 21 
ESP0900 System Maintenance 5 
ESP 1000 Legislation Compliance 5 
Table 1: Principles of Existing Systems Security 
It should be noted that the guidelines for database security present a sub-set of the 
information contained in the independent Database Security deliverable (2]. 
The underlying guidelines from each principle describe the concepts and 
countermeasures that should be adopted in order to achieve the recommended baseline 
security level. Coverage ranges from general concepts to specific technical issues. 
3.2 Target Audiences 
With such a broad coverage of areas it is to be expected that much of the material will 
be inappropriate to certain categories of staff. As such, three distinct sets of guidelines 
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Fig. 2: HCE Target Audiences 
However, the guideline sets are not totally independent and it is expected that the 
Management and IT & Security Personnel audiences will also read the General 
guideline set. Therefore, any General guidelines that are also applicable to the more 
specialised audiences are not duplicated in the other documents (unless new details 
have been added that are specific to the audience in question). 
The focus of each guideline set is as follows : 
" The General guidelines are aimed at the majority of HCE staff, including 
clinicians, administrators and general information system users. It is 
envisaged that a summary of the main points would be provided to staff as a 
basis for general day to day reference (50 guidelines). 
" The Management guidelines primarily target the senior decision makers 
within the HCE, who will be responsible for defining security policy (61 
guidelines). 
" The IT & Security Personnel set is aimed at personnel such as IT staff, 
system administrators and security officers who will be responsible for 
implementing security (122 guidelines). 
As an illustration of how the emphasis is altered for each target audience, the following 
example guidelines (all relating to the need to formulate and observe a Security Policy 
Document and taken from the Security Policy & Administration principle) may be 
considered : 
''All users should acquaint themselves with the HCE security policy 
and observe any general regulations as well as any that may 
specifically apply to their role or department. " 
fl "Written documentation detailing HCE security policy (or a 
synopsis of the main points) must be available to all personnel. It 
should contain a clear definition of information security, as well as a 
clear and unambiguous explanation of the objectives and scope in 
relation to the HCE. The specific principles and guidelines 
implemented by the HCE should also be detailed. " 
"Technical staff should provide relevant expertise to assist 
management in the formulation of the HCE security policy. They 
should subsequently acquaint themselves with the policy in full and 
observe any general regulations as well as any that may specifically 
apply to their role or department. " 
4 System Classification and Profiling 
Whilst the recommendations presented by the guidelines are considered to be 
comprehensive, it is envisaged that the baseline level of protection may not be 
sufficient for some sensitive healthcare application areas. As a result, it will be 
necessary for the further security requirements of these HCEs / systems to be 
established on an individual basis. 
However, some establishments may consider a full risk analysis study for each 
individual system to be prohibitive in terms of both financial cost and time. This 
highlights the requirement for a simplified means by which additional security needs 
can be identified in such cases. 
A potential approach identified within SEISMED is for existing systems to be classified 
according to predetermined "protection profiles", selected via an accompanying 
methodology [3]. The basis for such an approach is the classification of existing 
healthcare information systems using an appropriate combination of the key elements 






Fig. 3: Elements of Existing System Profiles 
It is possible to divide each of these elements into a number of further sub-categories. 
For example, the computer configuration is assessed on the basis of whether the 
machines involved are desktop PCs, portables or mini / mainframe systems and 
whether any networking aspects are involved. Protection related factors of the 
operational environment include the physical location, the nature of the buildings in 
which the system is housed and, finally, the number and mixture of people involved. 
Data sensitivity is assessed on the basis of the types and uses of data in the host system. 
A series of generic categories for both factors are included in the methodology (in the 
form of a healthcare generic data model), with associated impact ratings for 
information disclosure, denial, modification and destruction. 
The configuration and environment elements are considered to determine the basic 
protection requirements of a system (i. e. regardless of how it is actually used), with the 
assessment of data sensitivity building upon this to complete the profile. A series of 
predetermined profiles would exist for each element type (e. g. computer configuration 
profiles for personal, portable and mainframe systems), detailing the countermeasures 
required to deliver protection at different levels of sensitivity. These can be combined 
to represent many typical HCE information system scenarios and thereby describe an 
appropriate set of overall security countermeasures. 
In practice, the main stages involved in applying the methodology would be as follows: 
" determine basic system profile by identifying configuration and environment; 
" assess data sensitivity from the types and uses of data in the existing system; 
" determine overall protection profile and associated countermeasures; 
" select and implement final countermeasures. 
This last stage would be tempered by any HCE-specific factors which might limit the 
suitability or acceptability of the recommendations. For example, cost constraints, 
operational overheads and staff culture would all need to be considered before final 
countermeasure selection. 
A more detailed description of the classification methodology is presented in the 
referenced article and in the context of a supplementary deliverable from the 
workpackage. 
5 Conclusions 
It is believed that the final guidelines will serve to provide a comprehensive source of 
reference for European HCEs in relation to the protection of existing medical systems. 
The protection principles that have been established should remain relatively static and 
will be applicable, to some degree, in virtually all scenarios. It is, however, anticipated 
that the underlying guidelines may require future revisions to take account of changes 
in healthcare IT practice. 
It is acknowledged that many HCEs / systems may currently be operating with a level 
of protection significantly below the recommended baseline and may be faced with 
financial and / or organisational constraints that will complicate the process of change. 
As such the adoption and enforcement of the guidelines may represent a nontrivial 
task. However, it should recognised that each measure implemented will improve the 
overall security status of the HCE. 
In terms of further development, the guidelines have already formed the basis of a 
Validation workpackage, to ensure their applicability to the full European healthcare 
community. They have also been utilised in a SEISMED training programme to 
increase security awareness within European establishments. 
It is hoped that, in combination with the other guideline deliverables from the project, 
the guidelines for existing systems security will help to achieve a harmonised 
framework for the protection of healthcare establishments and systems throughout 
Europe. 
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